Originally posted by rwingett
Well, your definition is not accurate. My dictionary says: A disbelief in the existence of a deity.
[b]A disbelief.
If you break the word down, it literally means "without theism." Theism being a belief in a god, and the prefix 'a' meaning 'without.' Thus, an atheist is one without belief in a god. So I repeat: atheism is not a belief. It is the lack of belief.[/b]
Consider the proposition G. It is the case that either G or ~G.
(1) If I have never been confronted with the question of G or ~G, I have no belief whatsoever; I would not say that I am agnostic: I would say that I am ignorant of the case.
(2) If I am aware of the case, but have insufficient evidence to make a decision
either way then I remain agnostic on the question. Remaining agnostic here seems to me to be a kind of 50-50 position, in the face of either lack of information or equipollent countervailing evidence.
(3) If one perceives sufficient positive evidence for ~G (relative to G), the one
decides ~G on that basis (and that would seem to be the case of “strong atheism;” e.g., taking into account such “evidence” in terms of the problem of evil). A “strong” atheist is prepared to argue such evidence.
(3) The position of “weak atheism” does seem to involve a decision, even if a provisional one: in the face of insufficient evidence for G, I decide ~G.
Now, I don’t see the difference between (a) deciding to believe ~G, and (b) deciding to not believe (disbelieve) G, given the alternatives.
Sometimes, absence of evidence can be taken as evidence of absence. On the other hand, the ability to explain the cosmos without recourse to G (the “god of the gaps” question), would seem to provide at least some semblance of evidence in favor of ~G —which may explain why that very question, in terms of such things as the foundations of science and morality, seems to be a major battleground on here. (Recognizing that, here, G may be seen as an extraordinary claim that needs extraordinary evidence in its support.)
I’m starting to think that the distinction simply rests on explanatory statements of the
reasons for the decision of ~G—i.e., insufficient weighting of the relative evidence to reasonably decide G, as opposed to perceiving sufficient positive evidence against G. (This may go to the “burden of proof” question, as well.) Thus there is no real “category” difference between a “weak” and a “strong” atheist, in that both have made the decision ~G.
In terms of the ongoing argument between you and Dr. S. on this, I think that he is correct in terms of ~G not being the absence of a decision; on the other hand, I see your position, based on insufficiency of evidence for G, as opposed to a “strong” argument based on positive evidence for ~G, as having some explanatory relevance.
Clearly, however, you think that the evidentiary situation is one that allows you the decision: ~G. I find that to be qualitatively different from the situation of (1) above. That is, yours is an atheism that has been informed of the options and examined them; not that of the person who has never been so informed.