Originally posted by Agergon 2: Its not what you may think I concieve as God, but what you concieve as the greatest imaginable God. Perhaps someone could imagine greater, but that's irrelevant, it only matters what you can honestly concieve.
For starters I reject (2) of your rephrasing of Anselm's argument. I have no reason to assume that the being you would refer to as God is the greatest thing that can be conceived, or more importantly, I can conceive. To put it another way, I have no more reason to suppose I could conceive of an entity for which no other is greater than I could conceive of a nu ...[text shortened]... could argue it certainly doesn't -perhaps later). From all this you haven't got (5) yet ;]
on 3: of course it is true, at least for most people, even Dawkins. He most certainly doesn't believe in God, but he could concieve that it is remotely possible, or at least he cannot disprove the possibility, so 3 must be true.
on 4: Is the concept of a car greater than an actual car? On paper a car is simply a drawing. It holds little potential in its physical manifestation as a drawing (concept) but when built the car is far greater than the drawing which is a concieving of a car. The same would be true for any being, divine or not. 4 must be true.
this brings us to 5. If five is indeed absurd then 1 is true.
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Originally posted by DowardYou said:
on 2: Its not what you may think I concieve as God, but what you concieve as the greatest imaginable God. Perhaps someone could imagine greater, but that's irrelevant, it only matters what you can honestly concieve.
on 3: of course it is true, at least for most people, even Dawkins. He most certainly doesn't believe in God, but he could concieve that it is ...[text shortened]... ivine or not. 4 must be true.
this brings us to 5. If five is indeed absurd then 1 is true.
(2) Given our undestanding and definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
and as this doesn't specifically mention me or anyone else, then it should be assumed that it applies to all people. Moreover if I was wrong here, then were it not the case it should apply to all people then we could have, on a person by person basis, say
person 1 cannot conceive of a God better than God 1
person 2 cannot conceive of a God better than God 2 (for which God 2 > God 1)
person 3 cannot conceive of a God better than God 3 (for which God 3 > God 2 and God 3 > God 1)
.
.
person n cannot conceive of a God better than God n (for which God n > God n-1 and ... and God n > God 1)
then your argument would end up have any number of Gods existing!
"God" is a placeholder symbol for some entity that has capabilities beyond my capacity to conceive by virtue of being supernatural - all I can do is attach descriptors to it, indeed I do not actually conceive of this object as much as I keep track of what descriptors I have associated with the symbol: God; and furthermore I cannot evaluate whether the composition of attributes I would apply to this object at any given time is maximal.
I honestly cannot imagine that my notion of this entity could not be 'refined' at some point later and so for any thought about it I cannot have any confidence at all that I'd dreampt up the `best' version. I certainly hold that the God that christians believe in could be improved and so fails to be such a greatest conceivable being. (2) simply does not sail at all!
As for (3), since I cannot conceive of a greatest being then I cannot conceive of it existing, but more importantly I cannot actually conceive of anything supernatural existing unless I identify such an entity with things I have already experienced, I can of course reshape what I identify it with but I would require the base experiential materials in my head to do the imagining. This already puts limits on which gods I can imagine exist, and there will be uncountably many more which I yet cannot.
It is certainly not always better that things we imagine also exist, for example I've seen footage of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, I associate the mushroom cloud with a nuclear bomb, fear, and lots of death. I can also formulate in my mind the idea that such a bomb goes off in Manchester. I think it better this thought did not manifest in reality!
As for some supernatural entity, I'd have to first be able to evaluate what is good about it and what is bad about it before deciding whether it is better that it exists or not.
You don't get your contradiction because your premises, especially (2), are faulty.
Originally posted by black beetleIf separating our reality into internal and external is illusory, it must be a pretty useful illusion.
We can decide whatever we please alright according to the nature of the reality we are experiencing and according to the rules that hold this specific reality in existence, but this is not the case.
