why so angry?

Originally posted by bbarr
But now you're just articulating a version of compatibilism according to which true freedom is being free from sin and being able to act from love. It is perfectly compatible with this conception that Jesus could not have sinned, given the perfection of his character.

But now you're just articulating a version of compatibilism according to which true freedom is being free from sin and being able to act from love. It is perfectly compatible with this conception that Jesus could not have sinned, given the perfection of his character.BARR

The question is whether "could not have sinned " means that it would be morally repugnant to him or that it was actually impossible for him in real terms. The garden of gethsemane experience sounded very much like a hard choice for him where there was a real possibilty he could have turned away from God's plan for him. (If it be possible take this cup from me )

Potentially you are free to go out and kill your neighbours right now , but you may not because it would be a betrayal of who you are. Your respect for humanity is too great to do it , but you could because God has allowed a world where it is possible to turn to evil and destruction.

Originally posted by knightmeister
But now you're just articulating a version of compatibilism according to which true freedom is being free from sin and being able to act from love. It is perfectly compatible with this conception that Jesus could not have sinned, given the perfection of his character.BARR

The question is whether "could not have sinned " means that it would be morall could because God has allowed a world where it is possible to turn to evil and destruction.

If it was morally repugnant for Jesus to sin, then presumably he thought there was sufficient and decisive reason not to sin. So, to suppose that Jesus could have, nevertheless, sinned, is to suppose that Jesus could have freely chosen to act in a manner completely unsupported by what he took his reasons to be. So, explain to me how this is supposed to work. We suppose that Jesus engages in some process of moral deliberation that concludes with the thought "this would be repugnant, sinful, and should not be done...". Then, you suppose, he could freely act contrary to this conclusion by forming and following through on the intention to sin. But if he did do this, he could only do so by acting in a manner that he explicitly thought was decisively outweighed by his actual reasons. This is another example of how your conception of freedom severs the link between actions, free choices, and the reasons we take ourselves to have.

I think I missed it when you answered my question about God's freedom. Do you think God has the capacity to have done otherwise than that he in fact did? If you imagine a variation on the "time rewinder" thought experiment (just hypothetically) could God choose differently at T1 and T4, given that the entire state of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

Originally posted by knightmeister
But now you're just articulating a version of compatibilism according to which true freedom is being free from sin and being able to act from love. It is perfectly compatible with this conception that Jesus could not have sinned, given the perfection of his character.BARR

The question is whether "could not have sinned " means that it would be morall ...[text shortened]... could because God has allowed a world where it is possible to turn to evil and destruction.

Potentially you are free to go out and kill your neighbours right now , but you may not because it would be a betrayal of who you are

That certainly would not hold under your particular notion of freedom. According to your view, your carrying out a "free" action is neither a betrayal nor a testament to who you are. That's because under your view, there is simply no relationship whatsoever between the content of your "free" willings and those things that make you who you are. Under your view of freedom, you wouldn't (and couldn't) direct any such control over your free actions because your free actions would be random and arbitrary.

Note how -- throughout this entire discussion -- the only times when you make good sense are those times when you, in fact, deny your own libertarian version of freedom.

Originally posted by bbarr
If it was morally repugnant for Jesus to sin, then presumably he thought there was sufficient and decisive reason not to sin. So, to suppose that Jesus could have, nevertheless, sinned, is to suppose that Jesus could have freely chosen to act in a manner completely unsupported by what he took his reasons to be. So, explain to me how this is supposed to work. of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

Your arguments thoughout here are outstanding. If they, taken for what they are, cannot motivate defection to compatibilism, I don't know what can.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Your arguments thoughout here are outstanding. If they, taken for what they are, cannot motivate defection to compatibilism, I don't know what can.

*Blush* Thanks.

Originally posted by bbarr
I think I missed it when you answered my question about God's freedom. Do you think God has the capacity to have done otherwise than that he in fact did? If you imagine a variation on the "time rewinder" thought experiment (just hypothetically) could God choose differently at T1 and T4, given that the entire state of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

I haven't heard a clear answer to this yet, either.

