God's Freedom?

Originally posted by Suzianne
That would be great, SG, if only he didn't present it as the only logical conclusion to come to. That just ain't so.

You are so sure that the conclusion is wrong, and yet you cannot even conjure up a single sentence explaining why?

Suzi that tells theistic wafflers "do or do not - there is no try" - has this waiting for them at the end of the road? "He's using too much logic. I don't like it. Just take my word that his conclusions are faulty."

Suzi that says in General Forum prose competitions "I can write like a storm" hits a sudden dry spell?

You can do better.

Originally posted by FMF
You should direct this question at Grampy Bobby. 🙂

I lack your Job-like patience. I prefer speaking to people who might actually listen.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I believe if it can be known, God would know it, which is also how I view
what God can do, if it can be done, God can do it.
If there is such a thing as unknowable, if that can some how turn into a
knowable, would that invalidate all of the knowable things before as being
really known? If I for example had a choice before me, if no one could know
what ...[text shortened]... o it, does that invalidate all those that knew
all that could be known up to that point?
Kelly

If I for example had a choice before me, if no one could know
what I'm about to do then I do it, does that invalidate all those that knew
all that could be known up to that point?

No. It would just mean that for those who knew all that could be known up to the point of your choice, that did not include knowing what you were about to do -- even if they know afterwards (ex post) what you ended up doing.

I am not sure I really understand your objections. Which premise(s) of the argument in the opening post would you reject?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]What do the first three bullet points have to do with anything? And the fourth is something that "plagues" God too, since subjectivity is definitional to the type of mentality that you claim God possesses. None of this explains why it is an acceptable title for God but not for your neighbor, or any other mind.
The second bullet point carries the ...[text shortened]... objection related to explanatory priority, can you be more specific as to your exact misgiving?[/b]

As far as your objection related to explanatory priority, can you be more specific as to your exact misgiving?

No, we are getting off-topic, and we've been over it already many times before. The problem is embodied in the Euthyphro dilemma.

On topic and with respect to the argument in the OP, I think you have given it a fair reading and said you would reject Premise 2. So, that's fair enough.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
are you claiming that because god is perfectly rational and omniscient, and always chooses the best course of action, he must not have free will?



this is what i got from this rather long and tiring post.

No, that is not a faithful summary of the argument.

I presented the argument and then even presented a condensed version of the argument, all in the opening post. Do you want a condensed summary of the condensed summary, or something? 🙄

To be clear (and this is a nuance that ToO apparently missed too), the argument only purports to shows there is a problem here when perfect rationality and omniscience are construed as analytical or definitional to 'God'. This is important, I think, at least in the case of the perfect rationality. A crux of the argument, I would presume, would be Premise (9) and whether or not it actually follows from (2) & (6) & (8). I tend to think it does, but only in virtue of perfect rationality being construed as definitional to God. If, say, it were just contingently so that God is perfectly rational, then I doubt the argument goes through. That's my current take on the argument, anyway.

Originally posted by LemonJello
And I understand what you are trying to do. You're too proud or stubborn to admit that you sloppily redescribed the argument in grotesque fashion, and now you're attempting some irrelevant diversion. Anyone with marginal reading capabilities can see that the argument does not ultimately purport to show "that choosing perfectly rationally somehow preclud ...[text shortened]... h omniscience and perfect rationality is putatively built into the very definition of the agent.

Anyone with marginal reading capabilities can see that the argument does not ultimately purport to show "that choosing perfectly rationally somehow precludes free will".

You're too funny LJ.

Anyone with marginal reading capabilities can see that my post does not say that the argument "ultimately purport[s] to show 'that choosing perfectly rationally somehow precludes free will'".

What it does say is that the argument seems to boil down to "choosing perfectly rationally somehow precludes free will".

Not sure why you fail to understand the difference.

You might want to make sure you understand what others have written before throwing a hissy fit.

Originally posted by LemonJello

If I for example had a choice before me, if no one could know
what I'm about to do then I do it, does that invalidate all those that knew
all that could be known up to that point?

No. It would just mean that for those who knew all that could be known up to the point of your choice, that did not include knowing what you were about to d ...[text shortened]... erstand your objections. Which premise(s) of the argument in the opening post would you reject?

I'm not sure what your issue is, if I had two choices and I had to pick one
that was good for me and all others, and one that wasn't, I'd hope I'd
always pick the one that was good for me and others verses the one that
wasn't. If you want the freedom to choose badly, you may I guess. I would
hope that one who is Love would always do what is best.

Look around you, you see people who have the ability to make good or bad
choices. You happy with all the results? Being able to make the right choice
only means you are able too, always making the right choice means you see
the bad and make the right one. Freedom to do wrong can be there, just
because it is never picked does not mean it wasn't a choice that could be
made.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello
This is an argument aimed at a theist who is committed to all the following (1) through (4):

[b](1) God is, by definition, all-knowing.

(2) God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

Freedom of will is of an incompatibilist sort, one which entails at minimum the ability to choose otherwise. So in particular:
(3) If God freely ...[text shortened]... rgument is moot. Alternatively, of course, find and point out some error(s) within my argument.[/b]

I think a problem with this argument is that incompatibilist free will is an incoherent concept.
[I will use "free will" to mean incompatibilist free will for the rest of the post.]


A free decision is not a random one, otherwise the Decision Maker [DM] is simply a slave to
their random number/decision generator, like being forced to perform whatever action is
selected by a roll of a dice.

