10 Nov '11 05:34>1 edit
Originally posted by robbie carrobieExactly. I made that same point earlier. And that's why the whole issue of 'naturalness' in these debates is a red herring. And it is, regardless of which notion of 'natural' you mean. Here are the problems:
even so, one cannot equate animal behaviour with human as a justifying principle for
clearly there are animal behavioural patterns that if adopted by humans would prove to
be disastrous.
First, the concept 'natural' is either purely descriptive or at least partly normative. Roughly, it either refers to things that occur or typically occur in the world, or it has some evaluative component. Consider the following accounts of the concept:
Note that when I use the term 'homosexuality' below, I mean same-sex sexual activity. I could make the same points with regard to homosexual sexual orientation, but since Christians don't think it is a sin to have an orientation, we needn't belabor that point.
Here are some descriptive accounts:
1) X is natural if and only if X occurs in the world. On this view, pretty much everything is natural, including homosexuality, and of course this notion is irrelevant to issues of morality. Rape occurs; rape is wrong.
2) X is natural if and only if X regularly (typically, consistently, etc.) occurs in the world. Or, relatedly, X is natural with regard to some population S if and only if X regularly occurs within S. On this view, homosexuality is again natural, and again this notion is irrelevant to issues of morality. Rape regularly occurs among humans; Rape is wrong.
3) X is natural if and only if X commonly (often, etc.) occurs in the world. Or, relatedly, X is natural with regard to some population S if and only if X commonly occurs within S. Perhaps X is natural if and only if X occurs within the majority of S. On this view, homosexuality is not natural. Then again, on this view, neither is being stronger, smarter, or prettier than average. But none of these things are morally suspect, so why would homosexuality be morally suspect? Again, there is no relationship between this notion and morality.
Additionally, besides the obvious counter-examples descriptive notions of 'natural' generate when put to use in arguments purporting moral conclusions, there is also the deeper worry about the structure of these arguments. ConrauK pointed this out above, noting the Naturalistic Fallacy. Basically, the worry is this: No set of purely descriptive premises can entail a normative conclusion, and moral conclusions are normative conclusions. There is no deriving "ought" statements from purely "is" statements. Some supplementary normative premise will have to be employed (e.g., "If an act is unnatural, then the act is immoral or, at least, morally counts against that act" ). But these supplementary bridge-premises will stand in need of justification, and here is where counter-examples have real bite.
Anyway, here are some normative accounts:
4) X is natural for a population S if and only if X is typically (consistently, reliably, etc.) healthy for S. It should be clear that the notion of 'health' is at least partly normative/evaluative, relying, as it does, on the notion of 'good for'. There has been some debate here about whether homosexuality is physically healthy. Of course, there are other ways activities can be good or bad for a person, and physical health is not the only type of health. But, in any case, there is no clear connection between something being typically unhealthy and immoral. It is typically unhealthy to volunteer for armed service during times of war, but it is probably permissible, and may even be obligatory.
5) X is natural for a population S if and only if X typically (consistently, reliably, etc.) conduces to the flourishing of members of S. 'Flourishing', roughly, means to be living excellently or well. And this is standardly taken as a teleological notion. It's not just that one flourishes when one is happy or successful; it's a condition of flourishing that one's life is paradigmatic of one's kind, or that one's life is appropriate for the type of entity one is. There are really difficult epistemological questions here, concerning what sort of evidence could serve to justify any particular account of human flourishing. I won't belabor that here. But if you think that the evidence is biological, or statistical, or purely descriptive, then you'll end up with all the worries mentioned above. And if you think that particular accounts of human flourishing are ultimately justified by reference to moral arguments (i.e., if you think that what it means to flourish as a human is to live a morally good human life), then any argument against homosexuality that rests on such a notion of human flourishing will be viciously question-begging. A prohibition against homosexuality will be built right in to the account of flourishing.
Similar arguments apply to arguments employing notions like 'purpose' or 'design'. Either the purpose of X is some descriptive fact about it (e.g., Somebody intended that X be for this or that), or some at least partly normative fact about it (X is only appropriate for this or that). But if the purpose of X is a descriptive matter, then no moral consequences follow. Suppose it is a fact about X that God intended it to be used for this but not that. This is descriptive, and nothing normative follows. There are no moral consequences of this fact. If I build something I intend to prop open doors, and my girlfriend uses it to prop up a table, she has not thereby done something inappropriate. Suppose, however, that God is special in at least this regard: When God intends that X be used for this but not that, there is thereby an additional normative fact that X should be used for this but not that. Here you have just the supplementary premise you'd need to get from descriptive premises to normative conclusions. But, so what? This claim, that God's intentions are normative, is again viciously question-begging in the debate at hand. The theist who advances this claim has simply built in a prohibition against homosexuality, or against particular forms of activity, into notions like 'design', 'purpose', 'function', or whatever. And note, further, that here the notion 'natural' is no longer doing any real dialectical work. The theist is simply saying, in effect, that God says "don't engage in this sort of behavior". But then the theist is back to relying on purely religious arguments. These arguments are, of course, wholly question-begging and unsatisfactory.
So, that's that. I take this post as a refutation of the claim that there is anything morally important about the notion 'natural' with regard to homosexuality.