A thought to ponder

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm not sure why you insist on a legend, or on some abstract specification of those considerations germane to determining, on a case by case basis, whether some value or another is to given practical priority. I had hoped the chess analogy would be instructive here, but perhaps I was unclear. If you ask whether the bishop or knight is better, I will ask you ...[text shortened]... nd does not entail you have perfect access to it, and to claim otherwise is merely posturing.

love chess analogies 🙂

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]So if you want to speak of a personal god who is deserving of worship and love, then you are stuck with claiming attributes for that god that are deserving of that kind of response.

Interesting. I never thought worship of God depended on whatever attributes we were able to conceive about Him, rather that worship (reverence, adoration, etc.) of ...[text shortened]... herefore, is hardly grounds as a defeater for Christian belief (or even theism in general).[/b]

I much prefer the view that devotion begins with some direct, experiential, ineffable encounter with God than the view that our devotion is an appropriate response to God as defined by certain predicates. But if you are serious that God transcends our predicates; that God is actually ineffable, then you are committed to the claim that it is merely metaphorical when you use phrases like "God is compassionate", or "God is just". I mean, to claim that God transcends our predicates is just to claim that we are unjustified in believing that our predicates accurately apply to God. It is not as though I think God is beholden to my definitions; that is a silly claim. I don't think that actual chairs are beholden to my definition or concept of 'chair'. I'm open to learning new things about chairs, after all. Rather, I think that your use of the term 'God', as well as other terms like 'compassionate' and 'just', should be both internally consistent and consistent with what those terms publicly mean. Just as you cannot redefine 'compassionate' so that an entity can qualify while being unconcerned with the unnecessary and easily preventable suffering of others, so you cannot both claim that God transcends predicates like 'compassionate' and that it is appropriate to say 'God is compassionate'. This is simply a contradiction. The intellectual problem here is yours, not mine.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]So if you want to speak of a personal god who is deserving of worship and love, then you are stuck with claiming attributes for that god that are deserving of that kind of response.

Interesting. I never thought worship of God depended on whatever attributes we were able to conceive about Him, rather that worship (reverence, adoration, etc.) of herefore, is hardly grounds as a defeater for Christian belief (or even theism in general).[/b]

Therefore, it doesn't seem remarkable at all when folks like bbarr and others create an intellectual problem for themselves by imaging God as beholden to man's definition of what a compassionate person is.

I think the problem that exists is really fully yours. And bbarr pointed it out to you; he didn't somehow create it. You had stated the following:

Statements like, "A loving God wouldn't do this...", or, "A compassionate God wouldn't do that...", are simply unqualified statements. How do you know what God would or would not do?

But that seems false. It is simply definitional to our concept of compassion that a compassionate person would not act in certain ways or not do certain things. For instance, by definition, a compassionate person would not characteristically fail to act to alleviate what he takes to be the gratuitous suffering of others in instances where he knows he has the power and opportunity to do so. Not only would it not be an "unqualified statement" if I were to claim the same about a compassionate God; but it is actually something that basically must hold, definitionally. That's one reason why bbarr was pointing out your problem to you: for you to claim that such would constitute an "unqualifed statement", it basically then commits you to the idea that the predicate 'compassionate' takes on some wholly different meaning when predicated unto God.

But I think I see where you are coming from in another way. For instance, suppose I say that the recent earthquake in Haiti counts as evidence against the plausibility of God's existence. Basically, I am making a claim similar to the one above: that God would not have allowed such a state of affairs to obtain because He would take such suffering to be unnecessary; would have the power and knowledge to make the world such that it doesn't obtain; and would act accordingly. Now, as I understand your main objection that you put forth in this and previous threads, you say this is an "unqualifed claim" because it is possible that I'm wrong -- because it's possible that God wouldn't take such suffering to be gratuitous, and further it is possible that God would be perfectly justified in this. For instance, it's possible that there are reasons not under my attention (but presumably under the attention of some omniscient being) that would serve to justify allowing the earthquake to obtain. I fully agree with you that the existence of such justifying reason(s) is broadly possible. (This is one reason why, in my view, the logical problem of evil fails). But, sorry, so what? Why should I take this as material to a discussion concerning the evidential problem of evil? Why should I take it as any more material to this discussion than to any other discussion we could be having? After all, the mere possibility that there exist reasons beyond our attention that would serve to prove us mistaken exists in virtually any and all judgments we could possibly make. I only hear you complaining about this when it weighs on the subject of God and the evidential problem. Suddenly, because it's about God, I'm supposed to think it is arrogant of me to assert something about which it is merely broadly possible that there exist mysterious reasons floating around the cosmos that would serve to prove me mistaken? Please.

