Originally posted by ColettiThanks for the information, I'll check it out.
bbarr,
I think it would be great if you posted your argument on [b]http://www.christianlogic.com/forums/index.html . There's some very knowledge people there who could give you some valuable feedback. Not all of the regulars are Christians, but as you can imagine, logic is the focus of the site. And you'll get less fodder to sift through.
Th ...[text shortened]... intelligent non-Christan's on the site.
http://www.christianlogic.com/forums/topic643.html[/b]
What if ! This creation is in existence to permit every soul a set of choices - and the chance to learn from events following the choices made. Like in chess. What if ! Every soul-entity is a dynamic-being-in-creation, every worm, tree , human, elephant, god...........What if ! the task of caring for our little planet is being given to souls just clever enough to carry it through - and learn a whole lot while doing it ? What if good and evil is here for us to learn which we prefer - and work for more of what we see is right for ourselves and others - like our children, friends, animals. If so - would logic let god sit like a giant baby - moving toys about - to ward of evil - or make new physical laws every sunday - just to prove his omnipotence ? just a thought.....Have fun !
Originally posted by bbarrI am denying that the measurement is always possible, even by God, to come up with one definite quantifiable assessment that course of action (or inaction) A is morally preferable to course of action/inaction B.
Nothing in my argument requires that suffering or moral preferability be measurable by us. All the argument requires is that God have the ability to determine amongst alternative possible states of affairs which is morally preferable. Do you deny that God can do this? If so, then how does this not commit you to either rejecting God's omniscience or endorsing an epistemic version of moral skepticism?
In order for something to be measurable you have to be able to put a definite value on it. Is the value of one person suffering a death worth as much as 50 people suffering cuts and abrasions? 5000? 500,000? Is the answer always the same?
Regarding omniscience - it's a bit like the unliftable rock: God cannot know something that is inherently unknowable, for example by measuring something that is unmeasurable.
My thinking on this is also to some extent influenced by my work as an administrative lawyer. In some forms of review, a judge does not have power to overturn a decision merely because he/she would have arrived at a different conclusion. So long as the balancing of factors was done in a legally permissible fashion, the choice is open to the original decision maker.
I think what I'm saying is that I dislike your definition of morally perfect. Certainly, in some situations one course of action is the morally preferable. But in many situations there are a range of options - even to God, with his full knowledge of the things that can in fact be known.
Which is where I become thankful that he is a person, not a calculating machine.
As to which premises I have a problem with, I think it's probably (2) although (5) also makes me uneasy - but that's because of the problem with the definition of moral perfection. The basis of (2) is that non-E would NOT have brought about "unnecessary suffering". If both E occurring and E not occurring would have brought about suffering of different kinds but qualitatively of the same "unnecessary" effect, then the whole thing becomes illogical.
Originally posted by orfeoFor any set of fully specified states of affairs, A, B, C, ..., either there is a correct ranking of moral preferability for the members of that set or there is not. This is a logical truth.
I am denying that the measurement is always possible, even by God, to come up with one definite quantifiable assessment that course of action (or inaction) A is morally preferable to course of action/inaction B.
In order for something to be measurable you have to be able to put a definite value on it. Is the value of one person suffering a death worth as m ...[text shortened]... qualitatively of the same "unnecessary" effect, then the whole thing becomes illogical.
If there is a correct ranking, then some proposition that expresses that ranking will be true. This is a logical truth.
If so, then God knows this proposition and hence knows the correct ranking of the members of the set. This follows from God's omniscience.
If there is no correct ranking, then the proposition that denies that such a ranking exists will be true. This is a logical truth.
If so, then God knows this proposition and knows that there is no correct ranking of the members of the set. This follows from God's omniscience.
So, considerations of measurement are wholly irrelevant to my argument, unless you mean to just be denying that every set of possible states of affairs will have members that can be correctly ranked in terms of moral preferability. If this is all you mean to claim, then nothing at all follows concerning my argument, because moral perfection does not require of an entity that it prefer one state of affairs to another when these states of affairs are possessed of equivalent moral preferability.
I have no idea what your last paragraph was meant to express. I tried, but I just couldn't parse it.
