Originally posted by lucifershammerI disagree. Setting aside neurological explanations (which can add clarity to such musings) our perception of thought and emotion is still largely subjective. You perceive by your thoughts that you are thinking. We think that we think. There's an element of tautology in it, as you cannot separate both, so one cannot logically state with certainty that we think (although all evidence seems to point that we do).
Since you're complaining, I'll answer yours first. 😉
Even if emotions and thoughts are only known through experience, their reality is still properly a priori (a distinction that Kant made) because they cannot be denied without at once contradicting oneself; and therefore can be known with absolute certainty; i.e. an absolute truth can be claimed.
EDIT: I didn't read vistesd's latest post when I wrote the above. Honest.
Originally posted by vistesdWhy do you think that “I-self” represents something more than a transient consciousness-complex that has a nuero-physiological ground ... and has a singular perspective that is self-referential?
Why do you think that “I-self” represents something more than a transient consciousness-complex that has a nuero-physiological ground (responsible for memory, feeling, etc.), and has a singular perspective that is self-referential? That is, why do you think the “I-self” is a substance? A Buddhist (at least a Zen Buddhist) would flat disagree, while having ...[text shortened]... would distinguish between jivatman and atman, but ayam atma brahmasmi...
I'm not sure what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?
That is, why do you think the “I-self” is a substance?
A 'substance' (in classical metaphysics) is simply a distinct thing. Is that the sense you're using it in?
Originally posted by PalynkaIt's not a question of "We think that we think" but "We cannot think that we cannot think". Either we cannot think at all (like a rock) or, if we can think, we know that fact with certainty. If we didn't, then it should be logically possible for us to think that we cannot think without self-contradiction -- which it isn't.
I disagree. Setting aside neurological explanations (which can add clarity to such musings) our perception of thought and emotion is still largely subjective. You perceive by your thoughts that you are thinking. We think that we think. There's an element of tautology in it, as you cannot separate both, so one cannot logically state with certainty that we think (although all evidence seems to point that we do).
(I don't think it was intentional when you said "there's an element of tautology in it" -- but a tautology is also logical truth.)
Originally posted by lucifershammerIt's possible to conceive that we do not think but are given the perception of thinking.
It's not a question of "We think that we think" but "We cannot think that we cannot think". Either we cannot think at all (like a rock) or, if we can think, we know that fact with certainty. If we didn't, then it should be logically possible for us to think that we cannot think without self-contradiction -- which it isn't.
(I don't think it was int ...[text shortened]... id "there's an element of tautology in it" -- but a tautology is also logical truth.)
My point is that you cannot deduce existence through a tautology.
Originally posted by lucifershammerMaybe I can simplify: Why would one conclude that the “I-self” is anything more than a sense of (or, for humans at least, conscious awareness of) identity, and that the “thing” referred to is just this transient physical existent (including bodily and mental processes) that I refer to as “I”?*
[b]Why do you think that “I-self” represents something more than a transient consciousness-complex that has a nuero-physiological ground ... and has a singular perspective that is self-referential?
I'm not sure what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?
That is, why do you think the “I-self” is a substance?
A 'substance' (in classical metaphysics) is simply a distinct thing. Is that the sense you're using it in?[/b]
Yes, that is how I am thinking of substance—it was Wittgenstein who said that it an error to think that there must be a substance for every substantive (noun). So the question becomes: Why conclude that the “self” must be such a thing. I am not saying that it is irrational to make such a decision—just that, in the end, that is what it is.
* The difficulty I am having is not using the word “self” in my description—but if I use the phrase “self-referential,” I do not mean reference to a thing.
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Originally posted by PalynkaIt's possible to conceive that we do not think but are given the perception of thinking.
It's possible to conceive that we do not think but are given the perception of thinking.
My point is that you cannot deduce existence through a tautology.
No, it's not. Read that sentence again - it contradicts itself for two reasons:
1. Conceiving (here) is an act of thinking in itself.
2. (Brains in vat?) Even if one considers that strange entities called "thoughts" are "fed" to our minds, the very fact that they are perceived cannot be denied. But thought consists precisely in that perception.
My point is that you cannot deduce existence through a tautology.
I wasn't trying to. I'm just pointing out that there are certain existents we do know for certain.
EDIT: To put it another way, there are certain cases when existence is apprehended directly, without mediating deductions etc.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerObviously, in the context of the possibility I mentioned, that I conceive would be no more than a perception of conceiving.
