18 Jan 07
Originally posted by Agerga philosophical argument on the otherhand includes arguments such as: *The evidence for God's existence is greater than the evidence for Agerg's. reason?...I don't really hold with the current account of causation so therefore I choose the Aristotlean account...the truth of this implies that God is the agent of first cause...Therefore I conclude that God is more real than Agerg*...a classic example of circular reasoning.
[b]It did not. You said something about theists generally using flawed philosophical arguments etc. etc. but did not answer the question of whether a valid philosophical argument is sufficient.
A valid philosophical agument would suggest that the concept meritted further investigation, a philosophical argument on the otherhand includes ar ...[text shortened]... tting LH is smoke and mirrors, all I ever get is smoke and mirrors 😞[/b]
Since you seem to be perennially confused by the use of "because" instead of "therefore", I'll put the argument in terms you can (hopefully) understand:
1. Any rational metaphysical account of the universe (including solipsism or idealism) involves causation.
2. Causation can be of two kinds - event or agent.
3. Event causation requires a Humean regularity theory.
4. Regularity accounts of causation are self-refuting (e.g. they argue that induction is impossible but rely on induction themselves).
(3,4) 5. Therefore event causation is not a valid account of causation.
(2,5) 6. Therefore agent causation is a valid account of causation.
7. If causes are agents, then you cannot have an infinite cause-effect chain.
(7) 8. Therefore there is a First Cause.
9. The First Cause is itself uncaused and metaphysically necessary.
10.The First Cause can be termed God.
(1,10) 11. Therefore, God exists in any rational metaphysical account of the universe.
12. Solipsism/Idealism is a rational metaphysical account of the universe.
13. Agerg does not exist in these accounts.
(11,13) 14. Therefore it is more rational to believe in the existence of God than in that of Agerg
Care to point out the circularity?
In my "Soul???" thread you could have stated at the start that you hold that soul is just another word for physical body, you didn't because you do not hold to this view
That's because the soul is not just another word for physical body. In simple terms:
Soul : Human Being :: Design : Building
implying that *you* use circular reasoning and mis-representation of evidence (you have so far used the former already in this thread)
I've provided the complete argument in simple terms above. We can certainly debate the validity of those arguments, but since you repeatedly claim I use circular reasoning I want you to demonstrate that the argument (1-14) above uses circular reasoning.
If not, I expect you to withdraw that statement.
There are 3 things I can extract from your counter to that post
(1) is what I've argued above. Even if Agerg is an idea in my head, God must exist and cannot be an idea in my head. That's why it's more credible to believe in God than in Agerg.
For (2), see the argument. The evidence is philosophical (i.e. the irrefutable existence of causation itself) -- not specific fossils or galactic events or scientific observations (all of which presume causation, btw).
(3) is important because it means that one does not look for specific scientific evidence for God. That would be akin to trying to read a printed word by looking only at individual pixels.
All I'm getting LH is smoke and mirrors, all I [b]ever get is smoke and mirrors 😞[/b]
You got the emphasis wrong - "all I ever get is smoke and mirrors". Apparently I seem to have no problems having sensible and purposeful conversations with other people on the site (even when they clearly disagree with me). Now, I wonder why that is?
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerYour initial post said that we either adopt a "Humean" view of causation, or we adopt a view based on agent-causation.
Efficient Causation was one of four forms of causation in Aristotle (the other three being formal, material and final). In this particular case, yes, we are talking about efficient cause.
I don't know about "physical causation is reducible to efficient cause" -- the other three are equally applicable in physical causation.
I think I understand b ...[text shortened]... a nail being driven into a wall, then I would identify the immediate cause as the hammer.
Some philosophers think that all causal relationships can ultimately be reduced to event-causation; some think they can ultimately be reduced to agent-causation; some (like Chisholm, IIRC) think we need to leave room for both.
Agent-causation in THIS sense doesn't really provide a solution to Hume's sceptical argument, since even if an agent (say, me) undertakes to raise my arm, and by arm raises, then we still have only a "conjunction" - unless we say that I have somehow directly experienced the causal relationship.
If we are talking about efficient causation, to my mind, that's something else.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerPerhaps you need practice in adapting the register of your discourse to your interlocutor when needs be, especially if your interlocutor has little philosophical training. You also tend to condescend, which doesn't help.
Apparently I seem to have no problems having sensible and purposeful conversations with other people on the site (even when they clearly disagree with me). Now, I wonder why that is?
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerYes, we know that one cannot "learn" the nature of anything from past experience, according to Hume. We know that we have no reason to assume that "constant conjunctions" will continue to be observed.
It's not "plainly" false. Here's what he says in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience
But for Hume that doesn't matter. It's not a question of reason. Our human nature, "custom", "habit", or whatever, means we will continue to expect the sun to rise in the morning, or a stone to sink when we drop it in the lake.
