Originally posted by Conrau K
[b](2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

I think I need clarification here. As I understand, the problem here is of implicature. When you say 'God does know that S will do A', we infer 'it is true that S will do A but God just does not know that'. It reads as though God has decifient knowledge. A proper semantic of the verb 'knowin ...[text shortened]... of inferring God has limited knowledge. JS357 should find that much less challenging.[/b]

I'd say that in a case where it is possible that S will do not-A and G knows that, then if it is actual that S will do not-A, G will know that too. Again, I do not argue that this defeats free will.

It's really just the G-concept I prefer to the one that is needed in this particular defense of free will. It seems weird that G would be limited in knowledge for having bestowed free will on humans. Before G bestowed free will did G know everything? It's a rather constrained world for us to require G to live in, just to satisfy an argument for something we all live and feel and even demand.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Please explain how that makes any sense to you.

Well, if God trully has decided he will A, then God must always have known he will A. That is just a requirement of his omniscience. The point though is that this does not entail that doing A is necessary and not-A impossible. It does not mean that God was coerced.

And what your argument boils down to is basically 'God cannot have free will because when he will do A he can't do not-A.' The fact that he knows infallibly he will A really has nothing to do with this since you have already premised that God will do A.

Originally posted by JS357
I'd say that in a case where it is possible that S will do not-A and G knows that, then if it is actual that S will do not-A, G will know that too. Again, I do not argue that this defeats free will.

It's really just the G-concept I prefer to the one that is needed in this particular defense of free will. It seems weird that G would be limited in knowledge f ...[text shortened]... G to live in, just to satisfy an argument for something we all live and feel and even demand.

I'd say that in a case where it is possible that S will do not-A and G knows that, then if it is actual that S will do not-A, G will know that too. Again, I do not argue that this defeats free will.

Yeah, I think that is what Lemonjello is saying. And if God knows you will not-A, he certainly does not know that you will A.

It seems weird that G would be limited in knowledge for having bestowed free will on humans

Wait, I don't see anyone putting forward that argument.

Originally posted by vistesd
I’ll buy that. But I think that the conditions under which G can infallibly know that X, and yet ~X obtains are sufficiently limited, that those limits need to be overtly recognized in any discussion.

If the LT does not also accept the notion of alternative possible worlds, then the logical dillema, it seems to me, persists:

(1) G infallibly kn ...[text shortened]... cussions on here have shown that few such theists are willing to make any of the possible moves.[/b]

If the LT does not also accept the notion of alternative possible worlds, then the logical dillema, it seems to me, persists

True, but doesn't the LT have to accept the notion of alternative possible worlds (leaving aside how they construe these worlds)?

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]I'd say that in a case where it is possible that S will do not-A and G knows that, then if it is actual that S will do not-A, G will know that too. Again, I do not argue that this defeats free will.

Yeah, I think that is what Lemonjello is saying. And if God knows you will not-A, he certainly does not know that you will A.

It seems weird t ...[text shortened]... ng bestowed free will on humans

Wait, I don't see anyone putting forward that argument.[/b]

OK then.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]If the LT does not also accept the notion of alternative possible worlds, then the logical dillema, it seems to me, persists

True, but doesn't the LT have to accept the notion of alternative possible worlds (leaving aside how they construe these worlds)?[/b]

In order to escape the dilemma, I would think so, as long as the law of noncontradiction holds in a given world. But, think of some of the implications of alternative possible worlds for conventional theology (as generally represented on here)—such as the following “trilemma” that I proposed before:

(1) God saves (everyone); or

(2) God fails to save (at least some); or

(3) God does not will/want* to save (at least some).

[* If I recall correctly, the same word in the Greek; this last would fit the Calvinist double-predestinationist stance.]

To make a choice among the available (one-world) options seemed to be excruciatingly difficult for the Christian theists on here, because of what each possibility would affirm (or deny) about their god-concept.

