1 edit
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]This is demonstrably false.
Oh, boy.
You go to great lengths to continue to say the same thing without listening or comprehending what you're actually saying in comparison to the thing you are referencing.
The argument very, very specifically says there are no right ways to do a wrong thing, beginning with number seven and continuing thr ...[text shortened]... he purports to be bad are bad, and since they are bad, here are the acceptable counter-measures.[/b]
The argument very, very specifically says there are no right ways to do a wrong thing, beginning with number seven and continuing through number nine.
It starts in number seven where the author says he can't think of any right ways of doing wrong which can counterbalance the wrong and apply to both the case while carrying enough weight.
Number nine is the point where the author rejects even the aspects of which he knows nothing of: even his ignorance won't allow for any right actions to offset the wrong ones.
So you can imagine the argument allows for right all you want, but the argument itself rejects such a notion.
It emphatically denies there is any right way to do a wrong thing, even those ways the author has not considered.
None of them are either right or right enough.
No, the argument says no such thing. Premise (7) states "In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic" where "such cases" here refers to those described in premise (6), specifically "cases where [an omnipotent and omniscient being, conditioned on such a being's existence] intentionally allows animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer". Now, do you see how it specifically says "in many such cases", as opposed to "in all such cases"? Do you just not understand the difference here? If it were "in all such cases", then the subsequent assertorial content of premise (7) would purport to apply to each and every case described in (6). However, since (7) specifically only says "in many such cases", it only purports to apply to at least a proper subset of the cases described in (6). So it follows that the truth of (7) is consistent with there being some non-empty subset of the cases described in (6) for which there ARE "rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of [that] both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic". So this very clearly shows that your objection to premise (7) is wrong, predicated on a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of what premise (7) asserts.
Furthermore, it is also clear from a reading of the argument that the cases addressed in subsequent premises (8) and (9) are subsets of those addressed in (7). So, in fact, all these premises are fully consistent with there being some non-empty subset of the cases described in (6) for which there ARE "rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of [that] both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic". Furthermore, even the truth of (9) is consistent with there being some non-empty subset of the cases in (8) for which there ARE rightmaking counterbalancing characteristics of which we are not aware. (That is, (9) can still be true even if the cases described in (9) are only a proper subset of those in (8); this is one of the reasons why the inductive move from (8) to (9) is sound.)
So, I'm afraid you are just wrong six ways from Sunday on this point.
An assumption is made here and it must be challenged...
the author must show why the things he purports to be bad are bad, and since they are bad, here are the acceptable counter-measures.
Again, absolutely nowhere does the author use the word 'bad', or the word 'good' for that matter. Which premise are you trying to argue against here, and what, precisely, shows the premise to be false? What, precisely, is the "assumption" in the argument that you are challenging? Perhaps it would be good for you to precisely state it and show how it is implicit in the argument; then show that we have reasons to think it is false.
By not naming the good which he would accept as counterbalancing to these specified bad things, he leaves the argument open to the inference that the opposite of these scenarios must be good.
Let's give that piñata a whack.
Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to live a glorious existence in an ever-renewing forest, and the property of allowing a child to undergo prolonged happiness and eventual everlasting life, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Sorry, but "intentionally allowing an animal to live a glorious existence in an ever-renewing forest" is not somehow the "opposite" of "intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire"; nor is "allowing a child to undergo prolonged happiness and eventual everlasting life" the "opposite" of "allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer". Stating that premise (1) commits one to your rewrite above is surely over-reaching and frankly just a little bizarre. All you are doing here is injecting wholly extraneous information into premise (1) and then stating that the argument fails because the author does not provide support for this extraneous information. I'm sorry, but that is not how it works.
What you can reasonably infer here from premise (1), I think, would only be something like the following: "Both the property of intentionally disallowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of disallowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones." Now, you have given us absolutely no reasons to think this is a problem. Both this statement, as well as premise (1), are eminently plausible. If you have reasons to think otherwise, then let's hear them already!!!
Originally posted by LemonJelloNo, the argument says no such thing.
[quote]The argument very, very specifically says there are no right ways to do a wrong thing, beginning with number seven and continuing through number nine.
It starts in number seven where the author says he can't think of any right ways of doing wrong which can counterbalance the wrong and apply to both the case while carrying enough weight.
Num ...[text shortened]... re eminently plausible. If you have reasons to think otherwise, then let's hear them already!!!
It remains to be shown, and you've not done so yet.