It is a very interesting way of sharpening the question, I think, and not one I'd heard before (although to be fair, this was never an area I was particularly interested in).

Originally posted by bbarr
Sure, if you wanted to kill your son you could. If God had wanted to act otherwise than he in fact did, he could have. But this is not libertarian freedom, this is compatibilist freedom. Note the similarity between what you've just said and my conception that we are free when are able to act in accord with our characters and on the basis of the reasons at o ...[text shortened]... hy I specified in the argument above that at T0 and T3 your psychological states are identical.

"Sure, if you wanted to kill your son you could. If God had wanted to act otherwise than he in fact did, he could have. But this is not libertarian freedom, this is compatibilist freedom. Note the similarity between what you've just said and my conception that we are free when are able to act in accord with our characters and on the basis of the reasons at our disposal. If we had different desires or wants, then of course we could act differently than we do in fact. This is why I specified in the argument above that at T0 and T3 your psychological states are identical." BARR


It is libertarian free will because the actual possibility of me doing so exists , whereas in another view the possibility does not exist. For example , I can say that if I was a cat I would be able to lick my own bottom . I "could" do it if I "was" a cat , but I'm not so it's just a pointless truism. It's a bit like saying that a robot is free because if it were a different kind of robot it would act differently. With this logic I can argue that a worm is just as free as you because if it were a different worm or a cat then....?

For true free will one needs both possibilities to exist in the same universe not in other imaginary parallel dterministic universes with different conditions. In other words the timeline of our lives is not set in stone and can be influenced by real choices. If you are predestined to always choose A then what meaning does it have to say that you could have been predestined to choose B in a different universe? Both choices would be predestined timelines and not free.

Originally posted by bbarr
If it was morally repugnant for Jesus to sin, then presumably he thought there was sufficient and decisive reason not to sin. So, to suppose that Jesus could have, nevertheless, sinned, is to suppose that Jesus could have freely chosen to act in a manner completely unsupported by what he took his reasons to be. So, explain to me how this is supposed to work. ...[text shortened]... of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

Not to muddy the waters too much but...

There was but one sin that Christ could have committed: stepping out of the plan of God. Just as in the Garden, Adam and the woman were not able to sin; they daily had but one choice to make. Either remain in the Garden enjoying God's system or choose the other system.

Similarily, Christ had the same choice before Him. Humanly speaking, He had no concept of sin as He had never commited one. Taxed to every end possible for a man to be taxed, He remained in the plan of God. And yet--- at the core of it--- the very essence of the issue was His will or God's will.

In spite of His moral repugnancy, or His habits of real righteousness, when faced with the mockery of idiots and spat upon while subjected to the perverse justice of the morally bankrupt power-mongers of His day, He never recoiled... never chose His options over God's plan. And when the sins of the world were laid upon Him and He finally and completely experienced complete separation from His Beloved, He could have easily reacted to the shame. He did not, not because He could not, but in His freedom He chose God.

Of course, you can call that a reasoned decision wrought upon by contemplative deliberation, but what cannot be explained away is that (humanly) He had the choice. As proof, so did the man and the woman... and we all know how that turned out.

Originally posted by bbarr
If it was morally repugnant for Jesus to sin, then presumably he thought there was sufficient and decisive reason not to sin. So, to suppose that Jesus could have, nevertheless, sinned, is to suppose that Jesus could have freely chosen to act in a manner completely unsupported by what he took his reasons to be. So, explain to me how this is supposed to work. ...[text shortened]... of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

Then, you suppose, he could freely act contrary to this conclusion by forming and following through on the intention to sin. But if he did do this, he could only do so by acting in a manner that he explicitly thought was decisively outweighed by his actual reasons BARR


...BUT....what if one is caught between two opposing courses of action that are of equal validity and strength? In Jesus's case in the garden of gethsemane there was no valid reason to do anything other than God's will , to not do God's will (die for the sins of man) would be morally repugnant for him.
However , the realisation of what this would cost him in suffering and separation from his father etc was repugnant also (but in a different more gut felt way) Thus he was caught (the Bible hints that he was agonised like a caged animal) between these opposing course of action.
He could do both. He had "reasons" to do both and so whatever course he took would not be arbitary or random. He should go to the cross , but who could blame him for running away from it?

