Does an omnipotent/omniscient god think?

Originally posted by twhitehead
So you are comparing a being that can plan consequences and one that cannot, to try and prove something about a being that knows all consequences prior to planning.
I think you are missing that very important point that God is different from both thinking murderers and deranged murderers in that before God thinks or plans he already knows the consequence ...[text shortened]... , time does not exist for God, he sees the whole universe as a static object including all time.

So you are comparing a being that can plan consequences and one that cannot, to try and prove something about a being that knows all consequences prior to planning.
I think you are missing that very important point that God is different from both thinking murderers and deranged murderers in that before God thinks or plans he already knows the consequences. The OP suggests therefore that he cannot think and plan.

I appreciate that there is a difference; I just do not see how that matters. Some knowledge of future actions has to be a requirement of a volitive creature.

Originally posted by twhitehead
But once God has decided, he is constrained by his decision. He cannot rethink it and re-decide or his prior 'knowledge' of the future was imperfect. For his knowledge of the future to be perfect, be must know his own future decisions and future thinking.
He cannot simultaneously perfectly know the future and have volition in the future. Also either ther ...[text shortened]... n he did not know the future, or there was never a time that he actually made those decisions.

But once God has decided, he is constrained by his decision. He cannot rethink it and re-decide or his prior 'knowledge' of the future was imperfect. For his knowledge of the future to be perfect, be must know his own future decisions and future thinking.
He cannot simultaneously perfectly know the future and have volition in the future. Also either there was a time in the past, prior to thinking and deciding when he did not know the future, or there was never a time that he actually made those decisions.

Of course he can re-decide. Why would knowledge of future action prevent that?

A similar topic was discussed in this thread:

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=133337&page=&page=10

I think LemonJello gives a good summary of the libertarian-fatalist debate:

So it seems now at this point we pretty much all share the same mistrust of Premise 4. It seems to me that an infallibility condition on G's knowledge like necessarily (P -> G knows P) does get the theist everything he needs; but then Premise 4 is not justified on the basis of the infallibility condition.

Definitely a lesson learned here is that it is relatively easy for an objector to get caught in these sorts of trap. A discussion could go like this, for example:

Libertarian Theist (LT): "God's knowledge is infallible, but it does not infringe on our free will."

Fatalist Objector (FO): "Now, hold on. Let's suppose that you will A. Now, you're telling me that it is not possible that God does not know you will A. But if that is the case, then.."

LT: "No, excuse me, that's not what I'm telling you. It is possible that God does not know I will A."

FO: "But if you will A; and if possibly God does not know you will A; then possibly God is mistaken or ignorant. So He cannot be a perfect knower."

LT: "No, that doesn't follow. His knowledge is infallibile, and it is not possible that God is mistaken or ignorant about what I end up doing."

FO: "But, how can that be? We've supposed that you do in fact end up A-ing; and you're telling me that it is possibly the case that God does not know that you end up A-ing. So God cannot be a perfect knower."

LT: "No. That I end up A-ing is just contingently true. There are possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. That God knows I will A is likewise just contingently true because it is true in those possible worlds where I do end up A-ing, but false in those possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. So even though we have supposed that I will A, it is possible that God does not know that I will A. But that does not mean it is possible God is mistaken about what I do. It is still necessarily the case that if I end up A-ing, God knows it; just like it is necessarily the case that if I end up not A-ing, God knows it."

In short, the statement 'necessarily God knows he will A therefore he will A' does not entail he will necessarily A.

Originally posted by Conrau K
A similar topic was discussed in this thread:

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=133337&page=&page=10

I think LemonJello gives a good summary of the libertarian-fatalist debate:

[quote]So it seems now at this point we pretty much all share the same mistrust of Premise 4. It seems to me that an infallibility condition on G's k ...[text shortened]... s he will A therefore he will A' does not entail he will necessarily A.

Quote:

LT: "No. That I end up A-ing is just contingently true. There are possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. That God knows I will A is likewise just contingently true because it is true in those possible worlds where I do end up A-ing, but false in those possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. So even though we have supposed that I will A, it is possible that God does not know that I will A. But that does not mean it is possible God is mistaken about what I do. It is still necessarily the case that if I end up A-ing, God knows it; just like it is necessarily the case that if I end up not A-ing, God knows it."