Originally posted by bbarrYes, this is what I'm getting at. Except I think it DOES have implications for your argument.
If there is no correct ranking, then the proposition that denies that such a ranking exists will be true. This is a logical truth.
If so, then God knows this proposition and knows that there is no correct ranking of the members of the set. This follows from God's omniscience.
So, considerations of measurement are wholly irrelevant to my argument, unle ...[text shortened]... no idea what your last paragraph was meant to express. I tried, but I just couldn't parse it.
Which leads me back to proposition (2). I'm not satisfied of the implicit assumption that E not occurring will NOT lead to unnecessary suffering. Saying that a morally perfect being will act so that E does not occur (proposition 5) is only accurate if E not occurring is in fact a better choice - one without unnecessary suffering. I'm not satisfied this is the case.
And it has to ALWAYS be the case to establish that proposition (1), the existence of God/a morally perfect being, is false. Otherwise, the examples of unnecessary suffering merely establish that sometimes E occurring is no worse than E not occurring, so God allowed E to occur.
I know I'm not great at setting this out, hope that's slightly clearer than last time.
Okay, before you respond, I've looked more carefully at the wording of proposition (2).
I think my biggest problem is with the concept of "unnecessary suffering". What on Earth would establish suffering was LOGICALLY necessary or unnecessary?
I'd like you to expand on this concept, preferably at great length. I've mentioned before my queries about causation, and we seem to have here a notion that there's such a thing as "necessary" suffering which is causative of good.
To which my gut reaction is "post hoc ergo propter hoc". Also, causation is an extremely tricky subject when you're dealing with an (alleged) eternal being outside the normal laws of time.
I would certainly say that good can come out of suffering. But I wouldn't necessarily agree that the suffering is the causative agent.
Originally posted by orfeoI think that depends on your view moral responsibility. Not acting does not necessarily remove responsibility. But I do not think responsibility is necessarily tied to choices or actions. All this ties to what is moral perfection.
JUST ONE MORE...
God is omnipotent. Can he not for reasons of choice/principle NOT exercise his power? Bind himself in advance?
Or does that make him morally imperfect?
(P.S. Can I make it less clear??)
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Originally posted by bbarrThe argument above is valid as long as it refers to a certain perception of God. Evil and good are simply the two opposites that are found throughout nature. Without opposites, the Yin and Yang, life would not be possible at all. Without opposites we would also have no freedom of choice. Therefore God does not interfere. Imagine two armies approaching, they are fighting over something as simple as food. Both parties are praying to God for help. Who is God to help? And if God does not interfere could we reasonably conclude that He does not care and, therefore, does not exist? God is Self-energetic Mass-awareness. That is self-evident because energy and Awareness is all that exist. The energy part can be confirmed by any physicist and Awareness is simply part of our experience and cannot have developed out of dead matter or lifeless energy. Since everything is a condensation
[b]A General Argument from Evil:
God (def.): An entity that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
Omnipotent (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible.
Omniscient (def.): An entity G is omniscient if and only if G knows every true proposition.
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G i ...[text shortened]... s false. So, explicitly state in your response which premise you think is false any why.[/b]
of his energy, for God only God exists.
God is not a person and for that reason we should not try to understand God in human terms.
http://www.self-realization.com/prooffor.htm#The%20Design%20Argument
One reason why evil might be necessary is that, in its absence, good could not independently exist. That is, either it is in the nature of both good and evil that they can only exist in contrast to one another (symmetric mutuality), or it is in the nature of good that it only exist in contrast to evil (asymmetric mutuality).
For example, suppose (contrary to convention) that dark was equal to good and nice things, and light equal to bad and evil things. If light did not exist, then dark could not exist either: dark is, as it were, parasitic upon light. In a similar way, perhaps good is parasitic upon evil.
The asymmetric mutuality thesis is sort of the reverse of Augustine's notion that evil is merely the absence of good. But maybe heresy is the price to be paid for theodicy.
Here's another intuition pump: If everyone was in heaven eternally, would we be even *able* to notice how infinitely perfect it was, having no point of comparison? Hence, God made earth (and hell!) to invent heaven. (Darfius will be pleased!)
