A thought to ponder

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., but is the claim "You have reason to hope that God will ensure your good" to be interpreted truth-functionally or not? If so, then it seems like you're saying something very similar to 'God is compassionate' read truth-functionally, and that the best explanation why somebody would be comforted by the claim that God is compassionate, and come to reasonab unctionally so that the phrase will work instrumentally. This all seems a bit baroque.

My point is that the statement 'God is compassionate' should not be interpreted in the strict truth-functional way you have approached it (although, as I will say later, this is not to say that truth-functionality is out of the picture.) Your approach seems to be to ask what are the qualities that would distinguish a person as compassionate and whether God meets these qualities. If God does not meet your standard of compassion, then this statement is assigned a 0. My approach however is to ask why someone would be saying it and whether their reason is valid.

My observation is that a person would normally say that God is compassionate because he has seen another in distress and wants to console him. The statement that God is compassionate has to be understood in this context and by functional purpose it serves there. The person is saying that God is compassionate because he wants to console this man and encourage him to have trust in God's providence (there could be other reasons, mind you.) Now truth-functionality is important here. The interlocutors must both have some kind of belief about God's providence in order for him to feel some kind of trust in God; what I am saying however is that they do not have to have a belief about God's compassion.

That is how I would approach the tension between God's ineffability and apparent predication of compassion to God. When we say God is compassionate, it is not to predicate compassion to God but to impel the listener into a certain disposition to God. 'Compassion' serves an instrumental purpose. Maybe it is to make the person believe God is something like compassionate. You cannot however take a truth-functional analysis of this statement because compassion isn't really being predicated.

EDIT: Maybe a clearer way to put it is this: a truth-value cannot be assigned to a statement like 'God is compassionate' because it is not primarily propositional but functional; a truth-value, however, may be assigned to the meanings it elicits (something about God's providence and the need for trust in God). The point, however, is that the latter is ineffable because it hinges on God's nature. Something is truth-functional, just not the statement itself.

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm not sure why you insist on a legend, or on some abstract specification of those considerations germane to determining, on a case by case basis, whether some value or another is to given practical priority. I had hoped the chess analogy would be instructive here, but perhaps I was unclear. If you ask whether the bishop or knight is better, I will ask you ally attempt to reduce the breadth of human ethical experience to some handful of strictures.

I'm not sure why you insist on a legend, or on some abstract specification of those considerations germane to determining, on a case by case basis, whether some value or another is to given practical priority.
Simply because any system adopted must have a discernable and articulated value system. For instance, using your chess analogy, the goal is checkmate (or, short that, resignation) while the objectives include the rules of engagement, the 64 squares, and the power of each piece, among other things. There is more to consider than simply the situation at hand. Obviously the situation at hand needs to be considered, but, as you suggest, it must be considered within the framework of the overall goal.

Well, what is typically ethically relevant? I think autonomy is important, and authenticity and integrity. I think the fruitful pursuit of permissible interests in important, as are nourishing interpersonal relationships. I think that contentment, pleasure and the absence of unnecessary suffering is important. I think knowledge and moral character are important. I mean, these are among those things to which we advert when determining how it would be best, all things considered, to treat another. There are a plurality of values that are instrumentally related to checkmate. There are a plurality of values that contribute to, or are constitutive of, our well-being.
All of these are subjective, with nothing either anchoring or truly defining them. By your definition, we could put everyone on Prozac and call it all good.

The point here is that, in the abstract, ethical life is uncodifiable, non-algorithmic, and messy.
And yet, isn't that (codify) exactly what you attempt to do by naming what you think is important?

You don't want an ethical theory that is more precise than the domain to which it applies.
Two thoughts come to mind.
One, tell this to the politicians; and two, aren't you doing exactly this in your philosophy?

