Clarification on how we infer the theists intent wrt free-will/omniscience

Originally posted by lemon lime
What does "Pace" the point about Pharaoh mean"?

Sorry, I managed to miss this earlier. It's from the ablative of pax, Latin for peace, basically it means I'm acknowledging your position with regard to Pharaoh without agreeing with it and moving on to something else.

Originally posted by DeepThought
The point I was making was just that divine foreknowledge is believed by some to prevent anyone from having free will, however God intervening to curtail the free will of one person for specific reasons at one time would not prevent everyone else from having free will and would not prevent said person from having free will the rest of the time. It's dif ...[text shortened]... ide in discussions about free will.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge

The point I was making was just that divine foreknowledge is believed by some to prevent anyone from having free will, however God intervening to curtail the free will of one person for specific reasons at one time would not prevent everyone else from having free will and would not prevent said person from having free will the rest of the time.

The only part of this I disagree with is the notion that free will was not always present, but a case (for or against) can be made either way depending on how you define interference. If interference is defined as a direct negation of free will, therefore no free will was present or at work (with Pharaoh) because Gods will canceled it out, then under those circumstances this would work to explain negation (or non-existence) of free will.

But I think we can reasonably make a distinction between a direct intervention causing the canceling out of free will and an indirect intervention caused by non-prevention of free will. God "causing" a hardening of Pharaohs heart (or resolve) could be said to have been accomplished by Him not directly intervening (or interfering) with Pharaohs free will desire to accomplish his goal. Defining it in this way means Pharaohs free will was always present, whether his objective was realized or not.

If I lose a game of chess, it's not because my will to win or obtain a draw was not always present throughout the game. It simply means I was not able to accomplish the goal of winning. My opponent did not cancel out or negate my free will, because my free will was always present causing me to actively look at choices and make decisions. So if anything was canceled out or made null, it would be the result of making free will choices and decisions. Not accomplishing a goal doesn't cancel out free will, it cancels out an intended result or action guided by free will.

Gods' foreknowledge of what I will do doesn't have the power to cause me to do anything, because knowing isn't the same as causing. Knowing the effect of a particular cause doesn't have the power to cause that cause, or to achieve what is known to happen as a result of knowing. This may seem counter intuitive, but it isn't necessary for foreknowledge of events to have any direct effect on those events. There can be a surface appearance of cause and effect, but I think that's the only place this connection can actually exist...

Originally posted by lemon lime
[b]The point I was making was just that divine foreknowledge is believed by some to prevent anyone from having free will, however God intervening to curtail the free will of one person for specific reasons at one time would not prevent everyone else from having free will and would not prevent said person from having free will the rest of the time.

...[text shortened]... nce of cause and effect, but I think that's the only place this connection can actually exist...[/b]

Regarding the Crichton novel in your previous post. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about, to make the plot work he had to make an expert in a field bone-headedly stupid for a couple of chapters. Which meant he hadn't thought through the scenario properly and found a good reason, like evidence pointing in a different direction, to put the expert off the scent. It's the same kind of thing as the familiar horror film theme where the kids all decide to go into a dilapidated house and then decide to investigate the screams from the cellar one at a time.

The difficulty is that with non-prescient knowledge the knowledge follows the event. So the cause of the knowledge is the event. With normal predictions there is still not a prediction, essentially because the prediction can be wrong. The problem comes with infallibility. Our entity with infallible prescience cannot be wrong about what will happen and either the normal order in time of cause and effect are reversed or what is cause and what is effect are switched around. The problem exposes deep questions about the nature of cause and effect and the problem of time.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Regarding the Crichton novel in your previous post. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about, to make the plot work he had to make an expert in a field bone-headedly stupid for a couple of chapters. Which meant he hadn't thought through the scenario properly and found a good reason, like evidence pointing in a different direction, to put the expert o ...[text shortened]... The problem exposes deep questions about the nature of cause and effect and the problem of time.

Comparing or equating prescient knowledge with any form of prediction (normal or not) is a good example of what I meant by tinkering with definitions. Defining knowledge of an event as a cause because it comes before the event puts knowledge squarely in the same camp as physical causes and effects. I can't be sure if this definition of knowledge is applicable or not, because I've never regarded knowledge in and of itself to be a direct cause of an effect/event. I don't know how knowing (by itself, prescient or otherwise) could operate directly as a moving force. But I sense we are close to reaching full circle here, and I don't want to backtrack and require the same you do...