To your question about "how do I know what God would or wouldn't do?": hey, epistemic certainty is not requisite for knowledge. The mere possibility that I am mistaken in my judgment doesn't mean that it cannot constitute knowledge. I am more than happy to have beliefs that are possibly mistaken in this sense and yet seem to accord with the evidence at my disposal and align strongly with our first-order moral intuitions. I don't think a very large portion of our beliefs are immune from the possibility of error in this epistemic sense; and yet, again, I don't hear you complaining about this in other areas of discourse.

This notion about "who are you to understand what such a being would do" gets you out of the logical problem of evil, in my opinion. But I think it's a really poor response to the evidential problem. Basically you get out of being committed to a logical contradiction; but you stick yourself with being committed to some potentially extremely mysterious doctrine of the good. I don't see how it is anything more than selective skepticism. And it's also unfortunate for you that your God, whom I presumed was supposed to be a moral exemplar of sorts, possesses moral ways that are so mysterious and beyond your ability to understand. (Of course, you would deny this last point is any sort of real problem because, again, your skepticism toward your moral intuitions and faculty is merely selective, as it suits you.)

that worship (reverence, adoration, etc.) of God arose as a genuine response to who God is

(...)

God as He is in Himself is beyond all attributes....

There seems like a lot of tension here. So you have a genuine response of reverence and adoration toward something that you take to be beyond all attributes? A good part of the tension lies in exactly what bbarr brought up: you seem to want to have your cake and eat it too. You seem to want to hold that God is representative of attributes we justifiably take as valuable and then on the other hand to deny, as it suits you, that we can ascribe any attributes to God. I'm sure there is some good, robust way to release the tension, and I think it will involve being appreciative of the distinction bbarr brought up.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Therefore, it doesn't seem remarkable at all when folks like bbarr and others create an intellectual problem for themselves by imaging God as beholden to man's definition of what a compassionate person is. Of course a Being Who is infinite and beyond all attributes is going to challenge our ability to understand Him. Pointing out the inconsistencies be therefore, is hardly grounds as a defeater for Christian belief (or even theism in general).

But surely what you are saying amounts to the claim that God is not in fact compassionate as he is not 'beholden to man's definition of what a compassionate person is.'
Even if you are using the word metaphorically, then surely if God doesn't even come close to compassionate then it is misuse. If God were to ignore the suffering in Haiti (and it was unnecessary and easily preventable suffering) then surely it would amount to an attempt to deceive if you stated that God was compassionate and a claim that it was metaphorical would not help.
I realize the difficulty in describing the unknown or unknowable or infinite or something that is more that what we know. Clearly if someone is apparently more loving than the typical human or more compassionate than the typical human then those words may be used but would not suffice to define that persons actions. But if God does something that is decidedly uncompassionate or unloving then surely however infinite and indescribable his true attributes may be, it is wrong to call him compassionate or loving.

Originally posted by bbarr
I much prefer the view that devotion begins with some direct, experiential, ineffable encounter with God than the view that our devotion is an appropriate response to God as defined by certain predicates. But if you are serious that God transcends our predicates; that God is actually ineffable, then you are committed to the claim that it is merely metaphorica is simply a contradiction. The intellectual problem here is yours, not mine.

But if you are serious that God transcends our predicates; that God is actually ineffable, then you are committed to the claim that it is merely metaphorical when you use phrases like "God is compassionate", or "God is just".

