Why did God create cancer?

This is like standing on the North pole and arguing about which way's West.

Originally posted by bbarr
Are you familiar with the distinction between proximate causes and ultimate causes?

What about material, formal, and efficient causes as well? Or is the whole concept of causation merely a habit of mind as Hume maintained?

If you maintain the teleological stance of intelligent design you should not mistake the hierarchy of ethics.

You may maintain that Human Ethics/Morals are determined through sociological sources, or perhaps a deity; however, you may not extend those same Ethics/Morals onto that supernatural entity that you purport.

Thus, if you see "god as creator", that's really as far as you can go with any complaints about anything in this created universe being Good/Bad. Our idea of Ethics/Morals can only be applied to Humanity's actions; not something that is above Humanity's sensibility.

Originally posted by gaychessplayer
Question: Why did God create cancer?

Cause he's a douchebag.

Originally posted by whodey
The implications of saying that God created the fall is that God created sin. However, if God is a holy God and without sin then how could this be?

Sin is by definition a deviation from a holy God's perfect will. At best you could say that one does not have free will thus he created one to deviate from his perfect will that is without sin. However, it ...[text shortened]... gainst the concept of free will along side an all knowing and all powerful God would say no.

As for myself, the issue revolves around "free will".

Yeah, but your "free will" theodicy has never made much sense. Going back to our past discussion on the suffering neonate with an intestinal blockage, your claim is that all suffering is the result (at least ultimately so) of sin and, by extension, the willful actions of mankind. Even if this were true (it's not, but...), I think this claim fails to address the charge that is being advanced against your God concept. The charge is basically that there exist instances (of pain and suffering, for example) that are not logically necessary for the greater good or any good project ends; and if your all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God really did exist, such would not be the case.

Your "free will" defense fails on multiple levels. First of all, there are instances of seemingly unnecessary pain and suffering that really have nothing to do with free will. Your saying over and over that all suffering is the result of free will doesn't somehow make this claim of yours any less inane. Second, your defense wouldn't be successful anyway. That God has structured the world such that all suffering really does relate with the actions of mankind just sort of makes Him look like an unjust idiot: for example, only an unjust idiot would think it is good or right to visit or permit suffering on a neonate because of the sins of its forbears. Third, even if we assume that free will (in addition to being a substantial good in and of itself) is necessary for other supreme goods (such as love), that doesn't change the fact that God could have acted otherwise in these instances without affecting the status of free will. God could simply make it such that an intestinal obstruction or a cancerous tumor does not obtain, and he could do so without in any way precluding our ability to act autonomously, collectively and individually. So our having free will (which is something you consider necessary for our being able to enter into loving relationships with God and others) does not necessitate the instances of suffering being discussed here.

Basically, I think your sound bites like "God is the source of all love and life, so if we choose to reject him it opens the door to death and suffering" are tiresome. They don't even address the subject at hand because your God's thinking that all the death and suffering in the world is just retribution for our collective "rebellion" is compatible with (and might even entail) his being a bumbling idiot.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]As for myself, the issue revolves around "free will".

Yeah, but your "free will" theodicy has never made much sense. Going back to our past discussion on the suffering neonate with an intestinal blockage, your claim is that all suffering is the result (at least ultimately so) of sin and, by extension, the willful actions of mankind. Eve ebellion" is compatible with (and might even entail) his being a bumbling idiot.[/b]

So you think that sin, which is by its very nature destructive, should only occur in a bubble? Unfortunatly that is not the way it happens. Our sins effect those around us even if they are "innocent". In fact, Christ also suffered from the sin of the world even though he did not contribute to it in the least. Was it unjust for them to crusify him? Yes it was, however, they did it just the same.

Conversly, if we were not allowed to sin and have that sin effect those who are "innocent" then we would either have no contact with "innocent" people so as not to harm them or influence them towards our sinful ways or God could not let you sin. In order to not let you sin he would either have to take away your free will to do so or strike you down when you did sin. I don't think either scenerio is preferable. After all, we would all either be robots or dead.

