Molinism

Originally posted by LemonJello
You seem to have the same sort of objection as lemon lime -- that, basically, God's "fixing the outcome" according to Molinist account is somehow not consistent with our being free. I'll ask you the same thing I asked lemon lime about that: do you have an actual argument to show this?

"The point is, under Molinism, God should be able to arrange it (supposing it is his will) that all creatures fully retain their freedom and yet none of them say no."

I'm responding to you, you suggested that god should force his will upon all
life. I pointed out it is an unfair system, it is a fixed system, that forces only
one outcome that will provide whatever it takes to make it happen. You may
as well hold a gun to some ones child's head and say do this, there is
nothing free will about that. You either treat them all the same and
everyone makes their choices and they live with the results, or you make
them do what you want.
Kelly

Originally posted by lemon lime
Whether you believe I understand this or not, Molinism does appear to bear a striking resemblance to one particuar denomination of Christian belief (calvinist if I'm not mistaken) that proposes our so called free will decisions and choices have already been pre-ordained by God. This means our destiny has already been mapped out and our free will is ...[text shortened]... lict that doesn't need resolving, because it doesn't actually exist as a true contradiction.

Like I suspected, you have no actual argument that shows that God cannot hold middle knowledge. So what exactly was your beef with the Molinist position? I think you need to figure out exactly what it is you intend to argue. You just got done saying that the Molinist account amounts to a "manipulation" of free will. Now you seem to be saying that there is no problem after all. Which is it?

But this perception comes about from the fact that 1. we are not in a position to see future events and cannot know for certain what our choices will be and 2. God does know what the future will be for each and every one of us because he is omniscient. This can appear contradictory until we remind ourselves that God is not a man.

Sorry, but (1) and (2) as you have stated them do not appear contradictory unless one is just bad at logic. Perhaps you're just bad at following the logic on this point and so you have trouble sorting out the conjunction of (1) and (2); but others will see clearly that there is no contradiction in the state of affairs where humans are limited cognizers about future events whereas God is not. So your idea that this trap is a general one that most people fall into is fantasy I would think. I think, rather, the trap that a lot of people fall into is thinking that just because God foreknows, say, that S will do A it follows that S will not be free with respect to doing A. It's tempting to think that, but it's false upon deeper scrutiny.

In other words, just because I might know what people will do, that fact alone does nothing to influence them or tinker with their ability to make free will choices.

Okay, so what exactly is the problem with the Molinist position? You indicated before that there was some problem of "manipulation". Now you seem to be indicating there is no problem. Again, it would be great if you could pick a story and stick with it. Is it your intent to retract your earlier claim about how the Molinist account implies "manipulation" of free will?

This appears to be the same problem molinists struggle with when they go about setting up a rigged game, where the players all have free will but the outcome is already known.

It sounds to me like the problem was with you, not with the Molinists. They already seem to understand that there is no conflict with the situation where God "fixes the outcome" and yet his creatures are still free. You're the one who seemed puzzled and conflicted on the issue, saying first that there's a problem and then implying in the next breath that the problem is only illusory. Like I said, it's fun to watch you in action. First you say the Molinist position suffers from problem X. Then, when pressed, you go on to describe how problem X is merely illusory. Then, you say that the fact that people fall for this illusion must be the source of the Molinists' struggle. No: you're the one who fell for it and then went back on your own argument, contradicting yourself; the Molinists didn't fall for it and aren't struggling with it.

At any rate, if the Molinist's position were meant merely to resolve an apparent conflict between God's knowledge and human freedom, I would agree that they are trying to resolve an apparent conflict that doesn't need resolving, since there is no actual conflict in the first place. But thinking more about the Molinist position (and this is where it would be great to have a Molinist in this discussion to aid clarification), it is not meant merely to resolve this apparent conflict. It is meant to provide an account of divine providence that is still consistent with human freedom. That seems like a different fish to fry. One of my questions, again, would be what are the implications for God's moral responsibility; and are these palatable for the Molinist?

Originally posted by KellyJay
"The point is, under Molinism, God should be able to arrange it (supposing it is his will) that all creatures fully retain their freedom and yet none of them say no."

I'm responding to you, you suggested that god should force his will upon all
life. I pointed out it is an unfair system, it is a fixed system, that forces only
one outcome that will provi kes their choices and they live with the results, or you make
them do what you want.
Kelly

No I didn't suggest that "god should force his will upon all life."

Again, you seem to deny that it is consistent for God to "fix the outcome" according to the Molinist account and yet for His creatures to still be free. So, I'll ask again: do you have an actual argument that shows it is not consistent?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Like I suspected, you have no actual argument that shows that God cannot hold middle knowledge. So what exactly was your beef with the Molinist position? I think you need to figure out exactly what it is you intend to argue. You just got done saying that the Molinist account amounts to a "manipulation" of free will. Now you seem to be saying that ther for God's moral responsibility; and are these palatable for the Molinist?

