Clarification on how we infer the theists intent wrt free-will/omniscience

Originally posted by lemon lime
[b]The key word is "infallible". With most predictions there is a possibility of error, even if they turn out to be true.

Yeah, I get that. But again, equating (fallible) prediction with (infallible) prescient knowledge is not a valid equation. I can make predictions without knowing, but knowing necessarily involves certainty, and certainty ...[text shortened]... y of prediction.

https://themindlessphilosopher.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/logical-spock.jpg[/b]

... equating (fallible) prediction with (infallible) prescient knowledge is not a valid equation.

I meant to say comparing and comparison... not equating and equation. And it would have been better to say 'good' or 'accurate' rather than 'valid'.
Sometimes I don't spot mistakes like this until it's too late to edit.

Originally posted by lemon lime
[b]The consequence of infallible foreknowledge is that what is foreknown must come to pass.

This is building an argument that necessarily leads to "consequence of" and "must come to pass". It strictly defines foreknowledge as being a part of a cause and effect relationship. It also assumes the need for qualifiers such as "infallible" and "prescient ...[text shortened]... rom this a cause and effect relationship can be surmised without it being a necessary condition.[/b]

The statement of infallibility is important as it makes the foreknowledge absolutely certain. The word "evidence" is problematic because there is no evidence outside of the Bible and similar texts of infallible foreknowledge. The statement we are using is along the lines:

The things an entity with infallible foreknowledge believes will come to pass will come to pass.

There is no mention of cause and effect in this definition. The definition makes the future certain and it is difficult to avoid fatalist conclusions.

Originally posted by DeepThought
The statement of infallibility is important as it makes the foreknowledge absolutely certain. The word "evidence" is problematic because there is no evidence outside of the Bible and similar texts of infallible foreknowledge. The statement we are using is along the lines:

The things an entity with infallible foreknowledge believes will come to pass ...[text shortened]... ion. The definition makes the future certain and it is difficult to avoid fatalist conclusions.

Evidence is only problematic if it's regarded as absolutely necessary to, rather than supportive of, an argument. The problem I have with logic being the only arbiter of reality is if a connection between foreknowledge and the event itself cannot be clearly established, this could mean foreknowledge itself does not exist. It has the appearance of self fulling prophesy in that this conclusion can be arrived at before a process of logical evaluation begins, because only one outcome can be achieved.

It's not difficult to anticipate this conclusion from the beginning of the argument. If it must be proven that foreknowledge is able to cause an event by interfering with free will, but there is no physical path that can be found or established, then no (logic based) formulation can fix this... the outcome is built into (has already been established by) the premise. So whether foreknowledge itself is able to interfere with free will or not is always up for grabs, because a case (for or against) can be made either way.

Originally posted by lemon lime
Evidence is only problematic if it's regarded as absolutely necessary to, rather than supportive of, an argument. The problem I have with logic being the only arbiter of reality is if a connection between foreknowledge and the event itself cannot be clearly established, this could mean foreknowledge itself does not exist. It has the appearance of s ...[text shortened]... free will or not is always up for grabs, because a case (for or against) can be made either way.

The problem I have with logic being the only arbiter of reality is if a connection between foreknowledge and the event itself cannot be clearly established, this could mean foreknowledge itself does not exist.

This seems to be an argument from adverse consequences. If the requirement of infallibility creates a contradiction between omniscience and free will, then either infallible foreknowledge is impossible, free will does not exist, or you have to be able to justify applying dialetheism to questions about God.

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

Originally posted by DeepThought

The problem I have with logic being the only arbiter of reality is if a connection between foreknowledge and the event itself cannot be clearly established, this could mean foreknowledge itself does not exist.

This seems to be an argument from adverse consequences. If the requirement of infallibility creates a contradiction between ...[text shortened]... plying dialetheism to questions about God.

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

I made the point earlier that it's impossible to identify attributes (possessed by a sentient being) such as omniscience, prescience, omnipotence and omnipresence unless they are possessed by God. And I believe the limitations of this (our physical) reality necessarily make it impossible to equate the two. This can't be fixed or resolved as easily as getting oil and water to mix by adding soap, because oil water and soap all belong to the same physical reality. That might have been a "crap" analogy, I don't know, but it's the only one that came to mind as I was writing this.

Originally posted by lemon lime
I made the point earlier that it's impossible to identify attributes (possessed by a sentient being) such as omniscience, prescience, omnipotence and omnipresence unless they are possessed by God. And I believe the limitations of this (our physical) reality necessarily make it impossible to equate the two. This can't be fixed or resolved as easily ...[text shortened]... n a "crap" analogy, I don't know, but it's the only one that came to mind as I was writing this.

As I understand your first sentence you are saying that it is impossible to attribute any properties of this sort to any given entity unless the entity in question is God? For the omniproperties certainly, they imply an transcendent being. Prescience on the other hand is a more simple property, it does not have to be perfect. Infallible prescience on the other hand would be. However, this does not make any difference since we are not applying it to other entities. The difficulty is caused if one and only one infallible prescient being exists.

