Originally posted by divegeester
I see so the description can only be one single action which is weighed as morally positive or negative based on it positive or negative outcomes? Does this make sense in the scenario?
If I yank my child's arm and it causes harm to them but in doing so saves their life from a passing train, then that is morally positive, correct? But what if there wa ...[text shortened]... uld kill and eat, would it be morally positive to harm the arm then?
And so on ad infinitum.
I see so the description can only be one single action which is weighed as morally positive or negative based on it positive or negative outcomes?
No that does not follow, and that was not the point of the example I provided. You asked before "What would be an example of a right-making counterbalancing action?" But this argument does not suppose that rightmaking counterbalancing is predicated unto an action; rather, it would talk about a rightmaking counterbalancing characteristic of an action. In other words, the argument does not suppose that the property of being rightmaking counterbalancing is a first-order property of an action; rather, it supposes that it is a property of a property of an action (so a second-order property of an action). This distinction may seem minor and pedantic, but actually it is quite important to understand this distinction in order to understand the argument. The argument does not use "rightmaking" and "wrongmaking" to qualify the action itself but rather to qualify properties or characteristics of the action. So, an action can have both rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics and, according to the argument, it is only the net balance of all the relevant rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics that determines the overall rightness or wrongness of the action itself. This distinction is what I was trying to make clear in my example to you.
No, it need not be simply based on "positive or negative outcomes". That supposes some wholly consequentialist account of rightmaking or wrongmaking. But the argument itself is silent on what account is correct in this sense, whether it be consequentialist or otherwise. If we take just a simple common sense approach, these questions should probably be vetted through considerations that take into account not just the actual consequences of the action but also the underlying, precipitating motivations as well as the knowledge states of the actor. But the argument does not implicitly or otherwise endorse any particular account in this respect; that is up to the reader.
If I yank my child's arm and it causes harm to them but in doing so saves their life from a passing train, then that is morally positive, correct?
Simply based on this information alone that you provided, one should conclude that it is a positive thing, on the basis of the consequence that it saves the child's life. To the extent that this was done intentionally with the motivation to preserve the child's life, then I think this would outline a rightmaking characteristic for the action. Further, just based on the information you have provided, we know of no counterbalancing wrongmaking characteristics that would tip the scale the other way. (The knowledge, if present, that yanking the arm would itself cause some harm is not counterbalancing, given the knowledge that the potential harm from the train is so much more severe; in this case, it is the rightmaking characteristic already discussed that counterbalances.) So we should conclude that this is a prima facie morally right action. That is, it is morally right on the basis of all relevant right- and wrongmaking characteristics of which we know. Of course, we could probably add extraneous information into the example that would outline a counterbalancing wrongmaking characteristic of the action that would make the action itself morally wrong (what if, for example, the actor did not even know a train was coming and just intended to yank on the child's arm at that particular moment to pull the child closer so that he could stab the child through the heart just because the actor thought it would be funny to see some blood splatter). But, given our information, we know of no such counterbalancing wrongmaking characteristics, and such musings are implausible and unwarranted given our body of information.
I am going through this example in some detail to try to give you a better idea of how this sort of right/wrong accounting works in the context of the argument. For a given action, we consider all the relevant right- and wrongmaking characteristics we know of, which may carry different weights. Either those relevant rightmaking characters outweigh the wrong (such that the action is prima facie morally right, or permissible, or even obligatory, etc); or those relevant wrongmaking characteristics outweigh the right (such that the action is prima facie morally wrong, or impermissible, etc); or they will just exactly balance each other out (such that the action is permissible, but presumably just barely). This is the basic idea behind this sort of accounting.
One way to think about this particular argument is that it is basically trying to make the case that, if there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases in which that being carries out an action that is prima facie morally wrong (in the sense and context just described above). Then, it makes an inductive leap from this idea to the idea that if there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases in which that being carries out an action that is morally wrong (where we have dropped the "prima facie" qualifier).
To my mind, this inductive leap is the crux of the argument.
But what if there was no train but I knew there would be a train along at some point and I was (unbeknown to anyone else) training the child to save themself, would that action then be morally positive?
I am not sure I understand the scenario. So the actor here yanks the child's arm, causing harm to the child, even though there is no imminent threat of the train as before; and the actor does this with the intention of "training the child to save themself"? In this case, the intention seems good but the knowledge states of the actor in regards to how best train the child seem clearly deficient. Are there not other ways to so train the child that do not involve a harm-causing yank?
But what if I was saving the child so it could grow a reproduce and have descendants which I could kill and eat, would it be morally positive to harm the arm then?
