Originally posted by twhitehead
So I ask again, how does your post:
[b]Of course he can re-decide. Why would knowledge of future action prevent that?
make any sense?

You essential agree with me that it is a requirement of omniscience that re-deciding is impossible. Thus God cannot think.

And what your argument boils down to is basically 'God cannot have free will because ...[text shortened]... he first place.
Essentially, infallible knowledge of the future results in a time paradox.

Well put. It is similar to the time paradox. I believe some physicists would be very happy to disprove time-travel and put that one to bed! Can a god (as described) be proved to not exist using this argument?

Originally posted by twhitehead
So I ask again, how does your post:
[b]Of course he can re-decide. Why would knowledge of future action prevent that?
make any sense?

You essential agree with me that it is a requirement of omniscience that re-deciding is impossible. Thus God cannot think.

And what your argument boils down to is basically 'God cannot have free will because ...[text shortened]... he first place.
Essentially, infallible knowledge of the future results in a time paradox.[/b]

You essential agree with me that it is a requirement of omniscience that re-deciding is impossible. Thus God cannot think.[/b]

First, I do not agree that it is a requirement of omniscience that redeciding be possible. What I agree with is that 'If God will A, then God knows he will A' entails that 'God will not not-A'. That is the requirement of omniscience. My point here was that foreknowledge has nothing to do with it. If you start from the premise 'God will A', then obviously God will A and not not-A. That is trivial. Of course, if you start from the premise 'God will decide A then redecide not-A', then obviously that entails God will know that he will A and then redicide he will not-A. All we are doing is going round in circles.

Second, I do not see anyway how the inability to redecide would mean that God cannot think. Surely the initial decision is enough proof of the power to think. Decision-making is only possible for a volitive, cognitive, rational creature. I don't see why to be a thinking being, God would have to be a dithering idiot constantly changing his mind.

I think you are trying to respond to an argument I haven't made. Nor did the OP.

No. You are saying that since God will A, he knows he will A and therefore canot not-A. But that is really just a trivial inference and has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge.

We are not talking about free will, we are talking about God thinking over time.

I know Wolfgang wants to make this about thinking, but this is clearly the wrong word. As soon as you talk of God deciding, you are talking of a thinking being. The way this argument is running, it is entirely about free will.

If God knows the future at a given time, he has all possible information available to him for making decisions. If he makes a decision based on that information, then later on, any thoughts he has and changes to those decisions that he makes are not based on new information. So either God got cleverer, and changed his mind - thus making a better decision, or his decisions are purely arbitrary.

Well, that is a very naive view of how decisions are made. A decision is not just a reaction to available data. A change of mind does not necessarily indicate that some new information has come to the person. It may be that the person's nature has changed over time; their may be some affective, emotional change in the person. In short, God may at time t1 decide to A but then become angry, bored, tired, merciful, at time t2 and therefore decide not-A.

Obviously this would be unacceptable to a Christian but then again, talking about God as time-bound is in itself un-Christian. Whether or not though, I don't see how the ability to redecide is a necessary requirement of thought. If God does not change his decisions, that just indicates that he is resolute.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I agree that persons are prone to read it that way, which is the trap the fatalist objector in my hypothetical discussion falls into. This FO reads (1)&(2) as though they imply that it is possible that both S will do A and G does not know that S will do A. But that is not a faithful reading. Claim (1) just says that S will do A and claim ...[text shortened]... false to begin with, but I do not want to go there at all in this thread.)

Thanks for the clarification.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]...
Second, I do not see anyway how the inability to redecide would mean that God cannot think. Surely the initial decision is enough proof of the power to think. Decision-making is only possible for a volitive, cognitive, rational creature. I don't see why to be a thinking being, God would have to be a dithering idiot constantly changing his mind.

....

[/b]
But when did god make these initial decisions? (In fact are initial decisions for an eternal creature living 'outside of time' even possible?)

Either he came into being incomplete (ie NOT omniscient) and had to do some thinking.
OR
He has always existed but has not always existed in his omniscient state. Which begs the question when did he then become omniscient?

I think your post asks more questions than it answers.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Thanks for the clarification.

Yes, but the clarification states ".. claim (2) only translates to the claim that the proposition 'G does not know that S will do A' is true in at least some possible world."