Now, it seems to me that the alternative possible worlds hypothesis would be a way out of that trilemma—but at what cost to a scriptural exegesis and a soteriology that requires, say, eternal condemnation for the unsaved? How many Christians do you think would accept a hypothesis that allows a situation where an infallibly knowing god and free will are logically compatible, but where that also allows a situation where there are possible worlds in which, for example, universal salvation (or universal condemnation, for that matter) also might obtain. I would think that most libertarian theists would try very hard to avoid conceding an alternative possible worlds scenario. (It would be disingenuous, I think, for them to “cherry pick” only specific doctrinal points on which they would “allow” such an option&hellip😉.

If you recall the prior discussion we had on this, I remember that FreakyKBH essentially, at the end, committed himself to the Scylla of logical contradiction in order to avoid the Charybdis of what he saw as a blasphemous theological position. And that may well be the straits (pun intended) that most Christian theology finds itself in. You and I could cite a counter-example of, say, Gregory of Nyssa—but he is clearly outside the mainstream (perhaps even in Orthodox circles—despite being a saint of the church).

Basically, I think you are suggesting that the LT "has to accept" whatever alternative is dictated by logical non-contradiction. But I don't see most of them accepting that imperative...

Originally posted by vistesd
In order to escape the dilemma, I would think so, as long as the law of noncontradiction holds in a given world. [b]But, think of some of the implications of alternative possible worlds for conventional theology (as generally represented on here)—such as the following “trilemma” that I proposed before:

(1) God saves (everyone); or

(2) God fails ated by logical non-contradiction. But I don't see most of them accepting that imperative...[/b]

I was thinking about this problem too. If we say that there is a world where God will not-A, surely that has to be a very different world to the one where God does A. In fact, since God has a single nature, whose essence and action are the same (as the Thomistic formula goes), then the decision to not-A results in a different God than the one to A. We come to the old Kripkean naming problem. The LT however has to admit the possibility of God doing not-A if God is to have free will, even if the resultant God of that world (wherehe does not-A) no longer qualifies under the same name of God (who does A).

I think there is a solution but ultimately it leads to a kind of weak determinism. The LT will say that God has free will, that this entails that God in w1 does A and in w2 does not-A -- but will have to construe w1 and w2 as worlds where God has a different natures (perhaps one where he has the inclination to will the salvation of all and another where he does not.) This meets the requirement of libertarianism but results in a kind of determinism -- God's decision is ultimately the result of whatever is his nature in that particular world. God has free will basically only in the dynamic sense -- he has the power to do not-A but won't unless it were in accordance with his nature.

Neither of us really have much respect for the libertarian problem. I think the joy of this discussion is really just the fun of trying on a different hat once in a while.

Originally posted by wolfgang59
given that god supposedly knew the future of every particle in the universe at the moment of creation and given that god is part of the universe, does that imply that he knew his own actions in advance? and that therefore he cannot change them? in other words he is as helpless as any one of us? this would include god's inability to think (although he may ...[text shortened]... [/i] of thinking)

what value are worship and prayer when the god is powerless to think/act?

Why do you assume God is part of the universe? God created the universe does
not mean the universe is part of God, but only God's creation. That said, God
would not be limited to anything about the universe that He didn't want to be.
Kelly

Originally posted by Conrau K
I was thinking about this problem too. If we say that there is a world where God will not-A, surely that has to be a very different world to the one where God does A. In fact, since God has a single nature, whose essence and action are the same (as the Thomistic formula goes), then the decision to not-A results in a different God than the one to A. We come ...[text shortened]... he joy of this discussion is really just the fun of trying on a different hat once in a while.

It is an interesting question—especially the question of god’s nature in different possible worlds, as you have outlined it. I really hadn’t thought of how the alternative possible worlds hypothesis might apply in theological questions, till this discussion. Now, as a gestaltic non-dualist, I have to play with some questions within my own metaphysical position (e.g., the role of multiple alternative worlds within an ultimate gestaltic whole…? )—emphasis on the word “play”.