And if you think that you get this sort of specificity from theological ethics, you are fooling yourself. God may be perfect at balancing ethical considerations, but you are not. That there is a perfect legend does not entail you have perfect access to it, and to claim otherwise is merely posturing.
I don't consider that ethical behavior is man's highest calling. Rather, his highest calling is to be in a relationship with his Creator, the spiritual life. That his behavior would satisfy the highest ethical standards known to man while engaged in the pursuit of a spiritual life is beside the point. The Christian does not seek ethics first, but Christ first.

In fact, this is precisely the type of posturing that, when taken seriously, leads to those lamentably familiar forms of fundamentalism that myopically attempt to reduce the breadth of human ethical experience to some handful of strictures.
Very similar to how man ends up with philosophies intending to replace the same.

Originally posted by bbarr
Give me a fraking break. Every time I post anything on the Problem of Evil, I make it clear that the argument applies only to traditional theistic conceptions of God. In my first posts to you in this thread, I made it clear that, as far as I'm concerned, theists can use terms like 'compassionate' in non-standard ways; as metaphors, perhaps, or analogies. I' ...[text shortened]... without having to worry about the pesky entailments of such an attribution.

You're the one who will be stuck in some weird Orwellian double-speak, committed to the truth of the phrase 'God is compassionate' and the falsity of the phrase 'We are justified in attributing compassion to God'. "But the word means something different in the first phrase!" you'll reply.

No, I would take issue with the second phrase. It is wrong to attribute compassion to God unconditionally.

There is no double-speak here. What the love of God entails can be firmly established by consulting scripture. I take that collection of elements which make up what the love of God entails and thereby understand how the God of the Bible loves. It is not double-speak, therefore, when I say that God is a loving God, because I have a definite understanding of what His love entails.

Why not employ a different word? The obvious and uncomfortable answer is that you want the rhetorical punch of being able to say that God is compassionate without having to worry about the pesky entailments of such an attribution.

Rhetorical punch? I said earlier that worship of God, rather than a response to whatever attribute we care to recognize in Him, is instead an authentic response to Who God is. I have no need for a rhetorical punch based on a single attribute, however noble it may be.

Originally posted by Conrau K
My point is that the statement 'God is compassionate' should not be interpreted in the strict truth-functional way you have approached it (although, as I will say later, this is not to say that truth-functionality is out of the picture.) Your approach seems to be to ask what are the qualities that would distinguish a person as compassionate and whether God ...[text shortened]... nges on God's nature. Something is truth-functional, just not the statement itself.

Good, that's clearer, and I'm sympathetic to this line. A couple questions, however:

First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Second, I am not sure that you can give an account of the functional role of locutions like 'God is compassionate' wherein what is intended to be elicited is the belief that God is something like compassionate, without thereby running into the problems the liturgical account is supposed to avoid. Now, I don't have any worked out view on semantic similarity, but you'd figure that two terms are semantically similar only if they have similar entailments, refer to similar objects, states, entities, etc., and so on. You'd figure that a trait couldn't be similar to compassion unless it ruled out allowing unnecessary but easily preventable suffering.

But if this is right, then my initial worry still needs to be addressed. What is the relationship between the meaning of these particular predicates and the truth-functional propositional content of the elicited state? It can't be accidental that 'compassion' is used to elicit hope and trust in providence, but you can't give an account of providence that is so similar to the meaning of 'compassion' that it is rendered effable and, hence, subject to the problems the liturgical account aims to avoid.

Originally posted by bbarr
Good, that's clearer, and I'm sympathetic to this line. A couple questions, however:

First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should ...[text shortened]... le and, hence, subject to the problems the liturgical account aims to avoid.

I find it curious that your default sticking point it always compassion. You continue to posit that, because the compassion which is spoke of God is dissimilar to the standard of compassion you hold (although it is unclear if you hold yourself to this standard, or if it's simply an ideal you use to eliminate any and all comers), God cannot be compassionate.

What about another of God's attributes--- would another attribute meet with the same failure based upon your standards? For instance, we all have a general idea about what truth is, what it sounds like, how it is applied and whether or not our actions are in line with the same. We can also imagine a perfect standard of truth even though we fail daily in our comings and goings to be aligned with it. In addition, experience has taught us that--- while we have become increasingly aware of a greater body of truth--- there is more that we don't know than what we do. Given that absolute truth is knowable and yet we do not know it, are we to conclude that there exists no absolute truth?

