Originally posted by bbarrI know you do not believe we are governed by our physical and psychological states, which is why I’m asking you to explain how you could freely choose differently in the example above. I am certainly not saying that free will is impossible because we live in a deterministic universe, and nothing I wrote above entails this. I certainly don’t think the universe is deterministic, since there are metaphysically random quantum events. I also think that even if the world were deterministic that this would be compatible with having a free will, since being free to choose that P does not entail having the capacity to have not chosen that P. BARR
[b]First of all , does not Heisenbergs uncertainty principle imply that if the universe was repeated exaclty then quantum indeterminacy would also have to be repeated. But if this happened how could we say with certainty that things would turn out the same?
No, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle entails no such thing, it merely specifies limits on our ...[text shortened]... a way that doesn’t ultimately leave your choices seemingly without reason and thus arbitrary?[/b]
Firts of all I do not understand at all how one can have free will if one is not free to not chose P. How can P be a free choice if P is always destined to be chosen?? By your own logic (the T4 argument) choice P would always have to be repeated over and over again with no possibility of "not P" . You think this is free will? A choice that has only one possible outcome? You think a (hard) deterministic universe does not logically lead to an absence of free will? How so?
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Originally posted by knightmeisterSuppose I engage in a course of deliberation about whether to P. Suppose that my deliberations reveal to me that there are reasons in favor of choosing P that outweigh the reasons against choosing P. Suppose that the reasons I take myself to have result from my traits of character, what I take to be valuable or important, my projects or ends, etc. Suppose that I am not being coerced. When these conditions are met, I see every reason to call my choice 'free', despite the fact that given my psychology and the situation at hand I could not have chosen otherwise than P. My conception of freedom involves being free from overt external constraints upon choice or action and being able to act in accord with one's reasons, where one's reasons derive from one's character and one's knowledge of the situation. This is known as a compatibilist account of freedom, because even if the world was deterministic (which it, in fact, is not) this would be compatible with being free. This account is in stark opposition to your sort of view, a libertarian account of freedom, according to which a necessary condition of being free is the ability to choose otherwise than the way one in fact chooses. But libertarianism about freedom is incoherent for a couple of reasons. First, it choices that are not causally determined are metaphysically random (but I'm not arguing this point here). Second, and more importantly in my opinion, is that libertarianism seems to entail that when one chooses freely one's choice has no rational explanation; that is, one's choice is arbitrary. The benefit on my view is that we can make sense of choices that have sufficient reasons in their favor. It will be compatible, on my view, with freely choosing to P that one have sufficient reason to P. On your view, however, you could never freely choose that P because you have sufficient reason to P. On your view, if you have sufficient reason to P and your choice is caused by your recognizing that you have sufficient reason to P, then you have thereby failed to freely choose! This is deeply absurd because it severs the link between choices being free and choices being rational. It entails that whenever one freely chooses one must have insufficient reason to choose! This was the point of my question, and it is the point that you have yet to address. So, once more, please answer the question about the thought experiment above.
I know you do not believe we are governed by our physical and psychological states, which is why I’m asking you to explain how you could freely choose differently in the example above. I am certainly not saying that free will is impossible because we live in a deterministic universe, and nothing I wrote above entails this. I certainly don’t think the u nk a (hard) deterministic universe does not logically lead to an absence of free will? How so?
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Originally posted by bbarrBARR WROTE-- "Now, since you did choose differently, there must be some explanation for why you chose differently, else the implication will be that your choices simply have no explanation; that is, your choices will ultimately be arbitrary.
[b]First of all , does not Heisenbergs uncertainty principle imply that if the universe was repeated exaclty then quantum indeterminacy would also have to be repeated. But if this happened how could we say with certainty that things would turn out the same?
No, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle entails no such thing, it merely specifies limits on our a way that doesn’t ultimately leave your choices seemingly without reason and thus arbitrary?[/b]
It is no help to say “I simply chose differently the second time around”, or that “God in me allows me to choose differently the second time around”, for these responses merely reiterate the very thing I’m asking to be explained! On what basis could the choice at T4 differ? It can’t differ because you had different beliefs the second time around. It can’t differ because some reason seemed more pressing or relevant to you the second time around. It certainly can’t differ because the outcome of your deliberations was different the second time around. All these potential factors were, according the example, identical at T0 and T3. So, again, what explains the different choice at T4? What could explain it in a way that doesn’t ultimately leave your choices seemingly without reason and thus arbitrary?" ----BARR
"On what basis could the choice at T4 differ?" BARR
The basis for a differing decision would be that at T4 it would not just be the physical and psychological circumstances that would be replicated but also the spiritual and metaphysical circumstances also . God would also be present at T4 and by making his spirit available to a person at T4 he would be making his freedom from determinacy also available.
The key to this is to try to understand (which no-one does fully) the uncaused (free from determinism) nature of God. If God is free from determinism (which God would be because he would need to be the uncaused cause of all causes) then he is able to offer this freedom to us potentially via his spirit. This would mean that at T4 those conditions of freedom God offers to us would be repeated making a different choice possible.
If you want me to go further than this then I would need to go into how God's spirit interacts with us whilst in this life and since you don't believe in God in the first place that would be a bit of a task. The Bible says "in him we live and move and have our being" , this suggests that the Holy Spirit is present with us through our lives , if this is true (and I understand you would dispute this) then free choices are possible because of God's unique nature and the extent to which he shares it with us.
One way of thinking about it is whether one feels God is "free" in a real and meaningful way or whether he is pre-destined like a robot to make and re-make certain choices. But how could he be a robot? Who or what would be dictating to God ? What does it mean to say God is uncaused? If God is free from determinism then is it not possible for us to be also (if only for brief moments)? If the question "what explanation is there for God to exist?" has no meaning , then what happens if this God (for whom there is no explanation) empowers free choices? Would those choices not be totally free of explanation/cause and just be an expression of free will?
Alas , I guess much of this will be unsatisfactory to many , but I would argue there is a strong case for some uncaused entity/essence to existence anyway.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterYou haven't answered the question. All you have done is claim that God manifests in us in a manner that allows us to freely act. I'm asking you for an explanation for a possibly different choice. Think of like this: At T0 and T3, all of your psychological states are the same. All your reasons for choosing are the same. All your beliefs and desires are the same. Everything, from your point of view, is exactly the same. So, if you take the fully specified situation at T0 to warrant your choice at T1, then how could it possibly be rational for you, at T3, to take that identical situation to warrant a different choice?
BARR WROTE-- "Now, since you did choose differently, there must be some explanation for why you chose differently, else the implication will be that your choices simply have no explanation; that is, your choices will ultimately be arbitrary.
It is no help to say “I simply chose differently the second time around”, or that “God in me allows me to ch argue there is a strong case for some uncaused entity/essence to existence anyway.
Suppose that God manifests himself in you at T3 in an identical way to how he manifested in you at T0. Suppose, that is, that T0 and T3 are identical in all relevant spiritual and metaphysical senses. If so, would it be possible for you to choose differently at T4 than how you chose at T1?
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Finally, you seem to think that God is possessed of the same mysterious form of libertarian freedom that you think you possess. This entails, minimally, that if God freely chooses to P, then he could have freely chosen not P. But, if anything, it is even more obscure how God could do this than it is in your case. God, after all, knows at any time everything that can be known at that time. But this means that God, just prior to any choice of his, would have at his cognitive disposal all the relevant reasons for and against any possible choice. But if God is perfectly rational, and if being perfectly rational entails that one always choose that which has the most reasons in its favor, then it would be inconsistent with God's very nature for him to choose otherwise than in the manner he does, in fact, choose. That is, it is strictly impossible for God to have the sort of knowledge you think he does, be perfectly rational, and yet fail to choose the best course of action. But that entails that for any choice God makes, he could not have chosen otherwise. And this entails that God is not possessed of libertarian free will. But if God doesn't have libertarian freedom, then how can he bring it about by manifesting in you that you have libertarian freedom?
