An Inductive Argument from Evil

Originally posted by Penguin
Well that is not the god described in the Bible, Koran, or any other holy book or described by any theist who worships their deity. It's more like Spinoza's god or some sort of aloof 'cosmic consciousness'.

I also don't think such a god could really be called 'omniscient' and certainly not 'moral'. By that, I don't mean immoral, more amoral.

--- Penguin

Specifically, it's also by definition not the god described in the OP.

As that being was defined to be perfectly moral.

Originally posted by Penguin
Well that is not the god described in the Bible, Koran, or any other holy book or described by any theist who worships their deity. It's more like Spinoza's god or some sort of aloof 'cosmic consciousness'.

I also don't think such a god could really be called 'omniscient' and certainly not 'moral'. By that, I don't mean immoral, more [i]a[/i ...[text shortened]... rst page and last and probably missed the post where you elaborated on this.[/edit]
--- Penguin

"Well that is not the god described in the Bible, Koran, or any other holy book or described by any theist who worships their deity."

everyone searches for god in their own way. and no, i definitely do not follow a biblical or quranic god.

"I also don't think such a god could really be called 'omniscient' and certainly not 'moral'."
i don't think he needs to be moral. if he is eternal, he was maybe alone for an eternity before considering creating. maybe he is not about morality but simply observe our journey through existence.

"I apologise for jumping in mid-thread, I have only read the first page and last and probably missed the post where you elaborated on this"
it happens and is inevitable, no need to apologize.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
"Well that is not the god described in the Bible, Koran, or any other holy book or described by any theist who worships their deity."

everyone searches for god in their own way. and no, i definitely do not follow a biblical or quranic god.

"I also don't think such a god could really be called 'omniscient' and certainly not 'moral'."
i don't t ...[text shortened]... ssed the post where you elaborated on this"
it happens and is inevitable, no need to apologize.

Do you have any objections to the argument in the OP that are relevant to
the god concept the Argument is actually designed to deal with?

Originally posted by Penguin
Well, fair enough. But I think that is the step that many religious people would reject, and all the later steps that rely on it should, for consistency, include the phrase 'it is highly likely that..."

--- Penguin

Hi Penguin,

The only inductive move in the argument is from (8) to (9); all others are deductive. But, accordingly, since there is at least one inductive move, the argument does not puport to be anything other than an inductive argument. That is, the argument only purports to show that the conclusion follows with high likelihood (not deductively) from the premises. I presume this is enough to satisfy your concern in that regard.

At any rate, yeah, the move from (8) to (9) is surely a crux (if not the crux) of this argument, and it baffles me that theists here have not yet latched onto it, unless they simply have not read it or understood it.

However, I think there is at least one very good argument in favor of the move from (8) to (9), based on the work of philosopher Michael Tooley. In the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy essay I linked to in the opening post (which for disclosure happens to be authored by Tooley), it provides some good background discussion of (8) --> (9) in the extended discussion of section 3.2 (in particular, in 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). However, the best argument in favor of (8) --> (9), I think, is cursorily covered in section 3.5. Although it is not rigorously fleshed out in this essay, there are other of course other essays by Tooley that give the full, gory details, such as in "Inductive Logic and the Probability that God Exists: Farewell to Skeptical Theism" in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2012). However, I have been unable to find a free link to this article.

Originally posted by JS357
Well I don't count myself as a theist because when I introspect I find no belief in the existence of a deity. But arguments from induction are always provisional. I wonder if they belong in theological arguments. Of course theologically based beliefs that venture into the realm of science, such as geocentrism or the age of the earth, should be at least compare ...[text shortened]... an the simple conclusions, they speak for themselves and those who reject them are beyond reach.

But arguments from induction are always provisional. I wonder if they belong in theological arguments.

Of course good inductive arguments have a place in theology, just the same as any area of discourse. I have no interest in selective skepticism towards something like inductive reasoning, which is a mode of reasoning everyone relies on pervasively. I would be interested here, however, in any thoughts on whether or not the particular move (8) --> (9) is inductively sound.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Do you have any objections to the argument in the OP that are relevant to
the god concept the Argument is actually designed to deal with?

nope. other than i find it long winded. a god as defined in 15 doesn't exist.

Originally posted by LemonJello

But arguments from induction are always provisional. I wonder if they belong in theological arguments.

Of course good inductive arguments have a place in theology, just the same as any area of discourse. I have no interest in selective skepticism towards something like inductive reasoning, which is a mode of reasoning everyone relies on ...[text shortened]... however, in any thoughts on whether or not the particular move (8) --> (9) is inductively sound.

I tend to think the move from 8 to 9 is inductively sound.

Essentially, what 8) says is that there must be a greater good that obtains in every instance of said dying forest animals and suffering children, or the willful allowance of that suffering is morally wrong.