(1) God must be non-contingent

(2) If God is non-contingent, then God must be essentially ineffable

(3) If God is essentially ineffable, then God must be beyond all attributes

(4) If God is beyond all attributes, then no attribute can be applied to Him unconditionally

(5) If no attribute can be applied to God unconditionally, then any concept of God possessing attributes which are applied unconditionally must be false

(6) The problem of evil requires a concept of God which possesses attributes applied unconditionally

(7) The concept of God required by the problem of evil is false since it possesses attributes applied unconditionally

(8) The God of the Bible is revealed in such a way that attributes cannot be applied to Him unconditionally

(9) The God of the Bible cannot be the God required by the problem of evil

Originally posted by epiphinehas
(9) The God of the Bible cannot be the God required by the problem of evil

I realize you wish to eliminate the threat of 'the problem of evil', but suppose we set that aside.
Is it reasonable or meaningful to call God compassionate if he is known to not act in a manner that fits the commonly held meaning of the word 'compassionate'? Note that I am not claiming that God does not act compassionately, but merely supposing that to be the case.
By stating that God is not compassionate, I am not necessarily calling him evil - though you may feel that all uncompassionate beings are evil, that would a separate discussion.

Originally posted by bbarr
Good, that's clearer, and I'm sympathetic to this line. A couple questions, however:

First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should le and, hence, subject to the problems the liturgical account aims to avoid.

First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Actually, my contention is that locutions like 'God is compassionate' should elicit a whole host of feelings, dispositions, images and judgments which, in their entirety, constitute something ineffable. The middle-man is, in fact, the very goal. The locution should impel the person into a trust in God's providence but it should also elicit a lot of other thoughts and affective states. This is how I reconcile God's ineffability with God's attributes. We do not actually predicate attributes to God but rather use these predicates instrumentally to evoke feelings and thoughts which correspond to some ineffable quality of God. So with a statement like ‘God is compassionate’, I have been careful not to describe the kind of state it elicits – it is something about God’s providence and maybe something like compassionate but it is not these things exactly.

These kinds of locutions should not be treated as formal speech but rather like fictional stories or poems. Fictional stories cannot be treated as lies -- they do not posit anything about the world nor is truth-telling their aim. Stories primarily elicit feelings and judgments about the world. So a good novel then can sometimes give a better illustration of moral character than any philosophical treatment could. Similarly, in a poem, the meanings of words are so unstable we have no guarantee what they could refer to (strict meaning is not the point. Who cares what Lewis Caroll meant when he wrote about slithy toves and borogoves in Jabberwocky?) The point of poetry however should be to exploit these words, their subtle meanings, connotations and even sounds, to arouse certain internal states which touch on the ineffable.

Second, I am not sure that you can give an account of the functional role of locutions like 'God is compassionate' wherein what is intended to be elicited is the belief that God is something like compassionate, without thereby running into the problems the liturgical account is supposed to avoid. Now, I don't have any worked out view on semantic similarity, but you'd figure that two terms are semantically similar only if they have similar entailments, refer to similar objects, states, entities, etc., and so on. You'd figure that a trait couldn't be similar to compassion unless it ruled out allowing unnecessary but easily preventable suffering.

I am not saying that this locution necessarily posits any semantic similarity. If I did, then I would be basically arguing that these kinds of theological descriptions are analogical. Perhaps in the listener's mind it does evoke something like compassion -- but then again perhaps it does not. My point is that the locution itself should rouse a lot of emotions and feelings which may or may not posit some similar entailments.