You make the whole issue into a dry intellectual process whereas infact it's much deeper than that (to the extent that we often don't know exactly ourselves why we choose) . Also you neglect to think about the occasions where there is nothing to weight a decision one way or the other apart from our own will.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Not to muddy the waters too much but...

There was but one sin that Christ could have committed: stepping out of the plan of God. Just as in the Garden, Adam and the woman were not able to sin; they daily had but one choice to make. Either remain in the Garden enjoying God's system or choose the other system.

Similarily, Christ had the same choice b ...[text shortened]... d the choice. As proof, so did the man and the woman... and we all know how that turned out.

when faced with the mockery of idiots and spat upon while subjected to the perverse justice of the morally bankrupt power-mongers of His day, He never recoiled... never chose His options over God's plan

FREAKY

BUT one could say that he was definitely tempted to recoil from the cross. The fact that he "sweated blood" over it suggests that he chose the cross freely and that the other option was real.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Potentially you are free to go out and kill your neighbours right now , but you may not because it would be a betrayal of who you are

That certainly would not hold under your particular notion of freedom. According to your view, your carrying out a "free" action is neither a betrayal nor a testament to who you are. That's because under your vi ...[text shortened]... od sense are those times when you, in fact, deny your own libertarian version of freedom.[/b]

According to your view, your carrying out a "free" action is neither a betrayal nor a testament to who you are. That's because under your view, there is simply no relationship whatsoever between the content of your "free" willings and those things that make you who you are. Under your view of freedom, you wouldn't (and couldn't) direct any such control over your free actions because your free actions would be random and arbitrary. LEMON


Not at all. There is a relationship between choices and reasons. One has a choice between a betrayal of who we are or a confirmation of who we are , but both choices are possible and both would have their reasons. The difference with free will is that there is no determined /predestined cause for your reason , both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes. This is what happens when we are "caught" in the agony of making a difficult moral decision. We feel vividly the possibility of both course of action and both would have their reasons. As in the fuse and the bomb debate , there can be more than one reason for detonation.

In fact there is a strong relationship between choices and the person that you are. One might say that "I choose this way and that because that's the way I am" and more radical version would be " I have become the person I am because of the choices I have made"

This view of human choices says that the big choices we make are a culmination of all the little choices we have been making. We become who we are because of our choices so the two are very linked indeed!

Originally posted by bbarr
If it was morally repugnant for Jesus to sin, then presumably he thought there was sufficient and decisive reason not to sin. So, to suppose that Jesus could have, nevertheless, sinned, is to suppose that Jesus could have freely chosen to act in a manner completely unsupported by what he took his reasons to be. So, explain to me how this is supposed to work. ...[text shortened]... of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?

Do you think God has the capacity to have done otherwise than that he in fact did? If you imagine a variation on the "time rewinder" thought experiment (just hypothetically) could God choose differently at T1 and T4, given that the entire state of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?BARR

I think so. It's possible that there are many different ways that God could have put into action his plan for the world. God's "internal states" Wooah! Blimey if I could answer that question! All I can say is that God is not being influenced or predetermined by any other cause or reason. It's hard for us to imagine something uncaused but that's what God is. What he is able to throw into the melting pot of the universe is something radically different , what one might call "uncausedness" . This element is needed because otherwise all we have is determinism and no freedom of choice.

It's possible that God does not have free will in the sense that we have in the sense that he can't commit evil or do something imperfect. Although one could argue that he could do its just he doesn't want to. However , Jesus could be/ and was tempted and lived as a fully human being . Maybe it's Christ who gives us free will and that ability to make choices? There is also to factor in the role of opposing spirtual forces to God. We are tempted to certain course of action by the "enemy" . CS Lewis posits that the only reason that God allows evil to exist in the first place is that it's by product is a free world where we really can make evil or good choices.