So is there a possible world at which G does not know that S will do A?" It seems to me if our G is omniscient, this ''G does not know that S will do A" would only be true in a world where S does not do A, and in that world, G knows S will not do A. So, c'mon, does G know what choice A makes, in every possible world, or not? That's a simple question about this G-concept. You can say yes or no, but just say.

Originally posted by JS357
Yes, but the clarification states ".. claim (2) only translates to the claim that the proposition 'G does not know that S will do A' is true in at least some possible world."

So is there a possible world at which G does not know that S will do A?" It seems to me if our G is omniscient, this ''G does not know that S will do A" would only be true in a world w ...[text shortened]... t? That's a simple question about this G-concept. You can say yes or no, but just say.

So is there a possible world at which G does not know that S will do A?" It seems to me if our G is omniscient, this ''G does not know that S will do A" would only be true in a world where S does not do A, and in that world, G knows S will not do A. So, c'mon, does G know what choice A makes, in every possible world, or not? That's a simple question about this G-concept. You can say yes or no, but just say.

Yes, libertarianism requires that there is a world where G does not know S will do A, which is obviously the world where S does not do A. G is still omniscient. G knows what S will do in every world.

Originally posted by wolfgang59

But when did god make these initial decisions? (In fact are initial decisions for an eternal creature living 'outside of time' even possible?)

Either he came into being incomplete (ie NOT omniscient) and had to do some thinking.
OR
He has always existed but has not always existed in his omniscient state. Which begs the question [b ...[text shortened]... n[/b] did he then become omniscient?

I think your post asks more questions than it answers.[/b]

Either he came into being incomplete (ie NOT omniscient) and had to do some thinking.
[b]OR
He has always existed but has not always existed in his omniscient state. Which begs the question when did he then become omniscient?[/b]

I don't understand why these are the only two options. The theist will say God has always existed, has always been omniscient, always knew the decisions he would make and, being omnipotent, made them. If this is not an option, could you point out where the absurdity lies here.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Either he came into being incomplete (ie NOT omniscient) and had to do some thinking.
[b]OR
He has always existed but has not always existed in his omniscient state. Which begs the question when did he then become omniscient?[/b]

I don't understand why these are the only two options. The theist will say God has always existed, has always ...[text shortened]... potent, made them. If this is not an option, could you point out where the absurdity lies here.[/b]

I never used the word absurdity - thats your choice.

I was posing some questions based on your post.

You yourself put forward the idea that there was a time when god had to do some thinking - "initial thinking" I think you said. If at that time he had to think doesnt that suggest he didnt know?. But then in your recent post you contradict yourself and say "The theist will say God has always existed, has always been omniscient, always knew the decisions he would make and, being omnipotent, made them"

I'm not trying to batter anyones faith but I just dont see how this particular god can exist.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Either he came into being incomplete (ie NOT omniscient) and had to do some thinking.
[b]OR
He has always existed but has not always existed in his omniscient state. Which begs the question when did he then become omniscient?[/b]

I don't understand why these are the only two options. The theist will say God has always existed, has always ...[text shortened]... potent, made them. If this is not an option, could you point out where the absurdity lies here.[/b]

Is there a difference between knowning all that can be known and knowing
all?
Kelly

Originally posted by wolfgang59
I never used the word absurdity - thats your choice.

I was posing some questions based on your post.

You yourself put forward the idea that there was a time when god had to do some thinking - "initial thinking" I think you said. If at that time he had to think doesnt that suggest he didnt know?. But then in your recent post you contrad ...[text shortened]... m not trying to batter anyones faith but I just dont see how this particular god can exist.

I never used the word absurdity - thats your choice.

Never mind. I was only inviting you demonstrate a reductio ad absurdum from the statement that God is omniscient and God makes a decision.

You yourself put forward the idea that there was a time when god had to do some thinking - "initial thinking" I think you said. If at that time he had to think doesnt that suggest he didnt know?.

I don't believe I said that at all. I said that there is an initial decision. I don't think I mentioned 'initial thinking'.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]I never used the word absurdity - thats your choice.

Never mind. I was only inviting you demonstrate a reductio ad absurdum from the statement that God is omniscient and God makes a decision.

You yourself put forward the idea that there was a time when god had to do some thinking - "initial thinking" I think you said. If at that time l. I said that there is an initial decision. I don't think I mentioned 'initial thinking'.