Moreover, the fact this is part of our human nature means it (for Hume) impossible for us NOT to proceed on this basis (see previous quote from Hume). And science will proceed on this basis, too.
It may be an intellectually unsatisfying view, but there it is. He certainly did NOT believe his sceptical argument was the "death of science", or anything like it.
18 Jan 07
Agent-causation in THIS sense doesn't really provide a solution to Hume's sceptical argument, since even if an agent (say, me) undertakes to raise my arm, and by arm raises, then we still have only a "conjunction" - unless we say that I have somehow directly experienced the causal relationship.Originally posted by dottewell
If we are talking about efficient causation, to my mind, that's something else.[/b]
Your initial post said that we either adopt a "Humean" view of causation, or we adopt a view based on agent-causation.
Some philosophers think that all causal relationships can ultimately be reduced to event-causation; some think they can ultimately be reduced to agent-causation; some (like Chisholm, IIRC) think we need to leave room for both.
I don't see why we "need" to do that. I don't even see how we can do that. Things that are caused in one account can be random in the other. It seems to me that one would be adopting two clashing metaphysical systems at the same time.
even if an agent (say, me) undertakes to raise my arm, and by arm raises, then we still have only a "conjunction" - unless we say that I have somehow directly experienced the causal relationship.
This was the core of Anscombe's objection to Hume's account. Hume supposed that (in the billiards ball account) observing "true" causality (as opposed to just constant conjunction of like events) in Ball A causing Ball B to move would mean seeing three things:
1. Ball A hitting Ball B
2. [Causality]
3. Ball B moving away
Anscombe said it was essentially a strawman because causality lies precisely in the derivativeness of the effect from the cause. In other words, what we are seeing is the causal relationship -- not two logically disconnected events linked in our minds by habit.
If we are talking about efficient causation, to my mind, that's something else.
How so?
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI respond to what's put in front of me. If attitude is what I receive, then attitude is what I return. It has nothing to do with lack of philosophical training.
Perhaps you need practice in adapting the register of your discourse to your interlocutor when needs be, especially if your interlocutor has little philosophical training. You also tend to condescend, which doesn't help.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by dottewellHe certainly did NOT believe his sceptical argument was the "death of science", or anything like it.
Yes, we know that one cannot "learn" the nature of anything from past experience, according to Hume. We know that we have no reason to assume that "constant conjunctions" will continue to be observed.
But for Hume that doesn't matter. It's not a question of reason. Our human nature, "custom", "habit", or whatever, means we will continue to expect ...[text shortened]... NOT believe his sceptical argument was the "death of science", or anything like it.
The portion cited, especially the bold bit, says otherwise. Sure, we may still continue to do scientific activity out of habit but science as a discipline aimed towards revealing the nature of the universe (especially in Hume's time) would be essentially dead.
Unless you're reading my statement as saying that Hume thought scientists would stop doing science once they read his essay. I don't think you are, but that seems to be the way "death of scientific investigation" is interpreted in your post.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammerI don't see why we "need" to do that. I don't even see how we can do that.
I don't see why we "need" to do that. I don't even see how we can do that.
even if an agent (say, me) undertakes to raise my arm, and by arm raises, then we still have only a "conjunction" - unless we say that I have somehow directly experienced the causal relationship.
This was the core of Anscombe's objection to Hume's ...[text shortened]... talking about efficient causation, to my mind, that's something else.[/b]
How so?[/b]
Because if we interpret "agent-causation" in the standard way - i.e. causation by an agent rather than an event - then it in no way precludes my saying that some (or most) causal relationships are "event-causes". I could (for example) introduce the notion of agent-causation simply to explain (human) free will, without the need to extend "agency" to things we would not normally think of as agents (rainclouds, etc.)
Anscombe
Yes, I know what Anscombe thinks. What do you think?
If we are talking about efficient causation, to my mind, that's something else.
Becuase you seem to be saying that ALL causes need be explained in terms of agency.
18 Jan 07
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerIf science continues, then it does not die.
[b]He certainly did NOT believe his sceptical argument was the "death of science", or anything like it.
The portion cited, especially the bold bit, says otherwise. Sure, we may still continue to do scientific activity out of habit but science as a discipline aimed towards revealing the nature of the universe (especially in Hume's time) would be that seems to be the way "death of scientific investigation" is interpreted in your post.[/b]
If we accept a Humean account, all that does is change our understanding of what it is we are doing when we "do" science. We may only be discovering new "conjunctions", rather than achieving knowledge of necessary laws; but since we must always expect these conjunctions to continue, that doesn't really hinder the progress of science in any practical way.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by dottewell
Because if we interpret "agent-causation" in the standard way - i.e. causation by an agent rather than an event - then it in no way precludes my saying that some (or most) causal relationships are "event-causes".