Originally posted by rwingett
I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, [b]and create evil: I the LORD do all these things.
(Isaiah 45:7, KJV)[/b]

I prefer this translation which says "I form the the light and create the dark. I make good fortune and create calamity, it is I, the Lord, who do all this."

As a believer in the God of the Bible it is a given that God instigated calamities such as the great flood and Sodom etc, etc. This is much differnt than saying that God created evil, rather, it is just saying that evil is often met with calamities in order to quench such evil.

Originally posted by pulzar
What about material, formal, and efficient causes as well? Or is the whole concept of causation merely a habit of mind as Hume maintained?

What about them? No.

Originally posted by bbarr
What about them? No.

I love you bbarr. Can I have your kids?

Ewww...no...not sex...I want your baby goats.

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm confused here too. Aristotle's "doctrine of the mean" regarding virtues makes use of the idea of hitting or missing the mark. The courageous person responds appropriately to fear, he hits the mark and avoids the dual errors of brashness and cowardice. To miss the mark as the bravado or the coward does is to make an ethical error. This does not entail t ...[text shortened]... le ultimately responsible for their sins, since people don't create their own characters.

Many Christians do claim that missing the mark is due entirely to a moral failure (e.g., rebellion against God, willful disobedience, etc.). However, perhaps I should have said a “willful moral failure”?

The point of the translators of the Philokalia (and this is a strong stream on Eastern Orthodoxy) is that one can sin as a result of illusion: one can act, for example, with the best intentions but insufficient information; or, one’s intentions can be undone by unforeseen (or unforeseeable) circumstances. Illusion, not disobedience, is seen as the root of sin.

In this model, sin is seen more as an ailment in need of healing; so-called “original sin” is seen as an existential condition that does not impair one’s divine “imageness”, but inhibits one’s ability to live in the divine “likeness”. (The Eastern church is not nearly so heavily influenced by Augustine as is the west.) Eternal condemnation is not a doctrine of the Eastern Orthodox churches, though it is held by many, especially those who see salvation in the more juridical terms common to western theology. (Gregory of Nyssa’s version of universal salvation in the apokatastasis was, unlike Origen’s, not held to be heretical.)

Since I am not familiar with the language and models of ethics, as you are, I may well not state things correctly. It seems likely that Aristotle is not being followed here at all. The point is that the eastern model of sin and salvation seems generally not to be the “crime and punishment (or pardon)” predominant in the west; nor is there much of a notion of “sin nature” as an inherited propensity to wickedness. Again, that can be found in the Orthodox churches, but it seems not to be predominant.

Originally posted by vistesd
Many Christians do claim that missing the mark is due entirely to a moral failure (e.g., rebellion against God, willful disobedience, etc.). However, perhaps I should have said a “willful moral failure”?

The point of the translators of the Philokalia (and this is a strong stream on Eastern Orthodoxy) is that one can sin as a result of illusion: o ...[text shortened]... kedness. Again, that can be found in the Orthodox churches, but it seems not to be predominant.

You are certainly right that failures to act excellently can result from factors other than deficiencies of will or character. One can be led astray in action due to false information, exculpable inattention, causal forces that circumvent the evaluative faculties and/or the will, etc. I am unsure, however, whether these sorts of failures are ethical failures. I am also unsure of the extent to which various conceptions of sin are prepared to count these sorts of failures as sinful.

Are you saying that according to Eastern Orthodoxy one could have sinned by A-ing despite it being the case that (1) one's attempt to A was virtuously motivated, (2) one was in possession of information sufficient to justify A-ing, (3) one was not epistemically negligent in seeking out the information that justifies A-ing? If so, then it seems as though the Eastern Orthodoxy is committed to either the claim some bodily movements are just wrong (since actions are individuated at least partially by the intentions of an agent, that is, it is my intending to A that partially determines whether what I do is in fact A-ing), or that an act's having bad consequences can retroactively suffice for attributing a sin to the agent who performed that act.

If Eastern Orthodoxy is committed to either of these two claims, then it doesn't seem as though they conceive of sin as an ailment in need of healing. What is to be healed when one is justified in A-ing and is motivated to A by virtue?

