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why so angry?

why so angry?

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Originally posted by bbarr
Please go back and read the original question. If God is rational, and thus does what he has most reason to do given his perfect knowledge and character (as good, or loving, or whatever), then it would be a failing on his part to have ever done otherwise than that which in fact he did. Since God can't fail in this sense (on your view) it follows that it is im ...[text shortened]... mit both that (1) God can't act wrongly, and (2) God's love would prevail at both T1 and T4.
Please go back and read the original question. If God is rational, and thus does what he has most reason to do given his perfect knowledge and character (as good, or loving, or whatever), then it would be a failing on his part to have ever done otherwise than that which in fact he did. Since God can't fail in this sense (on your view) it follows that it is impossible for him to ever do otherwise than that which he, in fact, does. So, God doesn't have libertarian free will. In fact, the only way to make sense of God is to construe his will in compatibilist terms: His perfect loving character and perfect knowledge cause him to choose and act in the way he does. You even recognize this when you admit both that (1) God can't act wrongly, and (2) God's love would prevail at both T1 and T4.---- BARR


So let's say God does not have free will for a while . What do you think this proves? That his freedom is less than ours? To be perfect in love is to be more free than we are with our libertarian free will. This kind of freedom is the ultimate goal of the Christian life . In a sense libertarian free will is only a means to an end to this goal. I wonder if you think that God has less freedom than us?

One other consideration here is that in Christianity God comprises of 3 entities. In our debate we are refering to God the Father , but in God the son one can say that God does have free will in Jesus in that he was tempted to turn away from his mission (for example) and lived as a human.

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Originally posted by knightmeister
Please go back and read the original question. If God is rational, and thus does what he has most reason to do given his perfect knowledge and character (as good, or loving, or whatever), then it would be a failing on his part to have ever done otherwise than that which in fact he did. Since God can't fail in this sense (on your view) it follows that i us in that he was tempted to turn away from his mission (for example) and lived as a human.
I think it shows that since God is not free in the libertarian sense, it is false that you are free in the libertarian sense by virtue of God manifesting part of himself in you. If God exists, I think he would be more free than us, since he has access to perfect knowledge. One limitation on our freedom is that the reasons at our disposal are often merely apparent or only opaque. God is free to act perfectly in accord with his character, whereas we have to muddle through given our epistemic limitations.

That God is putatively comprised of three entities is immaterial to the arguments presented herein.

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Originally posted by knightmeister
According to your view, your carrying out a "free" action is neither a betrayal nor a testament to who you are. That's because under your view, there is simply no relationship whatsoever between the content of your "free" willings and those things that make you who you are. Under your view of freedom, you wouldn't (and couldn't) direct any such control ng. We become who we are because of our choices so the two are very linked indeed!
both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes

Not under your view, remember? Your view does not admit that reasons can be causally sufficient to elicit free choice because your view denies that free choices can have causally sufficient antecedents. In bbarr's example, for instance, if you had reasons at T0 that were causally sufficient to elicit your choosing to P at T1, then from the definition of sufficiency and the fact that these reasons are also present at T3, it follows that it is not possible for you at T4 to choose not to P. This is contradictory to your concept of freedom; so under your view of freedom, it is contradictory for you to say that reasons can cause free choices.

In fact there is a strong relationship between choices and the person that you are.

That may be true under a compatibilist account, but not under a libertarian account. Under your view, my allegedly free choices are uncaused and without explanation. Under your conception of freedom, I simply cannot be a genuine source of my free choices. In fact, it would seem ridiculous for them to be referenced as my choices.

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Originally posted by LemonJello
That may be true under a compatibilist account, but not under a libertarian account. Under your view, my allegedly free choices are uncaused and without explanation. Under your conception of freedom, I simply cannot be a genuine source of my free choices. In fact, it would seem ridiculous for them to be referenced as my choices.
In effect the choice is random. But knightmeister can't handle that obvious conclusion.

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Originally posted by twhitehead
In effect the choice is random. But knightmeister can't handle that obvious conclusion.
In effect the choice is random. But knightmeister can't handle that obvious conclusion. WHITEY

I can assure you that there are many times when it would be very convenient for me not to believe we have free will. Do you think that taking full responsibility for your actions before a holy God is a comfortable hobby?

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Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes

Not under your view, remember? Your view does not admit that reasons can be causally sufficient to elicit free choice because your view denies that free choices can have causally sufficient antecedents. In bbarr's example, for instance, if you had reasons at T0 that we ...[text shortened]... ree choices. In fact, it would seem ridiculous for them to be referenced as my choices.[/b]
both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes

Not under your view, remember? Your view does not admit that reasons can be causally sufficient to elicit free choice because your view denies that free choices can have causally sufficient antecedents. In bbarr's example, for instance, if you had reasons at T0 that were causally sufficient to elicit your choosing to P at T1, then from the definition of sufficiency and the fact that these reasons are also present at T3, it follows that it is not possible for you at T4 to choose not to P. This is contradictory to your concept of freedom; so under your view of freedom, it is contradictory for you to say that reasons can cause free choices. LEMON

This may sound kind of right in theory but in practice the decisions we make can be reasoned out either way. If I choose A over B then there is a reasoning that goes with that choice. It's just the same with B over A. Now just because neither of these reasons is causally sufficient to make me choose one or the other does not make them neccessarily arbitrary because whichever I choose has reasoning attached to it. However , you are right in saying that neither of these reasons is sufficient , so why choose A or B?

