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Originally posted by knightmeisterHow could that be? That's just what a probabilistic assessment is: determining where the balance of the probability is distributed. If I was in fact able to create such a balance, then it would in fact be the case the jumping off the cliff was equally risky as not jumping.
If I set you the task of proving that jumping off a cliff is less risky than not jumping off a cliff you could achieve the same thing by the same method and create endless scenarios etc to "balance" mine , but you would still be wrong.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterNo, you don't understand the point of the example at all, lest you wouldn't keep saying things that are inane. First, I brought up probability because I thought folks would understand the epistemic probability is a measure of the information we have at our disposal. Alas, you have convinced me that I was too optimistic. By abstracting away from contingent possibilities (you know, the way thought experiments and hypothetical scenarios tend to do) and thus eliminating from consideration those possible contingent factors that could, in the actual world, go into determining epistemic probability of a bomb's detonation, I thought it would become clear that joint causes can, individually, fail to increase probability (contra the second, non-trivial interpretation of Freaky's claim). Everybody here gets this but you, and you fail to get it because you fail to grasp the very nature of thought experiments and hypothetical scenarios. There is not enough information in the scenario as described to justifiably infer anything about the effects on probability of merely lighting the fuse. Since epistemic probability (again) is a measure of the information we have at our disposal, it is simply irrelevant to the example that if you change the scenario by adding information to it the probability of detonation increases with the lighting of the unconnected fuse. This is why you still will fail to grasp that Herr Doctor is making you look like an idiot by engaging in this scenario listing game above. The fact is that both you and he have at your disposal an infinite number of possible scenarios that would raise or fail to raise the probability of detonation respectively. There is a bijection from your list to his.
The bomb example is meant merely to illustrate that we often ascribe to effects joint causes that are individually insufficient to bring about that effect. To put the point in another way, sometimes we say of an effect that it was caused by both this and that, where this wouldn't have been sufficient to elicit the effect on its own and neither would ha be shown to be dependent on a previous causal link. (The uncaused cause being the exception)
Further, my claim was certainly not truistic, since I was talking about our ascriptions of the term 'cause', and not about actual causes in the natural world. The point I made in the original post, which you really should by now be aware of, is that our calling something a cause doesn't entail our commitment to any sort of sufficiency relations between casual types and typical effects.
I'm absolutely certain that you will fail to grasp this point, but I persist for the edification of others.
Edit: Actually, there probably isn't such a bijection, since his imagination is better than yours.
Also, you should probably save your energy for an attempt at answering my previous question to you regarding your conception of free will. You can find this question on pg. 14 of this thread, posted at 25 Apr '07 15:52. Unless, that is, you are prepared to admit that ultimately your decisions are completely arbitrary.
Originally posted by bbarrEverybody here gets this but you, and you fail to get it because you fail to grasp the very nature of thought experiments and hypothetical scenarios.
No, you don't understand the point of the example at all, lest you wouldn't keep saying things that are inane. First, I brought up probability because I thought folks would understand the epistemic probability is a measure of the information we have at our disposal. Alas, you have convinced me that I was too optimistic. By abstracting away from contingent p ...[text shortened]... ain that you will fail to grasp this point, but I persist for the edification of others.
I understood more than you may think. I do find thought experiments hard to value if they have little connection to the real world. However , I understand your frustration because I have come up with analogies myself that have been pedantically ripped apart.
Once the argument had gone the way it did it went off in a different direction and became a debate all on it;s own. I didn't understand why you had to bring probabilty into it. It just seemed much simpler to say unless the fuse is connected (and that the fuse being connected is the only way it can detonate) then it won't make any difference. You need both to happen , rule one out and the other happening is irrelevant. Got that months ago. Where my problem was is that unless you ARE able to rule out certain events in the real world then what is the point of saying this? If you translate you bomb/fuse thing to the real world it breaks down. Does this mean the argument it was supporting would also break down?
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Originally posted by knightmeisterJesus, you and no1marauder both seem to be striving toward human devolution today. The ability to reason about hypothetical scenarios is one of humankind's most important intellectual capacities, and both of you in one day call for its avoidance, characterizing it as pointless. Remarkable!