... the familiar horror film theme where the kids all decide to go into a dilapidated house and then decide to investigate the screams from the cellar one at a time.

YouTube

Originally posted by lemon lime
Comparing or equating prescient knowledge with any form of prediction (normal or not) is a good example of what I meant by tinkering with definitions. Defining knowledge of an event as a cause because it comes before the event puts knowledge squarely in the same camp as physical causes and effects. I can't be sure if this definition of knowledge is ...[text shortened]... te the screams from the cellar one at a time.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWv-dIUP9oc[/b]

The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true. Suppose weather forecasting became uncannily precise, we would not regard it as causative of the weather. But infallibility changes this. If God believes I will do X then I will do X. I you believe I will do X then you may be mistaken, wars have been won and lost over this kind of error (c.f. The Man Who Never Was [1]).

There is no definitional tinkering in this. Knowledge is simply defined, and has been for a few thousand years, as justified belief that is true. People have argued with that definition and it only applies to "knowledge of", not "knowledge how" or "acquaintance knowledge" ("I know how to type" and "I know Rachel" respectively), but that does not require "tinkering with" for this discussion. Infallibility means "never being wrong", period. There is no tinkering with definitions. The consequence of infallible foreknowledge is that what is foreknown must come to pass. Straightforwardly, this produces a problem for the notion of divine infallible foreknowledge and libertarian free will.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat

Originally posted by DeepThought
The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true. Suppose weather forecasting became uncannily precise, we would not regard it as causative of the weather. But infallibility changes this. If God believes I will do X then I will do X. I you believe I will do X then you may be mistak ...[text shortened]... foreknowledge and libertarian free will.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat

The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true.

Yeah, I get that. But again, equating (fallible) prediction with (infallible) prescient knowledge is not a valid equation. I can make predictions without knowing, but knowing necessarily involves certainty, and certainty is not an inherent property of prediction.

https://themindlessphilosopher.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/logical-spock.jpg

Originally posted by lemon lime
[b]The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true.

Yeah, I get that. But again, equating (fallible) prediction with (infallible) prescient knowledge is not a valid equation. I can make predictions without knowing, but knowing necessarily involves certainty, and certainty is not an inherent property of prediction.[/b]

Certainty is not a property of knowing either.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Certainty is not a property of knowing either.

Not a property of prescient knowledge, or not a property of knowing?

How can you know something without there being at least some level of certainty? If there is no certainty (certainty not a property) in knowing, then how is knowledge any different than speculation or imagination?

Originally posted by lemon lime
How can you know something without there being at least some level of certainty? If there is no certainty (certainty not a property) in knowing, then how is knowledge any different than speculation or imagination?

There are a lot of people here whose religious-based "knowledge" is not noticeably "...different than speculation or imagination". Their "certainty" comes from their "faith". Without "certainty"/"faith" their "knowledge" amounts to nothing, except perhaps as anthropological knowledge of what people and groups profess to believe.

I've been thinking about an alternative definition to accidental necessity, that's to say alternative to Plantinga's. He defines accidental necessity in terms of agency, which is fine as we cannot change the past, but I feel in some ways this is the wrong place to start. One could attempt to rewrite his definition in terms of chains of events, but this would lead to essentially the same conclusion. I want to start from a different angle. I have to talk about physics for a minute, so skip this next paragraph if you don't understand it. A common sense view of time will suffice for the rest.

In both general and special relativity what defines time is the observer. A given observer has a backwards light cone that is their own personal past. Quantum mechanics is in contradiction to this. It basically relies on a specific reference frame, in other words a special observer, to define what order observations are made in. This is the basis for the Problem of Time in physics. However for Earth bound observers the problem of time is pretty short term. It takes about a four milliseconds for light to travel the distance that crosses the earth. So the definition that I'm going to propose is only problematic on cosmological distance scales. This is not to deny that there is a problem, just that I don't think it will make a difference to any Earth bound conclusions.

Consider the set of possible worlds which are identical to the actual world until a given time T. Call this set A. Then something has the necessity of the past at time T if it is necessary in all possible worlds in that set. The relativistic equivalent is to specify an observer and for that observer only things in their backwards light cone have the necessity of the past. One requires an overall coherence which is beyond the scope of my definition, and irrelevant to discussions of anything Earth bound.