Now, do you see how it specifically says "in many such cases", as opposed to "in all such cases"?
Not in this instance, but he gets there eventually.
Right?
After all, how could he conclude what he concludes if he doesn't first eliminate all such cases?
Do you just not understand the difference here?
I know I do, but I'm really beginning to worry that you do, dear boy.
So this very clearly shows that your objection to premise (7) is wrong, predicated on a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of what premise (7) asserts.
That was my original thought, too.
But then I read the entire argument and found: that is exactly what he meant, exactly where he was driving.
Go freaking figure.
So, in fact, all these premises are fully consistent with there being some non-empty subset of the cases described in (6) for which there ARE "rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of [that] both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic".
Calm down.
All these subsets and non-empty subsets are going to give you a stroke.
They've certainly blurred your vision if you cannot see the plain truth that I have laid out for you.
The author rejects any known good actions on the part of God as well as any he may have missed.
The only empty subset is his brain and whatever burped forth this anemic argument.
Again, absolutely nowhere does the author use the word 'bad', or the word 'good' for that matter.
Get your head out of your ass and see if you can parse out what the double-speak phrases of "wrongmaking" and "rightmaking" really boil down to.
You can hide behind your adorable academic mask and insist these phrases have no connotation of bad and good, but the only one you're fooling is yourself.
If this is the best you can do, why bother, really?
"Both the property of intentionally disallowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of disallowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones."
Well, isn't that precious?
According to you, the least that God could do is create and leave His creatures the hell alone.
Keep them from suffering and keep them from death; no more, no less.
How marvelously quaint.
What else does the author want God to do, pray tell?
Originally posted by FreakyKBHChaff.
[b]No, the argument says no such thing.
It remains to be shown, and you've not done so yet.
Now, do you see how it specifically says "in many such cases", as opposed to "in all such cases"?
Not in this instance, but he gets there eventually.
Right?
After all, how could he conclude what he concludes if he doesn't first eliminate all such c ...[text shortened]... more, no less.
How marvelously quaint.
What else does the author want God to do, pray tell?[/b]
- Joined
- 31 May 06
- Moves
- 1795
Originally posted by FreakyKBHFreaky...
You ought to know: you offered this piece of crap argument in the first place and have failed to support its glaring deficiencies in any way other than insult.
Pretty much par for course.
This argument was taken verbatim from the Stanford on-line Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
It has presumably been written by experts in logic and philosophy who are no doubt
very familiar with this ancient argument.
Since then the article has been subject to the review of all those reading it, mostly students
of philosophy, who like all students are always trying to catch their tutors out.
In addition quite a few of the people on this site including LemonJello, who is no intellectual
slouch, have looked at this argument and read what you have claimed and do not agree
with you...
Do you not harbour even the slightest doubt that it might actually be you that is wrong?
Originally posted by googlefudgeThis argument was taken verbatim from the Stanford on-line Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Freaky...
This argument was taken verbatim from the Stanford on-line Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
It has presumably been written by experts in logic and philosophy who are no doubt
very familiar with this ancient argument.
Since then the article has been subject to the review of all those reading it, mostly students
of philosophy, who like a ...[text shortened]... ..
Do you not harbour even the slightest doubt that it might actually be you that is wrong?
That's where I read it first, too.
It has presumably been written by experts in logic and philosophy who are no doubt very familiar with this ancient argument.
Presumably.
Since then the article has been subject to the review of all those reading it, mostly students of philosophy, who like all students are always trying to catch their tutors out.
Point?
In addition quite a few of the people on this site including LemonJello, who is no intellectual slouch, have looked at this argument and read what you have claimed and do not agree with you...
Again: point?
Do you not harbour even the slightest doubt that it might actually be you that is wrong?
Had even one person been able to respond to the objection(s) with anything other than the dismissive charges of supposed irrelevance, I'd be inclined to think I missed something.
Yet, despite all of the alleged intellectual and philosophical fire power, there hasn't been anywhere near a sufficient response to my assertion of the inherent flaws of the argument.
The argument is based upon the premise of two imagined states of really bad conditions.
The argument does not support how or why such states are not preferred, what makes them bad, or any other claims related to why such states are anything other than normal.
The argument uses this premise as its lynchpin, thereby assigning to these states at minimum a baseline of unacceptable conditions, or possibly the pinnacle of unacceptable conditions--- it's impossible to tell since the premise doesn't offer anything in terms of value relations other than highly emotive language.