[b]It's possible to conceive that we do not think but are given the perception of thinking.
No, it's not. Read that sentence again - it contradicts itself for two reasons:
1. Conceiving (here) is an act of thinking in itself.
2. (Brains in vat?) Even if one considers that strange entities called "thoughts" are "fed" to our minds, the very f ...[text shortened]... at they are perceived cannot be denied. But thought consists precisely in that perception.[/b]
If that possibility is true, even the perception I mention in my previous post would be essentially meaningless as we wouldn't be able to define what it 'means' outside of our 'perceptions'.
You're basically (metaphorically) saying 'I call this thing 'thought'. I think, therefore I am'. Do you find such explanation satisfactory? First you need an 'I' for the first step with for which you conclude existence afterwards. It's circular. One must 'assume' one exists and that assumption does not fall out of the sky as it is based on evidence and Occam's Razor.
Originally posted by liteswordatlitespeedYou show me where did Juses said he is GOD or GOD say that Juses is GOD.
What do i have to do to help you to choose that Jesus is God?
I will submit some verses later.
Submit some verses from the Koran that talk about Jesus and I will look them over.
Originally posted by vistesdI'm sorry, but I don't understand your question. What do you mean by 'physically instantiated'?
Question (for both of you, Palynka and LH, that is): Developmentally, do we not exist (i.e., are physically instantiated) before we have any concept of “I”? Is not the “I-concept” developed relationally? I believe this is psychologically correct.
Originally posted by vistesdYour difficulty in expressing yourself without using the words "self" or "I" (which you shouldn't have used) illustrates my point.
Maybe I can simplify: Why would one conclude that the “I-self” is anything more than a sense of (or, for humans at least, conscious awareness of) identity, and that the “thing” referred to is just this transient physical existent (including bodily and mental processes) that I refer to as “I”?*
Yes, that is how I am thinking of substance—it was Wittgenst ...[text shortened]... n my description—but if I use the phrase “self-referential,” I do not mean reference to a thing.
The concept 'sense of identity' contains within it the concept of someone/something that is sensing/perceiving/thinking it (i.e. it's an analytical truth). You cannot assert the existence of one without simultaneously conceding the existence of the other.
Now, can you deny the existence of a 'sense of identity' within yourself? No you can't - because in the very act of denying you would simultaneously assert its existence (because it would be you denying it) and the act of denying analytically implies a denier.
I didn't understand what you meant by "transcient physical existent" the first time.
Now, I am not saying that there is an existent substance for every substantive. Just because I say the word "unicorn" does not mean I am asserting the existence of unicorns; but if I say "unicorns exist", then clearly I am.
Originally posted by ahosyney1 Timothy 3:16
You show me where did Juses said he is GOD or GOD say that Juses is GOD.
"And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached to the nations, believed on in the world, received up into glory"
John 20:28
"And Thomas answered, and said to him, My Lord and my God."
John 5:18
"Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the Sabbath, but said also that God was his Father, making himself equal with God."
John 8:58
"Jesus said to them, 'Verily, verily, I say to you, before Abraham was, I am.' Then they took up stones to cast at him.
Isaiah 9:6
"For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, The MIGHTY GOD, the everlasting FAther, the Prince of Peace."
And there you have it. References from the Old Testament, from the very words of Jesus himself, and from Pauline letters.
Originally posted by lucifershammerWhat I’m getting at is that “self” is no more than a physical reference (using physical here to include what goes on in the brain as well). Our unique (so far as we know—though the same may be true of, say, elephants and chimpanzees and whales) way of being conscious is self-referential.
Your difficulty in expressing yourself without using the words "self" or "I" (which you shouldn't have used) illustrates my point.
The concept 'sense of identity' contains within it the concept of someone/something that is sensing/perceiving/thinking it (i.e. it's an analytical truth). You cannot assert the existence of one without simultaneously c ...[text shortened]... g the existence of unicorns; but if I say "unicorns exist", then clearly I am.
By transient, I mean not permanent: when I die, no more individual self.*
It’s possible that I was mistaken, but I thought you were getting at something more than just using self as a descriptive term for my recognition of my own physical existence.
* I just going to go ahead and concede the problem of language here, and hope you can sort out all these “selves.” 😉
Originally posted by vistesdThen I don't see what you're getting at. I'm out of my league here, but I believe there's both biological and relational development before we can have a concept of self. Is parental affection only effective after the child has a concept of self? I think not...
Sorry--born.