Like I suspected, you have no actual argument that shows that God cannot hold middle knowledge.

And like I suspected, you are really not here to engage in an honest discussion of ideas but seem intent to argue for the sake of argument. I did not say (or imply) God cannot or does not hold middle knowledge, nor is it my intent to show he does not or cannot hold MK. I didn't know your purpose was to start this thread with the idea of arguing that point, but even so I don't feel the need to accommodate you by pretending to disagree with it.

So what exactly was your beef with the Molinist position? I think you need to figure out exactly what it is you intend to argue. You just got done saying that the Molinist account amounts to a "manipulation" of free will. Now you seem to be saying that there is no problem after all. Which is it?

Neither. Those were not both molinist positions. I was the one who was saying there is no problem, and therefore no need for a molinist God to go picking and choosing scenarios like they were vegetables at a food market. I was pointing out how it isn't necessary for God to tweak his creation for gaining a desired outcome. Did you actually read what I said or did you just skim over it? I think maybe it is you who needs to choose which battles he wishes to fight and not try to invent conflict where there is none. I have no "beef" with the Molinist position. I've seen this idea before, and was simply pointing out how Molinism appears to agree with Calvinism. If you have a "beef" with that then you should probably just focus on that, instead of dreaming up an opposing argument and pretending it's mine.

But this perception comes about from the fact that 1. we are not in a position to see future events and cannot know for certain what our choices will be and 2. God does know what the future will be for each and every one of us because he is omniscient. This can appear contradictory until we remind ourselves that God is not a man.

Sorry, but (1) and (2) as you have stated them do not appear contradictory unless one is just bad at logic. Perhaps you're just bad at following the logic on this point and so you have trouble sorting out the conjunction of (1) and (2); but others will see clearly that there is no contradiction in the state of affairs where humans are limited cognizers about future events whereas God is not. So your idea that this trap is a general one that most people fall into is fantasy I would think. I think, rather, the trap that a lot of people fall into is thinking that just because God foreknows, say, that S will do A it follows that S will not be free with respect to doing A. It's tempting to think that, but it's false upon deeper scrutiny.

Nice try, but editing out the last part of that statement which finishes the thought doesn't bode well for your own argument. Next time include all of the relevant parts, or I might feel free to do the same when quoting you.

In other words, just because I might know what people will do, that fact alone does nothing to influence them or tinker with their ability to make free will choices.

Okay, so what exactly is the problem with the Molinist position? You indicated before that there was some problem of "manipulation". Now you seem to be indicating there is no problem. Again, it would be great if you could pick a story and stick with it. Is it your intent to retract your earlier claim about how the Molinist account implies "manipulation" of free will?

Who is saying there is a problem with the Molinist position? Are you seriously unable to deal with more than one idea at a time? Can you walk and chew gum at the same time, or if I can does it mean I need to stick with just one activity and should retract the gum chewing because I happened to be walking when I started chewing the gum? Again, did you actually read any of my post (and think about it) before working out your argument, or did you only skim through it?

This appears to be the same problem molinists struggle with when they go about setting up a rigged game, where the players all have free will but the outcome is already known.

It sounds to me like the problem was with you, not with the Molinists.

And from where I'm standing it sounds like if it wasn't a problem for me, you would need to go looking for something to make into a problem.

They already seem to understand that there is no conflict with the situation where God "fixes the outcome" and yet his creatures are still free. You're the one who seemed puzzled and conflicted on the issue, saying first that there's a problem and then implying in the next breath that the problem is only illusory. Like I said, it's fun to watch you in action. First you say the Molinist position suffers from problem X. Then, when pressed, you go on to describe how problem X is merely illusory. Then, you say that the fact that people fall for this illusion must be the source of the Molinists' struggle. No: you're the one who fell for it and then went back on your own argument, contradicting yourself; the Molinists didn't fall for it and aren't struggling with it.

If you are hoping I'm puzzled and conflicted then I apologize for disappointing you, but like I said before I'm not here to accommodate you.

At any rate, if the Molinist's position were meant merely to resolve an apparent conflict between God's knowledge and human freedom, I would agree that they are trying to resolve an apparent conflict that doesn't need resolving, since there is no actual conflict in the first place. But thinking more about the Molinist position (and this is where it would be great to have a Molinist in this discussion to aid clarification), it is not meant merely to resolve this apparent conflict. It is meant to provide an account of divine providence that is still consistent with human freedom. That seems like a different fish to fry.

Uh huh... I hope we are getting close to the end of this. I really need to pee.

One of my questions, again, would be what are the implications for God's moral responsibility; and are these palatable for the Molinist?