Neither of us really have much respect for the libertarian problem. I think the joy of this discussion is really just the fun of trying on a different hat once in a while.

Absolutely. 🙂

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b](2) It is possible that G does not know that S will do A

I think I need clarification here. As I understand, the problem here is of implicature. When you say 'God does know that S will do A', we infer 'it is true that S will do A but God just does not know that'. It reads as though God has decifient knowledge. A proper semantic of the verb 'knowin ...[text shortened]... of inferring God has limited knowledge. JS357 should find that much less challenging.[/b]

I agree that persons are prone to read it that way, which is the trap the fatalist objector in my hypothetical discussion falls into. This FO reads (1)&(2) as though they imply that it is possible that both S will do A and G does not know that S will do A. But that is not a faithful reading. Claim (1) just says that S will do A and claim (2) only translates to the claim that the proposition 'G does not know that S will do A' is true in at least some possible world. It does not all just somehow translate to the claim that the propositions 'S will do A' and 'G does not know that S will do A' are both true in at least some possible world. Regardless, I agree with you that this is the way it is often translated in practice.

As you correctly point out, 'G does not know that S will do A' can be arrived at through different routes. One route involves 'S will do A' also obtaining and thus G is either mistaken or ignorant of that fact, which I think we can all agree is quite problematic for the idea that G is a perfect knower. However, this route directly contradicts the libertarian theist's infallibility condition on G's knowledge, and the LT is not committed to this route on any level. Therefore, when the FO latches on to this route and uses it to try to show inconsistency within the LT's position, the FO only shows that he misunderstands the LT's position. A different route, which is the one the LT is actually committed to, is that 'G does not know that S will do A' obtains merely because it is not the case that S will do A (or, rather, the LT is committed to the possibility that G does not know that S will do A obtaining merely because the possibility that S will not do A also obtains). But this is not problematic at all for the LT; it is simply a natural consequence of his libertarian commitments and the infallibility condition.

To answer your question, I think in many cases it would help for the sake of clarity to paraphrase (2) as you suggest. I think the primary benefit it could add to the current discussion is to make it more clear that the awkwardness of (1)&(2) does not stem from any deficiency in the LT's understanding of infallibility or from any deficiency in his infallibility condition itself. It actually stems mainly just from the LT's libertarian commitments. This is a principal point I think JS357 misrepresented. As I understood his objections, JS357 basically claimed that LT's commitment to (1)&(2) belies an improper construal of G's infallibility or of G's cognitive perfection. But, in fact, the alternative construals that JS357 have offered up will all also admit of (1)&(2) as will basically any other construal anyone could offer up, given the truth of libertarianism! (Of course, I think libertarianism is outrageously false to begin with, but I do not want to go there at all in this thread.)

Originally posted by JS357
I appreciate your thoughtful reply and I know my view is less sophisticated, but here it is.

Quote: "Prima facie, it does seem rather crazy to talk about the possibility that a perfect knower does not know P in a world where P is in fact the case."

Setting aside the question of craziness, I'll just cut through the discussion and say that by definition I work on the problem, if there is one, without taking such "just so" measures.

I regard a "perfect knower" G to be one who knows the truth value of all propositions that have a truth value.

Okay, but are you under the impression that this view is immune from being associated with the conjunction (1)&(2)? It is not. It is no more immune than the LT's construal of infallibility. As I mentioned above to Conrau K, the conjunction (1)&(2) is not going to stem from anyone's reading of infallibility or perfect cognition. It stems principally from the libertarianism at play throughout here. According to libertarianism, that S will do A goes hand in hand with the possibility that it is not the case that S will do A. But, then, that S will do A goes hand in hand with the possibility that G does not know that S will do A (again, because of the trivial observation that where it is not the case that S will do A, it is the case that G does not know that S will do A). Again, this is no strike against the cognitive powers of G. It is not even warranted for you to infer from (1)&(2) that it is even merely possible that G is mistaken or ignorant about what S will or will not do. It is simply an innocuous consequence of the libertarian assumption at play here.