I think that, in fact, we often do this. Say, for example, a man is called to court to give a character assessment for a man accused of some criminal act. He is asked about the accused man's character and responds 'He is a good man'. Now the jury is not really concerned about what 'good' entails and whether this applies to the accused. Perhaps the accused is slothful, irascible and intemperate, suggesting a bad character. The point however is that by saying 'good' the man suggests to the jury that, in his opinion, the accused did not commit the crime. He may also evoke a lot of other feelings and thoughts in saying 'good' . Yet whether the entailments of 'good' actually apply to the accused is not really the point; the point is what he is trying to achieve in saying 'good' and whether the effects he is trying to evoke in the jury are right.

But if this is right, then my initial worry still needs to be addressed. What is the relationship between the meaning of these particular predicates and the truth-functional propositional content of the elicited state? It can't be accidental that 'compassion' is used to elicit hope and trust in providence, but you can't give an account of providence that is so similar to the meaning of 'compassion' that it is rendered effable and, hence, subject to the problems the liturgical account aims to avoid.

But that is the point. I cannot give an account of that relationship because, as I am arguing, the 'truth-functional propositional content of the elicited state' is ineffable. Two people may still argue about whether or not it is true but they cannot pin it down in words. So I have no intention to render it effable. You are right that the use of the word 'compassionate' is not accidental; I just cannot give an account of the state the term elicits because this is, as I argue, ineffable.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Actually, my contention is that locutions like ...[text shortened]... he term elicits because this is, as I argue, ineffable.[/b]

I think the view you've articulated here is beautiful. Your liturgical account does justice to the importance of certain types of religious discourse, connects the content of such discourse with your orthodox theology while avoiding the conclusion that the religious discourse of other traditions are defective, and remains consistent with the contemplative conception of God as accessible via experience rather than description. Thanks for taking the time to answer my questions.

Best,

-Bennett

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Actually, my contention is that locutions like ...[text shortened]... he term elicits because this is, as I argue, ineffable.[/b]

We do not actually predicate attributes to God but rather use these predicates instrumentally to evoke feelings and thoughts which correspond to some ineffable quality of God. So with a statement like ‘God is compassionate’, I have been careful not to describe the kind of state it elicits – it is something about God’s providence and maybe something like compassionate but it is not these things exactly.

Well said! Much more eloquent and spot-on than my clumsy attempt. 🙂

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Actually, my contention is that locutions like ...[text shortened]... he term elicits because this is, as I argue, ineffable.[/b]

These kinds of locutions should not be treated as formal speech but rather like fictional stories or poems. Fictional stories cannot be treated as lies -- they do not posit anything about the world nor is truth-telling their aim. Stories primarily elicit feelings and judgments about the world. So a good novel then can sometimes give a better illustration of moral character than any philosophical treatment could. Similarly, in a poem, the meanings of words are so unstable we have no guarantee what they could refer to (strict meaning is not the point. Who cares what Lewis Caroll meant when he wrote about slithy toves and borogoves in Jabberwocky?) The point of poetry however should be to exploit these words, their subtle meanings, connotations and even sounds, to arouse certain internal states which touch on the ineffable.


This is pretty much how I read Torah. “Sacred myths” (as David S. Ariel calls them; if and whether they have a historical underpinning or not), poetry, parable, allegory—and even Hebrew versions of Zen koans.


Here is a favorite quote (that I have posted before), by a rather famous Jewish non-dualist:


“Every definition of God leads to heresy; definition is spiritual idolatry. Even attributing mind and will to God, even attributing divinity itself, and the name ‘God’—these, too, are definitions. Were it not for the subtle awareness that all these are just sparkling flashes of that which transcends definition—these, too, would engender heresy. ...

“The greatest impediment to the human spirit results from the fact that the conception of God is fixed in a particular form, due to childish habit and imagination. This is a spark of the defect of idolatry, of which we must always be aware. ...

“The infinite transcends every particular content of faith.”


(Rav Abraham Isaac Kook, from Orot HaKodesh, quoted in Daniel Matt The Essential Kabbalah.)

