An Inductive Argument from Evil

Originally posted by LemonJello
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).

For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]

So you believe there is an argument to be made that shows there is no
God, at least a good one, by what you call good and bad? I take it you
read C.S. Lewis's "Mere Christianity" that did the same thing except he
thought it showed God is real?
Kelly

Originally posted by wolfgang59
The logic falls down on step 7 as you are aware. It is the classic
escape clause for the theist; the omniscient deity knows why
suffering is a good thing even though we poor mortals do not.

No, that argument applies to step 9.

Step 9 is the one which moves beyond our knowledge to that of the deities.

Up until 9 there are no 'right-making properties the WE are aware of'.
It is only in step 9 that the argument makes the probability assessment that
there are no 'right-making properties' at all.

And it only 'falls down' if you require all arguments to be deductive and thus
100% guaranteed.

However since all arguments about reality must be based on premises which
cannot be known absolutely, only probabilistically. Then all arguments about reality
must have a probabilistic element anyway.

We just don't usually factor that in because the probability of being wrong is
too small to bother about. [or possibly calculate, there is a probability that we
are wrong about the Earth being an irregular oblate spheroid as opposed to a
flat disk... But I wouldn't know where to even begin calculating how absurdly tiny
that probability actually is]. However in an absolute sense those probabilities and
uncertainties are still there.


If you can demonstrate that it is probable beyond reasonable doubt that sufficient
'right-making properties/circumstances' don't exist for at least one instance of
bad things happening then this part of the argument stands up.

This is not to say that anyone who genuinely believes would actually care, and not
like GB just shrug the entire thing off. But the argument itself would stand up...

On this point.

My problem is step 16.

Originally posted by LemonJello
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil,

.....SNIP.....

Therefore:
15. There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
16. If God exists, then he is, by definition, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.

What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil,

.....SNIP.....

Therefore:
15. There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.
16. If God exists, then he is, by definition, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.

My problem with this argument is with step 16.

I don't think that Omnipotence or Omniscience or Moral Perfection are requirements
[by definition or otherwise] of a god.
And I think you get logical contradictions and paradoxes if you try to create an
Omnimax god.

I have not heard a description of any monotheistic god that I would class as
evil, let alone 'morally perfect'. So I think you can get to step 15 no problem.

It's 16 onwards It falls down.

Originally posted by LemonJello
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).

For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]

Your use of the word "intentionally" shows your givens to be false.

Edit: (Patience, I posted before I was finished.) The only "intention" is to allow evil and sin to cause their own detrimental effects. This is necessary, since without a detrimental effect, evil is not "evil". These effects are caused by evil, not by God. Saying they are caused by God is putting the cart well before the horse.

And I know this escapes you, but you cannot apply the logic of man to God. He knows more than you, and has reasons you cannot discern.

Originally posted by Suzianne
Your use of the word "intentionally" shows your givens to be false.

Do you disagree that intentionally causing someone to suffer is [or can be] morally wrong?

Originally posted by googlefudge
Do you disagree that intentionally causing someone to suffer is [or can be] morally wrong?

I cannot know the mind of God. If you mean that a man intentionally causing someone to suffer is morally wrong, then I agree. But there's that word "intentionally" again.

Originally posted by Suzianne
I cannot know the mind of God. If you mean that a man intentionally causing someone to suffer is morally wrong, then I agree. But there's that word "intentionally" again.

Stop jumping ahead and adding extra stuff in.
I haven't said ANYTHING about who is intentionally causing someone to suffer.

"Do you disagree that intentionally causing someone to suffer is [or can be] morally wrong?"

Originally posted by LemonJello
What follows below is an interesting inductive version of the evidential problem of evil, as taken directly from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/. It's an inductive argument in virtue of the move from (8) to (9).

For theists out there, I am interested to know [b]which premise(s) you reject and why. In particular, I am interested if there ...[text shortened]... on, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

Therefore:
17. God does not exist.[/b]

1.
from our point of view. what is god's point of view?

you assume god (an eternal being who may experience time differently or have in incomprehensible perception altogether) must register our suffering the same way we do. to him, an hour, or even a year of intense suffering of a human might not register at all.

he promises an eternity of bliss (whatever that may mean). what is 60 years of suffering to him?

