"atheism is a belief"

Originally posted by vistesd
First, as you already know, I reject the concept of “supernature”. But I have always agreed with twhitehead that, if the supernatural did intervene in the natural order, it would appear manifest as events-in-nature—and no matter how weird they seemed we would have no real warrant to, even provisionally, assume the supernatural, rather than some natural acti ...[text shortened]... upernatural" and "phenomena" can be coherently conjoined--but I need to think on that some more.

"First, as you already know, I reject the concept of “supernature”. But I have always agreed with twhitehead that, if the supernatural did intervene in the natural order, it would appear manifest as events-in-nature—and no matter how weird they seemed we would have no real warrant to, even provisionally, assume the supernatural, rather than some natural activities which we were not yet able to explain. "

Why do you think this?

Originally posted by vistesd
First, as you already know, I reject the concept of “supernature”. But I have always agreed with twhitehead that, if the supernatural did intervene in the natural order, it would appear manifest as events-in-nature—and no matter how weird they seemed we would have no real warrant to, even provisionally, assume the supernatural, rather than some natural acti ...[text shortened]... upernatural" and "phenomena" can be coherently conjoined--but I need to think on that some more.

Yes, and I disagree with twhitehead on this point. The best definition I have come across for the supernatural is here:

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

The argument pretty much exactly nails my problem with the "defining the supernatural out of existence" argument.
And then presents a [to my mind] working solution to the problem.


I would be interested to here what you think. ......

There is a trend in science and law to define the word "supernatural" as "the untestable," which is perhaps understandable for its practicality, but deeply flawed as both philosophy and social policy. Flawed as philosophy, because testability is not even a metaphysical distinction, but an epistemological one, and yet in the real world everyone uses the word “supernatural” to make metaphysical distinctions. And flawed as social policy, because the more that judges and scientists separate themselves from the people with deviant language, the less support they will find from that quarter, and the legal and scientific communities as we know them will crumble if they lose the support of the people. Science and the courts must serve man. And to do that, they must at least try to speak his language. And yet already a rising tide of hostility against both science and the courts is evident. Making it worse is not the solution.

As I argue in Sense and Goodness without God (pp. 29-35), philosophy is wasting its time if its definitions of words do not track what people really mean when they use them. And when we look at the real world, we find the supernatural is universally meant and understood to mean something metaphysically different from the natural. I could adduce many examples of the bad fit between real language and this ill-advised attempt at an "official" definition, but here are just two:

The underlying mechanics of quantum phenomena might be physically beyond all observation and therefore untestable, but no one would then conclude that quantum mechanics is supernatural. Just because I can't look inside a box does not make its contents supernatural.

Conversely, if I suddenly acquired the Force of the Jedi and could predict the future, control minds, move objects and defy the laws of physics, all merely by an act of will, ordinary people everywhere would call this a supernatural power, yet it would be entirely testable. Scientists could record and measure the nature and extent of my powers and confirm them well within the requirements of peer review.

Consequently, we need a proper definition of "supernatural" (and, therefore, of the word "natural" as well), one that tracks what people really mean when they use the word, one that marks a metaphysical distinction, and allows us to say when the word is being used sloppily or improperly, as must be the case for any word we intend to be useful. This is all the more crucial for metaphysical naturalists, who must define their worldview in some manner that actually makes it meaningfully different from supernaturalist worldviews. Critics of naturalism are entirely correct about this.

I define "nature" in Sense and Goodness without God (on pp. 211-12, with a little help from pp. 67-69). But I explain this in elaborate detail, with considerable supporting evidence, in my Secular Web article Defending Naturalism as a Worldview (2003), to which I referred readers in my book. After this, and the publication of Sense and Goodness, I defined the natural-supernatural distinction even more rigorously in the joint statement of the Carrier-Wanchick Debate (2006). Anyone who wishes to interact with my definitions of natural and supernatural must read these two articles.

In short, I argue "naturalism" means, in the simplest terms, that every mental thing is entirely caused by fundamentally nonmental things, and is entirely dependent on nonmental things for its existence. Therefore, "supernaturalism" means that at least some mental things cannot be reduced to nonmental things. As I summarized in the Carrier-Wanchick debate (and please pardon the dry, technical wording):

If [naturalism] is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely caused by natural [i.e. fundamentally nonmental] phenomena. But if naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature. In other words, such things would then be partly or wholly caused by themselves, or exist or operate directly or fundamentally on their own.

Despite all I have written on this, several people have had difficulties understanding how to apply my construction of these terms, so I thought I'd have some extended fun. Analogies and concrete examples always do a better job getting across to people what we're talking about, so that's what I'm going to do today. With a bit of fantasy, I'll show how my natural-supernatural distinction can be used to tell the difference between a natural and a supernatural explanation (a metaphysical question), and how we can know when one or the other actually is true (an epistemological question). I take a look at supernatural beings, substances, powers, properties, and effects, and we'll get to see what natural explanations of similar observations would look like, and how they would be different. ...............