Now in Christian terms the thing that may draw me to A is the ability God has given me to surrender my will to his will. B may involve following my path against God's will. But this choice is not easy . It involves surrender of the will , sacrifice of the ego and risk/faith. Simply knowing that one is God's will is not sufficient , an act of surrender is needed. It hurts our pride. This is what makes it a choice because it's different from how you portray it (ie as some intellectual exercise only). So what might cause me to choose A? The answer is that God's spirit enables us to surrender , we kind of let go and give ourselves away in faith. God can help us to do this but only with our co-operation. He can't force us to surrender. So neither reason is causally sufficient but the decision is not arbitrary because the choice is about surrender or not surrender.Let go or hold on.

As Christ said "He who loses his life shall find it , but he who holds onto his life shall lose it" . This is the only free will God is interested in , not whether we go to tescos or freemart.

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Originally posted by bbarr
I think it shows that since God is not free in the libertarian sense, it is false that you are free in the libertarian sense by virtue of God manifesting part of himself in you. If God exists, I think he would be more free than us, since he has access to perfect knowledge. One limitation on our freedom is that the reasons at our disposal are often merely app ...[text shortened]... t God is putatively comprised of three entities is immaterial to the arguments presented herein.
I think it shows that since God is not free in the libertarian sense, it is false that you are free in the libertarian sense by virtue of God manifesting part of himself in you. BARR


If this were so why would your argument follow? I have always argued that it is because God is free from determinism and causality that enables him to give us free will NOT that he neccesarily has/doesn't have free will.

"That God is putatively comprised of three entities is immaterial to the arguments presented herein" BARR

Why?

EDIT- Actually something dawned on me. I think really it is Christ (who has/had libertarian free will) who manifests in us . This is different from God the father. The Bible says that God dwells in us through Christ , this means the trinity becomes central rather than immaterial.

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Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes

Not under your view, remember? Your view does not admit that reasons can be causally sufficient to elicit free choice because your view denies that free choices can have causally sufficient antecedents. In bbarr's example, for instance, if you had reasons at T0 that we ...[text shortened]... ree choices. In fact, it would seem ridiculous for them to be referenced as my choices.[/b]
Under your view, my allegedly free choices are uncaused and without explanation.LEMON

No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person. This makes them even more your choice because you can't say "it's this or that that made me choose" you just say " I choose" therefore the ownership of the choice is entirely yours. It belongs to you and you only. You are responsible for it. What "causes" you to choose is you.There is nothing "making" you choose really you are just choosing. This is not arbitrary because one deliberately makes an act of will in one direction.Why? Because one chooses to surrender to God rather than follow one's own path. CS Lewis referenced this as a kind of dying to self.

In your model it seems equally ridiculous to think of them as "your" choices because it's not you choosing , instead it is the predetermined force of nature that makes you choose. There's no "you" in it apart from the illusion you have that "you" are somehow making a choice. The reality is that it's the thing (nature) that is making the choice through you . If the choice belongs to anything then at root source it belongs to the cause of that choice whioch in your view is not you but nature. Do you think a worm owns it's choices?

Of course the illusion is very real (and this is what makes it difficult to argue against) because you do actually have free will. This is what makes your view of freedom convincing. The experience of actual libertarian free will makes your view seem convincing to you. I think , in other words , that if you were really right and I was wrong then our experience of free will would not be so overpowering and convincing. This is why we can't help but be angry at others because we "know" in our souls that they didn't "have to " do what they did.

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Originally posted by knightmeister
both courses of action have reasons and so both reasons are possible causes

Not under your view, remember? Your view does not admit that reasons can be causally sufficient to elicit free choice because your view denies that free choices can have causally sufficient antecedents. In bbarr's example, for instance, if you had reasons at T0 that were ca ...[text shortened]... s is the only free will God is interested in , not whether we go to tescos or freemart.
I still don't see how you have actually addressed bbarr's initial question regarding possible explanations for your behavior at T4. It seems here that you are not really addressing it but merely if anything pushing it back one mental step. Now you're saying that to choose whether or not to P is really to choose whether or not to surrender to God's will. But, again, your conception of freedom entails that if you, say, choose to surrender to God's will at T0, then it is possible that you could choose not to surrender to God's will at T4. But what could possibly explain such behavior while still maintaining a genuine relationship bewteen you and your choices? Everything about you -- including any "enabling" features that God has infixed in you -- are identical at T0 and T3. It seems nothing about you; none of the things that make you who you are; can explain what is allegedly your own behavior.

As Christ said "He who loses his life shall find it , but he who holds onto his life shall lose it"

I like to think this quote is about letting go of affections for the "I-creature" and what it owns (pace the Kabir quote in my RHP profile).