The case is that we have to deal with the physical world, with our inner world and with the world of our ideas. As a result, we end up creating, projectin ...[text shortened]... s a projection of our 6 senses alone, our reality does not exist out there separated from us
😵
Originally posted by Agerghttp://www.watchtower.org/e/19990208/article_01.htm
So many time we atheists (or non-believers) have been hit with the old fundie chestnut:
"Until you prove God doesn't exist, your belief is as much a position of faith as mine"
(or derivatives of such) and usually we then try to convince the fundie who said this that we could apply the same reasoning to the tooth fairy, Gandalf, the FSM, and so on... ...[text shortened]... too shy/scared to share it with anyone
[b]Can you prove I don't have such a proof?[/b]
Check it out!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Originally posted by RJHinds"...You don't have to prove anything to make your assertions.
You don't have to prove anything to make your assertions.
I am only pointing out that the assertion that God does not exist
is a lie. And I gave the proof for that earlier. Since God does
exist you can not prove He does not exist. Any attempt would
be futile.
I am only pointing out that the assertion that God does not exist
is a lie. ...”
If you “don't have to prove anything to make your assertions” then why not the same apply to me so that I can assert “ I am only pointing out that the assertion that God does exist is a lie” ?
“...And I gave the proof for that earlier. ...”
I must have missed that proof; can you point it out?
“...Since God does exist you can not prove He does not exist. ...”
If God exists then I cannot prove 'He' does not exist.
If the tooth fairy exists then I cannot prove 'He' does not exist.
If God does NOT exist then I cannot prove 'He' does not exist.
If the tooth fairy does NOT exist then I cannot prove 'He' does not exist.
If God exists then you cannot prove 'He' DOES exist.
If the tooth fairy exists then you cannot prove 'He' DOES exist.
So that puts 'God' on an equal footing with the tooth fairy as far as proof is concerned.
I don't have to disprove that there is a tooth fairy to point out that, given the absence of credible evidence for a tooth fairy, the probability of the tooth fairy existing should be regarded as vanishingly small.
I don't have to disprove that there is 'God' to point out that, given the absence of credible evidence for a 'God' the probability of 'God' existing should be regarded as vanishingly small.
-same logically consistent reasoning for each.
Originally posted by Agergthere is a lot to digest in your response so lets take it one at a time.
You said:
(2) Given our undestanding and definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
and as this doesn't specifically mention me or anyone else, then it should be assumed that it applies to all people. Moreover if I was wrong here, then were it not the case it should apply to all peo ...[text shortened]...
You don't get your contradiction because your premises, especially (2), are faulty.
person n cannot conceive of a God better than God n (for which God n > God n-1 and ... and God n > God 1)
then your argument would end up have any number of Gods existing!
I think if you examine it differently you will see that only the greatest god imaginable will exist. If person 1 has a greater imagination than person 2 than person 2's god is incorporated into the god of person 1. hence only one god is imagined. Hope that clears up #1 for you. As for the rest i will read and respond as I am able.
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Originally posted by DowardThe Gods of person 1 and person 2 however would still be distinct in that God 1 contaned in God 2 lacks certain properties held by God 2. Moreover your (Anselm's) argument "proves" that God 1 exists, and God 2 exists (both by seperate applications of (7))! If they both conceive of precisely the same God however then we may look for persons i and j where this dosn't hold, or otherwise supposing it is the case in general they all conceive of the same God, then we are supposing there is a unique greatest conceivable god for which there are no other 'greatest conceivable gods' contained within it; and so contrary to your objection, it does matter that you can conceive it as much as anyone else, including me - since it must always be true that the parameters we use to formulate such a god must marry up with one specific god - this must hold for all people.
there is a lot to digest in your response so lets take it one at a time.
[b]person n cannot conceive of a God better than God n (for which God n > God n-1 and ... and God n > God 1)
then your argument would end up have any number of Gods existing!
I think if you examine it differently you will see that only the greatest god imaginable will exist. imagined. Hope that clears up #1 for you. As for the rest i will read and respond as I am able.[/b]
Furthermore, not one person (perhaps an evil person) is allowed to formulate for example, an evil God as the greatest conceivable being he/she can conceive!
I simply don't see how I could possibly expect myself to be able to conceive of this unique entity! and if I conceive of a lesser form of it then your argument doesn't force through.
