An Inductive Argument from Evil

Originally posted by LemonJello

The argument doesn't allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one.

That is patently false, as has been pointed out to you numerous times. The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever ...[text shortened]... argument in a mature, objective manner; then I would recommend you come on back some other time.

The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any.
Oh, it does?
I guess I missed it.
I mean, I saw the two that it pointed out for the bad, but I missed the ones that it illustrated which it considered right.
Maybe you can point them out for me?
"Patently false" my ass.

I've offered my objections, very clearly.
If it's too much for you to admit you don't have an answer for them, I understand: after all, stupidity, laziness and pride seem to run rampant in these parts.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any.
Oh, it does?
I guess I missed it.
I mean, I saw the two that it pointed out for the bad, but I miss ...[text shortened]... them, I understand: after all, stupidity, laziness and pride seem to run rampant in these parts.[/b]

😴

Give me an objection worth taking seriously, Freaky.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any.
Oh, it does?
I guess I missed it.
I mean, I saw the two that it pointed out for the bad, but I miss ...[text shortened]... them, I understand: after all, stupidity, laziness and pride seem to run rampant in these parts.[/b]

7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

Step 7 of the argument:

Step 7 states that there are cases where no rightmaking characteristics we know of
are sufficient to counterbalance the wrongmaking characteristics of the case in question.

However this implies and allows for some cases where there are rightmaking characteristics
we know of, and potentially yet more we don't know about.

This can be shown with the mirror of step 7:

~7. In [a few] such cases, [] rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

This step alone clearly indicates that "The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any."


You are thus proven irrefutably wrong yet again.

Originally posted by googlefudge

7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

Step 7 of the argument:

Step 7 states that there are cases where no rightmaking characteristics we know of
are sufficient to cou ...[text shortened]... eristic(s) it also possesses, if any."[/i]


You are thus proven irrefutably wrong yet again.

Really that daft, or are you working at it extra hard tonight?

The opening premise gives two very specific bad things.

Nowhere in the argument is there any presentation of any specific action which the author would deem good things.
In fact, from number seven onward, the author continually asserts that no 'good enough' counterbalancing acts exist.

There can be no implication or allowance for something that is stated to lack existence.

Your quote of number seven leaves out a most important word: no.
As in no characteristics exist.

This response of yours clearly indicates that you either have no idea what you are talking about (likely) or are so dead set in seeing the truth of the scene before you, you'll vote anything contrary to what I say (equally likely).

Originally posted by LemonJello
😴

Give me an objection worth taking seriously, Freaky.

Already have.
Like it or lump it, I don't object either way.

You obviously can't answer what has been put to you, so either you don't understand the principles involved in the argument you present, or you simply don't want to admit someone else sees what you missed.

EDIT:
Actually, I'll do one better.
Why don't you summarize my three main objections?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Oh, I see.
So (basically) exactly as I've objected to.
Thanks for clearing that up, SG.
Good stuff.

Umm, no.

How did you manage to develop your reasonably wide vocabulary and yet remain so bad at communication?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
If it's too much for you to admit you don't have an answer for them, I understand: after all, stupidity, laziness and pride seem to run rampant in these parts.

It's a giant atheist conspiracy to make you look bad. 😵

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Umm, no.

How did you manage to develop your reasonably wide vocabulary and yet remain so bad at communication?

I speak pretty.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
It's a giant atheist conspiracy to make you look bad. 😵

If you think I look bad, you should see the card carrying members of the Atheist Illuminaughties.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Really that daft, or are you working at it extra hard tonight?

The opening premise gives two very specific bad things.

Nowhere in the argument is there any presentation of any specific action which the author would deem good things.
In fact, from number seven onward, the author continually asserts that no 'good enough' counterbalancing acts exist.
...[text shortened]... the truth of the scene before you, you'll vote anything contrary to what I say (equally likely).

Again you are failing to tell the difference between actions, and characteristics of actions.

You are also yet again failing at basic reading comprehension.

Read my post again and note that I posted step 7 AND THE MIRROR of step 7.

7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

Step 7 of the argument:

Step 7 states that there are cases where no rightmaking characteristics we know of
are sufficient to counterbalance the wrongmaking characteristics of the case in question.

However this implies and allows for some cases where there are rightmaking characteristics
we know of, and potentially yet more we don't know about.

This can be shown with the mirror of step 7:

~7. In [a few] such cases, [] rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

This step alone clearly indicates that "The argument allows than an action, even one with a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, can be morally right as long as its rightmaking characteristic(s) at least counterbalance whatever wrongmaking characteristic(s) it also possesses, if any."


You are thus proven irrefutably wrong yet again.

The [] brackets in the mirror of step 7 clearly indicating where I have altered it, and the ~ symbol indicating
that this is NOT step 7, or is in other words that it is the mirror of step 7.


To paraphrase the builders saying... Read twice, post once... Not the other way around.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Again you are failing to tell the difference between actions, and characteristics of actions.