Similarly a free decision cannot be deterministic otherwise the DM wouldn't have the capability
to choose otherwise from the choice they did in fact make.

And it cannot be a combination of the two, because while that would mean that if we rolled
back time after a decision was made by the DM and we allowed the DM to try again they
could decide differently, but only at the whim of the roll of the dice.


But a mind unencumbered by determinism or randomness is still held hostage by it's own state.
For the mind to not simply be a random decision making machine, it must have a process of
weighing up pros and cons to determine the best course of action to take.
And given the same set of inputs to the same mind state the result must always be the same.

Actually this applies whether they are rational or not, the same mind in the same state given the
same inputs must output the same result whether it is rational or not.



However, there is a bigger problem. And it's with Premise 4.


Using Sam Harris' example of a serial killer...

A person with the mind of a serial killer who is then exposed to external circumstances that act as
a trigger to cause them to go on a killing spree is a result did not choose to have the mind of a
serial killer or to be exposed to those external circumstances... However we still rightly regard the
being entire as responsible for committing those actions and needing to be imprisoned to prevent
them from committing more murders.

Just because god [or any DM] doesn't have free will, doesn't mean that they were not the authors
of, or blameworthy for, the actions they choose to take.
If a being does evil, then that being is evil, even if they had no choice in the matter of them being evil.





Thinking about it my problems with this argument pretty much all stem from the incoherence of the idea of
free will. And I don't thing those problems are surmountable.

But I'm interested to see if you can prove me wrong.

Originally posted by Suzianne
That would be great, SG, if only he didn't present it as the only logical conclusion to come to. That just ain't so.

Then Prove Him Wrong.

The virtue of a logical argument is that if the premises are true and the
argument is logically sound then the conclusion must also be true.

If you think the conclusion is wrong, then you should be able to prove that
the argument is either NOT logically sound and/or that one or more of the
premises is false.

If you cannot do that, if the premises are true, and the logic sound then
you are wrong, and the conclusion is false.


By failing to accept that you simply look like you care nothing for the truth,
only what makes you feel good.


LJ is looking for people to [try to] knock the argument down, to see if it is valid.
If you're correct then it must be possible to do so.


Also, if you look carefully you will see that the argument applies to a very specific
god concept... Is it actually the god you believe in?

Because if not then the argument says nothing about the god you actually believe in.

Originally posted by KellyJay
... was good for me and others verses[sic] the one that
wasn't.

For god's sake versus

😠

Originally posted by LemonJello
This is an argument aimed at a theist who is committed to all the following (1) through (4):

[b](1) God is, by definition, all-knowing.

(2) God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

Freedom of will is of an incompatibilist sort, one which entails at minimum the ability to choose otherwise. So in particular:
(3) If God freely ...[text shortened]... rgument is moot. Alternatively, of course, find and point out some error(s) within my argument.[/b]

I do not believe it is possible to use logic and reasoning to determine if God has free will. There are certain things that we do not have the ability to completely understand because we are not equal to God. We just have to accept what has been revealed to us about God.

Originally posted by RJHinds
I do not believe it is possible to use logic and reasoning to determine if God has free will. There are certain things that we do not have the ability to completely understand because we are not equal to God. We just have to accept what has been revealed to us about God.

Or better, accept that your god, as an inherently contradictory entity, was made up 😏

Originally posted by Agerg
Or better, accept that your god, as an inherently contradictory entity, was made up 😏

If God was made up;
1. It would Say so in the Bible (The Bible is the Truth)
and
2. There would be no Bible because God Wrote it.

Stoopid Atheists!

Originally posted by googlefudge
I think a problem with this argument is that incompatibilist free will is an incoherent concept.
[I will use "free will" to mean incompatibilist free will for the rest of the post.]


A free decision is not a random one, otherwise the Decision Maker [DM] is simply a slave to
their random number/decision generator, like being forced to perform whate ...[text shortened]... t thing those problems are surmountable.

But I'm interested to see if you can prove me wrong.

Premise (3) is not only false but outrageously false. I have argued against such an incompatibilist notion on these boards for years and years, on the basis that such a view is hopelessly confused and incoherent. Premise (4) is also outrageously false too, when the conception of freedom at issue is of this incompatibilist sort. I have also argued that point many times on these boards as well, mostly through objections in the vein of the well-known Frankfurt-style cases.

This is why I specifically prefaced the opening argument with "This is an argument aimed at a theist who is committed to all the following (1) through (4)". Even though this incompatibilist conception of freedom is hopelessly incoherent, the vast majority of theists on this site (and indeed elsewhere too, at least in my experience) are incompatibilists in this sense. So the point of the argument is that it is a local consistency argument, where I basically say, okay, if you want your incoherent view of freedom, then fine, consider it given; but then you should be committed to the view that your God is not free, by your very own lights of what freedom consists in (given also (1) and (2)).

Originally posted by KellyJay
I'm not sure what your issue is, if I had two choices and I had to pick one
that was good for me and all others, and one that wasn't, I'd hope I'd
always pick the one that was good for me and others verses the one that
wasn't. If you want the freedom to choose badly, you may I guess. I would
hope that one who is Love would always do what is best.

Loo ...[text shortened]... e, just
because it is never picked does not mean it wasn't a choice that could be
made.
Kelly

What on earth does any of this have to do with the argument in the opening post? Are there are premises there that you disagree with? If so, which ones and why?