Most vile concept/aspect of christianity?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Look, claiming that my actions are determined is not identical to claiming that my actions are determined by factors other than ME. This is what you always seem to assume without any good reasons. It seems to me that you constantly keep begging the question. Compatibilism is not just 'semantics', as you claimed earlier. The compatibilist will say that ...[text shortened]... they are not even determined by me? That would be a desperately sad form of 'freedom'.

Firstly, everyone on this thread is using different definitions of free will. So far there have been three. The libertarian (which both of us reject), and two others (including yours which seems compelling). My first objection though, is that what do you define as me? I know at least that my "psychological states, the integral/abiding features of my character, my motivations" are at least partially controlled by things other then me. I posted a definition thats seems to fit what you are describing: that a free will, means that we can do as we will. This means my actions would be determined. My qualms about this are that given determinism, my actions would be determined before I was born. Though I "determine my actions", an antecendent before that would determine my determination (if you see what I mean). I would thus not consider my self the genuine source of my action. Though i do believe this is free will (albeit without any accountability).

Could you please connect your "source-action" thoery with free will. Sorry if i seem a bit rabid.

Originally posted by gollumprawn

Thanks for that great insight. Does Gollum happen to be related to the troll family?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Firstly, everyone on this thread is using different definitions of free will. So far there have been three. The libertarian (which both of us reject), and two others (including yours which seems compelling). My first objection though, is that what do you define as me? I know at least that my "psychological states, the integral/abiding features of my charact ou please connect your "source-action" thoery with free will. Sorry if i seem a bit rabid.

Ah, I see better where you are coming from now. But how do you just do away with accountability/moral responsibility? If my actions are determined by my deliberations, then even if it is the case that the features which buttress such deliberations (my character, motivations, etc.) are at least causally influenced by external considerations (my environment, upbringing, etc.), it still doesn't change the fact that my conscious self is still a substantial determinant of my actions. If my deliberations (which are in turn supported by my character and my motivations, etc) are the direct determinant of my actions, wouldn't that be enough to say that I am a 'genuine source' of my actions?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Ah, I see better where you are coming from now. But how do you just do away with accountability/moral responsibility? If my actions are determined by my deliberations, then even if it is the case that the features which buttress such deliberations (my character, motivations, etc.) are at least causally influenced by external considerations (my environme ...[text shortened]... y actions, wouldn't that be enough to say that I am a 'genuine source' of my actions?

It depends. For I might object that even conscious self determined by outside actions. I find it difficult to locate myself outside the influences of external influences.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks for that great insight. Does Gollum happen to be related to the troll family?

I made him do that. Twice.

Originally posted by Conrau K
It depends. For I might object that even conscious self determined by outside actions. I find it difficult to locate myself outside the influences of external influences.

Well, there is perhaps something to be said for those external factors that have causally influenced my conscious self. However, in no way do I think such considerations exonerate me from the responsibility that I must carry for my own actions. This is based in large part on the simple observation that my actions do appear in all respects to be determined by my deliberations that are in turn shouldered by my character, my beliefs, my motivations.

There is, however, a relatively common view that moral responsibility relies critically on the ability to have 'done otherwise'. Clearly at first sight, this would be a problem for the compatibilist. I believe bbarr outlined this problem in your other thread when he talked about whether or not the claim 'you ought to have done otherwise' entails the claim 'you could have done otherwise'.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I made him do that. Twice.

Relevance. 😵

Good for you, Freak.

Originally posted by Halitose
I’m going to try to dispense with the word “sees,” since that is producing a terribly frenetic image in my head. 😉

🙂

If I understand this correctly, it reduces to God simply knowing all of what’s happening all of the time, since the future is part of God's present?

Yes.

EDIT: It strikes me that this only removes determinati our perspective, our actions are still in the making... or something like that... 😕 😉

in answer to this : " ...God's perspective, everything is happening in the present, while from our perspective, our actions are still in the making... or something like that... "

there's a serious proplem with your idea, i.e. God would be stuck solid in his own timeframe, his being able to move in ours could not happen unless he could first move in his own. He would also experience everything at once and then stop existing, but go ahead and show the Lie algebra for your postulation.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Well, there is perhaps something to be said for those external factors that have causally influenced my conscious self. However, in no way do I think such considerations exonerate me from the responsibility that I must carry for my own actions. This is based in large part on the simple observation that my actions do appear in all respects to be determin ...[text shortened]... laim 'you ought to have done otherwise' entails the claim 'you could have done otherwise'.

Understand that I accept your free will. However, I do not accept accountability or moral responsibility since it seems unfair that if you couldn't have acted otherwise you are told you should have. That is why I advocate rehabilitation over punishment. Moral judgements aside, we are the immediate source of our actions but I do not believe we the genuine source of our actions (though as you say observation says we are).

Originally posted by vistesd
Okay, let me try it this way:

(1) An omniscient being G knows with certainty at time (t(e)-t) that an event E will occur at time t(e).