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Originally posted by knightmeister
Under your view, my allegedly free choices are uncaused and without explanation.LEMON

No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person. This makes them even more your choice because you can't say "it's this or that that made me choose" you just say " I choose" therefore the ownership of the choi we "know" in our souls that they didn't "have to " do what they did.
No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person.

How can that be? Your will; your volition; inclinations, motivations, intentions, desires; are identical at T0 and T3. So how could they explain your choosing differently at T4 vice T1?

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Originally posted by knightmeister
Under your view, my allegedly free choices are uncaused and without explanation.LEMON

No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person. This makes them even more your choice because you can't say "it's this or that that made me choose" you just say " I choose" therefore the ownership of the choi we "know" in our souls that they didn't "have to " do what they did.
In your model it seems equally ridiculous to think of them as "your" choices because it's not you choosing , instead it is the predetermined force of nature that makes you choose.

Under my compatibilist view, of course it is I who do the choosing, at the prompting of what I take to be good reasons. My beliefs, motivations, deliberations, character, etc. exert control over my choices and actions. That's me directing my own actions. In your view, on the other hand, I can't figure what exactly, if anything, could be directing one's free actions.

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Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person.

How can that be? Your will; your volition; inclinations, motivations, intentions, desires; are identical at T0 and T3. So how could they explain your choosing differently at T4 vice T1?[/b]
No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person. KM

How can that be? Your will; your volition; inclinations, motivations, intentions, desires; are identical at T0 and T3. So how could they explain your choosing differently at T4 vice T1?LEMON

...You are not entirely thinking it through. There are many times when our inclinations and our desires are in conflict with each other and we are caught within the tension of a decision. A desire is not the same as will because I can "will" against my desire.

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Originally posted by knightmeister
...You are not entirely thinking it through. There are many times when our inclinations and our desires are in conflict with each other and we are caught within the tension of a decision. A desire is not the same as will because I can "will" against my desire.
Will you stop instructing people to 'think?' It's so arrogant, especially since it is you who is confused.

A situation may arouse competing desires in an individual, but the most prominent desire reflects the
will in a free choice (not coerced or forced).

For example, you may want to go out with your friends tonight. But, you know that if you hang out
with them, you will most certainly stay out late and get drunk. Now, all things being equal, this may
really appeal to you, being the party animal that you are. However, you know you have church in the
morning and if you tie one on, you run the risk of feeling too tired and ill to go to church. You have
two mutually exclusive desires: to get drunk and party, and to go to bed early and sober. You may
really want to go out and party, but you stay home. That's because the desire to keep the Sabbath
holy is more powerful than the desire to party.

Consider another example: You are out on a date with this super hot chick. She invites you in for
coffee and, before you know it, you two are fooling around. However, things are getting really hot
and she is encouraging you to get naked with her and bang her brains out. Once again, you have
competing desires. The first is the desire to accede to her request, the second to abide by the law of
your God to remain chaste until marriage. Naturally, being the good Christian that you are, you inform
her that she is a hussy and storm out of the house in indignation. Just because you overcame the
desire to have sex with her doesn't mean that you 'willed' yourself out of the most powerful desire,
it just means that the desire to live according to God's word was the more powerful one.

This is in accordance with what bbarr has been saying all along: at any given time, the sum of our
desires based on our experiences and personalities constrains our behavior such that we freely choose
that which we determine by reason at that particular moment to be the best choice for us.

Nemesio

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Originally posted by knightmeister
No they are not without explanation. They can be explained as an act of will on the part of the person. KM

How can that be? Your will; your volition; inclinations, motivations, intentions, desires; are identical at T0 and T3. So how could they explain your choosing differently at T4 vice T1?LEMON

...You are not entirely thinking it through. There ...[text shortened]... ension of a decision. A desire is not the same as will because I can "will" against my desire.
You didn't even answer LemonJello's question. He is saying that everything but the 'second hand'
on your
clock were the same at T0 and T3. Everything. Your desires, your motivations, your personality,
your will, your beliefs, the will of God, everything. You seem to think that it is possible to choose
differently at T4 than T1. We want to know why. As far as can tell, if everything is the same, then
the decision should be the same; whatever moral/rational calculus you employ based on your state at
T1 should yield the same result as the same calculus at T4. Yet, you assert not based purely on the
criterion of time.

Why?

Nemesio

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Originally posted by Nemesio
Will you stop instructing people to 'think?' It's so arrogant, especially since it is you who is confused.

A situation may arouse competing desires in an individual, but the most prominent desire reflects the
will in a free choice (not coerced or forced).

For example, you may want to go out with your friends tonight. But, you know that if you hang o ...[text shortened]... determine by reason at that particular moment to be the best choice for us.

Nemesio
Will you stop instructing people to 'think?' It's so arrogant, especially since it is you who is confused. NEMESIO


....but you sound angry!!?? Why so? I am only doing what my nature determines me to do . How can I "stop" being arrogant and instructing people , I have no free will remember!!! I have no choice but to instruct. Why so angry?

🙄🙄🙄

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