Further flaws include the arguments insistence that nothing could possibly counterbalance the imagined scenario, even scenarios unknown to the author!
Dismissed as irrelevant, but very relevant indeed is the author's omission of what he considers to be good action which he would find acceptable in counterbalancing--- or even restoring the entire situation to a positive.
Which, again, is impossible to ascertain because the author gives no indication whatsoever what is supposed to be considered a positive.
LJ took a stab at one possible scenario: no suffering and no death.
That's just bizarre.
What could he possibly be basing that scenario on, exactly?
Certainy there are no conditions on the face of the planet known to man wherein suffering and death haven't been a part of life.
As in, ever.
How did he land on such a preposterous idea, one wonders?
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJello
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).
For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
Therefore:
17.God does not exist.[/b]
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
I think I would have to object right here because the word "an" as "an animal to die means an instance of such.
God does not allow every animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire. And that there be an occasion of such or more is not sufficient for me to build the rest of the argument upon to its conclusion of atheism.
The phrase "a child to undergo lingering suffering" also I cannot take as "every" child circumstance.
In the first case, a dying animal in a forest fire might conceivably be one with rabbies or a disease threatening to the whole ecosystem.
I feel sorrow for any animal in a fire of course. But I cannot know in first person what that animal is experiencing. Emotionally, of course I am moved to know it is suffering. But an instance of this, even if repeated more than once, is not definitional of God who always treats animals this way.
And God being all-knowing might have reasons for an occasion of an animal so perishing.
I have known a child and an adult who had a condition which caused them to have pain most of the time. Sometimes experiences like this can drive a person deep into the God of grace where they find deep chambers within their being which act as a counterpoise, a counter balance to support them in this suffering.
The discomfort is temporary. But they gain in transformational grace is weighty and causes God to be wrought into their being. As Paul said the momentary light affliction was working an eternal weight of glory to some suffering believers.
English Standard Version
For this light momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison,
New American Standard Bible
For momentary, light affliction is producing for us an eternal weight of glory far beyond all comparison. Here are a few translations of Second Corinthians 4:17:
King James Bible
For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory;
Holman Christian Standard Bible
For our momentary light affliction is producing for us an absolutely incomparable eternal weight of glory.
God used suffering to drive people deep into His presence and there with works Christ into them, wroughts Christ into the fabric of their personality.
Christians are not exempt from any of the sufferings which may occur to anyone else. That we have seen for sure.
The reason the argument does not advance for me to lead to atheism is also that the believer has the promise that all things are coordinated together to work for good to those called according to God's eternal purpose. God alone has the ability to orchestrate all experiences and circumstances for the advancement of those in His eternal purpose.
In this regard I can only say that the believer is in a better position than the non-believer.
"And we [Christians] know that all things work together for good to those who love God and to those who are called according to His purpose." (Romans 8:28)
"[A]ll things means everything, anything that may occur, any possible thing, can be used by the infinite providence of God to be to the advantage of the one who loves God, to the one called into the eternal purpose of God.
It is better therefore to believe in God, love Him, and be thankful for His sovereign arrangement of our situations and circumstances. He has promised not to allow us to be tempted above what we are able but will provide a way out.
English Standard Version
No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it.
New American Standard Bible
No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it.
I believe that the "way of escape" is to sink into God's presence more. He Himself is the way of escape for He transcends all. And He became a suffering man who life is available to blend with ours.
Lastly, the argument presents too much of a static picture of God and history. Though we do see suffering and death in this epoch, we have the promise that history is moving linearly into a state when death and pain and suffering will be no more.
We get a glimpse of a new heaven and new earth in which righteousness dwells and death, tears, pain, suffering, unrighteousness, and all curse resulting from the fall of man is swallowed up in salvation.
So we know that we are moving in the direction, at least, of a world in which animals do not perish by flame agonizingly or children do not die of cancer. These will one day all belong to "the former things" which have passed away for eternity.
"And He will wipe away every tear from their eyes; and death will be no more, nor will there be sorrow or crying or pain anymore; for the former things have passed away." (Rev. 21:4)
Originally posted by sonshipNo, it does not. "An" can be used in a strictly hypothetical context. It has no magical power to instantiate the thing that follows it.1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
I think I would have to object right here because the word [b]"an" as "an animal to die means an instance of such.[/b]
- Joined
- 31 May 06
- Moves
- 1795
Originally posted by sonship1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
I think I would have to object right here because the word [b]"an ...[text shortened]... e be sorrow or crying or pain anymore; for the former things have passed away." (Rev. 21:4) [/b]
I think I would have to object right here because the word "an" as "an animal to die means an instance of such.
