Originally posted by Bosse de NageWouldn't priestly celibacy also violate said imperative (according to LH's reasoning)?
Robert Silverberg wrote a book in which having sex with all comers is a social duty.
Wouldn't priestly celibacy also violate said imperative (according to LH's reasoning)?
Basically, yes. To the extent that the priest is willfully abstaining from any attempt at procreation, he is violating a perfect duty, according to the line of thought that LH has offered up for debate.
Originally posted by LemonJelloIt shouldn't be too hard to tweak the argument to show that there is a perfect duty not to procreate.
Basically, yes. To the extent that the priest is willfully abstaining from any attempt at procreation, he is violating a perfect duty, according to the line of thought that LH has offered up for debate.
Originally posted by LemonJelloI can see why, under the current formulation, the maxim does not constitute a perfect duty.
Let me be more clear why I think the consequentalist thing is an important issue here. Consequentialist argument is inextricably linked to the hypothetical and basically holds that the moral rightness/wrongness of an act is contingent upon the act's bringing about certain consequences (whether actual or expected). The criterial basis for your 'self-defe ...[text shortened]... ty absurd if you ask me. What would that say about the man Jesus of Nazareth?
Well I disagree. If an ethical theory does not align even remotely with our intuitions, then what the hell good is it? If an ethical theory produces absurd results, then that may be good reason to think twice about it.
Perhaps. But that's not the point of a generic debate. And, even if it is, that doesn't constitute a reason to start examining the other debater under the microscope instead of his/her arguments.
Originally posted by lucifershammerAlthough Kant thought that homosexuality was a form of sexual perversion and thus contrary to the natural ends of humanity, his arguments for this claim are based on naturalistic (teleological) considerations that he coopted from Aquinas (hence, ultimately, Aristotle). There is simply no way that homosexuality as a set of dispositions nor homosexual acts themselves violate the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative. If one thinks that homosexual acts do violate CI1, then that probably indicates that they interpret CI1 like John Stuart Mill did; as something like a consequentialist rule. But since no contradiction in conception or contradiction in will results when we specify a reasonable maxim for homosexual activity, homsexual activity doesn't violate either a perfect or an imperfect duty. This is one of the many places where Kant failed to understand the implications of his own view.
The first formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative goes:
""Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law."*
Homosexual activity violates the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative and is, therefore, unethical in [Kantian] deontological ethics theory. Debate.
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* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#The_first_formulation
Originally posted by bbarrEven accepting all of that as sound, it's still pretty gross, wouldn't you say? I mean, you can't reason your way around gross, can you?
Although Kant thought that homosexuality was a form of sexual perversion and thus contrary to the natural ends of humanity, his arguments for this claim are based on naturalistic (teleological) considerations that he coopted from Aquinas (hence, ultimately, Aristotle). There is simply no way that homosexuality as a set of dispositions nor homosexual acts them ...[text shortened]... his is one of the many places where Kant failed to understand the implications of his own view.
Originally posted by bbarrThank god you are back. Do you know the passages in the Met of Mor where he addresses these issues? I seem to remember they sounded a bit unhinged.
Although Kant thought that homosexuality was a form of sexual perversion and thus contrary to the natural ends of humanity, his arguments for this claim are based on naturalistic (teleological) considerations that he coopted from Aquinas (hence, ultimately, Aristotle). There is simply no way that homosexuality as a set of dispositions nor homosexual acts them ...[text shortened]... his is one of the many places where Kant failed to understand the implications of his own view.
Originally posted by bbarrThanks for that - you've pretty much covered the way I approached it earlier in the thread as well as dottwell's and LJ's objections.
Although Kant thought that homosexuality was a form of sexual perversion and thus contrary to the natural ends of humanity, his arguments for this claim are based on naturalistic (teleological) considerations that he coopted from Aquinas (hence, ultimately, Aristotle). There is simply no way that homosexuality as a set of dispositions nor homosexual acts them ...[text shortened]... his is one of the many places where Kant failed to understand the implications of his own view.
Just one question though - does imperfect duty take into account consequences?
Originally posted by dottewellYes, I'll post the references to Kant's discussion of sexual perversion tomorrow. They are scattered throughout his writings.
Thank god you are back. Do you know the passages in the Met of Mor where he addresses these issues? I seem to remember they sounded a bit unhinged.
Originally posted by lucifershammerIt's not supposed to. Kant claims that the content of morality must be both synthetic and a priori, and he takes the a priori nature of morality to be inconsistent with the claim that consequences are morally relevant in the assessment of the rightness of an act. But Kant is inconsistent on this point. For instance, when he discusses whether it is permissible to lie to a murderer who is after one's friend, he employs consequentialist considerations. The idea is supposed to be that every rational agent has, by virtue of being rational, some set of ends necessitated by practical reason alone. Any maxim that conflicts with one of these ends if universalized could not be one a rational agent could endorse. Kant thinks that maxims that license sexual perversion are of this sort, but it is unclear just how the putative natural ends of man (those deeply teleological ends he cribs from Aquinas) are mandated by considerations of practical reason alone. This is where Kant starts sounding more like an Aristotelian naturalist than a Kantian.
Thanks for that - you've pretty much covered the way I approached it earlier in the thread as well as dottwell's and LJ's objections.
Just one question though - does imperfect duty take into account consequences?