Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]If clerical responsibilities were shared with laypeople, then there would effectively be no imbalance between men and women.
Listen it's really simple. Women are not allowed to be clerics strictly on the basis of their gender. For there to truly be equal opportunity, the RCC would have to either allow women to be clerics or dispense with clerical ...[text shortened]... hem as something else: "There's no prejudice, there only SEEMS to be. Really." How pathetic.[/b]
Listen it's really simple. Women are not allowed to be clerics strictly on the basis of their gender. For there to truly be equal opportunity, the RCC would have to either allow women to be clerics or dispense with clerical positions altogether.
We seem to be conflating terms. If the issue is 'equal opportunity', then the Catholic Church obviously does not qualify; if the issue is 'discrimination', then the Church obviously discriminates against women in the sense that it excludes women from any sacerdotal ministry; if the issue, however, is equality and has some moral connotation, then I think you need to employ some subtlety.
There needs to be some clarification about what constitutes unjust gender discrimination. I would argue that it is not mere gender diefferences. For example, in the second-wave of feminist theory, there was a growing criticism of earlier feminists who merely advocated income parity and equal opportunity. These new feminists argued that the problem was not about equal opportunity but equal
value. They argued that rather than demanding that women have equal place in the workforce, they should be equally valued whatever their work. So, for example, domestic work should be valued equal to public work. Equality should mean, not equality merely in the public sphere, but equal value across the public/private divinde. This lead to greater calls for paid maternity leave and paid domestic work (which, in many countries outside the US, has been very successful.)
I think this criticism can be abstracted. Inequality is not merely difference. It is not enough to show that group A can engage in work a whereas group B cannot. What has to be demonstrated is that there is different value -- so, v(a) > v(not-a). Equality then would not be equal opportunity but about equal valuation of different roles. It might be, for example, that group A is required to do work of less value (for example, military service) in which case, inequal opportunity might actually be favouritism. It might be that work a has no value, in which case it is irrelevant whether one group is excluded.
Now I would agree that in the Catholic Church, there is disaprity of value. Only men can become priests and the priesthood is highly valued. I do not think, however, that the problem is essentially about excluding women -- but rather about valuing priests too much. If clerical responsibilities were shared with laypeople and priests were deprived of their privileges, then there would be equal valuation. You might argue that there is still discrimination and inequal opportunities -- but I would argue that there is no longer inequality. That is why I say that the problem is structural. It is not a superficial difference between men and women but a deeper problem about how power and responsibility is distributed in the Church.