I imagine that, in some cases, a greater good does obtain. For example, the doctor learns how to cure cancer due to his observance of a specific reaction one child has. Or, the child's determination in the face of his illness inspires another kid not to commit suicide. But it's difficult to accept that there is a counterbalancing good in EVERY case.

Surely there must be at least one kid who suffered though cancer without it doing much good for himself, or anyone else. Maybe a kid with indifferent parents and no friends or other relatives around. Given the high number of cancer cases, and the old age of the earth (~4B years) and the many natural forest fires that occurred before humans ever existed, it is hard to accept that there was some greater good in every single case of an animal being roasted alive in a forest fire, or every kid (and adult!) suffering from terminal cancer.

Originally posted by LemonJello
WTF?

Please explicitly show me how "it is a reasonable expectation for life to last forever" and "that while it's in session...life ought to be without suffering" are implicit in (1).

Your entire post here is simply absurd. You have completely failed to understand this argument on any level. Did you actually read any of it beyond your grotesqu ...[text shortened]... way that (1) entails all the crap you project on it.

And sorry, but your rant is just stupid.

Do you read the stuff you cut and paste from the website, or do you just like the way they sound when you read them out loud?

If it's "wrongmaking action" (whatever that's supposed to mean, although one can assume it's a new/improved way to say something is wrong) to allow suffering, agonizing suffering, lingering suffering, and then death from cancer, then OF COURSE conversely, it is 'rightmaking action' to keep a creature alive with cancer and yet also keep it from suffering, from agonizing suffering, from lingering suffering.

What else could that claptrap of crap mean, exactly?

The first premise of your argument isn't highlighting the "wrongmaking action" of fires in a forest or even the existence of cancer.
It speaks and objects specifically to suffering and then death.
The inference is quite clear to any reasonable person whose faculties haven't been emasculated by virtue of their blind acceptance of such terms as "wrongmaking action."
Namely, if suffering and death are in that group called 'bad,' then pleasure (or, at the least, non-suffering) and life are good.

Or did I miss something in my deplorable inability to comprehend the English language?

We can talk about the rant in a separate thread, if you like.
But your assertion of absurdity merely underscores your failure to grasp how the insertion of emotive language renders an argument--- however otherwise convincing--- inert.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
But your assertion of absurdity merely underscores your failure to grasp how the insertion of emotive language renders an argument--- however otherwise convincing--- inert.

Just because you got all hot and bothered over them doesn't mean they're pandering, or emotive.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
I tend to think the move from 8 to 9 is inductively sound.

Essentially, what 8) says is that there must be a greater good that obtains in every instance of said dying forest animals and suffering children, or the willful allowance of that suffering is morally wrong.

I imagine that, in some cases, a greater good does obtain. For example, the ...[text shortened]... being roasted alive in a forest fire, or every kid (and adult!) suffering from terminal cancer.

i believe morally good and the greater good can be two separate things. killing a person to save a thousand is morally wrong but it is for the greater good.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Just because you got all hot and bothered over them doesn't mean they're pandering, or emotive.

Do you understand the difference between an objective argument and a subjective one?
Can you imagine bringing such incendiary language into a discussion involving math?
It would be laughed out of the room.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Do you understand the difference between an objective argument and a subjective one?
Can you imagine bringing such incendiary language into a discussion involving math?
It would be laughed out of the room.

Yes, but this isn't math. This is an argument from evil. Human values come into play with the word "Evil".

How would you word things so that the case is accurately stated without being *overly emotive?

* - you decide what is 'overly emotive'

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Yes, but this isn't math. This is an argument from evil. Human values come into play with the word "Evil".

How would you word things so that the case is accurately stated without being *overly emotive?

* - you decide what is 'overly emotive'

So you're essentially saying that 'good,' 'evil' are both emotional aspects of the human condition.
You are basically saying that both qualities are emotional in substance, and therefore, completely without any attachment to a separate, non-negotiable standard.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
So you're essentially saying that 'good,' 'evil' are both emotional aspects of the human condition.
You are basically saying that both qualities are emotional in substance, and therefore, completely without any attachment to a separate, non-negotiable standard.

No, I am not saying that at all. Suppose, for example, a sociopath kills a little-known person quickly, and in their sleep, say, with a drug. The sociopath feels no remorse over the killing. No one misses or discovers the body of the victim, so no one grieves. I would still say the murder is an evil act, despite the complete lack of emotional change in either killer, victim, or the rest of humanity in general.

What I was trying to do is see if you had thought of a way to cut out the bits that you consider to be 'too emotive' from the argument, without substantially changing the content of the argument. If there is no way to do this, then I think the charge of 'too emotive' may be dismissed.