Originally posted by bbarrMy conception of freedom involves being free from overt external constraints upon choice or action and being able to act in accord with one's reasons, where one's reasons derive from one's character and one's knowledge of the situation.BARR
Suppose I engage in a course of deliberation about whether to P. Suppose that my deliberations reveal to me that there are reasons in favor of choosing P that outweigh the reasons against choosing P. Suppose that the reasons I take myself to have result from my traits of character, what I take to be valuable or important, my projects or ends, etc. Suppose th ...[text shortened]... address. So, once more, please answer the question about the thought experiment above.
Firstly , I am not a hard determinist obviously but....
....ultimately it matters not whether the constraints or causes are internal /external or overt or subtle , the simple brute fact would be that from the moment the big bang exploded your every choice in life would have been predestined to the finest degree. This would mean that there is no difference between you and a worm. Both you and the worm would be making pre-destined and pre determined choices. The fact that your choices might be far more complex and have the added illusionary "feeling" of freedom would be neither here nor there. You would be no more free in real terms than a worm.
No I understand that you say you are not a hard determinist so that wouldn't apply to you. But since you argue very much in this vein against free will /free choices it makes me wonder how soft a determinist you can really be. If I put you and the worm through your T4 experiment by your reckoning you could not out perform the worm.
Your conception of freedom is just a neat way of looking at it to me , but it can be no real freedom because it can separate you from the worm only in complexity but not in any real way. In a (hard) deterministic universe both you and the worm are equally trapped and have no control whatsoever of your actions. Both you and the worm have no way of doing anything else other than that which you do. The fact that you have the illusion you could be free in such a universe does not give you any better chance than the worm of making a free choice. Who knows maybe the worm thinks it is free also?
To put it bluntly , to me freedom in terms of choices to choose A or B cannot come in "degrees" , you are either free to make DIFFERENT choices or you ain't , so if you can only choose A then you are not free , full stop. No amount of rationalising can make it different.
I would be interested to know about how you see the universe as not being wholly deterministic.
Originally posted by bbarrSuppose, that is, that T0 and T3 are identical in all relevant spiritual and metaphysical senses. If so, would it be possible for you to choose differently at T4 than how you chose at T1? BARR
You haven't answered the question. All you have done is claim that God manifests in us in a manner that allows us to freely act. I'm asking you for an explanation for a possibly different choice. Think of like this: At T0 and T3, all of your psychological states are the same. All your reasons for choosing are the same. All your beliefs and desires are th ...[text shortened]... es. If so, would it be possible for you to choose differently at T4 than how you chose at T1?
Yes , because the essence of God's uncaused ad free nature would be repeated as well. He would manifest himself in you in the same way , namely in a way that enables you to make a truely free choice. The conditions for freedom would have been repeated.
Originally posted by bbarrIt entails that whenever one freely chooses one must have insufficient reason to choose!BARR
Suppose I engage in a course of deliberation about whether to P. Suppose that my deliberations reveal to me that there are reasons in favor of choosing P that outweigh the reasons against choosing P. Suppose that the reasons I take myself to have result from my traits of character, what I take to be valuable or important, my projects or ends, etc. Suppose th ...[text shortened]... address. So, once more, please answer the question about the thought experiment above.
Not neccessarily. The reasoning process can still be influential but as long as it is not the final cause of the choice then the choice is still free. There are always influences to choices but we find ourselves caught between courses of action . Do I choose A or B? What is it that tips the balance?
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Originally posted by knightmeisterQuantum indeterminacy entails that the complete state of the universe at any time does not entail the complete state of the universe at any future time. Thus, my choices have never been predestined. But, honestly, I wouldn't care even if my choices were predetermined. As long as I am able to act authentically by choosing in accord with who I am and the reasons I have at my disposal, without threat of coercion, then that is as free as I can be. The point is this: even if a complete specification of the world prior to my choice would entail that I would choose in some way, that really has no bearing on me at all. I still have to go through processes of deliberation. I still have to amass and weigh reasons. I still have to determine what the best course of action would be given what I care about. Whether we are free in a libertarian or compatibilist sense matters not at all to how we have to go on in life.
My conception of freedom involves being free from overt external constraints upon choice or action and being able to act in accord with one's reasons, where one's reasons derive from one's character and one's knowledge of the situation.BARR
Firstly , I am not a hard determinist obviously but....
....ultimately it matters not whether the constrain e interested to know about how you see the universe as not being wholly deterministic.