So the actor here yanks the child's arm, causing harm to the child; but in doing so, saves the child's life from the train; but the actor's motivation was just to save the child "so it could grow a reproduce and have descendants which [the actor] could kill and eat"? In that case, there is clear moral failing in the intentional states on the part of the actor. I think this is an example that shows that determination of right- and wrongmaking should not be divorced fully from the underlying motivations and knowledge states of the actor.
Again, most of the points are somewhat tangential to the actual argument in the opening post: that argument does not specifically endorse any underlying account of right- and wrongmaking.
26 Apr 14
1 edit
Originally posted by SwissGambitI think it is inductively sound too, and I think your reasoning here is correct.
I tend to think the move from 8 to 9 is inductively sound.
Essentially, what 8) says is that there must be a greater good that obtains in every instance of said dying forest animals and suffering children, or the willful allowance of that suffering is morally wrong.
I imagine that, in some cases, a greater good does obtain. For example, the ...[text shortened]... being roasted alive in a forest fire, or every kid (and adult!) suffering from terminal cancer.
As Penguin pointed out earlier, the move from something like (a) "There are cases of X with no known RCs" to (b) "There are cases of X with no RCs" looks sketchy at first glance. However, the step here becomes more and more eminently plausible the larger the number of concrete cases referenced to (a). Like you say, the move becomes eminently plausible in virtue of the sheer number of concrete cases. I think Tooley's work demonstrates this nicely, and rigorously.
26 Apr 14
Originally posted by FreakyKBHFreaky, please do us all a favor and actually read premise (1) again. If you read it carefully enough, you will see that nowhere does it employ the phrase "wrongmaking action". In fact, nowhere in the entire argument, in any of the premises, is that phrase employed. Why do you think that is? Did you even read any of the rest of the argument to figure out what the "wrongmaking" and "rightmaking" talk is all about? In the context of this argument, 'wrongmaking' and 'rightmaking' are not predicates of the action itself. An action is not wrongmaking, just like it is not rightmaking. In the context of this argument, a morally relevant action is either morally right or morally wrong (or neutral), based on the net balance of all the relevant rightmaking characteristics and wrongmaking characteristics of that action. Do you understand this distinction?!? Because once you understand it, you will see that you were mistaken in your earlier analysis of premise (1). Premise (1) only asserts that the property of intentionally allowing the cases of suffering and death at issue constitutes a very serious wrongmaking characteristic of an action. Do you get it now? Premise (1) does not even entail that such an action is morally wrong all things considered; only that it has a very serious wrongmaking characteristic. So, premise (1) is still perfectly consistent with the idea that such an action would still be morally right, if there happen to be sufficiently counterbalancing rightmaking characteristics that apply. So, how in the world could premise (1) imply the stuff that you say it does, like implicitly endorsing "supreme" goods and whatnot? It doesn't, of course. So your initial objection against premise (1) is nonsense. I'll ask you again: which premise(s) would you reject and why? This time, try reading the argument carefully first.
Do you read the stuff you cut and paste from the website, or do you just like the way they sound when you read them out loud?
If it's "wrongmaking action" (whatever that's supposed to mean, although one can assume it's a new/improved way to say something is wrong) to allow suffering, agonizing suffering, lingering suffering, and then death from cancer, ...[text shortened]... the insertion of emotive language renders an argument--- however otherwise convincing--- inert.
Originally posted by LemonJelloFreaky, please do us all a favor and actually read premise (1) again. If you read it carefully enough, you will see that nowhere does it employ the phrase "wrongmaking action". In fact, nowhere in the entire argument, in any of the premises, is that phrase employed.
Freaky, please do us all a favor and actually read premise (1) again. If you read it carefully enough, you will see that nowhere does it employ the phrase "wrongmaking action". In fact, nowhere in the entire argument, in any of the premises, is that phrase employed. Why do you think that is? Did you even read any of the rest of the argument to figure ...[text shortened]... which premise(s) would you reject and why? This time, try reading the argument carefully first.
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Gosh, if there ever was a difference without a distinction, I think you found it.
Did you even read any of the rest of the argument to figure out what the "wrongmaking" and "rightmaking" talk is all about?
I read the entire argument, found it wanting, beginning with the first premise, as already specified.
If it is flawed with its very first premise, what is the hope for the rest of it?
The rest of your argument is essentially gibberish.
The action is either wrong or right on whichever standard you wish to ascribe to it.
The fact of the matter is, this argument is flawed from the beginning, does nothing to correct itself throughout the other premises, and fumbles its way to an ill-conceived result.
Quite pathetic, really.
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27 Apr 14
Originally posted by FreakyKBHIf his argument were gibberish then it would be universally incomprehensible.
[b]Freaky, please do us all a favor and actually read premise (1) again. If you read it carefully enough, you will see that nowhere does it employ the phrase "wrongmaking action". In fact, nowhere in the entire argument, in any of the premises, is that phrase employed.