God does not allow every animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire. And that there be an occasion of such or more is not sufficient for me to build the rest of the argument upon to its conclusion of atheism.
The phrase "a child to undergo lingering suffering" also I cannot take as "every" child circumstance.
In the first case, a dying animal in a forest fire might conceivably be one with rabbies or a disease threatening to the whole ecosystem.
I feel sorrow for any animal in a fire of course. But I cannot know in first person what that animal is experiencing. Emotionally, of course I am moved to know it is suffering. But an instance of this, even if repeated more than once, is not definitional of God who always treats animals this way.
And God being all-knowing might have reasons for an occasion of an animal so perishing. ......
Whoa... Slow down. Having read your post [all of it] I think I know where you have a problem with this argument.
It's not step 1... It's step 9. But we are getting WAY ahead of ourselves.
I think there is a misunderstanding of how a formal logical argument works going on here.
You are dumping all kinds of things on step one that just don't exist in step one.
So what I propose is starting again and very slowly moving through the argument step by step rather than
looking at the whole thing at once.
Step 1:
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Now based upon what you say in your post I believe that you agree with what is said here.
What this step is saying is that here are two situations [not saying anything about if these situations actually
occur in reality] which we would consider to have bad aspects, like pain and suffering, and that if a being
intentionally allows these situations to occur then the action of allowing these situations to occur has
"wrongmaking characteristics". That is if you are toting up the actions moral plus points and minus points
then this action has some minus points.
The fact that you say that you "feel sorrow" for an animal dying an agonizing death in a forest fire, and that
you say that people you've known who live with pain who have found relief in their belief of god which "act as
a counterpoise, a counter balance to support them in this suffering" shows that you believe that the pain and
suffering are minus points. You are telling us you think that pain and suffering is bad, because otherwise you
wouldn't be trying to tell us about all the things that might make up for the bad points...
But that's getting ahead of the argument.
ALL step 1 is saying is that intentionally allowing these two examples of pain and suffering has minus points.
It says absolutely nothing about who the being is that is doing the intentionally allowing of these situations.
So talking about god is premature, we haven't got their yet.
So can you agree that these two situations have minus points [like pain and suffering]?
And that the action of intentionally allowing these to occur also thus has minus points [intentionally allowing the pain and suffering of others]?
Don't worry about whether there might in any given circumstance be counterbalancing plus points because we
haven't got to that part of the argument yet.
And don't worry about who the being is who is doing these actions because again we haven't got to that part
of the argument yet.
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]This argument was taken verbatim from the Stanford on-line Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
That's where I read it first, too.
It has presumably been written by experts in logic and philosophy who are no doubt very familiar with this ancient argument.
Presumably.
Since then the article has been subject to the review of all those readin ...[text shortened]... 't been a part of life.
As in, ever.
How did he land on such a preposterous idea, one wonders?
The argument is based upon the premise of two imagined states of really bad conditions.
The argument does not support how or why such states are not preferred, what makes them bad, or any other claims related to why such states are anything other than normal.
The argument uses this premise as its lynchpin, thereby assigning to these states at minimum a baseline of unacceptable conditions, or possibly the pinnacle of unacceptable conditions--- it's impossible to tell since the premise doesn't offer anything in terms of value relations other than highly emotive language.
Premise (1) simply asserts that the property of intentionally allowing the types of events involving suffering and death at issue is a very serious wrongmaking characteristic of an action. All that means is basically that it counts seriously (weightily) toward making the action wrong, in the absence of further, and perhaps countervailing, considerations. Now, in all seriousness, stop and ask yourself: do you even understand the assertorial content of (1)? Premise (1) is not claiming that any action with said property is wrong; and it is not claiming that the suffering and death of innocents are somehow supremely or irrevocably bad or anything else of this sort. All it says, again, is that such a property counts weightily toward making the action morally wrong, such that it would presumably take hefty countervailing considerations to tip the scale in the other direction. Now, it is up to the reader to employ some reasonable standards for the proper application of 'right' and 'wrong' unto actions in order to determine if this premise is true or false. That's a task you have simply failed to perform. Perhaps you do not understand how this is supposed to work. You do not get to simply assert that the argument as provided has failed to support its premise in this way and that's the end of the story. Compacted presentations of arguments generally do not provide, and are not in the business of providing, such ancillary support. Duh. (Of course, if you read the extended essays by Tooley on inductive logic and the problem of evil, you would be presented with the full treatment, including details of ancillary support for each substantive premise.) That's why the readers here are supposed to engage in the practices of justification, offering relevant epistemic reasons for and against. You apparently missed this memo.
