26 May 05
Originally posted by bbarrThe headache is justified empirically. That covers only a small amount of knowledge. And if you change your mind regarding your memory, then what was true is now false. I don't see that it would matter if you said that it would still be true because your knowledge is based on what you think is true, not what is actually true.
You are confused. The concept of truth is not the same concept as the concept of justification.
If it is true right now that I have a headache, then a thousand years from now it will be true that a thousand years earlier, Bennett Barr had a headache. This will be true regardless of what anybody believes or has reason to believe. Truth is not dependent ...[text shortened]... [b]Using induction to justify beliefs will always cause some beliefs to be absolutely false.[/b]
Let me see if I understand:
Knowledge is justified true belief. In other words, knowledge is belief that we think is correct. And justification is subjective since it can be mistaken. And knowledge is only tentative tied to universal truth.
There appears to be a barrier between truth, and perceived truth. One is universal, for all times, and all people. The other is only what the individual "thinks" is true, and it is subjective to time, person, human error, etc (all those unavoidable sources of error).
Is this correct: one can have false (in a universal sense) knowledge, but one can not believe what one thinks if false (as understood).
Please correct me if I misunderstand or you think my conclusions are due to misunderstandings or faulty reason. Do you think there is any way to guarantee or prove that any one's individual knowledge matches universal truth?
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The reason inductive justifications will lead to false beliefs, is because it must by definition. I'm not saying all will be false, but some will always be (by definition) false. Mathematically speaking, someone is going to win the lottery - so some inductive beliefs will be false eventually. (Such as I believed I was going to leave a noon today, but I was wrong.)
26 May 05
Mathematically speaking you only are certain of winning a lottery if all the combinations are sold at least once. You can have all but one combination sold and the one not bought ending up being the one picked by the machine and sorry charlie, the lottery commission wins!
The problem with belief systems is the participants behaving as if the belief system was in actual fact true. So if there is no god, and all 6 billion people on earth believes in say, the catholic docrtrine, then the combined force of those 6 billion beliefs will not create a god, just as in the opposite case, suppose there is a real live (ugh) god and there are 6 billion atheists, those (in this case) poor deluded folks won't even dull the luster of a real god. So belief in no way denotes reality.
Suppose there is a real live god and it doesn't give a rats ass about the evolution, growth, death, health or anything else to do with the human race or the planet earth, would you still worship such a god?
Of course if that were the case, this god would never let you know and the religious rabble would continue to kill each other in the name of some god or other till the end of time and nobody a whit closer to true sprirtuality.
26 May 05
Originally posted by ColettiThere are simply too many errors in this post for me to respond adequately. Alas, you are my cross to bear Coletti, so I'll try:
The headache is justified empirically. That covers only a small amount of knowledge.
Yes, the headache is justified empirically. Yes, it is the case that the set of knowable truths contains an infinite number of truths knowable a priori rather than empirically.
And if you change your mind regarding your memory, then what was true is now false.
No, no, no! If I had a headache, and believed I had a headache, and had good reason for believing I had a headache, then my belief is knowledge. If I later change my mind about having had a headache, then I am wrong. The mere fact that I change my mind about having a headache doesn't somehow, magically, make it the case that I didn't have a headache.
Knowledge is justified true belief.
Yes.
In other words, knowledge is belief that we think is correct.
No! Thinking that your belief is correct is not sufficient for justification. Just because you think that P, it does not follow that the belief that P is justified anymore than it follows that P is true. Being justified in believing that P requires you to have reasons you can advance in favor of P, where these reasons minimally suffice show that P is more likely true than false.
And justification is subjective since it can be mistaken. And knowledge is only tentative tied to universal truth.
No! Epistemic justification is no more subjective than moral justification. We can be mistaken about whether our reasons are good ones, but that doesn't entail anything about whether our reasons are actually good, and hence it doesn't entail anything about whether our beliefs are justified.
There appears to be a barrier between truth, and perceived truth.
Yes. We can be mistaken. We can think something is true when it is false, and we can believe something is false when it is true. What is true is true independent of whether we believe that it is true. Just because everybody used to believe the Earth was flat, it didn't follow that the Earth was flat. Now we have good reasons for thinking that the Earth is roughly spherical. These reasons are not subjective in any interesting sense of the word. The goodness of these reasons does not depend on what we believe about them.
Is this correct: one can have false (in a universal sense) knowledge, but one can not believe what one thinks if false (as understood).
For the last time, one cannot know something that is false. One can believe something that is false, and one may even be justified in believing something that is false, but one cannot know something that it false. Propositional knowledge is factive, in that if P is known it follows that P is true. It does seem to be the case that rational agents cannot believe things that they think are false.
Do you think there is any way to guarantee or prove that any one's individual knowledge matches universal truth?