[i]1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing d ...[text shortened]... out the other premises, and fumbles its way to an ill-conceived result.
Quite pathetic, really.[/b]
As a number of us here have absolutely no problem following it, it thus cannot be gibberish.
The fault therefore must lie with you, and your ability to follow the argument.
Not from any fault in the argument itself.
27 Apr 14
Originally posted by FreakyKBHPoor FreakyKBH...just can never admit he was wrong about stuff like this....
[b]Freaky, please do us all a favor and actually read premise (1) again. If you read it carefully enough, you will see that nowhere does it employ the phrase "wrongmaking action". In fact, nowhere in the entire argument, in any of the premises, is that phrase employed.
[i]1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing d ...[text shortened]... out the other premises, and fumbles its way to an ill-conceived result.
Quite pathetic, really.[/b]
Do me a favor and answer the following questions. They are both simple YES or NO questions.
Does the phrase "wrongmaking action" show up in premise (1) or anywhere else in the argument for that matter?
According to premise (10), does an action count as morally wrong, all things considered, just in virtue of having one very serious wrongmaking characteristic?
Again, YES or NO is all that is required here, Freaky.
27 Apr 14
Originally posted by googlefudgeGibberish was an inaccurate word.
If his argument were gibberish then it would be universally incomprehensible.
As a number of us here have absolutely no problem following it, it thus cannot be gibberish.
The fault therefore must lie with you, and your ability to follow the argument.
Not from any fault in the argument itself.
Fantasy or detached from reality would have been better words and terms to use.
There are many fans of the high fantasy works of Tolkien, which is at least to some degree related to their ability to suspend their belief and accept the premise of his stories.
I have no problem following any part of it; I merely reject the premise as it is based on nonsense which is the fault of the argument.
27 Apr 14
Originally posted by SwissGambitDo tell.
Your analysis of the argument so far has indeed been pathetic. If you cannot see a difference between 'characteristic' and 'action', then there is little hope that you can comprehend the entire argument.
Regale me with your explanation of how "wrongmaking characteristics" of an action can be taken as anything other than an assessment that the action is wrong.
27 Apr 14
Originally posted by LemonJelloDoes the phrase "wrongmaking action" show up in premise (1) or anywhere else in the argument for that matter?
Poor FreakyKBH...just can never admit he was wrong about stuff like this....
Do me a favor and answer the following questions. They are both simple YES or NO questions.
Does the phrase "wrongmaking action" show up in premise (1) or anywhere else in the argument for that matter?
According to premise (10), does an action count as morally wrong, al ...[text shortened]... ry serious wrongmaking characteristic?
Again, YES or NO is all that is required here, Freaky.
I truncated the entire gobblygook of wrongmaking characteristics of an action for you to follow easier.
If the characteristics of the action are considered wrong, the results are the same.
According to premise (10), does an action count as morally wrong, all things considered, just in virtue of having one very serious wrongmaking characteristic?
The tenth premise (and your assessment of its counterbalancing characteristics) is wholly beside the point.
The problem lies in the first premise, as it relies on a subjective, man-centered criteria--- on top of the fact that it is couched in emotionally-charged language.
It supposed that it all begins and ends with the state of man, as though there is nothing more important.
What other discipline of thought can get away with such pander?
Originally posted by FreakyKBHA 'wrong-making characteristic' is only a reason that generally - but not always - tends to make the action morally wrong.
Do tell.
Regale me with your explanation of how "wrongmaking characteristics" of an action can be taken as anything other than an assessment that the action is wrong.
If there are right-making characteristics that are more important, then the action is morally correct.
In layman's terms, it means we weigh the good consequences against the bad, and decide accordingly.
For example, killing is generally bad - HOWEVER - if I kill an person who breaks into my house with a weapon, I have the more important good result that myself, and other occupants of the house, have been saved from harm. Killing is GENERALLY wrong because taking a human life is a very powerful wrong-making characteristic. But in this case, it is morally correct, because the lives of innocent people take precedence over the life of an initiator of force.
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Does the phrase "wrongmaking action" show up in premise (1) or anywhere else in the argument for that matter?
I truncated the entire gobblygook of wrongmaking characteristics of an action for you to follow easier.
If the characteristics of the action are considered wrong, the results are the same.
According to premise (10), does an ac ...[text shortened]... re is nothing more important.
What other discipline of thought can get away with such pander?
I truncated the entire gobblygook of wrongmaking characteristics of an action for you to follow easier....If the characteristics of the action are considered wrong, the results are the same.
The argument is already easy for me to follow just as it is actually written, thank you very much. How about I take it upon myself to truncate "FreakyKBH would never be the sort of person who beats his wife" to "FreakyKBH beats his wife"? Now, doesn't that just make it so much easier for you to follow the claim? You're welcome....