You are also yet again failing at basic reading comprehension.

Read my post again and note that I posted step 7 [b]AND THE MIRROR of step 7.

[quote][i]7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the ca ...[text shortened]... 7.


To paraphrase the builders saying... Read twice, post once... Not the other way around.

Almost.

I contend that the argument specifies bad action but fails to specify good action.
What is your refutation of that claim, exactly?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Almost.

I contend that the argument specifies bad action but fails to specify good action.
What is your refutation of that claim, exactly?

Would you like the "see spot run" version of the argument? Or have you graduated from
infants to juniors?

The argument specifies occurrences with bad characteristics.

The argument specifies that a subset of those occurrences have insufficient [if any] good
characteristics to make them net good occurrences.
This implies the existence of a subset of those occurrences that do have sufficient good
characteristics to make them net good occurrences.

The argument defines a being that knows about the occurrences and has the ability to stop
them, and thus argues that this being is intentionally allowing these occurrences.
Intentionally allowing these occurrences falls into the class of 'actions'.

Where the being is allowing occurrences with net good characteristics the being is doing a
net good action.
Where the being is allowing occurrences with net bad characteristics the being is doing a
net bad action.


None of this is relevant to the validity of the argument.


Given that the problem of evil simply states that there exists evil/wrongness in the world that
has no sufficient justification and thus no being that has absolute power to stop these events
and absolute knowledge [foreknowledge] of these events and is perfectly moral can exist...
There is no need to specify specific instances of good for the purposes of this argument.

All that is needed is to establish the existence of the irredeemably bad.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Already have.
Like it or lump it, I don't object either way.

You obviously can't answer what has been put to you, so either you don't understand the principles involved in the argument you present, or you simply don't want to admit someone else sees what you missed.

EDIT:
Actually, I'll do one better.
Why don't you summarize my three main objections?

Why don't you summarize my three main objections?

Here is what I would take to be your three main objections:

(1) You claimed the following:

The argument doesn't allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one....it makes a statement that no right action exists!

This is demonstrably false. Premise (1) states that certain properties constitute very serious wrongmaking characteristics of an action. But, even for an action that possesses such a very serious wrongmaking characteristic, the argument still clearly allows that this action is morally right or neutral if there happens to be rightmaking characteristic(s) that both apply to the case in question and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic. As googlefudge has already correctly pointed out, premise (7) only states that "in many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question, and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic". So, firstly, that's perfectly consistent with the idea that in some such cases there are rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of that both apply to the case in question and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic. Secondly, it's also perfectly consistent with the idea that there may well be rightmaking characteristics we are not aware of that apply and counterbalance for some further cases. Further, both of these ideas are perfectly consistent with the truth of all subsequent premises in the argument. So, it is simply false to claim that the argument "does not allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one".

Regarding the related claim that the argument "makes a statement that no right action exists", it is obviously the case upon cursory inspection that the argument makes no such statement. If you still claim otherwise, then explicitly show where the argument makes this statement; or retract. Put up or shut up.

(2) You claimed the following:

the argument goes to great pains to describe what it considers to be wrong action without describing what it would accept as right action

First of all, how is the objection relevant? The argument has no need to explicitly "describe what it would accept as right action". The argument succeeds simply on the basis of what it does explicitly state, as is.

Notwithstanding, what counts as a morally right action is clearly implicit in the argument; so have you simply lost all ability of inference? Premise (10) reads as follows: "An action is morally wrong, all things considered, if it has a wrongmaking characteristic that is not counterbalanced by any rightmaking characteristics". What in the world do you think the talk of "wrongmaking characteristics" and "rightmaking characterstics" is all about? As has already been explained in detail, this type of accounting holds that it is the net balance of wrongmaking and rightmaking characteristics of an action that determines the wrongness or rightness of that action, all things considered. It follows naturally that for a morally relevant action to be morally right or neutral, it just needs to NOT be the case that the action has wrongmaking characteristic(s) not counterbalanced by any rightmaking characteristics. I'm sorry this inference is so hard for you to make, but obvious examples would be an action that has no wrongmaking characteristics; or one that has wrongmaking characteristics that are soundly counterbalanced by other rightmaking characteristics that it possesses; or one that possesses both wrongmaking and rightmaking characteristics but in which these perfectly balance each other out.

That the argument does not explicitly state something that is implicit in the argument (and not necessary, anyway, for success of the argument) is not a failing of the argument. This is simply a failing of your inferential abilities and of your assessment of what such an argument needs in order to be successful.

(3) You claimed the following:

There is an assumption of bad, without any support for the same.

The word 'bad' shows up precisely nowhere in the argument, so it is hard to take seriously this objection. Would you like to take another shot at rewording or fleshing out further this objection?

