What is wrong with being ATHIEST?

Originally posted by bbarr
The savant may have a form of performative knowledge ("knowledge how"😉 akin to knowing how to ride a bike or throw a strike, but he certainly does not have propositional knowledge ("knowledge that"😉 because, ex hypothesi, he can provide no reason for thinking that the principles under consideration are true. From an epistemic standpoint, nothing distinquishes the savant's true beliefs from mere lucky guesses.

The problem, then, is with the epistemic standpoint because the savant does possess knowledge even though he cannot justify them.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
The problem, then, is with the epistemic standpoint because the savant does possess knowledge even though he cannot justify them.

No, this is false. He may have performative knowledge akin to riding a bike, but he does not have propositional knowledge (also called 'reflective knowledge' in the literature). Ex hypothesi, he can give no reasons for his belief. His subjective sense of certainty is irrelevant to the justificatory status of his belief (ie., pig-headedness does not confer justification upon a belief).

Originally posted by bbarr
No, this is false. He may have performative knowledge akin to riding a bike, but he does not have propositional knowledge (also called 'reflective knowledge' in the literature). Ex hypothesi, he can give no reasons for his belief. His subjective sense of certainty is irrelevant to the justificatory status of his belief (ie., pig-headedness does not confer justification upon a belief).

So, for knowledge in general, justification is not a necessary condition. It is a necessary condition for a subset of knowledge called propositional/reflective knowledge. Correct?

Which then raises the obvious question (raised in the other thread as well) - what are the standards for epistemic justification?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
So, for knowledge in general, justification is not a necessary condition. It is a necessary condition for a subset of knowledge called propositional/reflective knowledge. Correct?

Which then raises the obvious question (raised in the other thread as well) - what are the standards for epistemic justification?

There is no such thing as "knowledge in general". The term 'knowledge' is not univocal, it is used in a bewildering variety of ways. We speak of animals (even insects) knowing this or that, and often speak of machines as knowing this or that (particularly computers). We often use 'know' as synonymous with 'strongly believe'. There is absolutely no reason to think that those states (of machines, animals, children and adults) we variously call 'knowledge' share any essential properties in virtue of which it would make sense to take them as a set. There is no homogeneity between these states.

The sort of knowledge I am talking about, reflective or propositional knowledge; knowledge that something is the case requires access to reasons. Of course, this is the sort of knowledge that is at issue when one claims that it is the case that, for instance, God exists or has a particular nature.

What do you think the standards of epistemic justification are? When we say of a belief that it is justified, what is it that we are saying?

Originally posted by bbarr
What do you think the standards of epistemic justification are? When we say of a belief that it is justified, what is it that we are saying?

The point I'm trying to make is that is not clear what standards hold for justification. For instance:

1. Is the mere existence of justification sufficient for epistemic justification?
2. Is inductive reasoning sufficient for epistemic justification?
3. Is deductive reasoning necessary for epistemic justification?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
The point I'm trying to make is that is not clear what standards hold for justification. For instance:

1. Is the mere existence of justification sufficient for epistemic justification?
2. Is inductive reasoning sufficient for epistemic justification?
3. Is deductive reasoning necessary for epistemic justification?

I have no idea what you mean by (1). Good inductive reasoning and valid deductive reasoning is sufficient for justification in those cases where, respectively, there is a strong evidential base and premises that are themselves justified.

Originally posted by bbarr
I have no idea what you mean by (1). Good inductive reasoning and valid deductive reasoning is sufficient for justification in those cases where, respectively, there is a strong evidential base and premises that are themselves justified.

Good inductive reasoning is usually the weakest justification for knowledge. It is always deductively fallacious. Would you say knowledge can be based on possible truth? And can one believe something if it is only possible true.

Originally posted by Coletti
Good inductive reasoning is usually the weakest justification for knowledge. It is always deductively fallacious. Would you say knowledge can be based on possible truth? And can one believe something if it is only possible true.

go back to sleep.

Originally posted by Coletti
Good inductive reasoning is usually the weakest justification for knowledge. It is always deductively fallacious. Would you say knowledge can be based on possible truth? And can one believe something if it is only possible true.

No, this is false. The strength of the justification transferred via inductive reasoning is dependent on the evidential base of the inference, and can approach certainty. The overwhleming majority of your knowledge about the world is based, at least tacitly, on induction (because induction plays a role in abductve reasoning, or inference to the best explanation). Of course inductive reasoning is not deductively valid. So what? Inductive reasoning isn't deductive reasoning ('cause it is inductive reasoning).

Originally posted by bbarr
No, this is false. The strength of the justification transferred via inductive reasoning is dependent on the evidential base of the inference, and can approach certainty. The overwhleming majority of your knowledge about the world is based, at least tacitly, on induction (because induction plays a role in abductve reasoning, or inference to the best explanati ...[text shortened]... So what? Inductive reasoning isn't deductive reasoning ('cause it is inductive reasoning).

Inductive beliefs can approach certainty - like Newtons laws are 99.9% certain. But that is rare on a normal basis.