I am committed to God's essential ineffability. I don't know how God, if He is God, could be otherwise; assuming God is the only uncreated Being, distinct from all created things (i.e., holy). I think it is because of the non-contingent nature (holiness) of God that any characteristic attributed to Him (loving, just, merciful, etc.) must mean something different than what is normative for the terms used. For example, we can speak of the justice of God, or the love of God, or the mercy of God, etc., and understand how those terms apply to God. But those terms alone as they are publicly understood cannot apply to God, and I think that is to be expected.

I mean, to claim that God transcends our predicates is just to claim that we are unjustified in believing that our predicates accurately apply to God.

As I said, I think that is to be expected.

...you cannot both claim that God transcends predicates like 'compassionate' and that it is appropriate to say 'God is compassionate'. This is simply a contradiction. The intellectual problem here is yours, not mine.

The reason I insist upon the essential ineffability of God is precisely because I don't think it is appropriate to say unconditionally that 'God is compassionate' or 'God is just'. It is my contention that it is the skeptic who creates an intellectual problem by using God's attributes unconditionally as a way of discrediting theistic belief via the problem of evil. I think it is appropriate, as I said earlier, to speak of the compassion of God, or the love of God, or the justice of God, or the mercy of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God, and that it is appropriate to do so even if God is essentially ineffable.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]But if you are serious that God transcends our predicates; that God is actually ineffable, then you are committed to the claim that it is merely metaphorical when you use phrases like "God is compassionate", or "God is just".

I am committed to God's essential ineffability. I don't know how God, if He is God, could be otherwise; assuming o God, and that it is appropriate to do so even if God is essentially ineffable.[/b]

I think it is appropriate, as I said earlier, to speak of the compassion of God, or the love of God, or the justice of God, or the mercy of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God, and that it is appropriate to do so even if God is essentially ineffable.

Could you clarify this? It seems that, as others have said, you are predicating attributes to God and yet insisting on the total ineffability of God (which would seemingly exclude the possibility of any meaningful predication.) There is definitely a tension (although, Epi, I think I am inclined to agree with you if some clarification is obtained.)

In my view, I agree that it is right to call God compassionate, just and merciful and at the same time say that God is ineffable. The reason I would do that is because the language used to describe God should not be taken truth-functionally but rather just functionally (or instrumentally.) Language used to describe God is not primarily propositional but liturgical. So when we say that God is 'just' or 'compassionate', it is not to posit some property of God but to arouse certain internal dispositions, feelings, attitudes and images, which arouse the right conception of God.

So the issue is not about whether compassion can be predicated to God or whether compassion is being used in its normative sense, but whether this predicate functions instrumentally. Does the word 'compassion' arouse the right feelings? Does it cultivate the proper devotion in the believer? This would be my solution. We can say that God is compassionate and God is ineffable because in both cases we are not so much putting forward propositions as eliciting an affective state.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]I think it is appropriate, as I said earlier, to speak of the compassion of God, or the love of God, or the justice of God, or the mercy of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God, and that it is appropriate to do so even if God is essentially ineffable.

Could you clarify this? It seems that, as others have said, you are pre ...[text shortened]... oth cases we are not so much putting forward propositions as eliciting an affective state.[/b]

This is an interesting view. I am confused, though, about the following:

Presumably it is not accidental that the liturgical use of terms like 'compassionate', 'just', etc. can function to elicit the proper dispositions, images, affections, etc. But what does it mean for these internal states to be proper? Either they can be proper merely in that they are good states for people to have, in which case their liturgical use has very little to do with God's actual nature (or even whether God exists), or they can be proper in that they allow us to approach some more accurate understanding of God's actual nature. But, if you mean 'proper' in the second sense, then you can't really escape something very close to the truth-functional use of the terms. Presumably the reason why the liturgical use of these terms, rather than the liturgical use of 'cruel', 'unjust', elicit the proper inner states is because they more closely approximate God's actual nature. But if that's right, then the functional efficacy of the liturgical use of these terms depends upon their approximate truth-functional appropriateness. This seems like a dilemma to me. Can you help clarify?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]But if you are serious that God transcends our predicates; that God is actually ineffable, then you are committed to the claim that it is merely metaphorical when you use phrases like "God is compassionate", or "God is just".