While I don't subscribe to the notion that God's knowing I will do A, precludes the freedom of my will, I do object to the notion that it is possible that God does not know what I will do. That is, I reject it as not following from the fundamental perfection and omni-qualities of God as attributed by most theologians. WRT the above argument, a well-formed concept of God would have God know which possible world is actualized -- created -- and would know what I will do in that world. If by some stretch, two or more worlds are actualized, God would know my future actions in each one. This is because God, properly conceived, exists in a mode that is perfect, wholly complete in all aspects including knowledge, and atemporal WRT to the duration or point in time of any actualized (created) world. While we may have a future in this created world, God, not being a creature of this world, does not and so there is no undisclosed future act from God's perspective. But again I do NOT argue that this, in itself, defeats free will.

Originally posted by JS357
Quote:

LT: "No. That I end up A-ing is just contingently true. There are possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. That God knows I will A is likewise just contingently true because it is true in those possible worlds where I do end up A-ing, but false in those possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. So even though we have supposed that I will A, it ...[text shortened]... t from God's perspective. But again I do NOT argue that this, in itself, defeats free will.

While I don't subscribe to the notion that God's knowing I will do A, precludes the freedom of my will, I do object to the notion that it is possible that God does not know what I will do.

I think you misunderstand him. When Lemonjello says 'God does not know I will A', that does not mean God is mistaken, errant or has an otherwise limited knowledge (he says this himself); it means that I might do not-A. Now whether I do A or not-A, God knows which one. The point is that God only knows I will A because I choose to do A. God's knowledge is not coercing me. I could choose not-A and if I did, God would not know that I will do A -- he would know that I will not-A.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]While I don't subscribe to the notion that God's knowing I will do A, precludes the freedom of my will, I do object to the notion that it is possible that God does not know what I will do.

I think you misunderstand him. When Lemonjello says 'God does not know I will A', that does not mean God is mistaken, errant or has an otherwise limited knowled ...[text shortened]... not-A and if I did, God would not know that I will do A -- he would know that I will not-A.[/b]

Put simply, Lemoncello said, quote, "...it is possible that God does not know that I will A." My view is, if you do A, God knows that you do A, eternally. If you don't, God knows that. This is my characterization of God. If yours is that God does not know some truths, then that is yours.

I do not dispute the idea that God is not coercing you by the simple fact of knowing what you will do. But Lem clearly states, "...it is possible that God does not know...".

Originally posted by Conrau K
Wolfgang certainly wants to make it about thinking, but it is clear from context that he really means free will. Otherwise, I have no idea how God's knowledge about the future could possibly conflict with his ability to think. One seems to entail the other.

If “free will” entails god’s ability to effectively…choose…among options?* We argued this before, I think.

If god knows (omnisciently) that X, can god effectively choose that ~X is (or will be; take your pick on the time issue) in fact the case? How would you put that conjunction in a valid logical inference? Such as,

(1) G knows that X (omnisciently; infallibly); and

(2) G effectively chooses ~X?.**

If “free will” does not entail effective choosing, what does it entail? I don’t think invoking “free will” solves anything here—but you might convince me that I’m wrong. Note that I am not arguing that G’s knowledge somehow enforces action. I am simply addressing the logic of the case—that is can you show that the conjunction of G knowing omnisciently X and G effectively choosing ~X does not lead to a contradiction.

* The phrase “among options” is really redundant to the notion of choosing.

** By effectively choosing, I mean that the choice is not just wishful thinking, but is actuated. And, of course, I am not talking about sequential alternative outcomes: now X, then ~X, then X, then...

With the mention of "thinking", one might get into the psychological territory of how G goes about choosing X or ~X in any event.

Originally posted by JS357
Put simply, Lemoncello said, quote, "...it is possible that God does not know that I will A." My view is, if you do A, God knows that you do A, eternally. If you don't, God knows that. This is my characterization of God. If yours is that God does not know some truths, then that is yours.

I do not dispute the idea that God is not coercing you by the simple f ...[text shortened]... ng what you will do. But Lem clearly states, "...it is possible that God does not know...".

