Originally posted by lemon lime
Something appears to be missing... I don't see where man having a choice in the matter (free will) factors into this, and it appears free will and the ability to choose has been intentionally left out in order to insure the argument will be absurd. God allowing us to say either yes or no to him has always been a part of this, so why have you left this part out?
Free will can enter into it in several ways, but does not change the reductio:
First, human free will is often raised as a
defeater of God’s will that all be saved (in that some people “refuse the gift” ). That is essentially an Arminian argument, under which God desires to save, but fails because of human free will.
Second, the free-will argument entails that God values our ability to freely choose over our ultimate well-being.
— Note: In the parable of the Good Samaritan, in which I believe that the Samaritan is an analog for God (or Christ), the Samaritan does not wait for permission to save the beaten man. He does not wait until the man is sufficiently conscious and aware to make an informed choice about whether or not he wants the Samaritan to save him. He asks nothing of the man at all. Which also goes to the third point, viz:
Third, the free-will argument really can only work if it is assumed that the choice is made under conditions of full awareness of both the gift and the consequences of refusal—no seeing things “through a glass darkly”, so to speak. Otherwise it is really an unfair choice (either way, it is a
forced choice).
—Note: It is important here to mention that the free-will argument generally restricts the choice to this lifetime, and under conditions where even proponents often seem to argue that we do not have full knowledge and awareness—e.g., when arguments are made that we cannot fully or at least sufficiently understand common terms as applied to God (such as God’s being just). And yet it is assumed that people have a sufficient concept of eternity, for example, rather than just some vague notion of “a really long time”. [Note within a note: it is not uncontroversial that the Greek words commonly—though not exclusively—translated as “forever” actually mean that.]
Fourth, it is clear that, Biblically, God does not always value our free will over either our own well-being or the well-being of others. Proponents of the soteriological free-will argument seem to assume that this is the single case in which God shows greater concern for our choosing than for our well-being—our well-being throughout all eternity.
I think that the free-will argument is an especially bad argument when cast in the context of a God whose ideal of justice is essentially retributive rather than reformative/restorative—that is, in the context of a forever-lasting punishment, or any punishment whose intent is not reformative/restorative. It is hard to square that with a God who is not only “just” (an attribute) or who is “love” [
agape] ( a statement of essential nature)—without stripping such words of their meaning. It is also hard to square with the model of God the father as a loving parent. It certainly does not fit in a model of salvation as being healed or made well. (Just to be clear, by “hard to square”, I mean unreasonable, not merely what I might dislike.)
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In addition to the above, the kind of “libertarian free will” generally assumed in the argument ends up being either internally contradictory, or reduces to randomness. This has been shown on here multiple times before. I’ll see if I can find a thread reference when I have more time.