I am committed to God's essential ineffability. I don't know how God, if He is God, could be otherwise; assuming ...[text shortened]... o God, and that it is appropriate to do so even if God is essentially ineffable.[/b]

Well, as I said in an earlier post, if you give up the claim that God is compassionate, just, benevolent, etc., then you don't have to worry about the Problem of Evil. There is no contradiction is supposing that a being who is neither compassionate, just, nor benevolent would care one whit about unnecessary and easily preventable harm to others.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
God is sovereign. We can question why God does things a certain way, but what do we gain by doing so, if in the end God's will always prevails?

Might makes right!

Originally posted by robbie carrobie
yes but this is a healthy reverence not fear as in morbid terror of being torched alive for eternity and poked with big sticks by the devil to make sure were still alive and suffering pain to the maximum degree.

Wow. You just brought that stereotypical cartoon depiction of Hell to life in my imagination...now I can envision it. Creepy.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Therefore, it doesn't seem remarkable at all when folks like bbarr and others create an intellectual problem for themselves by imaging God as beholden to man's definition of what a compassionate person is.

I think the problem that exists is really fully yours. And bbarr pointed it out to you; he didn't somehow create it. You had stated the fol ...[text shortened]... ve being appreciative of the distinction bbarr brought up.[/b]

That's one reason why bbarr was pointing out your problem to you: for you to claim that such would constitute an "unqualifed statement", it basically then commits you to the idea that the predicate 'compassionate' takes on some wholly different meaning when predicated unto God.

I don't see how any term applied to God could retain its normative meaning, considering that God as He is in Himself is beyond all attributes. The best we could do would be to speak of the love of God, or the justice of God, or the mercy of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God. This is to be expected, IMO, because descriptors are intended to describe contingent things, whereas God is, by definition, non-contingent (i.e, a non-thing), and so descriptors are ill-suited to the task of delineating His exact nature.

Basically you get out of being committed to a logical contradiction; but you stick yourself with being committed to some potentially extremely mysterious doctrine of the good. I don't see how it is anything more than selective skepticism. And it's also unfortunate for you that your God, whom I presumed was supposed to be a moral exemplar of sorts, possesses moral ways that are so mysterious and beyond your ability to understand.

What you are demanding is unreasonable, IMO; that is, a God who is non-mysterious. My contention is that God, if He is God, must be ineffable, by definition. God is essentially non-contingent (a distinction which is absolutely unique to God alone), which means His exact nature will be forever unknowable since nothing can be known about that which is indescribable (only things can be described). As such, it is to be expected that our unconditional application of predicates to God be problematic. My ideas about how a compassionate person acts are probably not much different than yours, and when I try to understand God based on what I know of compassion, I too must conclude that God is not compassionate. Big deal; it is to be expected that God is not compassionate as I understand a compassionate person to be. It strikes me as intellectually irresponsible to demand that God be understandable in order for His existence to cease being ridiculous or implausible.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, as I said in an earlier post, if you give up the claim that God is compassionate, just, benevolent, etc., then you don't have to worry about the Problem of Evil. There is no contradiction is supposing that a being who is neither compassionate, just, nor benevolent would care one whit about unnecessary and easily preventable harm to others.

You see, you are the one insisting on applying these concepts to God unconditionally.

I haven't given up the claim that God is compassionate, just, or benevolent. As I said, it is more appropriate to speak of the compassion of God, the justice of God, the benevolence of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God.

Originally posted by bbarr
This is an interesting view. I am confused, though, about the following:

Presumably it is not accidental that the liturgical use of terms like 'compassionate', 'just', etc. can function to elicit the proper dispositions, images, affections, etc. But what does it mean for these internal states to be proper? Either they can be proper merely in that they ...[text shortened]... ctional appropriateness. This seems like a dilemma to me. Can you help clarify?

Can you help clarify?

I would say that the appropriateness of any theological description can only be decided by individual religious communities. As an English-speaking Catholic, I would be concerned with three questions -- 1. Why is this word used? 2. What dispositions does the word 'compassionate' elicit? and 3. Does the reason for this word and do the dispositions it elicits accord with the traditions of the Church? So if asked about whether it is right to say God is compassionate, I would answer:

1. This statement would usually occur in times of hardship and difficulty. If I saw a person struggling in his life, I might say 'God is compassionate' by which I hope for him to experience some hope that his current condition will be alleviated.
2. The idea of compassion should arouse some sense of trust, that God's providence will prevail.
3. These do accord with the traditions of the Catholic Church. It is right to console and trust is the right disposition toward God.