Perhaps then, the greater the evil, the greater the good, as in the absence of the former, there can be none of the latter. But, as the existence of a checkered world is better than the existence of none at all, God made it. (Yes, we may have to get into the difficult issue of existence being an additional and decisive ontological good.) Really bad things are allowed to happen because, if they didn't, the good things that happen would be less good.
The trouble is, of course, the good may not be parasitic upon the bad, or only partially (and not enough). Does ice-cream taste any worse to those who have suffered than to those who have not?
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI believe good could very well exist without evil, evil is like a mistake
One reason why evil might be necessary is that, in its absence, good could not independently exist. That is, either it is in the nature of both good and evil that they can only exist in contrast to one another (symmetric mutuality), or it is in the nature of good that it only exist in contrast to evil (asymmetric mutuality).
For example, suppose (co ...[text shortened]... enough). Does ice-cream taste any worse to those who have suffered than to those who have not?
in math, all the math could be done correctly there wouldn't be an
evil. Evil can only exist if good is there, it is dependent on good to
exist not the other way around.
Kelly
Originally posted by KellyJayIt could also be of course that neither evil nor good depend on each other. If you believe that good can stand alone, why not evil too?
I believe good could very well exist without evil, evil is like a mistake
in math, all the math could be done correctly there wouldn't be an
evil. Evil can only exist if good is there, it is dependent on good to
exist not the other way around.
Kelly
Originally posted by bbarrAs for christians, if they have read the book of Job, they should understand this.
Even if I presented a flat out proof that God didn't exist, the theist wouldn't be required to accept it. The theist could claim that deduction is not truth-preserving, or whatever. If the standard for epistemic justification is the mere logical possibility that something be the case, then theism certainly satisfies that standard, as does the belief that o ...[text shortened]... diction, but rather that he is committed to a doctrine the content of which he knows not what.
Originally posted by orfeoWhat part of 'logically necessary for the greater good' don't you understand? If, between to fully specified states of affairs, one where E occurs and one where E does not occur, there is no difference as to moral preferability, then God does not prefer one of these states of affairs to another. Hence, his moral perfection is perfectly consistent with allowing E to occur. I don't know how much clearer I can make this point.
Yes, this is what I'm getting at. Except I think it DOES have implications for your argument.
Which leads me back to proposition (2). I'm not satisfied of the implicit assumption that E not occurring will NOT lead to unnecessary suffering. Saying that a morally perfect being will act so that E does not occur (proposition 5) is only accurate if E not oc ...[text shortened]... cur.
I know I'm not great at setting this out, hope that's slightly clearer than last time.
Originally posted by orfeoI've defended premise (2) at great length pages ago. If you have a problem with that defense, then please point out which specific claims you take issue with and why.
Okay, before you respond, I've looked more carefully at the wording of proposition (2).
I think my biggest problem is with the concept of "unnecessary suffering". What on Earth would establish suffering was LOGICALLY necessary or unnecessary?
I'd like you to expand on this concept, preferably at great length. I've mentioned before my queries about ...[text shortened]... out of suffering. But I wouldn't necessarily agree that the suffering is the causative agent.
The concept of logical necessity is this:
X is logically necessary for Y if and only if it is logically impossible for Y to obtain without X also obtaining. In other words, the supposition that ~X conjoined with the supposition that Y leads to a contradiction of the form (P & ~P).
Logical necessity is not the same as causal efficacy, as I pointed out repeatedly in my defense of premise (2). I refer you back to that discussion, and to the example I used as an illustration of the difference.
God's alleged eternality (existing outside of time) is completely irrelevant to this discussion. If God is omnipotent, then God can exert a causal influence in time. If God cannot exert a causal influence in time, then not only will the theist have to give up any number of beliefs (about Jesus being God, for instance), but the theist will have to deny that God is omnipotent.
The supposition that suffering never causes anything is completely absurd, and completely antithetical to the vast majority of theistic beliefs. The suffering that I have experienced from touching hot things has caused me to learn not to touch hot things. Hence, suffering is causally efficacious. Further, were suffering not causally efficacious, if it never brought anything about at all, then there would be no point to suffering and hence no reason for God not to have created a world with no suffering in it at all.