Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
"In basic terms, Molinists hold that in addition to knowing everything that does or will happen, God also knows what His creatures would freely choose if placed in any circumstance." = Omniscience.
Omniscience = "Omniscience  mainly in religion, is the capacity to know everything that there is to know. [i]In particular, Hinduism and the Abrahamic ...[text shortened]... gs, etc. In Latin, omnis means "all" and sciens means "knowing". (wiki)
As usual, you haven't stated any clear point. If I had to hazard a guess, your point is that belief in an omniscient divine being also commits one to Molinism. Presumably, then, your point is that all proponents of the Abrahamic religions are also Molinists. If so, you're badly mistaken. I'm afraid it is not that easy.
Just because one believes there exists some omniscient divine being doesn't mean that she is rationally committed to Molinism. Here's why. Molinists are committed to divine "middle knowledge" which consists of divine knowledge in counterfactuals that have a form something like If S were in circumstances C, S would freely choose to do A
. Now, let's consider the definition of 'omniscience' that you yourself have provided: omniscience is "the capacity to know everything there is to know". Under this definition of omniscience, from the proposition that there exists some G who exemplifies omniscience, does it follow that G has knowledge consisting in the counterfactuals outlined above? Surely not. That would only follow with some ancillary assumptions, all of which can be rejected by the person who thinks there is an omniscient G (let's call this person T). Here are some examples, just off the top of my head. First, such counterfactuals can only be known if they are truth-apt and have truth conditions, but this can be rejected by T; and if it is rejected then such counterfactuals do not fall within the set of "everything there is to know" and hence it doesn't follow that an omniscient G knows them. Second, for such counterfactuals to be known they need to have determinate truth values, as opposed to, say, probabilistically indexed ones; and this of course can also be rejected by T. Third, even if T thinks such counterfactuals have determinate truth values, T can still claim they fall outside the set of "everything there is to know" by rejecting the idea that belief in such counterfactuals can be justified (and this may not be such a crazy rejection in the case that the freedom at issue is of a libertarian sort). Fourth, your definition of 'omiscience' doesn't imply that an omniscient G knows everything there is to know; it only implies that G has the capacity to know everything there is to know. So even if T thinks such counterfactuals fall inside the set of everything there is to know, T could still avoid Molinism by simply claiming that G has the capacity to know them but doesn't exercise this capacity for whatever reason. Etc, etc. There are surely more examples, but those are just the ones off the top of my head.
So, no, T is not committed to Molinism simply because T thinks an omniscient G exists. At any rate, since it seems you mistakenly think otherwise, is it safe to say that you consider yourself a Molinist?