Emphasis mine.

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

Originally posted by googlefudge
Yes, and I disagree with twhitehead on this point. The best definition I have come across for the supernatural is here:

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

The argument pretty much exactly nails my problem with the "defining the supernatural out of existence" argument.
And then presents a [to my mind] working so ...[text shortened]... te]

Emphasis mine.

http://richardcarrier.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/defining-supernatural.html

At first blush it seems to me that he is trying to resolve some confusion between the metaphysical distinction and testability. Or that he is tryi ng to bridge the metaphysical (ontological) distinction with what he sees to think is the faulty view in science and law.

Let me think about it a bit. But I wonder how one would test for the existence of mental phenomena that had no nonmental content. And if you can't test, then the decision of whether it should be considered natural but untestable or supernatural and also untestable would have to be made on some other grounds. And I think that brings us back to where we started--the philosophical naturalist is not likley to be any less committed to naturalism, and vice versa for the supernaturalist.

EDIT: I likely didn't put that very well; I'm rushing this a bit, but essentially one would have to rigorously define the parameters of some kind of mind-functions that had no nonmental (i.e., physical--even at the quantum level) substratum, in order to even conduct a thoroughgoing thought experiment.

EDIT 2: I'm taking a look at the articles Carrier references here.

This from Carrier’s conclusion in the Carrier-Wanchick debate:

The best methods known for ascertaining the facts have only discovered results corresponding to naturalism.

I agree. My point is that I see nowhere that he addressed the question (that tw and I raise) about how it could be otherwise. He argues for empiricism (no problem) and superior methods of discovering evidence (no problem)—but he offers no empirical test that could be performed on the supernatural divorced from any (claimed) effect in the natural realm.

His argument is essentially no more than this: all we see (with our best methods) is nature, so nature is all there is. I agree with his conclusion, but that’s a flawed argument (black swans).

My argument is that, no matter how often and rigorously one has failed to disprove the naturalistic hypothesis, Carrier has to be left with some (small) probability that the (metaphysical) supernaturalist hypothesis is nevertheless correct. And that in itself always justifies further inquiry, on scientific principles. I take the view that—even if a coherent definition of the supernatural is provided (and Carrier may have done that; I’m still mulling it)—there is no epistemic warrant for believing in the supernatural, even if it is empirically nontestable (which I still maintain, and for which Carrier has given, so far as I have seen, no real counter-argument); if nothing else, Ockham’s Razor would apply (though I think I am arguing a somewhat stronger position). [Testing the natural and not finding the supernatural strikes me both as unsurprising, and of far less weight than Carrier seems to give it.]

Carrier’s dismissal of attempts at a naturalized theism (in the other article)—as trivial or meaningless—is just shallow and deflective rhetoric. He may actually provide an argument in his books; he does not do so here. To do so, he would have to at least address the naturalized theism of the Stoics—who thought of themselves as nothing if not rigorously logical, and it would be the rare philosopher, I think, who would characterize their views as trivial or meaningless, even if one disagreed. I'm not sure that a naturalized theism is any more directly testable than supernaturalism--though I'm not sure, which means I'm not sure. 😉 But I don't think it's defeatable on rational grounds--which means the black swan is always there.

Carrier thinks he slew the dragon of supernaturalism; I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.

Originally posted by vistesd
This from Carrier’s conclusion in the Carrier-Wanchick debate:

[b]The best methods known for ascertaining the facts have only discovered results corresponding to naturalism.

I agree. My point is that I see nowhere that he addressed the question (that tw and I raise) about how it could be otherwise. He argues for empiricism (no problem) and superi ...[text shortened]... of supernaturalism; I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.[/b]

[/internet communication caveat....] My tone and thoughts while writing this were light hearted, however on reading this I
realise it doesn't really scan that way. I am happy with all the points, and don't feel like trying to re-write at 1:40 am and
peppering the post with smiley's doesn't seem suitable... So therefore this disclaimer... Also anyone not getting the Discworld
references... Get thee to a bookstore! ... That is all.

even if a coherent definition of the supernatural is provided (and Carrier may have done that; I’m still mulling it)

Well my point was that I agree with Carrier that it's possible to have a coherent definition of the supernatural, and
that his is such a definition.
Which is I think the main point at which twhitehead and I disagree. [on this topic]

but he offers no empirical test that could be performed on the supernatural divorced from any (claimed) effect
in the natural realm.

