Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
Originally posted by LemonJello
1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones. [Who is "allowing..."?]

2. Our world con ...[text shortened]... al substance laboriously presented as a bedrock premise; apropos of a high school debaters club.

Who is "allowing..."?

Irrelevant.

Reiterates the painfully obvious...

So you concede that the truth of premises (2) and (4) is obvious. Noted.

Presumes to know the "omnipotent being's" plan and rationale for events which occur within it.

Actually, it presumes nothing of the sort.

Who is the "being"?

Irrelevant.

Originally posted by divegeester
What would be an example of a right-making counterbalancing action?

What would be an example of a right-making counterbalancing action?

The argument speaks of right- or wrongmaking and counterbalancing as it relates to characteristics of actions. An action itself could have both rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. A rightmaking counterbalancing characteristic of an action would be one that effectively offsets the wrongmaking characteristic(s) of the same action, such that the action on balance is not morally wrong, in accordance with the account of moral wrongness of an action as detailed in premise (10). In other words: but for that rightmaking characteristic of the action, the action would have been morally wrong, in virtue of its other wrongmaking characteristic(s).

Here would be an example (I'm sure we could come up with many others too). Suppose that I intentionally yank on the arm of my child, knowing that it will probably result in some pain and injury to him or her. And suppose it does cause some pain and injury to the child. That is a wrongmaking characteristic of the action, inasmuch as it constitutes a wrongmaking characteristic to intentionally do something to another person that you know will probably result in his or her pain and injury. Now, suppose that I performed this action within the larger and ultimate context that I just thought it would be funny to do so. That's a stupid reason to perform such an action, and there is in this case no rightmaking counterbalancing characteristic of the action. Suppose on the other hand, that I performed the action within the ultimate context of rapidly pulling the child out of the way of an oncoming car that I know would have caused much more serious pain and debilitating injury, or even death, unto the child. That's a good justifying reason and would outline a rightmaking counterbalancing characteristic for my action.

Originally posted by wolfgang59
The logic falls down on step 7 as you are aware. It is the classic
escape clause for the theist; the omniscient deity knows why
suffering is a good thing even though we poor mortals do not.

If the objection is that there exist sufficiently counterbalancing rightmaking characteristics of which God has awareness but we do not, then that is not an objection against premise (7), but rather against (9) and by extension against the inductive move from (8) to (9).

Further, the theist making this objection against (9) would presumably still have the task of providing some justification for this objection. Simply making the objection does not constitute a viable escape clause against an inductive argument of this sort. It would only constitute a viable escape clause against the logical problem of evil, which is a different form of the argument that attempts to show deductively that there is a logical contradiction entailed by the state of affairs in which God and evil coexist. The logical problem of evil fails easily to this sort of objection (and hence fails, period), since it is surely at least merely logically possible that this sort of objection is correct. But that in itself counts virtually nothing toward defeating the inductive evidential formulation of the argument.

Originally posted by KellyJay
So you believe there is an argument to be made that shows there is no
God, at least a good one, by what you call good and bad? I take it you
read C.S. Lewis's "Mere Christianity" that did the same thing except he
thought it showed God is real?
Kelly

I do not understand what you are asking. Could you clarify? Additionally, if you think there is a strong argumentative point contained within Mere Christianity that successfully transfers and applies to the argument in the OP, please go ahead and state what it is.

Which premise(s) of the argument that I posted in the OP would you reject and why?

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
14 was already a conclusion to previous points. it concluded a being cannot be simultaneously a, b and c

15 offered no new information. but you are right, they are not really equivalent. 15 actually introduces an element of confusion. from 15 you can assume a being can have a and C, yet all the points 1 through 13 lead (if one accepts them all) to 14, n ...[text shortened]... structure of the OP's argument is the least of my complaints. my main concerns are with 1 and 16

Why do you reject premise 1)? 16) I can understand, but 1)? That's crazy talk, isn't it?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Which premise(s) do you reject and why?

1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Let's just start there, since the rest hinges on this.