But, how are you not just falling for precisely the "trap" that prompted my post in the thread referenced by Conrau K? The fatalist objector there brings up the objection that, basically, the conjunction

(1) S will do A
(2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

is problematic for the idea that G is a perfect knower. This is more or less exactly your objection as well. But the conjunction (1)&(2) is not problematic in this regard, which was exactly the point of the example discussion between the libertarian theist and fatalist objector (with this being fleshed out more fully in the thread Conrau K referenced).

Lemoncello said, quote, "...it is possible that God does not know that I will A."

Right, that is what the libertarian theist states. He then proceeds to state "But that does not mean it is possible God is mistaken about what I do. It is still necessarily the case that if I end up A-ing, God knows it; just like it is necessarily the case that if I end up not A-ing, God knows it."

The reason for this is the following. Again, the infallibility condition on G's knowledge that this libertarian theist endorses is contained in the following: necessarily (P -> G knows P). Please note here that this does not preclude the conjunction (1)&(2) above, but note also that this amounts to no real strike against the cognitive powers of G: the infallibility condition still basically entails that G cannot be mistaken about what S will or will not do. This is why your inference (from the conjunction (1)&(2) to the idea that such G fails to be a perfect knower or even to the idea that it is merely possible that G is mistaken or ignorant about what S ends up doing) is flawed, and this is exactly the "trap" that I was trying to highlight in the other thread as an example of what lucifershammer was calling "crazy" talk mentality. Prima facie, it does seem rather crazy to talk about the possibility that a perfect knower does not know P in a world where P is in fact the case. But, again, it turns out to be not crazy at all since a proposition's being possible here just means that it is true in at least some possible world; and because it is one of the libertarian's chief commitments that, despite that P is true, there are possible worlds where P is false. If the libertarian theist is committed to the fact that P obtains (and hence that a perfect knower knows P) but simultaneously also the fact that there are possible worlds where P does not obtain; then he will be committed to the fact that P obtains (and hence a perfect knower knows P) but simultaneously also the fact that there are possible worlds where a perfect knower does not know that P obtains; ergo, he will be committed to the fact that P obtains (and hence a perfect knower knows P) but simultaneously also the fact that it is possible that a perfect knower does not know that P obtains. There is no problem here. In short, the inference from conjunction (1)&(2) to the idea that it is possible that G is mistaken about what S will do, is not valid. This invalid inference, however, seems tempting and that is what makes it an easy "trap".

If you are still not convinced that you have fallen into a trap, consider the following. You state here that your view is "if you do A, God knows that you do A (, eternally)". Well, that seems really weak at face value toward that idea that this 'God' you refer to is a perfect knower since this condition is consistent with its merely contingently being the case that if you do A, God knows that you do A. I doubt your view would survive much scrutiny in that regard. So, surely, we ought to be able to strengthen your condition on God's knowledge by adding necessarily in there to make it: "necessarily, if you do A, God knows that you do A (, eternally)". Surely, this could only strengthen your view with respect to the inference that such a God is a perfect knower, correct? But -- guess what -- this strengthened version of your own view is actually the view of the libertarian theist who said correctly, as you quoted, "...it is possible that God does not know that I will A." The upshot: even a substantially stronger version of your own view still admits that such possibilities will co-exist even with the putative cognitive perfection of God.

Originally posted by vistesd
If “free will” entails god’s ability to effectively…choose…among options?* We argued this before, I think.

If god knows (omnisciently) that X, can god effectively choose that ~X is (or will be; take your pick on the time issue) in fact the case? How would you put that conjunction in a valid logical inference? Such as,

(1) G kno ...[text shortened]... might get into the psychological territory of how G goes about choosing X or ~X in any event.

If “free will” does not entail effective choosing, what does it entail? I don’t think invoking “free will” solves anything here—but you might convince me that I’m wrong. Note that I am [b]not arguing that G’s knowledge somehow enforces action. I am simply addressing the logic of the case—that is can you show that the conjunction of G knowing omnisciently X and G effectively choosing ~X does not lead to a contradiction. [/b]

Well, I think if we draw on world-semantics, then it becomes easier to see how God could know infallibly that he will X yet also at the time ~X still be possible. The libertarian would say something like in world 1, God will X and therefore God knows he will X; in world 2, however, God will ~X and therefore God knows he will ~X. The fact that God will X, that he knows he will X, does not mean that ~X is impossible -- it just doesn't obtain in that world.