If in another religious community, things were different (consolation is not good or trust is not the right disposition in that context), then this expression would have to be rejected. The point is that its rejection would not be on the grounds of whether it is true or false.

Now obviously this does rely to some extent on some approximate truth-functional meaning. If I divorced any possible truth-functionality from the statement 'God is compassionate', it is hard to see how it could be successful at all. Why would this man have any reason to trust if compassion did not signify something? The truth value in this statement is partly what makes it so affective. What I am saying however is that when we evaluate whether certain statements about God are appropriate, the dispositions of the religious person have to be accounted for. When we say that 'God is compassionate', we are really saying 'You have reason to hope that God will ensure your good.' Basically we have to account for why and for what effect this statement is made and whether the motivation is right.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
You see, you are the one insisting on applying these concepts to God unconditionally.

I haven't given up the claim that God is compassionate, just, or benevolent. As I said, it is more appropriate to speak of the compassion of God, the justice of God, the benevolence of God, etc., in order to understand how those terms apply to God.

Give me a fraking break. Every time I post anything on the Problem of Evil, I make it clear that the argument applies only to traditional theistic conceptions of God. In my first posts to you in this thread, I made it clear that, as far as I'm concerned, theists can use terms like 'compassionate' in non-standard ways; as metaphors, perhaps, or analogies. I'm the guy who said above that this metaphorical usage can avoid the Problem of Evil. If you think I'm the one insisting on applying these notions to God, then you have reading comprehension issues. I do not insist on traditional theistic conceptions of God, and if you think it was atheists or secular philosophers who came up with the traditional conception, then you need to take some classes. Take it up with Anselm, if you want. I am an atheist, you can define 'God' however you damn well please. What I do insist on is using terms appropriately and consistently.

I know you haven't given up using phrases like 'God is compassionate' but, as you mentioned, the term 'compassion' as it appears in that phrase does not mean what we ordinarily take it to mean. You can use that string of letters to refer to whatever suits your fancy. You're the one who will be stuck in some weird Orwellian double-speak, committed to the truth of the phrase 'God is compassionate' and the falsity of the phrase 'We are justified in attributing compassion to God'. "But the word means something different in the first phrase!" you'll reply. Fine, but why then muddy the lexical waters? Why not employ a different word? The obvious and uncomfortable answer is that you want the rhetorical punch of being able to say that God is compassionate without having to worry about the pesky entailments of such an attribution.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Can you help clarify?

I would say that the appropriateness of any theological description can only be decided by individual religious communities. As an English-speaking Catholic, I would be concerned with three questions -- 1. Why is this word used? 2. What dispositions does the word 'compassionate' elicit? and 3. Does the reason for this word an r why and for what effect this statement is made and whether the motivation is right.[/b]

O.K., but is the claim "You have reason to hope that God will ensure your good" to be interpreted truth-functionally or not? If so, then it seems like you're saying something very similar to 'God is compassionate' read truth-functionally, and that the best explanation why somebody would be comforted by the claim that God is compassionate, and come to reasonably hope that God will ensure their good, is because they believe the claim that God is, actually, truth-functionally, compassionate. And, anyway, why should concordance with Catholicism matter, if these phrases are primarily instrumentally employed? You'd figure that such concordance would be important if the claims are truth-functional, since you'd want to avoid a contradiction. But if these claims are primarily instrumentally employed, then there isn't any real threat of a contradiction because the functional content of the claim doesn't have entailments that could contravene orthodoxy. Perhaps you insist on such a concordance because it renders the instrumental use of these claims more effective; people are more inclined to take comfort from them if they take them to be consistent with Catholicism or justified on the basis of orthodoxy. But this seems weirdly indirect and deceptive. It is as though you are relying on the listener to take a phrase truth-functionally so that the phrase will work instrumentally. This all seems a bit baroque.