To return to your question. If one replicated the conditions at T0 and T3 then God's uncaused/free nature would also be replicated so there would be no reason to assume that the outcome would be the same other than the fact that God's love would prevail. The difficulty with imagining this is the same difficulty in imagining something that has no beginning or cause. Why does God exist? There is no why , he just is. How did come come to exist? He has always existed. What drives God to love? Nothing. God is love. etc etc

Originally posted by knightmeister
"Sure, if you wanted to kill your son you could. If God had wanted to act otherwise than he in fact did, he could have. But this is not libertarian freedom, this is compatibilist freedom. Note the similarity between what you've just said and my conception that we are free when are able to act in accord with our characters and on the basis of the reason ...[text shortened]... e B in a different universe? Both choices would be predestined timelines and not free.

It is a necessary condition of choosing freely that one choose for reasons, which is why the robot or the worm are not as free as I am. Neither the robot nor the worm choose freely because they do not choose at all. I suppose it is possible for a robot to be so complex that its choices are mediated by conceptions of what it ought to do, where these conceptions are applied to internal representational states. If so, and if further conditions are met (say, the ability to learn from its experiences, and to apply that knowledge to future choices, and the ability to for its final ends and projects to be modified in light of its knowledge), then that robot would be just as free as we are. Of course, such a robot would be radically different than the sort that initially comes to mind when you use the term in your implicit argument by analogy. The implicit conception that you are employing is of an object that merely behaves in a programmed manner, with no will of its own, no character, no concepts, etc. Robots of this sort are merely extentions of the will of programmers. But when you start adding in the sorts of psychological capacities that I take to be conditions for freedom, then you end up with an entity for which there is substantial reason to credit freedom.

Alternatively, it seems like on your view a robot could be free as long as it was hooked up to some quantum system such that its choices were causally undetermined; that is, such that there was always some non-negligible probability that it could have chosen otherwise. But this would be to mistake the possibility of random action for freedom.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Then, you suppose, he could freely act contrary to this conclusion by forming and following through on the intention to sin. But if he did do this, he could only do so by acting in a manner that he explicitly thought was decisively outweighed by his actual reasons BARR


...BUT....what if one is caught between two opposing courses of action that are ...[text shortened]... where there is nothing to weight a decision one way or the other apart from our own will.

In such a case one searches for reasons that tip the balance, as I mentioned earlier. In Jesus' case, on your view, "there was no valid reason to do anything other than God's will". So, presumably, Jesus took there to be decisive reasons in favor of doing what he did. Yes, the choice was difficult and tragic and the stuff of very powerful mythology. This is all consistent with my view, but inconsistent with yours, since you suppose Jesus could have both recognized that he had decisive reasons to conform to God's will and that this recognition was insufficient to determine his choice. I guess it was just lucky for humanity, on your view, that he chose as he did.

It is question begging, in the context of this discussion, to simply assert that Jesus could have conformed to God's will or failed to do so. Whether he could have chosen otherwise, given a full spedification of the reasons at this disposal and his psychology, is precisely what is at issue.

Originally posted by knightmeister
Do you think God has the capacity to have done otherwise than that he in fact did? If you imagine a variation on the "time rewinder" thought experiment (just hypothetically) could God choose differently at T1 and T4, given that the entire state of the universe, including God's internal states, are identical at T0 and T3 respectively?BARR

I think so. ...[text shortened]... e has always existed. What drives God to love? Nothing. God is love. etc etc

Please go back and read the original question. If God is rational, and thus does what he has most reason to do given his perfect knowledge and character (as good, or loving, or whatever), then it would be a failing on his part to have ever done otherwise than that which in fact he did. Since God can't fail in this sense (on your view) it follows that it is impossible for him to ever do otherwise than that which he, in fact, does. So, God doesn't have libertarian free will. In fact, the only way to make sense of God is to construe his will in compatibilist terms: His perfect loving character and perfect knowledge cause him to choose and act in the way he does. You even recognize this when you admit both that (1) God can't act wrongly, and (2) God's love would prevail at both T1 and T4.