Further, this reading of yours does not seem to have any benefit over the infallibility condition offered by the LT, which was the following: necessarily, if P then G knows P. The LT already naturally gets that G "knows the truth value of all propositions that have a truth value" because for any P, the conjunction of P and LT's infallibility condition entails that G knows P. If anything, I would say there are good reasons to think your take on perfect knowing is inferior to the LT's take. For example, the notion of infallibility should be wrapped up with immunity from even the possibility of epistemic error; whereas I think it is doubtful that yours provides for this. Under your reading, sure, it follows that if P then G knows P; but isn't your construal still consistent with this merely contingently being the case? If so, then even if it is true that if P then G knows P; it does not follow that G's knowledge is immune from the possibility of epistemic error. If your take is consistent with its only contingently being the case that if P then G knows P, it follows directly that your take is consistent with the possibility that it is not the case that if P then G knows P. This result surely seems problematic for the idea that G is a perfect knower. But the LT's infallibility condition, in contrast, explicitly cannot suffer from this problem. And that is one main reason why I think the LT's infallibility condition is substantially stronger than the alternatives you have offered.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Well, if God trully has decided he will A, then God must always have known he will A. That is just a requirement of his omniscience.

So I ask again, how does your post:
Of course he can re-decide. Why would knowledge of future action prevent that?
make any sense?

You essential agree with me that it is a requirement of omniscience that re-deciding is impossible. Thus God cannot think.

And what your argument boils down to is basically 'God cannot have free will because when he will do A he can't do not-A.' The fact that he knows infallibly he will A really has nothing to do with this since you have already premised that God will do A.
I think you are trying to respond to an argument I haven't made. Nor did the OP.
We are not talking about free will, we are talking about God thinking over time. If God knows the future at a given time, he has all possible information available to him for making decisions. If he makes a decision based on that information, then later on, any thoughts he has and changes to those decisions that he makes are not based on new information. So either God got cleverer, and changed his mind - thus making a better decision, or his decisions are purely arbitrary.
But also, if he knew the future, he should know that he was going to get cleverer and make those new decisions, so why doesn't he just go with the decision in the first place.
Essentially, infallible knowledge of the future results in a time paradox.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I regard a "perfect knower" G to be one who knows the truth value of all propositions that have a truth value.

Okay, but are you under the impression that this view is immune from being associated with the conjunction (1)&(2)? It is not. It is no more immune than the LT's construal of infallibility. As I mentioned above to Conrau K, the conju ...[text shortened]... libility condition is substantially stronger than the alternatives you have offered.[/b]

I don't believe I have ever hinted or said that G is mistaken or ignorant.

Any libertarian assumption that contradicts my view of G would be an assumption I do not make. This is not to say that my view of G is "correct." As far as I am concerned we are like playwrights discussing a character in a play we are writing together. We do want that character to be logically consistent with other aspects of the play, such as the rules of the "world" that character inhabits.

Under my construal, if *necessarily* G knows all true Ps, then G knows this and I don't have to specify it. 🙂

Seriously, if merely not specifying necessity implies imperfection, and necessity is a mark of perfection in knowledge, then necessity is implied, as I have specified perfection as a general attribute.

If there is an underlying point to your concern, I don't see it. Are you driving at a point concerning G thinking? Concerning free will? What is it?

Originally posted by JS357
I don't believe I have ever hinted or said that G is mistaken or ignorant.

Any libertarian assumption that contradicts my view of G would be an assumption I do not make. This is not to say that my view of G is "correct." As far as I am concerned we are like playwrights discussing a character in a play we are writing together. We do want that character to be e it. Are you driving at a point concerning G thinking? Concerning free will? What is it?

I don't believe I have ever hinted or said that G is mistaken or ignorant.

I did not say that you did.