Here, let me show you how it's done. I, as the reader, find premise (1) plausible. Why? Because if S intentionally allows such an event, then S deliberately accommodates that event's obtaining even if S knows he or she could take action to prevent it. That's a serious moral failing given the nature of the events at issue and given the absence of counterbalancing justifying considerations, for the following reasons. It indicates an alarming lack of a primary virtue, compassion, on the part of S. Such intentional allowance is, at best, indifferent and callous, in the lack of countervailing considerations. It shows an alarming failure of S to appropriately factor the moral relevance of suffering and suffer-filled death, as well as the moral considerability of an animal or a child as moral patients. Now, it is fully granted that this first-order judgment could be effectively reversed by countervailing considerations in more fully specified cases that show that such an action is on balance actually morally right on the part of S. That's all fully granted and still fully consistent with the truth of premise (1). (And, by the way, feel free to provide plausible countervailing considerations that would outline rightmaking characteristics for such actions as performed by an omnipotent and omniscient being, since that could help aid our analysis and understanding of some subsequent premises in the argument.)
Ok...now your turn. Quid pro quo...it's Freaky's turn to try to give some semblance of a counter-case for why premise (1) is false. If the premise is really as bad as you make it sound, then it should be an easy task for you.
Further flaws include the arguments insistence that nothing could possibly counterbalance the imagined scenario, even scenarios unknown to the author!
This has been shown in detail, multiple times by multiple posters, to be false. As already shown, this objection is predicated on willful ignorance on your part concerning what premises like (7), (8), and (9) assert. At this point, it is unconscionable that you would persist in this objection.
LJ took a stab at one possible scenario: no suffering and no death.
That's just bizarre.
What could he possibly be basing that scenario on, exactly?
Certainy there are no conditions on the face of the planet known to man wherein suffering and death haven't been a part of life.
As in, ever.
How did he land on such a preposterous idea, one wonders?
I have some trouble believing you are not just playing dumb here. You were the one who implied that the truth of premise (1) would also commit one to the truth of the following:
”Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to live a glorious existence in an ever-renewing forest, and the property of allowing a child to undergo prolonged happiness and eventual everlasting life, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.”
But that is false, because this statement simply does not follow from premise (1).
While it is true that it is a very valid and useful method of argument to show to your interlocutor that acceptance of P would commit him or her to acceptance of Q, where you then go on to show that Q is absurd or otherwise has something wrong with it (although you have not made it clear what would be wrong with the above statement, anyway); that of course only works if Q actually does follow from P. Whereas what you have done here is just invent some new statement that does not follow from P. So, you have made a pig's ear of something yet again.
I have already granted you that from premise (1) one ought to be able to at least infer the following:
"Both the property of intentionally disallowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of disallowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones."
But why is this a problem? This statement is just as plausible as premise (1), and for very similar reasons! Again, if you have reasons to think otherwise, then let’s hear them already!!!
Come on, Freaky, get with the program.
Originally posted by sonshipThank your for your thoughts, sonship. However, I think you have failed to understand the assertorial content of premise (1). Please read googlefudge's remarks to you or my remarks above in response to Freaky, since I think those may help clarify what (1) is asserting.1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
I think I would have to object right here because the word [b]"an ...[text shortened]... e be sorrow or crying or pain anymore; for the former things have passed away." (Rev. 21:4) [/b]
8 edits
I am told by two parties that I do not understand the first step of this argument.
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
No, they may not necessarily be wrongmaking characteristics of an action.
I don't know what convolutions more I need to study. If I do not go along with the step 1, I don't know why it is mandatory that I proceed to step 2.
I don't see the difference in me saying "Wait, I don't agree absolutely with step 1" as being any different from googlefudge or some other poster saying they do not go along with step one of the Kalaam Cosmological argument.
ie. "Wait a minute. I don't agree that everything that begins to exist has a cause."
Come on guys. What's good for the goose is good for the gander.
I do not swallow step one that a dying animal or suffering child has to be necessarily always wrongmaking, especially in the circumstances of the Fall of man and the world as we find ourselves since God created the first man and he departed from God's authority.