I argue it does. If you do that then you are equivocating on 'cause' (as a relationship between an agent exercising causal powers and an object's state being altered vs. two events that are proximate in time and space).
Yes, I know what Anscombe thinks. What do you think?
I think it's a valid counter-argument. Why do you ask?
Becuase you seem to be saying that ALL causes need be explained in terms of agency.
That is what I'm saying. Until Hume, that was how all causes were explained. Note that by 'agent' I simply mean some thing or being.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by dottewellOh, but it does. If you cannot discover necessary laws and cannot reasonably expect past conjunctions to continue (even if you instinctively expect it), then there is no incentive to attempt scientific investigation. If I am a medical researcher who finds that a particular compound provides a cure for cancer in all lab rats, would I go on to human testing if I know that the only reason I think it will work in humans is because my instinct is to expect it to?
If science continues, then it does not die.
If we accept a Humean account, all that does is change our understanding of what it is we are doing when we "do" science. We may only be discovering new "conjunctions", rather than achieving knowledge of necessary laws; but since we must always expect these conjunctions to continue, that doesn't really hinder the progress of science in any practical way.
Further, in reality, conjunctions are often not similar. If I found that iron balls dropped to the earth from the top of a six storey building at 9.8 m/s^2 but leaves do not, then I would have no reason to suspect that the reason the experiment failed with the leaves was not because the theory of gravitation was wrong. I would have no reason to think that, but for secondary factors, the two events were indeed similar (c.f. Cartwright, 1983). Another classical example is when I realise I have to clean the lens on my microscope as opposed to having discovered a new kind of bacterium.
18 Jan 07
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerIf you cannot discover necessary laws and cannot reasonably expect past conjunctions to continue (even if you instinctively expect it), then there is no incentive to attempt scientific investigation.
Oh, but it does. If you cannot discover necessary laws and cannot reasonably expect past conjunctions to continue (even if you instinctively expect it), then there is no incentive to attempt scientific investigation. If I am a medical researcher who finds that a particular compound provides a cure for cancer in all lab rats, would I go o ...[text shortened]... have to clean the lens on my microscope as opposed to having discovered a new kind of bacterium.
You are missing the point. You were talking about what Hume thought; you said he recognised his sceptical puzzle of induction was "the death of science".
Hume thought we are COMPELLED to expect conjunction to continue, not by reason but by nature.
There may be no RATIONAL incentive, but that's irrelevant when there is COMPULSION by virtue of our nature.
For Hume our expectations and actions are not purely a result of our rational reflection. So ON HIS TERMS, science would continue.
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by dottewellBeing compelled to expect conjunctions to continue is not the same thing as being compelled to search for new conjunctions. Given 10 observations that obey the law F = ma, I would be compelled (in Hume's account) to expect the 11th to follow suit.
[b]If you cannot discover necessary laws and cannot reasonably expect past conjunctions to continue (even if you instinctively expect it), then there is no incentive to attempt scientific investigation.
You are missing the point. You were talking about what Hume thought; you said he recognised his sceptical puzzle of induction was "the ...[text shortened]... are not purely a result of our rational reflection. So ON HIS TERMS, science would continue.[/b]
But nothing compels me to make a 11th observation! If I know (since Hume's told me so and I accept his argumentation) that there is no reason why the 11th observation should not follow a completely different law for no apparent reason at all, then why would I have an incentive to make a 11th observation?
18 Jan 07
Originally posted by lucifershammer...And believing that by doing science I am discovering laws doesn't compel me to search for new laws, either.
[b]Being compelled to expect conjunctions to continue is not the same thing as being compelled to search for new conjunctions. Given 10 observations that obey the law F = ma, I would be compelled (in Hume's account) to expect the 11th to follow suit.
But nothing compels me to make a 11th observation! If I know (since Hume's told me so an ...[text shortened]... for no apparent reason at all, then why would I have an incentive to make a 11th observation?[/b]
So what? The question of what motivates scientific endeavour is a quite separate one, which in many regards is neutral between a Humean and anti-Humean view of induction.
Bluntly: if I want to cure cancer, I'll probably keep going with the science thing, whether I'm Humean or not. Where does Hume say different, as you claimed?
18 Jan 07
2 edits
Originally posted by lucifershammerOkay. So you're Thomas Reid, or Aquinas, or whatever. Do you think if we accept Anscombe's criticism of Hume we have to revert to some sort of Reidian view of efficient/agent causation?
Originally posted by dottewell
[b]Because if we interpret "agent-causation" in the standard way - i.e. causation by an agent rather than an event - then it in no way precludes my saying that some (or most) causal relationships are "event-causes".
I argue it does. If you do that then you are equivocating on 'cause' (as a relationship be causes were explained. Note that by 'agent' I simply mean some thing or being.[/b]
Explain the following in terms of agent causation:
Darvlay's face annoys me.
What does it mean here to say Darvlay's face is an "agent"?