Everybody here gets this but you, and you fail to get it because you fail to grasp the very nature of thought experiments and hypothetical scenarios.
I understood more than you may think. I do find thought experiments hard to value if they have little connection to the real world. However , I understand your frustration because I have come up with eal world it breaks down. Does this mean the argument it was supporting would also break down?
Originally posted by bbarrThis is the one you want a response to isn't it?
[b]First of all , does not Heisenbergs uncertainty principle imply that if the universe was repeated exaclty then quantum indeterminacy would also have to be repeated. But if this happened how could we say with certainty that things would turn out the same?
No, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle entails no such thing, it merely specifies limits on our ...[text shortened]... a way that doesn’t ultimately leave your choices seemingly without reason and thus arbitrary?[/b]
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesBUT you could only create a balance NUMERCIALLY in such a scenario( like jumping of a cliff) . You think by creating an equal NUMBER of scenarios where jumping off a cliff is less risky would do the trick??? How strange? Common sense should tell you that any assessment of the plausibility of said scenarios would result in a imbalance.
How could that be? That's just what a probabilistic assessment is: determining where the balance of the probability is distributed. If I was in fact able to create such a balance, then it would in fact be the case the jumping off the cliff was equally risky as not jumping.
For example , you might say that it's better to jump because at that moment an alien was about to blast you with a laser gun and you would die and by jumping you would at least have a small chance. But you think that would counterbalance the scenario where jumping is a bad idea because if you hadn't you would live? Duh???
A probabilistic assessment does not just involve the number of scenarios that one can create for and against but also a QUALITATIVE assesment of the scenarios themselves. I guess you have never done a risk assessment before (let's hope you never get loose on one ). By your logic we would all be jumping under buses on the off chance that a piano was about to land on our heads!
You are either a wind up merchant or just very dense.
Originally posted by knightmeisterIt's your turn. Why are you stalling?
BUT you could only create a balance NUMERCIALLY in such a scenario( like jumping of a cliff) . You think by creating an equal NUMBER of scenarios where jumping off a cliff is less risky would do the trick??? How strange? Common sense should tell you that any assessment of the plausibility of said scenarios would result in a imbalance.
For example ...[text shortened]... ano was about to land on our heads!
You are either a wind up merchant or just very dense.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI had other things to do like assess whether I should stick my head in a lions mouth or not. I spent hours thinking of 100's of bizarre reasons why I should do it , but they all seemed pretty unlikely compared to the one very good reason why I shouldn't do it. Mind you if your logic is right I there was a 100-1 on chance that I should actually do it because there was a massive numerical imbalance in favour of sticking my head in the lions mouth. I wonder whether I should have done it now!!!?? Maybe I have no idea how probability works.
It's your turn. Why are you stalling?
Originally posted by bbarrFurther, my claim was certainly not truistic, since I was talking about our ascriptions of the term 'cause', and not about actual causes in the natural world. The point I made in the original post, which you really should by now be aware of, is that our calling something a cause doesn't entail our commitment to any sort of sufficiency relations between casual types and typical effects.
No, you don't understand the point of the example at all, lest you wouldn't keep saying things that are inane. First, I brought up probability because I thought folks would understand the epistemic probability is a measure of the information we have at our disposal. Alas, you have convinced me that I was too optimistic. By abstracting away from contingent p ...[text shortened]... is, you are prepared to admit that ultimately your decisions are completely arbitrary.
I'm absolutely certain that you will fail to grasp this point, but I persist for the edification of others. BARR
I get this fine. Even in one of my scenarios where the fuse sets fire to something else (like a man's clothing) the fuse is not directly the cause of detonation but is a component of a series of events. The detonation does not depend on the man's clothing or the fuse but both together . Lighting the fuse does not mean that detonation will happen in this scenario but it could raise the probability of it happening. I accept that one would need to introduce clothing into the scenario though.
Originally posted by knightmeisterWhat does any of that have to do with what I wrote above?
Further, my claim was certainly not truistic, since I was talking about our ascriptions of the term 'cause', and not about actual causes in the natural world. The point I made in the original post, which you really should by now be aware of, is that our calling something a cause doesn't entail our commitment to any sort of sufficiency relations between ...[text shortened]... it happening. I accept that one would need to introduce clothing into the scenario though.