(2) It is possible that at time t(e)-t, the time of the omniscient knowledge that event E will occur, that another event ~E will instead occur.

(3) If event ~E is an actual possibility at time t(e)-t, then E is not ...[text shortened]... of omniscience..... As a matter of fact, I believe it would render G's omniscience immaterial.

(1) An omniscient being G knows with certainty at time (t(e)-t) that an event E will occur at time t(e).

Generally, okay. A few observations, though:

Obs 1: I've argued in this thread that God is an agent outside time, therefore it makes as much (or no more) sense to speak of God knowing something "at time t(e)-t" as speaking of God knowing something at "time t(e)" or at "time t(e)+t".

So, even if your argument were valid, it would not say anything about God's foreknowledge and free will.

Obs 2: An omniscient being that is time-bounded would know that E would occur at t(e) from the moment it becomes omniscient (or from the moment it comes into being, if it is essentially omniscient).

So, your argument really deals with foreknowledge.

Obs 3: The word "certainty" is used here in an epistemic sense; i.e. the proposition (E happens at t(e)) is true, G has adequate justification (whatever the measure might be), G believes that E happens/will happen at t(e), and Gettier's condition is satisfied (i.e. G is not just accidentally correct).

(2) It is possible that at time t(e)-t, the time of the omniscient knowledge that event E will occur, that another event ~E will instead occur.

You are making an assumption here - that a causal sequence will be temporally unidirectional; i.e. if A causes B, then A will precede B in time. This is the assumption I've challenged throughout this thread.

I'm arguing that, for ~E to be logically possible, all that is needed is for ~E to be logically consistent with all the causal events leading up to E/~E (i.e. it be consistent with all events that are causally prior, whether they are temporally prior or not).

What this means is that (2) above can be interpreted as "~E is logically consistent with all causally prior events that have occurred as of t(e)-t".

(3) If event ~E is an actual possibility at time t(e)-t, then E is not a certain outcome but only a possible one.

Here you're using "certain" in the sense of 'logically necessary' - not the epistemic sense you used it in (1). In the epistemic sense, E is still a certain outcome, even though it is not logically necessary at t(e)-t (i.e. all causal priors as of t(e)-t do admit of ~E). ~E is still logically possible for the same reason - although it cannot be known (because it isn't true).

You touched on the salient issue with your last point. There is a distinction between certain and logically necessary.

Once that distinction is made (and, more importantly, applied), the whole "problem of evil" dissipates like so much flatulence.

Originally posted by lucifershammer


Obs 1: I've argued in this thread that God is an agent outside time, therefore it makes as much (or no more) sense to speak of God knowing something "at time t(e)-t" as speaking of God knowing something at "time t(e)" or at "time t(e)+t".

Nonsense. Either t(e)-t is a well-defined concept with respect to God or it is not.

If it is not well-defined, then you should not have introduced it in the first place in your auxiliary claims 2 and 2'.

If it is well defined, then it denotes a time. If God's knowledge does not change, then he knows everything he knows at all times, and t(e)-t is one such time. Thus, we can speak of what God knows at any time t.

Right now, would you say that God knows how many hairs are on your head? If so, then you cannot appeal to the "God is outside of time" argument. If you wouldn't say that, then God must not be omniscient or his knowledge must change with time, since right now, he doesn't know how many hairs are on your head.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Nonsense. Either t(e)-t is a well-defined concept or it is not.

If it is not well-defined, then you should not have introduced it in the first place in your auxiliary claims 2 and 2'.

If it is well defined, then it denotes a time. If God's knowledge does not change, then he knows everything he knows at all times, and t(e)-it is on ...[text shortened]... wouldn't say that, then God must not be omniscient or his knowledge must change with time.

When it is said of God that He is "outside of time," it is said in relation to what boundaries exist, not that He is unable to see/know anything of time. While God is free from boundary of time parameters, He knows all things at all times.

We live in terms of chronology, cause and effect, etc., and are certainly bound in our knowledge to logical order. God is not thusly bound, knowing all that ever would be, at what time it would be, causes, conditions. etc.

God never learns anything because He has always known everything. This is God's mentality connected with His infinity.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Nonsense. Either t(e)-t is a well-defined concept with respect to God or it is not.
If it is not well-defined, then you should not have introduced it in the first place in your auxiliary claims 2 and 2'.

Go back and read what I actually wrote in 2 and 2' - I was explicitly referring to it in the context of a non-divine, temporally bounded knower.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Right now, would you say that God knows how many hairs are on your head? If so, then you cannot appeal to the "God is outside of time" argument. If you wouldn't say that, then God must not be omniscient or his knowledge must change with time, since right now, he doesn't know how many hairs are on your head.

Your phrasing begs the question.

I would say that God knows how many hairs are on my head right now, as well as how many hairs were on my head yesterday and how many will be on my head tomorrow - all mentions of time in the above statement are from my perspective, not His.