No, there are no guarantees. We can have overwhelming evidence in favor of a claim, and have really good reasons for believing a claim, but it is always possible that our beliefs are false ('cause it is always possible that we are subject to massive deception, or that we are insane, or...)
The reason inductive justifications will lead to false beliefs, is because it must by definition.
This isn't what you claimed earlier. Further, it is no part of the definition of induction that it necessarily leads to falsehoods. It is true that inductive inferences do not establish with certainty their conclusions, but this is often the case with deductive reasoning as well, so I'm not sure what the problem is.
I'm not saying all will be false, but some will always be (by definition) false.
This is just false. I don't know what else to say. Induction does not rule out error, but it is wrong to say that induction necessarily leads to error. These two claims are different, and only the former, weaker claim is true.
27 May 05
Originally posted by bbarrThanks for the detailed answer, it was very helpful.
There are simply too many errors in this post for me to respond adequately. Alas, you are my cross to bear Coletti, so I'll try:
[b]The headache is justified empirically. That covers only a small amount of knowledge.
Yes, the headache is justified empirically. Yes, it is the case that the set of knowable truths contains an infinite number of trut ...[text shortened]... to error. These two claims are different, and only the former, weaker claim is true.
[/b]
Heres a quick one to see if I understand.
We can have true and false beliefs, but for the object of belief to also be knowledge, it must be true (minimally).
So knowledge is external to individuals (objective), where belief are held by individuals (subjective). So what we can know, must be true knowledge (redundancy intended). And if it is false, we do not know it, we only believe it.
That's confusing because most people think they know what they know, even if they might be wrong. That's usually what I mean when I say I know. I don't usually distinguish between what I know and what I believe in normal conversation.
BTW: I hold to the idea that all knowledge is propositional.
27 May 05
I'll throw in my tidbit here....
It seems to me that everyone is accepting knowledge as "justified true belief." I'd like to bring up the existence of Gedier counterexamples to this theory of knowledge.
A man wakes up in the morning and looks out his window to see rain falling. In reality, a movie set team is pouring false rain in a studio that appears very similar to the outside of the man's window. AND, outside of the studio, it really is raining! The man is justified in having the belief that it is raining (he sees the false rain), it is true that it is raining (outside of the studio), BUT he DOES NOT really KNOW that it is raining.
This is a contradiction with the justified true belief theory of knowledge.
Furthermore, this theory of knowledge leads to a very subjective idea of reality. A variety of beliefs will lead to a variety of sets of knowledge and a variety of truths. If knowledge and truth are subjective, then obviously ethics will become subjective. That is where the significance of accepting this theory lies with respect to the question of this board.
If there is no God, then where can we find universal truth and a reasonable system of ethics???
27 May 05
Originally posted by yousersWe haven't discussed justification of knowledge yet - so I'm wondering if the man looking out the window is justified in believing it is raining outside. If I understand bbarr's definition of knowledge, then it would not matter if the man believed it was raining or not. The knowledge would not depend on him, or really his observations.
I'll throw in my tidbit here....
It seems to me that everyone is accepting knowledge as "justified true belief." I'd like to bring up the existence of Gedier counterexamples to this theory of knowledge.
A man wakes up in the morning and looks out his window to see rain falling. In reality, a movie set team is pouring false rain in a studio that a ...[text shortened]...
If there is no God, then where can we find universal truth and a reasonable system of ethics???
But I still have not settled on what I think knowledge is, or how or by what means we know it.
Your last question is important and I am wondering that myself.
27 May 05
2 edits
Originally posted by yousersThe Gettier counterexamples don't show that propositional knowledge doesn't have, as necessary conditions, justification, truth and belief. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, the Gettier counterexamples merely show that some fourth condition (the so-called "Gettier condition" ) is also a necessary condition for propositional knowledge.
I'll throw in my tidbit here....
It seems to me that everyone is accepting knowledge as "justified true belief." I'd like to bring up the existence of Gedier counterexamples to this theory of knowledge.
A man wakes up in the morn ...[text shortened]... e can we find universal truth and a reasonable system of ethics???
The JTB analysis of propositional knowledge is partial, because JTB isn't sufficient for propositional knowledge, but that doesn't entail that JTB isn't correct as far as it goes, merely that it is incomplete.
So, when you claim that the Gettier counterexamples show a contradiction in the JTB theory of knowledge, you are making a mistake. A contradiction only follows if you claim that the JTB theory is a complete account of propositional knowledge, and this is not something I have claimed in this thread or elsewhere. In fact, on the previous page of this thread I claimed the following:
Knowledge is justified true belief (plus some fourth condition, the so-called 'Gettier condition', but this is technical)
The JTB analysis does not lead to a subjective view of reality, nor does it lead to any sort of relativism about truth. This is simply a mistake on your part.