Originally posted by bbarr
You are certainly right that failures to act excellently can result from factors other than deficiencies of will or character. One can be led astray in action due to false information, exculpable inattention, causal forces that circumvent the evaluative faculties and/or the will, etc. I am unsure, however, whether these sorts of failures are ethical failures ...[text shortened]... ealing. What is to be healed when one is justified in A-ing and is motivated to A by virtue?

Just to be clear, I am not saying that all Eastern Orthodox hold to these views, only that they seem to represent the majority.

It works something like this:

(1) As a result of the fall (whether one views that as an historical event or not) humanity’s ability to realize their potential for conforming to the likeness of God is diminished (in Orthodoxy generally, it is that, and not the basic image of God that is impaired).

—I should note that, in Orthodoxy, salvation is ultimately seen in terms of theosis, realizing the divine nature in humanity. It is a process, not an event.

(2) The root of this impairment is illusion. This seems to me not dissimilar from maya that inhibits one’s ability to realize the divine nature of atman as Brahman. Orthodoxy, however is not dualistic; there do seem to be some strong panentheistic strains. Hence, salvation does not entail union with the divine ousia, which is ineffable, but rather a communion between the derived (created) divinity of the human person and the (uncreated) original divine essence.

—There is a whole theology of God’s ousia and God’s “energies” behind this that I am still grappling with. From my own non-dualistic perspective, some of it seems a bit convoluted. But, as I say, I am still working through it.

—As a side note, the Orthodox view of the Trinity is three hypostases of a single ousia, a distinction which developed over several centuries. They accept only with reservation the translation of hypostasis as “person”.

(3) As a result of illusion, people “fail to hit the mark”, thinking and acting in ways that hinder the realization of their divine nature—hamartia.

(4) The process of realizing one’s full divine-human nature (as exemplified in Jesus as the incarnate Christ) entails the continuing transformational process of metanoia (and that is how metanoia is seen). In that process, the impairment of illusion is healed (the root meaning of soterias being to make whole or make well).

(5) The process of transformation requires God’s grace and human participation in what the Orthodox call synergia. Thus the sharp arguments about faith and grace versus “works” (Augustine versus Pelagius) is absent in Orthodoxy.

(6) If one does not realize theosis in this lifetime, one may well after death:

(a) Ultimate universal salvation is neither a dogma nor a heresy in the Orthodox Church.

(b) Some Orthodox have viewed “hell” somewhat metaphorically as a kind of chemo-therapy in which it is remaining “sinful” characteristics or proclivities that are purged (a bit closer, perhaps, to Roman Catholic purgatory); this was Gregory of Nyssa’s view.

—Not all Orthodox hold to universal salvation in a final apokatstasis in which all is reconciled to God who becomes “all in all.” Some hold to eternal condemnation; some hold to a more juridical model of pardon or punishment—but I am reading a number of prominent Orthodox theologians who do not.

_____________________________________________

Some notes:

* Orthodoxy neither follows the principle of sola scriptura, nor, by and large any kind of Biblical literalism. But most of the above, at least, can be supported by scriptural exegesis.

* Orthodoxy does not view humanity as being by nature sinful, but by nature divine.

* There are two streams in Buddhism: in Japanese tariki and jiriki. The former is “other power” and is represented by the Pure Land schools, where one calls upon the Buddha of compassion for grace; the latter is “own-power” and is represented by the Zen schools. Orthodoxy, in a sense—and in its different paradigm—is a little of both.

* Orthodoxy claims to adhere to the earliest Christian traditions (oral tradition, not unlike that in Judaism). Quite frankly, I think they have a case.

* The fundamental approach of Orthodoxy is mystical and liturgical. Theology, per se, is largely apophatic, ala Pseudo-Dionysius.

* The one “horn” of Euthyphro’s dilemma that Orthodox seem least likely to give up is God’s omni-benevolence, and likely would take a lot of the OT stories that portray God as acting monstrously as just that: stories.