Originally posted by JS357"Reality", "internal", "external" etc. are merely words -specific points on a specific map, not the territory- we are using for our convenience and shouldn't be considered some kind of absolute truth. So kindly please discard the words -like the one who leaves his boat aside after having cross the river- and be prepared to take the illusory reality we perceive seriously whenever you have to, for reality is neither real, nor not real, nor both, nor neither😵
If separating our reality into internal and external is illusory, it must be a pretty useful illusion.
Originally posted by DowardThere is more to say on this...
there is a lot to digest in your response so lets take it one at a time.
[b]person n cannot conceive of a God better than God n (for which God n > God n-1 and ... and God n > God 1)
then your argument would end up have any number of Gods existing!
I think if you examine it differently you will see that only the greatest god imaginable will exist. ...[text shortened]... imagined. Hope that clears up #1 for you. As for the rest i will read and respond as I am able.[/b]
Suppose for arguments sake what you say is reasonable and the greatest God I can conceive of is God 1 which is contained in God_max. Who's to say that tomorrow I don't improve my formulation of God 1??? From this alone you fail to get your contradiction since in this case I haven't imagined the greatest conceivable being.
Originally posted by AgergIf I can concieve a book, let's say Lord of the Rings, and am able to write only a chapter, but someone else is able to write not only my chapter but "The Fellowship of the Ring" and then a third person is able to write The same chapter and book plus the final twp books, and then a fourth person can write "The Hobbit" the ensuing trilogy and "The Simiriallian" (spelling) then there are still only 5 books, or one collection of books with a coherent (relatively) story line. They don't become seperate books with the same words, they are the same book.
The Gods of person 1 and person 2 however would still be distinct in that God 1 contaned in God 2 lacks certain properties held by God 2. Moreover your (Anselm's) argument "proves" that God 1 exists, and God 2 exists (both by seperate applications of (7))! If they both conceive of precisely the same God however then we may look for persons i and j where this d ...[text shortened]... tity! and if I conceive of a lesser form of it then your argument doesn't force through.
In the same way if I imagine that my god can eat nickles and poop staples, and the next person imagines a god that can do that plus play the harmonica while doing the taxes of Bill Gates, it doesn't mean there are two seperate gods, it means one person has a greater capacity for the conception of god. I would say that I have a greater capacity for the conception of god than you do and feel comfortable with that statement. If you were able to somehow develope that ability then whatever you concieve (different than me) would not automatically become a second god.
Originally posted by AgergThen god 1 or god max is not the greatest god concievable. If you reformulate then that new formulation is the greatest concievable god, though yes tomorrow you may concieve of an even greater god, it does not negate the proof, it merely strengthens it.
There is more to say on this...
Suppose for arguments sake what you say is reasonable and the greatest God I can conceive of is God 1 which is contained in God_max. Who's to say that tomorrow I don't improve my formulation of God 1??? From this alone you fail to get your contradiction since in this case I haven't imagined the greatest conceivable being.
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Originally posted by DowardBut your objection to my claim we must all be thinking of the same god requires that in this analogy of books that any subcollection strictly contained within 5, say, Encapsulates the entire story of Lord of the Rings.
If I can concieve a book, let's say Lord of the Rings, and am able to write only a chapter, but someone else is able to write not only my chapter but "The Fellowship of the Ring" and then a third person is able to write The same chapter and book plus the final twp books, and then a fourth person can write "The Hobbit" the ensuing trilogy and "The Simiriallian whatever you concieve (different than me) would not automatically become a second god.
If my conception of the greatest conceivable being is God_1 < God_max, you are first assuming that for the properties of both Gods, their intersection is the properties of God 1 (draw a Venn diagram), this is not justified - perhaps what constitutes best God for me entails properties which are incompatible with your God (actually this is true). Again the point of asking: how can one be sure that I cannot improve upon God_1 tommorow? (i.e. perhaps I become a devout Christian) or who's to say that as you do more Bible study your formulation of God 2 > God 1 wouldn't be improved?? is to illuminate the point that (5) requires we *have* thought of the greatest conceivable God - it doesn't work if we cannot do this!