But what some claim as true knowledge is based on loose inductive reasoning. The rules of "good" inductive reasoning often lead to errors. And if knowledge is true belief, then inductive based knowledge will aways be possibly wrong. So while the way my daily operations in the world may be primarily inductive, that does not mean that possible truths can count as knowledge. (I'm sure this can be better said but I hope you know what I mean.)

If knowledge is true belief, and a belief can not be both true and false, then how can any knowledge be sort-of true? That seems to make knowledge subjective to individuals, and not universal to all.

Originally posted by Coletti
Inductive beliefs can approach certainty - like Newtons laws are 99.9% certain. But that is rare on a normal basis.

But what some claim as true knowledge is based on loose inductive reasoning. The rules of "good" inductive reasoning often lead to errors. And if knowledge is true belief, then inductive based knowledge will aways be possibly wrong. So ...[text shortened]... sort-of true? That seems to make knowledge subjective to individuals, and not universal to all.

Knowledge is not true belief. Knowledge is justified true belief (plus some fourth condition, the so-called 'Gettier condition', but this is technical). Knowledge based on induction will not be certain, but neither will knowledge based on deduction, because it will always be possible that you have deduced a conclusion erroneously, or that you are hopelessly conceptually confused, or that your memory is faulty, or... Since you can't rule out these possibilities with certainty, you can never be certain that you have performed a deduction properly, and hence can never be sure that the conclusion of some putative deduction actually follows from the premise set. So what? All this shows is that certainty is not required for knowledge, and that the results of deduction and induction are not certain. This is not news, we know all sorts of things that we are not absolutely certain of. If you know something, then it is true. It is impossible to know a falsehood. I have no idea what you are talking about when you say things like 'sort-of true'. Are you aware of the principle of bivalence?

Originally posted by bbarr
No, this is false. The strength of the justification transferred via inductive reasoning is dependent on the evidential base of the inference, and can approach certainty. The overwhleming majority of your knowledge about the world is based, at least tacitly, on induction (because induction plays a role in abductve reasoning, or inference to the best explanati ...[text shortened]... So what? Inductive reasoning isn't deductive reasoning ('cause it is inductive reasoning).

I don't see how arguments starting with the premise that God (of the bible) exists could possibly lead to a valid conclusion.
And the "intelligent designer" argument doesn't explain anything, bringing to mind 'non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem', as well as not coming close to showing a "first cause" except to say there wasn't any , which brings the Razor back to mind.

Originally posted by bbarr
.. If you know something, then it is true. It is impossible to know a falsehood. I have no idea what you are talking about when you say things like 'sort-of true'. Are you aware of the principle of bivalence?

By sort-of I mean possibly.

With deductive reasoning, one is guaranteed that if the premises are true and the implication is correct, the conclusion MUST be true. That is by definition untrue of abductive or inductive reasoning. True, reasoning is always handicapped by human error, but the mechanics of deductive reasoning make it better for finding the errors and correcting them.

I still find your concept of truth confusing. You once said what is true is true for all times and places and people. That is a very high standard of truth. But then that is not compatible to "justified" true belief. Using induction to justify beliefs will always cause some beliefs to be absolutely false. And if they are false, how can they be true? And if they are false, how can they be knowledge?

It seems you must reformulate your definition of truth to not be for all time or all people. Truth justified by induction always has the potently to be shown wrong with time.

(I'd have to look up bivalence but I recall it was 'like' the law of non-contradiction or identity but more mathmatical)

Originally posted by frogstomp
I don't see how arguments starting with the premise that God (of the bible) exists could possibly lead to a valid conclusion.
And the "intelligent designer" argument doesn't explain anything, bringing to mind 'non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem', as well as not coming close to showing a "first cause" except to say there wasn't any , which brings the Razor back to mind.

Or, for those who don't read Latin, "Do not needlessly multiply entities". In other words, approach with healthy skepticism hypotheses that are ontologically profligate.

Originally posted by Coletti

I still find your concept of truth confusing. You once said what is true is true for all times and places and people. That is a very high standard of truth. But then that is not compatible to "justified" true belief. Using induction to justify beliefs will always cause some beliefs to be absolutely false. And if they are false, how can they be true? ...[text shortened]... ence but I recall it was 'like' the law of non-contradiction or identity but more mathmatical)

You are confused. The concept of truth is not the same concept as the concept of justification.

If it is true right now that I have a headache, then a thousand years from now it will be true that a thousand years earlier, Bennett Barr had a headache. This will be true regardless of what anybody believes or has reason to believe. Truth is not dependent on our beliefs, it is an objective matter.

This is completely compatible with the notion of justification. If a belief of mine is justified, then that means I will have access to good reasons for thinking that my belief is true. Of course, I can have true beliefs that are unjustified (e.g., lucky guesses), and I can have justified beliefs that are false (e.g., P is the case, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary).

The following claim of yours don't make any sense:

Using induction to justify beliefs will always cause some beliefs to be absolutely false.