I'll go on to look at other premises. But my rejecting step one, I think, is as perfectly valid as someone else's refusal to accept the first step of the Kalaam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God posted in another thread this week.
[Lots of edits ]
1 edit
Originally posted by sonshipRejecting a premise is fine; but for there to be any meaningful discussion, everyone needs to understand the meaning of the premises.
I am told by two parties that I do not understand the first step of this argument.
[quote] 1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ...[text shortened]... gical Argument for the Existence of God posted in another thread this week.
[Lots of edits ]
In the Kalam thread, if you felt a skeptic was rejecting a premise because he did not understand the wording, it would be reasonable for you to bring that up so that the question of meaning is resolved. Only then could everyone know which premise(s) the argument-denier really rejects.
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJello
[quote]The argument is based upon the premise of two imagined states of really bad conditions.
The argument does not support how or why such states are not preferred, what makes them bad, or any other claims related to why such states are anything other than normal.
The argument uses this premise as its lynchpin, thereby assigning to these states at m ...[text shortened]... ns to think otherwise, then let’s hear them already!!!
Come on, Freaky, get with the program.
Premise (1) simply asserts that the property of intentionally allowing the types of events involving suffering and death at issue is a very serious wrongmaking characteristic of an action.
And my response is that there may instances where the opposite might be serious wrongmaking.
You see, I think the first step assumes the non-existence of God up front. I think it assumes that an omniscient being who would know when the non-suffering of an animal or death of a child would be wrongmaking, does not exist.
premise 1, I think, is loaded with the assumption of the conclusion the argument is designed to prove.
- Joined
- 31 May 06
- Moves
- 1795
Originally posted by sonshipNo if you reject step 1 then we can't move on to step 2.
I am told by two parties that I do not understand the first step of this argument.
[quote] 1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ...[text shortened]... of the Kalaam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God posted in another thread this week.
But I don't think you do reject step 1... Or at least you wouldn't if you understood what it
actually meant. Because what you are saying to us about your position is completely
compatible with step 1.
.... I do not swallow step one that a dying animal or suffering child has to be necessarily always wrongmaking, especially in the circumstances of ....
This is where you are going wrong.
You a leaping ahead of step one and are saying 'but there are circumstances that might make these
actions net moral good'..
Yes, we know this, Step 1 is not in any way incompatible with this, but you are getting ahead of the
argument.
We generally try to avoid pain, we regard pain as being bad because it's unpleasant and debilitating
to be in pain. And it also usually means that there is some reason for us to be in pain that's generally
not good. However if you get a cut, you need to [should] clean the cut out before bandaging/stitching
it closed. And cleaning the wound [by for example washing it out with alcohol] tends to cause more
pain. However if someone is helping you and causes you pain by pouring medicinal grade alcohol on a
bad cut before bandaging it they are not doing a net morally bad thing DESPITE the fact that they
caused you pain BECAUSE of the mitigating circumstances. In this case making sure that the wound
doesn't turn septic with all that that entails.
The pain doesn't cease to be bad/unpleasant jut because there is justification for causing it.
Put it another way.
IF you had a choice between using medicinal alcohol which cleans the wound but causes pain,
and 'magic wonder wound cleaner' which also cleans the wound but causes no pain then it would
be immoral to use the alcohol instead of the magic wound cleaner because the added pain is
still a bad thing we would like to mitigate if at all possible.
Causing pain is a bad thing. That doesn't mean that there are not circumstances where causing
pain is necessary to meet some higher good.
The situations described in step 1 have bad things happening in them. That doesn't mean that
there couldn't be counterbalancing circumstances that counterbalance the bad, but we haven't got
to that bit in the argument yet.
Presumably you believe that the ultimately good and moral place is heaven.
Presumably you would also say that in heaven children don't suffer long painful deaths.
So in a perfect world children suffering long painful deaths wouldn't happen.
Thus children suffering long painful deaths must have some inherent bad quality that in a perfect
world would never happen.
So children suffering long painful deaths is still a bad thing, even if in our imperfect world their
can be circumstances than make it less bad than the alternative and this the net best moral outcome
available.
Step one is simply saying that there are bad aspects, "wrongmaking characteristics" of intentionally
allowing situations with bad aspects to occur, giving two examples.
It specifically doesn't say that the ACTION on net is bad/wrongmaking.
So can you accept that the situations described in step 1 have bad/wrongmaking aspects/characteristics
and that thus the action of allowing them also has bad/wrongmaking aspects/characteristics ?