23 Mar 05
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeExcellent post. Not even 'bachelor' has necessary and sufficient conditions, if we take seriously the manner in which it is used (e.g., the Pope is an unmarried male of marriagable age, yet the term 'bachelor' doesn't quite seem to fit).
The philosopher Wittgenstein noted that most everyday concepts do not have necessary and sufficient defining conditions, but that different exemplars of a concept, of varying degrees of prototypicality, blend gradually into one another, and merely exhibit a degree of family resemblance.
W. gave the example of the concept "game". Are all games fun? ...[text shortened]... Who would have thought that sodomy could be such a philosophically fertile topic of discussion!)
23 Mar 05
4 edits
Originally posted by bbarrHow is this view different from radical skepticism?
Excellent post. Not even 'bachelor' has necessary and sufficient conditions, if we take seriously the manner in which it is used (e.g., the Pope is an unmarried male of marriagable age, yet the term 'bachelor' doesn't quite seem to fit).
Under this view, mustn't we doubt the truth of any non-formal claim whatsoever, because there could always be some case of which we cannot conceive that would cause what we believe to be an otherwise true claim to be false?
For example, if I claim "I know that I am a sodomite because I just received a hummer," are you not required to say, "False! You do not know what a hummer or a sodomite is, and thus the implication does not hold, for you cannot know for certain that there does not exist someone who has received a hummer yet is not a sodomite!" ?
23 Mar 05
2 edits
Originally posted by kirksey957I would, but it would be futile, for bbarr would reject her finding by saying that since sufficient conditions for pain do not exist, her finding on whether it was painful does not really make it so, and thus her response would contribute no new information to us.
Will you ask her for us?
23 Mar 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf having a justified belief requires absolute certainty, then yes. But if certainty is a prerequuisite for justification, then every view entails radical skepicism, as we can never be non-circularly justified in believing that our cognitive apparatus is operating properly. The impossibility of doubt is an unreachable epistemic standard, which is why Descartes failed in his project in the Meditations to establish anything with absolute certainty (and he failed to even consider the possibility that his ability to draw inferences may be flawed, or that he may be irremediably conceptually confused).
How is this view different from radical skepticism?
Under this view, mustn't we doubt the truth of any non-formal claim whatsoever, because there could always be some case of which we cannot conceive that would cause what we believe to be an otherwise true claim to be false?
For example, if I claim "I know that I am a sodomite because I just ...[text shortened]... ain that there does not exist someone who has received a hummer yet is not a sodomite!" ?
Besides, this whole objection is question begging if you take Wittgenstein seriously. You are assuming that knowing that P requires of one that he be able to determine with absolute certainty whether P obtains. In other words, you are assuming that a necessary condition for some belief to be accurately termed 'knowledge' is for the belief to be certain. But, of course, Wittgenstein would respond that there are no necessary conditions for knowledge. If you want to know when a belief counts as knowledge, look at how the term 'knowledge' gets deployed in our language game. What role do attributions of knowledge play in our form of life. The disparate uses of the term 'knowledge', just like the term 'game', will have some family resemblances.
23 Mar 05
3 edits
Originally posted by bbarrLet me see if I can summarize your explanation in my own words.
If having a justified belief requires absolute certainty, then yes. But if certainty is a prerequuisite for justification, then every view entails radical skepicism, as we can never be non-circularly justified in believing that our cognitive ...[text shortened]... , just like the term 'game', will have some family resemblances.
Wittgenstein's observation is only relevant when we require certainty for epistemic justification. If we don't require certainty for epistemic justification, then his observation becomes irrelevant, because the fuzzy cases that muddy the otherwise clear waters of the necessary and sufficient conditions of various concepts are simply a special variety of uncertainty, which is acceptable.
Is this a fair assessment of the relevance of Wittgenstein's observation?
23 Mar 05
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesNot quite. If we require certainty for justification, then radical skepicism follows regardless of our theory of meaning (Wittgenstein presents a 'use-theory' of meaning).
Let me see if I can summarize your explanation in my own words.
Wittgenstein's observation is only relevant when we require certainty for epistemic justification. If we don't require certainty for epistemic justification, then ...[text shortened]... a fair assessment of the relevance of Wittgenstein's observation?
If we don't require certainty for justification, then there is no reason to think that the paucity of conceptual analyses or definitions of terms will cause us any epistemological trouble. Just because we can't have necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a pet or a chair doesn't mean that the vast majority of time we will fail to apply the concepts 'pet' and 'chair' correctly.
But this doesn't mean that Wittgenstein's observation was irrelevant, just that it doesn't have brutal epistemological consequences. His observation, which comes from his use theory of meaning (though he would have denied he had any real theory), is interesting dissimilar from other theories of meaning (e.g., causal theories, Conceptual Role Semantics, teleological theories, etc.).
24 Mar 05
1 edit
Originally posted by NemesioWrong forum.
What's the debate here?
The spirituality here, as should be obvious, is the transcendental wonder of being able to truly claim that nobody has parked in your brown zone despite Wittgenstein's warning that one cannot be sure of the sufficient criteria that characterize such an act, for the boundaries between parking, standing, idling, and respecting a Do Not Enter sign are fuzzily established.
29 Mar 05
Originally posted by darvlaywhats wrong with a lil toungue-poo now and then.. then again.. and last night... and hopefully in a few hours..lol
Oral sex or, more specifically, oral sodomy? Oral sex is more of a broader definition which can include orally stimulating the genitals or the anus. To me, sodomy is specifically "backdoor" shenanigans.
For all you puritans, oral sodomy is commonly known as the rim-job or the tongue-poo.