Right, that's just one of your questions. Nothing particularly interesting or relevant about it, it's just one of many questions and should not be interpreted as something to be highlighted, nor in anyway be interpreted as motivational impetus in starting this thread.

Originally posted by LemonJello
No I didn't suggest that "god should force his will upon all life."

Again, you seem to deny that it is consistent for God to "fix the outcome" according to the Molinist account and yet for His creatures to still be free. So, I'll ask again: do you have an actual argument that shows it is not consistent?

That was how I read what you wrote!
The thing that suggests that a god who can setup the universe that will
not always get his way would be disappointment, where he wanted one
thing to occur and it did not. You are suggesting that should/would not
occur, that such a god would get his way each time.

So for you it seems that god would do what it takes to get the outcome
it wants and will always get the outcome it wants, because it will always
set it up that way.

While I'm suggesting that God actually knows what it takes to get His
points across to where we have no excuse, and from there it is on us to
act one way or another. We will all be treated the same way and with some
it will be towards God while others will reject Him, but the choices are ours.
Kelly

Originally posted by lemon lime
[b]Like I suspected, you have no actual argument that shows that God cannot hold middle knowledge.

And like I suspected, you are really not here to engage in an honest discussion of ideas but seem intent to argue for the sake of argument. I did not say (or imply) God cannot or does not hold middle knowledge, nor is it my intent to show he does not terpreted as motivational impetus in starting this thread.[/b]

Yeah, okay, I am the one who is not here to engage in honest discussion. 🙄
You're the one who barged into the discussion pistol-whipping ridiculous claims against Molinism while admittedly having no understanding of what Molinism is in the first place. You really are something.

And you were the one who implied there is something wrong with the Molinist scenario I presented (KJ does too), but perhaps you cannot follow your own thoughts through. I presented a scenario to KJ which is consistent with Molinism. And you were the one who implied that it amounted to "manipulation" of free will. But under Molinism, it doesn't amount to "manipulation" of free will: rather, it just follows directly that if God holds middle knowledge of the form "If S were in C, S would freely do A"; and if God actualizes S in C; then S is free upon doing A. See...no manipulation. So, you must have had some beef with one of these assumptions (either the object of middle knowlege, or the actualization of S in C). Now all of a sudden, though, everything is peachy and there is no problem. Yeah, and I'm the one who cannot follow an argument: you cannot even follow your own arguments, apparently!

Right, that's just one of your questions. Nothing particularly interesting or relevant about it, it's just one of many questions and should not be interpreted as something to be highlighted, nor in anyway be interpreted as motivational impetus in starting this thread.

That's right. Didn't I already explain this to you? I would be even more interested in discussing some other issues related to middle knowledge with a Molinist. Frankly, some of those issues would be more technical and probably a bit over your head, given that you admittedly know virtually nothing about Molinism in the first place (and cannot seem to follow arguments well generally). As it has turned out in this thread, I have had to spend more time defending Molinism from absurd, ridiculous charges, more or less all brought on by you, a self-admitted ignoramus on Molinism. Gee, I'd declaim on subjects of which I know I am ignorant, but that would just be silly of me. You're right, I do need to pick my battles. You ain't worth my time. KJ is, even if he doesn't understand what I am asking half the time. At least I know he is a genuine guy.

Originally posted by KellyJay
That was how I read what you wrote!
The thing that suggests that a god who can setup the universe that will
not always get his way would be disappointment, where he wanted one
thing to occur and it did not. You are suggesting that should/would not
occur, that such a god would get his way each time.

So for you it seems that god would do what it takes ...[text shortened]... ith some
it will be towards God while others will reject Him, but the choices are ours.
Kelly

Again, KJ, the fact seems to be that it would be consistent for such a God to always "get his way" and yet for his creatures to be free at the same time. If Molinists are right and God has middle knowledge (knowledge of all those propositions of the form "If S were in C, S would freely do A" ); and supposing God can actualize whatever creatures in whatever circumstances he wishes; then all he needs to do is actualize only creature/circumstance combinations that he knows will result in free actions that happen to accord with his will. The creatures are still free, and yet God "always gets his way".

If you disagree, then please point out the error in this thinking. Is the error in thinking that God could hold such knowledge in the first place? Is the error in thinking that God could actualize the creature/circumstance combinations in this way? Is it something else?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Again, KJ, the fact seems to be that it would be consistent for such a God to always "get his way" and yet for his creatures to be free at the same time. If Molinists are right and God has middle knowledge (knowledge of all those propositions of the form "If S were in C, S would freely do A" ); and supposing God can actualize whatever creatures in whatev ...[text shortened]... could actualize the creature/circumstance combinations in this way? Is it something else?

It will always be a matter of trust, the god your talking about you are
making up as you go so no matter what it will do what you will.
If it could be anything other than what you want, you'd have to let go of
control which you don't have the ability to do, while a god who can control
itself could.
Kelly