Before delving into it, I want to rant just a bit.
I find it reprehensible when an otherwise reputable source of knowledge (stanford.edu) resorts to inflammatory language with the obvious intent to incite emotionalism in an alleged objective discussion. Words such as agonizing and lingering suffering serve no other purpose than to illicit a subjective response.
It's pandering, no matter which way you cut it.
/rant

This initial premise presupposes two supreme goods (albeit from a supposed supreme bad position) which simply don't exist... or, at minimum, aren't established.
Namely, that life should not have an end and--- that while it's in session--- life ought to be without suffering.
Where does the author get either of these ideas, one wonders?

Until the author can answer with consistent support why it is a reasonable expectation for life to last forever and for it to be without suffering, this dog stalled at the gate.

Originally posted by googlefudge

What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil,

.....SNIP.....

Therefore:
15. There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
16. If God exists, then he is, by definition, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.

My pr ...[text shortened]... orally perfect'. So I think you can get to step 15 no problem.

It's 16 onwards It falls down.

I don't think that Omnipotence or Omniscience or Moral Perfection are requirements
[by definition or otherwise] of a god.
And I think you get logical contradictions and paradoxes if you try to create an
Omnimax god.

I understand your objection against (16), based on the idea that such a definition is internally contradictory. I myself find the conditional (16) a bit awkward, though I do not see a pressing need to revise it.

The point I would make here is that the problem of evil has always been an argument that examines a 'God' with these three omni- attributes; or more to the point, examines the (in)compatibility of the existence of an entity putatively possessing such attributes with the existence of evil. So, if it is granted that the argument is sound up through (15), then it pretty much already fully succeeds as a "problem of evil". Even if the definition of 'God' at issue here is internally incoherent, that would not change the fact that many theists endorse just such a definition. In that case, the soundness of (1)-(15) is fatal for their position. To drive this point home, one could simply replace (16) & (17) with (16*):

Therefore:
(16*) The proposition "God exists" is false, wherein 'God' is defined as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

(Of course, (16*) also follows directly from the idea that such a definition is internally incoherent to begin with.)

At any rate, the problem of evil does not purport to address conceptions of 'God' that lie outside this sort of definition.

Originally posted by Suzianne
Your use of the word "intentionally" shows your givens to be false.

Edit: (Patience, I posted before I was finished.) The only "intention" is to allow evil and sin to cause their own detrimental effects. This is necessary, since without a detrimental effect, evil is not "evil". These effects are caused by evil, not by God. Saying they are caused by G ...[text shortened]... nnot apply the logic of man to God. He knows more than you, and has reasons you cannot discern.

Your use of the word "intentionally" shows your givens to be false.

How so? Which premise(s) are you rejecting?

The only "intention" is to allow evil and sin to cause their own detrimental effects. This is necessary, since without a detrimental effect, evil is not "evil". These effects are caused by evil, not by God. Saying they are caused by God is putting the cart well before the horse.

You need to re-read the argument. The argument is talking about "intentionally allowing…" not about "causing…." In fact, the words 'cause' and 'causing' appear nowhere in the argument. So what exactly is the problem? Hilariously, the only "intention" the argument is talking about is that of intentionally allowing, which is what you already admittedly acknowledge here (and actually even claim is somehow necessary). So: 🙄

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Let's just start there, since the rest hinges on this.

Before delving into ...[text shortened]... or life to last forever and for it to be without suffering, this dog stalled at the gate.[/b]

Boy is that rant misguided. The suffering is the point. It is not pandering at all to mention it.

If that's pandering, then so is a large chunk of Job that describes, in detail, how Job suffered.

(🙄)

Originally posted by LemonJello

Your use of the word "intentionally" shows your givens to be false.

How so? Which premise(s) are you rejecting?

[quote]The only "intention" is to allow evil and sin to cause their own detrimental effects. This is necessary, since without a detrimental effect, evil is not "evil". These effects are caused by evil, not by God. Saying th ...[text shortened]... you already admittedly acknowledge here (and actually even claim is somehow necessary). So: 🙄

I think I'm going to start numbering each sentence in my posts. Theists lately respond as if hypnotized when they see them.

1. Fear the awesome power of my enumeration, puny theists!

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
1.
from our point of view. what is god's point of view?

you assume god (an eternal being who may experience time differently or have in incomprehensible perception altogether) must register our suffering the same way we do. to him, an hour, or even a year of intense suffering of a human might not register at all.

he promises an eternity of bliss (wha ...[text shortened]... finally we have reached the end. and no, 1->16 do not, by a longshot, prove god doesn't exist.

you assume god (an eternal being who may experience time differently or have in incomprehensible perception altogether) must register our suffering the same way we do.