If there is an infallibly omnisciently prescient entity then they know everything by the definition of omniscience, because they are prescient this means they know everything that happens in the future, and because they are infallible there is no possibility that they are mistaken. Given these conditions it is difficult to avoid fatalistic conclusions.

Originally posted by DeepThought
As I understand your first sentence you are saying that it is impossible to attribute any properties of this sort to any given entity unless the entity in question is God? For the omniproperties certainly, they imply an transcendent being. Prescience on the other hand is a more simple property, it does not have to be perfect. Infallible prescience on ...[text shortened]... that they are mistaken. Given these conditions it is difficult to avoid fatalistic conclusions.

This seems unnecessarily complicated, but it probably didn't help matters when I included prescience in with the omni- mix.

I was specifically talking about infallible foreknowledge attributable to an infallible God. If this is about any possible god imaginable then I've made the mistake of assuming otherwise. So I apologize for not understanding this earlier, and for assuming this discussion centered mostly around the Judeo Christian God.

Originally posted by lemon lime
This seems unnecessarily complicated, but it probably didn't help matters when I included prescience in with the omni- mix.

I was specifically talking about infallible foreknowledge attributable to an infallible God. If this is about any possible god imaginable then I've made the mistake of assuming otherwise. So I apologize for not understanding this earlier, and for assuming this discussion centered mostly around the Judeo Christian God.

That is the way DeepThought likes it.

Originally posted by RJHinds
That is the way DeepThought likes it.

I think for any agnostic this is how it would have to be and not necessarily how they would like it to be, however agnosticism itself (as a belief) does have a natural tendency to lean in one direction in preference to the other. I was an agnostic at one time and treated ideas about God in much the same way... as an idea rather than as being a reality.

Originally posted by lemon lime
I think for any agnostic this is how it would have to be and not necessarily how they would like it to be, however agnosticism itself (as a belief) does have a natural tendency to lean in one direction in preference to the other. I was an agnostic at one time and treated ideas about God in much the same way... as an idea rather than as being a reality.

Yes, man has a way of distorting the facts with ideas of nonsense.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I've been thinking about an alternative definition to accidental necessity, that's to say alternative to Plantinga's. He defines accidental necessity in terms of agency, which is fine as we cannot change the past, but I feel in some ways this is the wrong place to start. One could attempt to rewrite his definition in terms of chains of events, but this ...[text shortened]... on the possibility of alternatives then Paul does not have free will in this matter in my model.

Consider the set of possible worlds which are identical to the actual world until a given time T. Call this set A. Then something has the necessity of the past at time T if it is necessary in all possible worlds in that set.

This account does not make sense to me. I would think, surely, that anything that is necessary in a world would also be necessary in any identically specified world. I am not quite sure in what sense 'necessary' is intended here; but, for example, you imply later in the post that it may refer to necessitation stemming from the history of the world coupled with whatever laws are in play. But, of course, any two identically specified worlds up to the time in question will have the same history and relevant laws; so, if some feature is necessary in this sense in one of these worlds it should be necessary in the other. But, then, for a given feature of the world it should be that it is necessary only in all members of A; or else no members of A.** But, then, this account basically reduces to saying that something is accidentally necessary at T if it is necessary, period. This does not seem to give any actual content to the notion of accidental necessity; rather, it just seems to kick the question down the road a little.

**Or, for clarification in the event that I am misunderstanding something here, do you have a specific counterexample where something is necessary in a nonempty proper subset of A?

Originally posted by RJHinds
Yes, man has a way of distorting the facts with ideas of nonsense.

Physician, heal thyself!

I don't think DeepThought needs advice from the likes of you or lemon lime when it comes to critical thinking and that kind of stuff.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Physician, heal thyself!

I don't think DeepThought needs advice from the likes of you or lemon lime when it comes to critical thinking and that kind of stuff.

Of course you don't need advice (clarification explaining your point of view) from the likes of us when it comes to critical thinking and that kind of stuff. If you are water and we are oil, and oil and water do not mix, then why would you think either point of view would be adequate for explaining the other?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Physician, heal thyself!

I don't think DeepThought needs advice from the likes of you or lemon lime when it comes to critical thinking and that kind of stuff.

But how would you know about that kind of stuff? 😏

Originally posted by LemonJello

Consider the set of possible worlds which are identical to the actual world until a given time T. Call this set A. Then something has the necessity of the past at time T if it is necessary in all possible worlds in that set.

This account does not make sense to me. I would think, surely, that anything that is necessary in a world would a ...[text shortened]... ou have a specific counterexample where something is necessary in a nonempty proper subset of A?

On the assumption that the universe isn't deterministic the future isn't set so any event in the future would not necessarily happen in all the possible worlds in A. In Plantinga's example, assume the Ants moved in earlier today (Wednesday), I can't remember if he specified the day. Paul may or may not mow his lawn on Sunday. So there's a subset of possible worlds where he mows and a subset where he doesn't. I've used a possibilist view of time and defined an accessibility relation based on that. In set A each possible world has a complete history stretching indefinitely into the future. As time passes the possible worlds which differ from the actual world become excluded from the set. The difficulty with the account is that the actual world differs from the other possible worlds in not having a set future. I don't know how much of a problem that is.