Originally posted by twhitehead
I agree that non-existence is usually harder to prove, but that is a function of possible existences.
Your claim that we must look everywhere is only true if God is defined as existing in an unknown location, and having no known specific effect on a known location.
For example, if God is defined as being a little green man in my fridge, then I need only ...[text shortened]... ll, then I need only prove the existence of one unhappy person to prove his non-existence.
Well, suppose I say that the LGM in your fridge is only visible when the door is closed? (I believe you touched on this before with your “invisible pink unicorn” example.) So, every time you open the fridge door, the little fella simply becomes invisible…
This is an example of the problems of falsification once the supernatural (extra-natural) category is brought into things. The possibility of falsification (or defeasibility) is simply—de facto—denied by fiat.
Absent admission of such a supernatural category, it seems perfectly reasonable to conclude—after X number of look-sees—that absence of evidence can, in some cases, be taken as evidence of absence. This might not be proof at the level of certainty, but it would certainly seem to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or by preponderance of (non-) evidence.
That is, I do not see how the absence of evidence in such a case can be taken to warrant a reasonable belief in LGMs that reside in the refrigerator dimension. Nor do I see how invocation of the “supernatural” can, of itself, offer such warrant.