No, the argument does not assume this. If you think otherwise, then actually show us how this is implied by the argument.

2-6 are obvious, no point going over them.

7 is hard to decipher. i have no idea what you (or the author) are trying to communicate.

8 and 9 seem to just reiterate 6

Well, If you really have no idea what (7) asserts, then you should also be confused on the contents of (8) and (9) as well. That's because, no, (8) and (9) do not simply reiterate (6); they also materially include implication owing to (7), as anyone who can at least marginally read should be able to clearly see. You also somehow completely failed to grasp that (8) --> (9) also includes the critical inductive step.

If you honestly have no idea what (7) is saying, then perhaps it will help you to refer to the example I provided above in response to divegeester regarding right- and wrongmaking characteristics, etc.

11 again, 6 rephrased. i have a distinct dislike for windbags who like to add the same thing to the list, just to see the number rise

Well, I think it is clear that you have no intention of actually taking the time to read and analyze the argument with any reasonable care. These are throw-away objections, nothing more than the product of sheer laziness and/or flagrant misrepresentation on the part of you, the reader.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
just to give an example of the author being a windbag.

14: X has characteristics A AND B AND NON C
15. X doesn't have A AND B AND C.


we have already established x cannot have c while having a and b (omnipotence and omniscience).
there is no need to reinstate that there cannot be an x with all three of those characteristics. (assuming the argumen ...[text shortened]... s after 6, prove that information is relevant to the argument, and i will recant my statement.

prove to me that new information has been presented in steps after 6, prove that information is relevant to the argument, and i will recant my statement

Or you could just re-read the argument for yourself, this time with even a modicum of care. It's also hilarious that you would state that you have no clue what (7) asserts and then, at the same time and before even attempting to get clarification on what (7) does assert, imply with such bluster that (7) introduces no new, relevant information. Yikes!

Originally posted by googlefudge
No step 1 only established that these things had bad aspects.

It did not consider whether there might be circumstances which made
those events good on net.

Shooting down a hijacked plane might kill hundreds of innocent people.
However if shooting that plane down saves the lives of tens of thousands
inside a packed stadium then on net, the good ...[text shortened]... entirely separate conditions. All of which are established in, and important
to the argument.

"Shooting down a hijacked plane might kill hundreds of innocent people.
However if shooting that plane down saves the lives of tens of thousands
inside a packed stadium then on net, the good outweighs the bad."

we are not talking about complex decisions concerning the greater good. we are talking about morally good or morally bad. shooting down an airplane full of people is morally bad. no matter how many lives you save.

"They are thus establishing entirely different things."
that's your opinion. my opinion is entirely different. 7 adds nothing important to the discussion, nothing that would make god more or less moral. if god is guilty of letting events described in 1 happen, then god is not morally perfect. there is no weighing.




actually forget it. i am tired of discussing semantics. out of my many points, you took the least important one.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
14 was already a conclusion to previous points. it concluded a being cannot be simultaneously a, b and c

15 offered no new information. but you are right, they are not really equivalent. 15 actually introduces an element of confusion. from 15 you can assume a being can have a and C, yet all the points 1 through 13 lead (if one accepts them all) to 14, n ...[text shortened]... structure of the OP's argument is the least of my complaints. my main concerns are with 1 and 16

my main concerns are with 1 and 16

Your objection against (1) is fantasy, precipitated no doubt by the aforementioned laziness and/or misrepresentation.

Regarding your remark on (16), if your view is that we cannot define God; that God simply resists any definition or description; then that's fine. But then God-talk will be cognitively meaningless, such that "God exists" and other God-statements have no discernable propositional content. So, there's a pretty big upshot here to the objection you raised against (16)**; have you considered that?

** which was:

...how can a limited being hope to describe an eternal, limitless being?

I also wonder why, if God defies all description by humans as you seem to claim, you would feel justified in describing him in words like 'eternal', etc. You just want to have your cake and eat it too: use descriptive words for rhetorical punch in describing God, as it suits you; then deny that we can do such things at other times, as it suits you. Amounts to nothing more than contradiction on your part.