I have explained in detail why the inclusion of the phrase "characteristics of an" is important there and cannot simply by "truncated". Go back and re-read my posts to that effect, if it will help you to understand that the truth of premise (1) is still consistent with the action's being morally right, all things considered.
I see no need here to continue to respond to this particular objection of yours. It is predicated on an inability or unwillingness to even understand what premise (1) asserts. So not only do you not have an objection against the argument worth taking seriously; but you cannot even seem to grasp what the very first premise of the argument claims. Yikes....
28 Apr 14
Originally posted by SwissGambitOh, I see.
A 'wrong-making characteristic' is only a reason that generally - but not always - tends to make the action morally wrong.
If there are right-making characteristics that are more important, then the action is morally correct.
In layman's terms, it means we weigh the good consequences against the bad, and decide accordingly.
For example, killing ...[text shortened]... ct, because the lives of innocent people take precedence over the life of an initiator of force.
So (basically) exactly as I've objected to.
Thanks for clearing that up, SG.
Good stuff.
28 Apr 14
Originally posted by LemonJelloGo back and re-read my posts to that effect, if it will help you to understand that the truth of premise (1) is still consistent with the action's being morally right, all things considered.I truncated the entire gobblygook of wrongmaking characteristics of an action for you to follow easier....If the characteristics of the action are considered wrong, the results are the same.
The argument is already easy for me to follow just as it is actually written, thank you very much. How about I take it upon myself to trun ...[text shortened]... but you cannot even seem to grasp what the very first premise of the argument claims. Yikes....
I could re-read them, but they still say the same thing, and the argument still suffers from the same flaw.
Perhaps you should read the actual objection in a fresh light without thinking you know what is being said, it will finally dawn on you.
According to what you--- and your little buddies, SG and gf--- have said, the first actions (presumably bad; although it's kinda hard to tell with the double-speak language used) can be balanced out by other action (good, but again, the distinction is hard to make for the same reasons), thereby rendering the overall effect... well, this is where it gets a little fuzzy.
The argument doesn't allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one.
Kinda curious, huh.
But I'm just getting started in describing how this truly pathetic argument falls in upon its center, burdened by its presumed supports.
In addition to the omission of the results of what right, counterbalancing action would create, the argument goes to great pains to describe what it considers to be wrong action without describing what it would accept as right action.
As bad as that is, it gets worse: not only does it not describe what action it would deem right, it makes a statement that no right action exists!
How does that work, exactly?
The author knows bad, doesn't describe good, but asserts no good is known.
WTF?
Move the goalposts much?
But we don't need to get that far into this crap to smell how bad it is.
As I objected to in the first place, the argument starts its self-implosion with its very first premise.
It describes two actions which it purports to be bad: forest fires and cancer.
Wait.
No, I got that wrong.
Suffering and death.
Yeah, those are the bad ones.
There is an assumption of bad, without any support for the same.
And, as I already pointed out, this 'bad' presumes the absence of either as preferred states.
Here again, the argument crumbles upon itself.
The argument concludes God doesn't exist, so it cannot be informed by anything other than the natural state of things.
The natural state of things includes nothing more than life, suffering and death--- each with all they entail.
If there is only life, suffering and death, how can the argument present as 'bad' suffering and death?
Why not say life is bad, too?
Where does a natural philosophy get an idea that such a state as 'no suffering' and 'no death' as even possible?
The argument might as well say: "there is suffering and death, therefore God doesn't exist."
Which, essentially, is what it is saying.
Just very poorly.
28 Apr 14
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Go back and re-read my posts to that effect, if it will help you to understand that the truth of premise (1) is still consistent with the action's being morally right, all things considered.
I could re-read them, but they still say the same thing, and the argument still suffers from the same flaw.
Perhaps you should read the actual objection in a ...[text shortened]... ath, therefore God doesn't exist."
Which, essentially, is what it is saying.
Just very poorly.[/b]
The argument doesn't allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one.
That is patently false, as has been pointed out to you numerous times. The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any. Now, at this point, either you're too stupid to understand this; too lazy to try to understand it; or just too proud to admit that you have made a pig's ear of it on your first go-around. Whichever is the case, it is not worth my time to address your stupidity; your laziness; or your pride.
I will respond to your objection(s) at such time that you present some objection(s) worth responding to. Everyone who knows me well knows that I am responsive to any objections that are thoughtful and considered. Yours, however, is just based on willful ignorance regarding what the argument actually asserts.
The argument might as well say: "there is suffering and death, therefore God doesn't exist."
Which, essentially, is what it is saying.
Sorry, but even an idiot could see that this is not what the argument essentially is saying. Please address the argument for what it actually is and for what it actually asserts. Is that really asking so much of you? If you are not capable at this time of analyzing the argument in a mature, objective manner; then I would recommend you come on back some other time.