Yes, I think you can reasonably infer from premise (1) that disallowance of such instances of suffering and death, in the circumstances where one has the ability and knowledge to do so, is morally preferable, all else equal. That is, you can reasonably infer that the property of intentionally disallowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of disallowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are rightmaking characteristics of an action. But why is this a problem? I realize all the "wrongmaking characteristic…" talk is sooooooo difficult for you to grasp. So let's dumb this down a bit. All premise (1) basically says (in conjunction with premise (10)) is that intentionally allowing such instances of death and suffering is a wrong thing to do, in the absence of extenuating reasons that would justify allowing such events to play out. (You could also reasonably infer here that intentionally disallowing such instances of death and suffering is a right thing to do, in the absence of extenuating reasons that would justify allowing such events to play out.) Again, why is any of this a problem? If you think this is false, then provide some reasons that you think show it is false! However, arguing against premise (1) is a tough row to hoe, I think. The argument is not committed to any specific underlying account regarding what makes 'right' and 'wrong' properly apply in this sense, nor does it need to endorse any specific account. That is left to the reader. But premise (1) is eminently plausible under a whole range of different reader-imported accounts, since any number of these accounts will confirm that the intentional disallowance of such things as avoidable suffering and death of sentient beings is prima facie morally preferred. Again, if you have reasons to think otherwise, then please list and elaborate on them.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Would you like the "see spot run" version of the argument? Or have you graduated from
infants to juniors?

The argument specifies occurrences with bad characteristics.

The argument specifies that a subset of those occurrences have insufficient [if any] good
characteristics to make them net good occurrences.
This implies the existence of a subse ...[text shortened]... s of this argument.

All that is needed is to establish the existence of the irredeemably bad.

You've gotten a bit closer to the crux, but you're still failing to see the actual essence.

As stated--- and to which you agreed--- the argument offers to specific bad things: suffering and death.

But what you fail to acknowledge--- and what is patently obvious--- is that the argument does not offer any specific good things: none which it would call good on their own merit, and none which would offer (what the author considers to be) sufficient enough to offset the bad in such a way as to render the whole situation either morally good or at least neutral.

This is entirely relevant to the argument, as has been asserted repeatedly by yours truly.
Stick around: I'll keep the beat going.

HINT: It has to do with establishing the supposed "irredeemably bad."

Originally posted by LemonJello

Why don't you summarize my three main objections?

Here is what I would take to be your three main objections:

(1) You claimed the following:

The argument doesn't allow for any scenario other than a morally wrong one....it makes a statement that no right action exists!

This is demonstrably false. Premise (1) state ...[text shortened]... eferred. Again, if you have reasons to think otherwise, then please list and elaborate on them.

This is demonstrably false.
Oh, boy.
You go to great lengths to continue to say the same thing without listening or comprehending what you're actually saying in comparison to the thing you are referencing.

The argument very, very specifically says there are no right ways to do a wrong thing, beginning with number seven and continuing through number nine.

It starts in number seven where the author says he can't think of any right ways of doing wrong which can counterbalance the wrong and apply to both the case while carrying enough weight.

Number nine is the point where the author rejects even the aspects of which he knows nothing of: even his ignorance won't allow for any right actions to offset the wrong ones.

So you can imagine the argument allows for right all you want, but the argument itself rejects such a notion.
It emphatically denies there is any right way to do a wrong thing, even those ways the author has not considered.
None of them are either right or right enough.

First of all, how is the objection relevant?
Is that a trick question?

I get that you swallowed this one hook, line and sinker, but seriously: where's your critical thinking?

ANY argument which makes a statement is always challenged on the veracity of that statement.
Do you want to prove something, or do you simply wish to accept it?

When an argument goes to such great lengths to make an overly emotive point, my radar goes nuts.
So should yours.
Pity it didn't.

THIS argument wants us to accept the descriptions employed at face value, without further inspection.
Well, further inspection is required in all cases, if the truth is desired.

An assumption is made here and it must be challenged.
Is suffering bad?
Is death bad?
If either or both are bad, on what scale are they bad?
Compared to what are they bad?

Other relevance: how is it that the author so readily latches onto
animal (presumed innocence),
agonizing suffering (nobody got time for that),
forest fire (isn't that where Smokey lives?),
infant (more presumed innocence),
lingering suffering (when will it end?),
death (forfend!), and
cancer (aghast!).

All of the language is pointed and calculated.
The author wants an emotional response.
The author seems to be very well versed in what he considers to be (and what he hopes others will accept as) bad.
Why is he so very silent on what he considers to be good?

By not naming the good which he would accept as counterbalancing to these specified bad things, he leaves the argument open to the inference that the opposite of these scenarios must be good.

Let's give that piñata a whack.

Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to live a glorious existence in an ever-renewing forest, and the property of allowing a child to undergo prolonged happiness and eventual everlasting life, are rightmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.

It's highly relevant because the author must show why the things he purports to be bad are bad, and since they are bad, here are the acceptable counter-measures.