27 May 05
Originally posted by ColettiThe Gettier counterexamples are counterexamples to the claim that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge. The Gettier counterexamples are completely irrelevant to the notion of epistemic justification. In the example provided above, it is clear that the man is justified in believing it is raining (though if you doubt this, we can alter the example so that the man is subject to some radical Matrix-like deception). What is clear is that one may be justified in believing that P and yet not know P because P is false. Further, one may be justified in believing that P and yet not know P because although P is true, one's justification for the belief that P doesn't track the truth of P (which is what is always the case in Gettier counterexamples).
We haven't discussed justification of knowledge yet - so I'm wondering if the man looking out the window is justified in believing it is raining outside. If I understand bbarr's definition of knowledge, then it would not matter if the man believed it was raining or not. The knowledge would not depend on him, or really his observations.
But I still ha ...[text shortened]... r by what means we know it.
Your last question is important and I am wondering that myself.
27 May 05
Originally posted by bbarrOkay, I see you are far more familiar with this territory that I am. (my apologies for butchering Gettier spelling, haha) Please enlighten me as to what that fourth condition can be.
The Gettier counterexamples don't show that propositional knowledge doesn't have, as necessary conditions, justification, truth and belief. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, the Gettier counterexamples merely show that some fourth condition (the so-called "Gettier condition" ) is also a necessary condition for propositional knowledge.
The JTB anal ...[text shortened]... oes it lead to any sort of relativism about truth. This is simply a mistake on your part.
You disagree with my claim that this theory of knowledge leads to relativism. Please show me how it is objective. I imagine the universality of these truths will be emphasized by the method of justification?
28 May 05
Originally posted by yousersScience is all about stepping out of the studio.
I'll throw in my tidbit here....
It seems to me that everyone is accepting knowledge as "justified true belief." I'd like to bring up the existence of Gedier counterexamples to this theory of knowledge.
A man wakes up in the morning and looks out his window to see rain falling. In reality, a movie set team is pouring false rain in a studio that a ...[text shortened]...
If there is no God, then where can we find universal truth and a reasonable system of ethics???
29 May 05
Originally posted by yousersThis theory of knowledge doesn't entail relativism about truth because this theory of knowledge doesn't, itself, take any particular stand on what the property of truth is. One can adopt a JTB account of knowledge and maintain a correspondence theory of truth (as I do), or a coherence theory of truth, or a pragmatic conception of truth, or a deflationist theory of truth, or a minimalist theory of truth, or.... Only some of these theories of truth will have relativistic implications, and the ones that do are rejected by the overwhelming majority of philosophers. Neither the correspondence theory nor the deflationist theory nor any of the related minimalist theories of truth have relativistic implications.
Okay, I see you are far more familiar with this territory that I am. (my apologies for butchering Gettier spelling, haha) Please enlighten me as to what that fourth condition can be.
You disagree with my claim that this theory of knowledge leads to relativism. Please show me how it is objective. I imagine the universality of these truths will be emphasized by the method of justification?
29 May 05
Originally posted by bbarrOk thanks for clearing that up. But you did not elaborate on the fourth condition necessary to avoid the Gettier countexamples...
This theory of knowledge doesn't entail relativism about truth because this theory of knowledge doesn't, itself, take any particular stand on what the property of truth is. One can adopt a JTB account of knowledge and maintain a correspondence theory of truth (as I do), or a coherence theory of truth, or a pragmatic conception of truth, or a deflationist th ...[text shortened]... ist theory nor any of the related minimalist theories of truth have relativistic implications.
29 May 05
Originally posted by yousersThere have been any number of proposals put forth, some have claimed that a causal connection must obtain between the fact that makes the belief in question true and the having of that belief, some have claimed that the belief in question can't be based on a false lemma, some that the belief in question must be based on a lemma that would not be true if the belief in question had, counterfactually, been false. This is just a sample of the variety of views out there. The past thirty years in epistemology has seen the presentation of Gettier conditions turn into a cottage industry (though it has died down in the past decade or so, overtaken by other debates). The basic thing a Gettier condition needs to accomplish, to be adequate, is to tie justification to truth in the right way. The whole point of Gettier counterexamples is that there are cases where one may be justified in holding a belief that is, in fact, true, while one's justification for that belief is accidental relative to the truth of the belief. If you'd like to discuss any of the above suggestions, or present one of your own, that will be fine. I am not inclined to present my own views on this topic just yet, because I haven't fully thought the problem through and because I am more interested in the notion of epistemic justification than in coming up with a correct analysis of knowledge (because, as I mentioned earlier, I seriously doubt that the concept of knowledge is univocal, and hence that there is any such thing as a correct, non-disjunctive analysis of it).
Ok thanks for clearing that up. But you did not elaborate on the fourth condition necessary to avoid the Gettier countexamples...