2-6 are obvious, no point going over them.

7 is hard to decipher. i have no idea what you (or the author) are trying to communicate.

8 and 9 seem to just reiterate 6

10. assuming you talk about the good of an action outweighing the bad, i guess that is true, with the specification that there are many (myself included) who believe an action may be morally wrong even if the good outweighs the bad.

11 again, 6 rephrased. i have a distinct dislike for windbags who like to add the same thing to the list, just to see the number rise

12. yes, we already said, 6. no therefore. you need to have reached a conclusion to use therefore. hopefully there aren't many items left

13. agreed

14. yes.

15. the exact idea of 14. the dude isn't even trying anymore.

16. the definition of whom? why is that person allowed to submit a definition of god, and moreover, how can a limited being hope to describe an eternal, limitless being?

17. finally we have reached the end. and no, 1->16 do not, by a longshot, prove god doesn't exist.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
1.
from our point of view. what is god's point of view?

you assume god (an eternal being who may experience time differently or have in incomprehensible perception altogether) must register our suffering the same way we do. to him, an hour, or even a year of intense suffering of a human might not register at all.

he promises an eternity of bliss (wha ...[text shortened]... finally we have reached the end. and no, 1->16 do not, by a longshot, prove god doesn't exist.

I'll let LJ do the full rebuttle but...

If you think a load of those steps say the same thing you didn't read them carefully enough.

Every step says something new and different from the steps before.


And it's a formal logical argument. Every step must be entirely rigorous and specific.
The author is not being a windbag, that's what a formal logical argument looks like.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I'll let LJ do the full rebuttle but...

If you think a load of those steps say the same thing you didn't read them carefully enough.

Every step says something new and different from the steps before.


And it's a formal logical argument. Every step must be entirely rigorous and specific.
The author is not being a windbag, that's what a formal logical argument looks like.

just to give an example of the author being a windbag.

14: X has characteristics A AND B AND NON C
15. X doesn't have A AND B AND C.


we have already established x cannot have c while having a and b (omnipotence and omniscience).
there is no need to reinstate that there cannot be an x with all three of those characteristics. (assuming the argument solved the Morally perfect issue)


"And it's a formal logical argument. Every step must be entirely rigorous and specific"

yes. and a step must introduce new information. not reiterate what has been said before. prove to me that new information has been presented in steps after 6, prove that information is relevant to the argument, and i will recant my statement.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
just to give an example of the author being a windbag.

14: X has characteristics A AND B AND NON C
15. X doesn't have A AND B AND C.


we have already established x cannot have c while having a and b (omnipotence and omniscience).
there is no need to reinstate that there cannot be an x with all three of those characteristics. (assuming the argumen ...[text shortened]... s after 6, prove that information is relevant to the argument, and i will recant my statement.

14: If X has characteristics A and B, then X does not have characteristic C.
15: There is no being that has characteristics A, B and C.

This is not a reiteration. It is a process of reasoning. You start with "if (A and B) then not C" and end with "not (A and B and C)", which are different statements. In the latter, you could have A and C be true. In the former, you cannot.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
just to give an example of the author being a windbag.

14: X has characteristics A AND B AND NON C
15. X doesn't have A AND B AND C.


we have already established x cannot have c while having a and b (omnipotence and omniscience).
there is no need to reinstate that there cannot be an x with all three of those characteristics. (assuming the argumen ...[text shortened]... s after 6, prove that information is relevant to the argument, and i will recant my statement.

1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and
the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking
characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.

2. Our world contains animals that die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children who undergo lingering
suffering and eventual death due to cancer.

3. An omnipotent being could prevent such events, if he knew that those events were about to occur.

4. An omniscient being would know that such events were about to occur.

5. If a being allows something to take place that he knows is about to happen, and which he knows he could
prevent, then that being intentionally allows the event in question to occur.