What separates me from the worm is that I can choose and act but the worm cannot. The worm simply moves, and its movements are not based on any conception of what it ought to do. That is, it is a necessary condition for acting or choosing at all that one be possessed of practical rationality. Practical rationality is, at bottom, the capacity to act from reasons (not just in accord with them, but to be actually motivated by their recognition). I can do this, you can do this, some other mammals can do this, but worms cannot.
You think that my conception of freedom, if it was correct, would entail that we are trapped. But this is confused. We are trapped when we cannot act in accord with the reasons we have at our disposal; when we cannot choose and act in accord with who we are and what we believe and desire. We are trapped when decisions are taken from us by threat or coercion. But we are not trapped in any of these ways according to my conception of freedom. My conception of freedom preserves the link between rationality and freedom, while yours severs it entirely. Your attempt to escape from the illusion of entrapment leaves you with a conception of freedom that entails that you are completely adrift, with no ultimate explanation for your actions, since your choices are bizarrely independent from the reasons to which you have access.
Originally posted by knightmeisterSee my edit above. It is contradictory to suppose that God has the sort of freedom you think we do.
Suppose, that is, that T0 and T3 are identical in all relevant spiritual and metaphysical senses. If so, would it be possible for you to choose differently at T4 than how you chose at T1? BARR
Yes , because the essence of God's uncaused ad free nature would be repeated as well. He would manifest himself in you in the same way , namely in a way that enables you to make a truely free choice. The conditions for freedom would have been repeated.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterWhat tips the balance are the reasons we have at our disposal. This is why it is so damnably hard for us to decide in cases where the reasons we have fail to be decisive. In such cases we look around for anything that could weigh in favor of one choice rather than the other. This should be crystal clear to anybody who has argued with their girlfriend about where to go to dinner.
It entails that whenever one freely chooses one must have insufficient reason to choose!BARR
Not neccessarily. The reasoning process can still be influential but as long as it is not the final cause of the choice then the choice is still free. There are always influences to choices but we find ourselves caught between courses of action . Do I choose A or B? What is it that tips the balance?
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Originally posted by bbarrPlease address this interesting point fully, KM. If an omniscient God has a goal then it would be contradictory for him to choose other than the best possible means of achieving it. What then can it mean to say god could have acted otherwise?
...if God is perfectly rational, and if being perfectly rational entails that one always choose that which has the most reasons in its favor, then it would be inconsistent with God's very nature for him to choose otherwise than in the manner he does, in fact, choose. That is, it is strictly impossible for God to have the sort of knowledge you think he does, b eedom, then how can he bring it about by manifesting in you that you have libertarian freedom?
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I hereby declare this contest a draw. Any scenario that takes more than 3 days to imagine would have a difficulty rating of at least "extraordinarily difficult to imagine" and more likely "pushing human imagination nearly beyond its natural limits." Thus, even if knightmeister could imagine further scenarios, their difficulty rating would offset the probabilities of my scenarios, and lo and behold, we would find that on balance, given an unconnected fuse, lighting it does not increase the probability that the bomb detonates unless the fuse is connected.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesSo you do accept that the plausibility and difficulty to imagine should be taken into account into the probability (alongside numerical factors)? This was my initial objection when you first started! But you poo pooed it then.
I hereby declare this contest a draw. Any scenario that takes more than 3 days to imagine would have a difficulty rating of at least "extraordinarily difficult to imagine" and more likely "pushing human imagination nearly beyond its natural limits." Thus, even if knightmeister could imagine further scenarios, their difficulty rating would offset th ...[text shortened]... g it does not increase the probability that the bomb detonates unless the fuse is connected.
Originally posted by bbarrHowever , in certain moral situations we are often forced to make a decision based on faith or a committment to the world the way we believe it is ultimately. Some decisions , especially the important ones , are about risk , belief and committment and sometimes what seems "reasonable" at the time is not the best course of action.
What tips the balance are the reasons we have at our disposal. This is why it is so damnably hard for us to decide in cases where the reasons we have fail to be decisive. In such cases we look around for anything that could weigh in favor of one choice rather than the other. This should be crystal clear to anybody who has argued with their girlfriend about where to go to dinner.