So □ª, the accidental necessity operation, ranges over the set of possible worlds relative to Earth bound observers at some UTC time T, which have identical histories up until that time. Future events that can change do not have accidental necessity, however future events that are inevitable, given the history of the world and the laws of physics, have the same accidental necessity that the past does. If I had thrown a ball into the air a few seconds ago then it would hit the ground a few seconds into the future. Physics guarantees that, there is no possible world in the set I am considering in which that won't happen. However, had William of Normandy not decided to invade England then I would not exist and neither would any of you. The decision changed too much, the possible worlds where we all exist are not in the set of accidentally necessary worlds had he decided not to invade.

This produces an accessibility relation on the set of possible worlds considerable for accidental necessity. In Plantinga's ants example the ants have moved in. If Paul mows his garden they will die. Possible worlds within my definition exist where that will come to pass. But not if God cares about the ants and knows the future. My claim is that Plantinga's example is incoherent relative to my definition of accidental necessity. Either God can tell which the actual world is, among the myriad of possible futures are, or he cannot. If he can then Paul will not mow his lawn and is lacking alternative possibilities. If free will depends on the possibility of alternatives then Paul does not have free will in this matter in my model.

Originally posted by lemon lime
Not a property of prescient knowledge, or not a property of knowing?

How can you know something without there being at least some level of certainty? If there is no certainty (certainty not a property) in knowing, then how is knowledge any different than speculation or imagination?

To know is to have a belief which is justified and true. Infallibility enters in the level of justification. As mere mortals we are forever uncertain and can be found wrong. Which does not mean that everything we know is false, just that we can never be sure. Infallibility means that there is perfect justification. There is no possibility of being wrong.

Originally posted by FMF
There are a lot of people here whose religious-based "knowledge" is not noticeably "...different than speculation or imagination". Their "certainty" comes from their "faith". Without "certainty"/"faith" their "knowledge" amounts to nothing, except perhaps as anthropological knowledge of what people and groups profess to believe.

I don't see how this is relevant, because the main focus of discussion has been prescient knowledge.

I don't want to talk about a personal faith based knowledge, because frankly it's aggravating to listen to some people here presuming to know what other people believe, presume to know what those beliefs are based on, and presume to know why people believe as they do.

If faith isn't about knowing, then how are they able to know without actually knowing, but rather are able to know by having faith in their being right about what they don't actually know? I don't want to listen to this, or point out how stupid it is for someone to contract themselves by employing their own faith in knowing what is wrong about someone elses faith... but apparently I won't have a choice in the matter, and will have to address this at some point.


see what I did there?

Originally posted by lemon lime

I don't see how this is relevant, because the main focus of discussion has been prescient knowledge.

It was a comment on the relationship between "certainty" and "knowledge", which you mentioned, although it may not be the main focus of the discussion.

...it's aggravating to listen to some people here presuming to know what other people believe, presume to know what those beliefs are based on, and presume to know why people believe as they do.

Most people here talk constantly about what they believe, about what those beliefs are based on, and talk about why they believe what they believe, so there is little or no presumption needed when responding to them or commenting on what they said.

Originally posted by DeepThought
To know is to have a belief which is justified and true. Infallibility enters in the level of justification. As mere mortals we are forever uncertain and can be found wrong. Which does not mean that everything we know is false, just that we can never be sure. Infallibility means that there is perfect justification. There is no possibility of being wrong.

So in other words... I can not know with any certainty about the outside world, because I am only aware of what my sensory inputs are telling me.

I will need to give this more thought

Originally posted by DeepThought
The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true. Suppose weather forecasting became uncannily precise, we would not regard it as causative of the weather. But infallibility changes this. If God believes I will do X then I will do X. I you believe I will do X then you may be mistak ...[text shortened]... foreknowledge and libertarian free will.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat

The consequence of infallible foreknowledge is that what is foreknown must come to pass.

This is building an argument that necessarily leads to "consequence of" and "must come to pass". It strictly defines foreknowledge as being a part of a cause and effect relationship. It also assumes the need for qualifiers such as "infallible" and "prescient". This really isn't necessary, because I'm fairly sure everyone here understands what foreknowledge would mean within the context of this forum.

Another argument not strictly dependent on cause/effect could naturally lead to saying:

"The evidence of (infallible) foreknowledge is that what is foreknown does come to pass."

From this a cause and effect relationship can be surmised without it being a necessary condition.