Originally posted by vistesd
“Every definition of God leads to heresy; definition is spiritual idolatry. Even attributing mind and will to God, even attributing divinity itself, and the name ‘God’—these, too, are definitions. Were it not for the subtle awareness that all these are just sparkling flashes of that which transcends definition—these, too, would engender heresy. ...
“The ...[text shortened]... ich we must always be aware. ...
“The infinite transcends every particular content of faith.”

And yet despite all that denial of definitions (and therefore description), a picture of an infinite entity emerges. How can we know of the existence of such an entity if we refuse to define it? Surely all the poetry, parable and allegory can only lead to misunderstanding and vastly divergent views between people? Does poetry, parable and allegory achieve some sort of definition that direct dictionary style definitions cannot, or are they in fact a means of hiding the lack of knowledge under a veil of words (a popular technique in religious literature).

Originally posted by twhitehead
And yet despite all that denial of definitions (and therefore description), a picture of an infinite entity emerges. How can we know of the existence of such an entity if we refuse to define it? Surely all the poetry, parable and allegory can only lead to misunderstanding and vastly divergent views between people? Does poetry, parable and allegory achieve ...[text shortened]... iding the lack of knowledge under a veil of words (a popular technique in religious literature).

Do you think that Dylan Thomas was really attempting to accurately describe nature when he wrote “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower, drives my green age….”? Does that fact that he wasn’t diminish the validity of his poetry? How? Should his poetry really be “countered” by an accurate biological description of plant growth? Can it be? Does that make any sense?


Now, I have argued many times that religion (or spirituality, if you prefer) belongs more in that “aesthetic” realm, than in the realm of propositional truth-claims. Various exclusivist religionists disagree with me. I have also said that I think that “aesthetic” (for wont of a better word) aspect of our living out of our lives gets short-shrift in our discussions on here.


If the “grammar of our consciousness” is not exhaustive of the larger “syntax of reality” (the cosmos), then there is a domain of mystery—the ineffable. Some religionists try to pin down that domain of mystery—I don’t. (Although my own non-dualism might be construed so, I think my comments on “the whole” below might alleviate that somewhat.)


However, my own “getsaltic non-dualism” posits an “implicate expressive ground” from which, in which and of which all forms/figures are manifest. Based on observations of the forms, the most I can say of that ground is that it is coherent (hence cosmos, not chaos). The word most often used for that coherence in non-dualist religious literature seems to be “harmony”. The most I can say of the “domain of mystery” is that it is coherent, or harmonious.


Aside from other philosophical analyses of “aesthetics”, what we find to be beautiful (or awe-inspiring, or wonder-inducing) is harmony/coherence. Hence, I see the various religious traditions as, at bottom, aesthetic responses (and poetic speculations) vis-à-vis that.


Poetry is poetry; it is not a substitute for something else. Music is music; it is not a substitute for logic or philosophy or science. Do not take it as descriptive.


And I think that is what Rav Kook (I have read other stuff by him) is getting at. His image, by the way, is not that of an infinite entity. In that domain of discourse, “infinite” is not a mathematical concept. It is simply a statement of the mystery, the ineffable. (Similarly, in mystical Jewish thought, “beginning” means the point beyond which nothing is known—not the point beyond which nothing was.) To confuse poetic responses with descriptive ones results in idolatry, broadly construed.


Or, to put it in plain non-dualistic terms, the ein sof, the “without end”, is without end—boundless—simply because it is the whole; hence it is by definition boundless. The notion of infinite extension seems not really meaningful; there is nothing for ein sof (the Jewish version of Brahman or the Tao—ultimately the all-in-all) to be extended in. There is nothing else for the whole to extend into.


Idolatry (as Rav Kook uses the term) might be defined as attempts to “eff” the ineffable, or attempts to treat responsiveand evocative language (such as poetry) as descriptive language.