__________________________________________

This is still pretty bare-bones. It is, simply, a different paradigm than what I know as Western Protestantism. For example, Orthodox theologian Olivier Clement can write that: “The world is a vast incarnation, which the fall of humanity tries to contradict.” I have quoted elsewhere Gregory of Nyssa on incarnation.

Other quotes from Orthodox writers, just for flavor:

“The Logos of God had become man so that you might learn from a man how a man may become God'' (Clement of Alexandria)

"A sure warrant for looking forward with hope to deification of human nature is provided by the incarnation of God, which makes man god to the same degree as God Himself became man. For it is clear that He who became man without sin will divinize human nature without changing it into the divine nature, and will raise it up for His own sake to the same degree as He lowered Himself for man's sake. This is what St. Paul teaches mystically when he says, '...that in the ages to come He might display the overflowing richness of His grace' (Eph. 2:7)." (Maximus Confessor)

“God became man so that man might become God.” (St. Athanasius)

“By participation of the Spirit, we are knit into the Godhead.” (St. Athanasius; my bold)

“As a copious spring could not be stopped up with a handful of dust, so the Creator’s compassion cannot be conquered by the wickedness of creatures.” (Isaac of Nineveh; 7th century)

Orthodox theologian Olivier Clement: “For the early church salvation is not at all reserved to the baptized ... The Word [logos] has never ceased and never will cease to be present to humanity in all cultures, all religions, and all irreligions. The incarnation and resurrection are not exclusive but inclusive of the manifold forms of his presence.”

Continuation of quote from above—

And: “For the highest spirituality (and theology) of the first centuries, God will be ‘all in all.’ Certain fathers granted that God would turn away from those who turned away from him. This is what Western Scholasticism was to term poena damni, the penalty of damnation. Such a fundamentalist [sic] reading of the Gospels (which leads to speculation on the nature of the ‘worm’ and the ‘fire’ that will torment the damned) was denounced not only as external but as ‘absurd’ by the greatest representatives of early Christianity, for example by St Ambrose of Milan and John Cassian in the West, and in the East, quite apart from strict Origenism, by Gregory of Nyssa, John Climacus, Maximus the Confessor, and Isaac of Nineveh.

“For this last author, whose development of the doctrine of hell is undoubtedly the most important contribution to this subject in the whole of Christian theology, it is unthinkable and contrary to the very spirit of the Christian revelation that God should abandon anyone.”

_______________________________________

With all that said, the simple answer to your last question is that the strain of Orthodoxy (which seems to be a large minority, if not the majority view) I have presented does not hold principally to a soteriology of justification, but to a soteriology of sanctification. The juridical model of salvation largely adopted in the West is largely absent in the East (and Augustine is not so strictly followed). Salvation is the transformational process toward theosis, which is really a return to our original nature.

Despite the theological dualism (or at least panentheism), it seems to have many parallels to other Eastern religions.

Originally posted by whodey
So you think that sin, which is by its very nature destructive, should only occur in a bubble? Unfortunatly that is not the way it happens. Our sins effect those around us even if they are "innocent". In fact, Christ also suffered from the sin of the world even though he did not contribute to it in the least. Was it unjust for them to crusify him? Yes it ...[text shortened]... t think either scenerio is preferable. After all, we would all either be robots or dead.

So you think that sin, which is by its very nature destructive, should only occur in a bubble?

No, that's not even remotely what I said. What I said is that there exist instances of suffering that are unnecessary for any greater good and for any of God's putative plans and project ends for his creation -- and, again, we can point to such instances that don't have a single thing to do with our free will or God's provisions for human free will, etc. Your God knows about these instances, he could very simply act so that they do not obtain, and yet he doesn't. Somehow you think this is still compatible with his being all-compassionate and morally perfect.

You have yet to provide a reasonable account that explains why an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God would refrain from preventing unfortunate articles of the "natural lottery", such as natural disasters, afflictions of neonates, etc (we could come up with all sorts of harrowing examples). Your blanket appeal to human free will and sin fails for the reasons I already cited.

Originally posted by whodey
Did God create death or is it simply a byproduct of rejecting the source of all life?

Your question seems to pose a false dichotomy. I believe both that God created death, and that death is a byproduct of rejecting Him.