Originally posted by LemonJello
But, how are you not just falling for precisely the "trap" that prompted my post in the thread referenced by Conrau K? The fatalist objector there brings up the objection that, basically, the conjunction

(1) S will do A
(2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

is problematic for the idea that G is a perfect knower. This is more lities will co-exist even with the putative cognitive perfection of God.

(2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

I think I need clarification here. As I understand, the problem here is of implicature. When you say 'God does know that S will do A', we infer 'it is true that S will do A but God just does not know that'. It reads as though God has decifient knowledge. A proper semantic of the verb 'knowing' however entails not only that the thinker believes the thought-content but that the thought-content is true. For example, if I say "I do not know that Hillary Clinton is president' it is because the content of that thought is false -- it does not mean that Hillary Clinton is president and I am just completely unaware of it.

Running alone these lines, would it be acceptable to paraphrase 2 as 'It is possible that S will do not-A and G knows that'? I think that avoids the issue of inferring God has limited knowledge. JS357 should find that much less challenging.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]If “free will” does not entail effective choosing, what does it entail? I don’t think invoking “free will” solves anything here—but you might convince me that I’m wrong. Note that I am [b]not arguing that G’s knowledge somehow enforces action. I am simply addressing the logic of the case—that is can you show that the conjunction of G knowing omni ...[text shortened]... e knows he will X, does not mean that ~X is impossible -- it just doesn't obtain in that world.[/b]

[/b]I’ll buy that. But I think that the conditions under which G can infallibly know that X, and yet ~X obtains are sufficiently limited, that those limits need to be overtly recognized in any discussion.

If the LT does not also accept the notion of alternative possible worlds, then the logical dillema, it seems to me, persists:

(1) G infallibly knows that X at time t in world w; and (in fact)

(2) ~X at time t in world w.

_____________________________________________

It reminds of Euthyphro’s Dillema, in which there are certainly moves that the O-O-O theist can make to relieve the problem—but discussions on here have shown that few such theists are willing to make any of the possible moves.

Originally posted by vistesd
I’ll buy that. But I think that the conditions under which G can infallibly know that X, and yet ~X obtains are sufficiently limited, that those limits need to be overtly recognized in any discussion.

If the LT does not also accept the notion of alternative possible worlds, then the logical dillema, it seems to me, persists:

(1) G infallibly kn ...[text shortened]... cussions on here have shown that few such theists are willing to make any of the possible moves.[/b]

So do you think this god is having a jolly good time laughing over this debate?

Originally posted by sonhouse
So do you think this god is having a jolly good time laughing over this debate?

Well, now I am!! 🙂

Originally posted by LemonJello
But, how are you not just falling for precisely the "trap" that prompted my post in the thread referenced by Conrau K? The fatalist objector there brings up the objection that, basically, the conjunction

(1) S will do A
(2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

is problematic for the idea that G is a perfect knower. This is more ...[text shortened]... lities will co-exist even with the putative cognitive perfection of God.

I appreciate your thoughtful reply and I know my view is less sophisticated, but here it is.

Quote: "Prima facie, it does seem rather crazy to talk about the possibility that a perfect knower does not know P in a world where P is in fact the case."

Setting aside the question of craziness, I'll just cut through the discussion and say that by definition I regard a "perfect knower" G to be one who knows the truth value of all propositions that have a truth value. This would include knowing at which possible worlds they are true and at which possible worlds they are false, and it includes knowing the choices made by any free agents there may be, such as "In world W at time T, A freely chooses to do X."

If anyone wants to define G, as a "perfect knower" to be one who knows all knowable true propositions to be true, etc., and wants to define as not knowable, those propositions that state and/or reveal the actions of free agents when acting freely, that's their business.

I include "reveal" because presumably G is a perfect thinker and will know what a free agent chooses by knowing the state of the world that the choice entails. This opens up a can of worms, but I think it's needed, because if some Y happens at world W at time T if and only A does X, G can't know that Y happens because G knows the proposition "Y entails A doing X."

All of this careful definition of perfect knower seems aimed at salvaging the notion of free will. I would rather stick with the simple idea of perfect knower and work on the problem, if there is one, without taking such "just so" measures.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Of course he can re-decide. Why would knowledge of future action prevent that?

Please explain how that makes any sense to you.