You stated "I do object to the notion that it is possible that God does not know what I will do. That is, I reject it as not following from the fundamental perfection and omni-qualities of God as attributed by most theologians." The implication you were making here is that if a view of G's cognitive perfection is compatible with the conjunction (1)&(2), then there is something deficient about that view. But, you have failed to support this in any substantive way. And, I think you are just wrong on this point: the conjunction (1)&(2) does not owe in any real way to the LT's infallibility condition or to his understanding or misunderstanding of what it means for G to be cognitively perfect; nor is it warranted for one to infer from (1)&(2) that it is even possible that G is mistaken or ignorant. Again, it simply owes to his libertarianism.

After that, you have been providing alternative readings of cognitive perfection that, presumably, you think avoid conjunction (1)&(2). But, guess what, none of them will avoid (1)&(2), given the truth of libertarianism. Beyond that, I have given some additional reasons why I think your alternatives fail in ways that the LT's take on infallibility does not. Here, I did not say that you have hinted or said that G is mistaken or ignorant. What I said is that your take on G's cognitive perfection seems nevertheless consistent with the possibility that it is not the case that Q, where Q is the proposition 'if P, then G knows that P'. To me, this seems problematic for you.

Any libertarian assumption that contradicts my view of G would be an assumption I do not make.

There is nothing about the libertarian assumption here that contradicts your view. The truth of libertarianism just means that, whatever view you do have of G's cognition, it will have to still be friends with conjunction (1)&(2). But, as I am trying to point out, that is not really a problem that should concern us.

Under my construal, if *necessarily* G knows all true Ps, then G knows this and I don't have to specify it.

No, please be careful here. I did not say that the infallibility condition means that from P it follows that necessarily G knows P. If the conjunction of P and the infallibility condition entails that necessarily G knows P, then genuine fatalistic problems arise. (For this, please see the other thread that Conrau K referenced. In particular, the contributions of bbarr, Lord Shark, Conrau K, lucifershammer are all excellent toward this and related points. And directly speaking this point, I think that thread probably provides at least a link or some discussion toward an even earlier argument of bbarr's that clearly demonstrates the genuine fatalistic problem here.) The LT's condition on infallibility is specifically structured to avoid this problem. The proposition that is necessary is not that G knows P; rather, it is the conditional that if P, then G knows P. This distinction turns out to be quite important.

Anyway, I do not think your construal as you stated it before had anything to do with necessity. That is one reason why I do not think it would succeed. If you want to add in necessity, I recommend you do it on the conditional, not on the proposition that G knows all true Ps. If you bring necessity in on the proposition that G knows all true Ps, I think you will surely be wrong when you say that G's perfect knowing does not preclude freedom of the libertarian sort (again, see bbarr's earlier argument for the clear demonstration of this). On the other hand, if you bring necessity in on the conditional, I do not think there is any genuine threat of theological fatalism.

Anyway, I do appreciate that there are some real subtleties to this discussion. Sometimes I take this for granted due to my previous studies on this topic. So, please forgive me if I seem insensitive to that.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I don't believe I have ever hinted or said that G is mistaken or ignorant.

I did not say that you did.

You stated "I do object to the notion that it is possible that God does not know what I will do. That is, I reject it as not following from the fundamental perfection and omni-qualities of God as attributed by most theologians." The impli ...[text shortened]... ious studies on this topic. So, please forgive me if I seem insensitive to that.[/b]

I believe that somewhere along the way I said that under my formulation, G knows all true P's. I think with the word 'true' this is the same as 'if P, then G knows P.' I think I also said that G knows the truth value of all P's. This may be superfluous, since "The truth value of P is 'false'" is a proposition and so is known by G, so it expresses the same idea as far as I can tell. At any rate, I can accept 'if P, then G knows P' as expressing the same idea.

But all along, I have said that I am not arguing a position on free will.

I can see I am dabbling at the edge of a lake that you and others have explored much further. I appreciate your patience.