[/b]It suddenly strikes me that this whole paradigm of argument (and I agree with your affirmation of it for certain pragmatic purposes) lies outside the paradigm of “spiritual/religious” language that you and I both affirm. With regard to your comment about “a different hat”, Nietzsche, in his perspectivism, thought that that was key. Nevertheless, for good or ill, I am personally more comfortable in that “elictive” (to use bbarr’s word) language; and even less skilled in others. That may be my limitation and shortcoming; that may be my place.

Damn, but it is good to cross thought-blades with you again! Be very well, old friend.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]So is there a possible world at which G does not know that S will do A?" It seems to me if our G is omniscient, this ''G does not know that S will do A" would only be true in a world where S does not do A, and in that world, G knows S will not do A. So, c'mon, does G know what choice A makes, in every possible world, or not? That's a simple question abou ...[text shortened]... world where S does not do A. G is still omniscient. G knows what S will do in every world.

OK so what are the implications on free will, if any?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]I never used the word absurdity - thats your choice.

Never mind. I was only inviting you demonstrate a reductio ad absurdum from the statement that God is omniscient and God makes a decision.

You yourself put forward the idea that there was a time when god had to do some thinking - "initial thinking" I think you said. If at that time l. I said that there is an initial decision. I don't think I mentioned 'initial thinking'.

[/b]My bad.
You did say "initial decision". Maybe there was some "initial thinking" in order to make that decision?

I didnt intend to take any liberties but apologies if I did.[/b]

Originally posted by Conrau K
All we are doing is going round in circles.

And as far as I can tell, not making any sense.

Second, I do not see anyway how the inability to redecide would mean that God cannot think. Surely the initial decision is enough proof of the power to think.
Because the initial decision itself is re-deciding. He is deciding something that prior to the decision he already knew he would decide.

Decision-making is only possible for a volitive, cognitive, rational creature. I don't see why to be a thinking being, God would have to be a dithering idiot constantly changing his mind.
My claim is that his mind is essentially fixed for all eternity - therefore he is not thinking.

No. You are saying that since God will A, he knows he will A and therefore canot not-A. But that is really just a trivial inference and has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge.
No, I am not saying that at all. As I said you are responding to an argument I haven't made.

I know Wolfgang wants to make this about thinking, but this is clearly the wrong word. As soon as you talk of God deciding, you are talking of a thinking being.
And God cannot decide therefore he cannot think.

The way this argument is running, it is entirely about free will.
No. That is where you want it to run, not where it started.

Well, that is a very naive view of how decisions are made. A decision is not just a reaction to available data. A change of mind does not necessarily indicate that some new information has come to the person. It may be that the person's nature has changed over time; their may be some affective, emotional change in the person. In short, God may at time t1 decide to A but then become angry, bored, tired, merciful, at time t2 and therefore decide not-A.
So Gods personality changes randomly? It seems you agree with me that his decisions are essentially arbitrary.

Obviously this would be unacceptable to a Christian but then again, talking about God as time-bound is in itself un-Christian.
Well then a Christian must agree with me that God cannot think (as thinking requires time). God is static.

Whether or not though, I don't see how the ability to redecide is a necessary requirement of thought. If God does not change his decisions, that just indicates that he is resolute.
Because you are missing the point that deciding (or thinking) is re-deciding by definition. It is making a decision that prior to making it was not made (but God knew he would make).

Originally posted by Conrau K
I was thinking about this problem too. If we say that there is a world where God will not-A, surely that has to be a very different world to the one where God does A. In fact, since God has a single nature, whose essence and action are the same (as the Thomistic formula goes), then the decision to not-A results in a different God than the one to A. We come he joy of this discussion is really just the fun of trying on a different hat once in a while.

I don't think it is true that God, in order to have free will, must be able to choose not-A (i.e., something contrary to His nature and purpose). For the simple reason that for any given circumstance there may be multiple creative responses available to God, each equally consistent with God's nature and each equally sufficient for God's purposes. I propose that God's choices of actions be construed instead as a set, e.g., [A1, A2, A3, A4...]. The possibility of choosing A1 rather than A2 doesn't necessitate a different God in either possible world (A1 or A2) since God's nature and purposes in both worlds remain unchanged. Even if God, by necessity, must act according to His nature (i.e., God must choose to A), God can still be said to possess free will insofar as God is free to choose among a plethora of creative responses [A1, A2, A3, A4,...].