__________________________________________


EDIT: There is more here than you asked for, I know. Rav Kook is speaking of an “infinite entity” only if it is proper to call the Whole an infinite entity. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t. The Whole (or the One) is ineffable vis-à-vis any partial language. Anything that I say of it ought to be taken as, “It seems as if…”. To substitute for that “it seems as if…” a descriptive statement, or propositional truth-claim, “It is…”, is the kind of idolatry Rav Kook refers to.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]First, if it is the task of functional locutions like 'God is compassionate' to console listeners by virtue of eliciting in them the judgment that they should trust in God's providence, then why not cut out the middle man? Why not just say, truth-functionally, 'You should trust in God's providence'?

Actually, my contention is that locutions like ...[text shortened]... he term elicits because this is, as I argue, ineffable.[/b]

I realize you received the ultimate prize in these here parts, the virtual pat on the back from bbarr, but I find myself as the proverbial fly in the ointment on this one.

Actually, my contention is that locutions like 'God is compassionate' should elicit a whole host of feelings, dispositions, images and judgments which, in their entirety, constitute something ineffable. The middle-man is, in fact, the very goal.
Presumably, the ingredients are unimportant, it is the potpourri's overall smell we are after? If the 'it' that we are after is ineffable, who's to say that we ever successfully reach it? It almost sounds as though you are contending that God Himself is ineffable... which, although it shares elements of the sentiment 'through the glass darkly,' its overall meaning is something altogether different.

The locution should impel the person into a trust in God's providence but it should also elicit a lot of other thoughts and affective states.
By locution, are you referring to such phrases as:

There is a way that seems right to a man, but in the end it leads to death.
or
For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.
or
This righteousness from God comes through faith in Jesus Christ to all who believe. There is no difference, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus.

Those types of locutions, or did you have something else in mind? The fact of the matter is, God has obviously used our own frame of reference in describing Himself and the situation to man. When God is described using certain attributes, He has done so knowing that there already exists an inherent understanding of the concepts used, irrespective of the perfection of said understanding.

In the Garden, this was true when He appealed to their basic desire to perpetuate their own existence:

"... but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it, dying, you will surely die."

Certainly this elicited "a lot of other thoughts and affective states," about something which, at the time, was ineffable in theory (they had no experience with death), but was made known--- effable--- by virtue of contrast (with their present condition).

Segue
'Compassion' is something nearly every adult can relate to, as it is applied to a judicial situation. On one hand, you have the standard of law while on the other hand, the offense against the law. The judgment always goes against the offense, in support of the law. An exception to this judgment only comes when the judge exhibits compassion: lessens or eliminates the judgment which would otherwise be levied against the offender. Bbarr (and, it would appear, to a certain extent, you) would have us believe that such compassion is emotionally-driven, as a result of some unnamed sentimentality. While this may be true it reference to the courts of law governed by man, this is clearly not the case when speaking of God's compassion. His compassion is based on the reality of Christ's work on the cross... certainly not because He just feels so darned sorry for us.

Further, bbarr would have us believe that the innumerable cases of unwarranted or unnecessary suffering in the world is somehow an indication of God's lack of compassion. His fruit salad is unable to distinguish apples from oranges. The suffering which occurs in the world is decidedly not related to the judgment of God, therefore, compassion (or lack thereof) isn't even a consideration when speaking on the topic of suffering.
End of Segue

These kinds of locutions should not be treated as formal speech but rather like fictional stories or poems. Fictional stories cannot be treated as lies -- they do not posit anything about the world nor is truth-telling their aim. Stories primarily elicit feelings and judgments about the world.
I must again inquire regarding the exact locutions to which you refer as construed as 'fictional stories or poems.' If you mean the allegories used by the Lord Jesus Christ, well, duh. If, however, you mean that all of Scripture is meant to be a malleable encyclopedic Play-Doh, well, we're going to have some irreconcilable differences.

Originally posted by bbarr
I think the view you've articulated here is beautiful. Your liturgical account does justice to the importance of certain types of religious discourse, connects the content of such discourse with your orthodox theology while avoiding the conclusion that the religious discourse of other traditions are defective, and remains consistent with the contemplative con ...[text shortened]... ther than description. Thanks for taking the time to answer my questions.

Best,

-Bennett

Thank you. I really appreciate your comment.