Step 1: define two examples of bad things

Step 2: Identify that the bad things defined in step one happen in the world

Step 3: State that an all powerful being could prevent these events from occurring if it knew that these
events were going to occur.

Step 4: State that an all knowing being would know that these events were going to occur.

Step 5: State that a being capable of stopping an event, that knows the event is going to occur, is
intentionally allowing that event to happen.


So far each step is new and different from the the others.

Therefore:
6. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are cases where he intentionally allows animals
to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer.

Step 6: If there is a being with attributes from 3 and 4, and the events defined in step 1 happen [step 2]
then this being is intentionally allowing these events to occur.

This follows from steps 1 through 5 and says something new.

7. In many such cases, no rightmaking characteristics that we are aware of both apply to the case in question,
and also are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristic.

Step 7: There are cases of the events defined in [step 1], that do occur [step 2], where WE know of no good
circumstance or consequence of these events that balances out the bad consequences of those events.

Step 7 is saying something completely new, It is adding that WE know of no upside of these otherwise
bad events which makes then net positives [or even neutral].

Therefore:
8. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases of such a being's intentionally
allowing animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual
death due to cancer, that have wrongmaking properties such that there are no rightmaking characteristics that
we are aware of that both apply to the cases in question, and that are also sufficiently serious to counterbalance
the relevant wrongmaking characteristics.

Step 8: Combines steps 6 and 7 to state that there are events that occur that WE cannot see any net upside to
that a being with properties from steps 3 and 4 would be intentionally allowing to occur.

This is again different from any statement prior and advances the argument... As do all subsequent steps.


So now would be the time to recant your statement.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
14: If X has characteristics A and B, then X does not have characteristic C.
15: There is no being that has characteristics A, B and C.

This is not a reiteration. It is a process of reasoning. You start with "if (A and B) then not C" and end with "not (A and B and C)", which are different statements. In the latter, you could have A and C be true. In the former, you cannot.

14 was already a conclusion to previous points. it concluded a being cannot be simultaneously a, b and c

15 offered no new information. but you are right, they are not really equivalent. 15 actually introduces an element of confusion. from 15 you can assume a being can have a and C, yet all the points 1 through 13 lead (if one accepts them all) to 14, not 15. at best 15 includes 14, at worst, it also includes any arrangement of a, b and c (as long as you don't have all of them)


this is getting out of hand, the structure of the OP's argument is the least of my complaints. my main concerns are with 1 and 16

Originally posted by googlefudge
[quote]1. Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and
the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking
characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.

2. Our world contains animals that die agonizing deaths in forest fire ...[text shortened]... argument... As do all subsequent steps.


So now would be the time to recant your statement.

your step 7 was already covered in step 1 where you already established the bad things. if you need to reiterate they are bad (have no silver linings), why is 1 needed?


8 is already covered by 3 and 4

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
your step 7 was already covered in step 1 where you already established the bad things. if you need to reiterate they are bad (have no silver linings), why is 1 needed?


8 is already covered by 3 and 4

No step 1 only established that these things had bad aspects.

It did not consider whether there might be circumstances which made
those events good on net.

Shooting down a hijacked plane might kill hundreds of innocent people.
However if shooting that plane down saves the lives of tens of thousands
inside a packed stadium then on net, the good outweighs the bad.

Step one established the equivalent of shooting down a plane killing hundreds is bad.

Step 7 established the equivalent of "not all instances of passenger planes
getting shot down killing hundreds have circumstances that we as humans
can or have spotted that make up for the wrongness of shooting down the plane."

They are thus establishing entirely different things.

The reason they are needed is that you need to establish three things.

1 That there are events that occur that on their own are morally bad.

2 There is a subset of these events that have no extenuating circumstances that WE know
of that make them net positives.

3 There is PROBABLY a subset of those events that have no extenuating circumstances
at all that make them net positives.


Those are three entirely separate conditions. All of which are established in, and important
to the argument.