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-Removed-Just from what I gather here, it seems that twhitehead was trying to make a point about belief structure consistency. If someone says that he or she believes P; and if P implies Q; and yet he or she does not believe Q upon considering it; then there's probably a failure of rationality somewhere in there.
However, for what it's worth, I would add some points here to consider.
First, from the fact that one has declared belief in P; and P implies Q; and yet one does not believe Q upon introspection; it does not follow that one does not "really" believe P. I think probably some belief structure disorder is clearly indicated by this scenario; but I do not see much to recommend the conclusion that P is not a real object of this person's belief. One can simply fail to fully grasp the implications of some proposition, while still really thinking this proposition is true. It happens quite regularly.
Second, it may not be so clear that P implies Q in this case. In this case, P would stand for the proposition that there is life after death, in accordance with Christian eschatology; and Q would stand for the proposition that natural death is not such a big deal (or some such). But that P implies Q in this case hardly seems to follow, especially since Christian eschatology often holds that there can be vastly different conditions of life after death, depending on the state of one's soul at natural death (after all, heaven and hell are pretty vastly different).
Third, in such cases as this, we may need to examine the distinction between belief and faith. In order to rightly be called a Christian it may just be that, with respect to some core Christian tenets, either belief or faith is enough. And there are very plausible accounts of 'faith' under which an attitude of faith with respect to P does NOT entail belief that P (see, e.g., bbarr's excellent delineations of different potential interpretations of 'faith' in Thread 102108 ). For example, 'faith' seems consistent with an attitude in which one decides, out of volition, to accept that P under some sort of assumption; but that does not entail belief that P. The relevance of this point to the current discussion is as follows. Whereas it seems a relatively straightforward matter that there is something structurally wrong with the situation where one declares belief that P, has good grounds for thinking that P implies Q, and yet does not declare belief that Q upon introspection; it is far less clear that there is something structurally wrong with a situation in which we replace 'belief that P' with 'faith that P' in that same situation. (Of course, if you are like me, you would still have other fundamental epistemic objections against 'faith' to begin with.)
Fourth, we should not forget that belief proceeds at differing levels of credence or confidence. For instance, one could have an extremely high degree of psychological certainty in the truth of P; or on the other hand one could think it is only slightly more probably true than not; and we may call it "belief that P" in both cases. But this may have interesting implications here. Suppose that one believes P but only with a modest degree of conviction. Suppose also this person believes that P implies Q but again with only something like the minimal required conviction. So, this person believes both that P and that P implies Q. But does it follow that this person should also believe Q on this basis? I am not so sure, given the probabilistic nature of the belief and given that it takes both that P and that P implies Q to infer Q on such basis (say, in the absence of direct evidence that recommends Q). This may also be something to think about.
Originally posted by robbie carrobieAgain, what relevance does this have to anything? We're talking about you claiming to be 'persecuted and harassed' because of your version of Christianity. If getting shouted at by householders because you turn up unannounced on their door step peddling your propaganda is evidence of 'persecution and harassment' then, as my grandmother would say, that is 'weak as water'.
So you have no experience? would you like to go from house to house and gain some experience?
Originally posted by Proper KnobCan a man who's warm understand one who's freezing? - Solzhenitsyn
Again, what relevance does this have to anything? We're talking about you claiming to be 'persecuted and harassed' because of your version of Christianity. If getting shouted at by householders because you turn up unannounced on their door step peddling your propaganda is evidence of 'persecution and harassment' then, as my grandmother would say, that is 'weak as water'.
Originally posted by LemonJelloGeeeeeeeez, talk about a hijack...
Just from what I gather here, it seems that twhitehead was trying to make a point about belief structure consistency. If someone says that he or she believes P; and if P implies Q; and yet he or she does not believe Q upon considering it; then there's probably a failure of rationality somewhere in there.
However, for what it's worth, I would add som ...[text shortened]... n the absence of direct evidence that recommends Q). This may also be something to think about.
-Removed-It goes both ways. I'll always disagree with you because of your "not seeing" and supporting what the bible says about being a part of his organization and why it has to exist in order to do the world wide teaching work a Christian has to do in order to educate all who are looking for knowledge of Jehovah and of the time period we are in.
This work has to be done in an organized manor just as it was done while Jesus was here.
If it was left up to individuals like yourself, it would never be done.
As I asked Ron, and he of course has no responce, when was the last time you went out to your neighbors and offered to help teach them about God's Kingdom and what it will do not only for the person your talking too but all of mankind?