I think the fact that you [both] are overlooking is that absence of evidence IS evidence of absence. [albeit, typically weak or
very weak evidence]

This means that if we were to come across a purported 'supernatural phenomena' according to his definition, and we rigorously
tested this phenomena looking for any explanatory evidence/observations that were more basic than, and underlay the 'mental'
processes that seem to be 'causing' the phenomena. And those tests came up negative, then a Bayesian analysis of the competing
hypothesis [natural vs supernatural] would conclude that the supernatural explanation is now more likely than before, in other-words
this is evidence FOR the supernatural explanation. Now how strong this evidence would be would depend on our ability to test the
phenomena, and how unlikely it would be that a natural explanation would exist that we cannot test for and uncover.
If we spend centuries [for example] examining this/these phenomena and find that we can find nothing more base than 'mental elements'
underlying them, when everything we have learned about nature tells us that we should be able to detect any natural phenomena
underlying these mental elements if they existed, then it would be reasonable to conclude with sufficiently high confidence that these
phenomena are indeed supernatural in nature according to this definition. Reveal Hidden Content
We would still use the scientific method, or it's descendents to evaluate and explore these phenomena, as there is nothing in the
scientific method that limits it to only natural phenomena. However we would be in the [deeply weird, but kinda fun] situation
where we had two [or more] rule-sets that might apply to a given situation. The normal 'natural' laws of physics, and the rules
of the supernatural phenomena, whatever they are.


However, back in reality as opposed to the hypothetical...

Our observations of the universe do not include any such phenomena, [and they could have done, they just didn't/don't]
and so the Bayesian analysis tells us that the absence of any evidence for supernatural explanations and evidence for
natural ones is VERY strong evidence that the supernatural doesn't exist.

Now yes, any probabilistic answer of this nature is vulnerable to 'black swans'. However the probability 'confidence' is the
likelihood of finding such black swans. And as our confidence on this subject is so high, the likelihood of such black swans
existing is vanishingly small to the point of insignificance.

As far as I am concerned, 'further inquiry' of "the supernaturalist explanation" is wasting time and effort on the off-chance that
you might win the weekly national lottery 14 times in a row with your first and only tickets, buying only one ticket each week.

It's so absurdly improbable that it's not worth seriously considering.

I think he killed a windmill—but I thought it was a windmill to begin with.

I think we all agree... trouble is there are all these weird people who believe the windmill is a dragon for no good reason.
And for some of them, knocking it down does actually convince them it is in fact a windmill, and not a dragon.

If you thought it was a windmill already, the argument probably wasn't for you.

Carrier’s dismissal of attempts at a naturalized theism

I don't claim to agree with everything he says/argues. I agree with his definition of the supernatural, and why we shouldn't
try to define it out of existence. Points beyond that I don't guarantee to be in agreement with him.

But I would say... What's the point of "naturalised theism"?

Morality cannot come from god/s. Doesn't matter what kind.

We have no phenomena we cannot explain naturally, or that would be explained better by a god's existence.
In fact nothing can be explained by a god, as explanations by definition are in terms of things we understand, and
gods are pretty much by definition and by practice things we do not understand.

We can be sure beyond any reasonable doubt that no afterlife exists, supernatural or otherwise.
Let alone one that acts as a reward/punishment for actions taken in this life.

No being that deserves worship would require it, No being that requires worship deserves it, and No being deserves worship.

No being of the power commensurate with the term god, that knows or cares about our existence, and has the power to effect it,
and be good, because of the problem of evil. So any such being must by necessity be evil...


I see no evidence for any gods of any description.
I see no reason to need any gods of any description.
I see no benefit to gods existing, or benefit to belief that gods exist.
I see no point wasting time wondering if they exist, or what they might be like, or wondering what they might want.

The only thing I see point in is dealing with other people, and their beliefs, because those actually matter.

As far as I can see, belief in gods of any sort, is both almost certainly wrong, and even more certainly pointless.

So to that extent I might agree with Carrier that "attempts at a naturalized theism" are trivial and meaningless.
I cannot see any point or value in such considerations. [unless you happen to simply enjoy the mental gymnastics, in which
case have fun 🙂 ... just don't expect me to care about the results]

But I don't think it's defeatable on rational grounds--which means the black swan is always there.

No, it means the Black Swan MIGHT be there.

Carrier is a rationalist and Bayesian, and like any good rationalist he cares more about the Probability, than the Possibility.
It's Possible that the world is in fact a flat disk sitting on the back of 4 giant elephants themselves standing on a giant star turtle.
And that all of humanity [or the vast majority of it] is being deluded by all the evidence that seems to show that this is not true.
Its POSSIBLE that that is the case.

But I/he/science doesn't care so much about what is possible. Because what matters is what is or is not Probable.

It's not Probable that we live on Discworld, and it's not Probable that god/s exist.

As the Majorie Daw says, the bible, along with all other religious texts, belong firmly in the fictional section. 😉

Originally posted by googlefudge
[i][/internet communication caveat....] My tone and thoughts while writing this were light hearted, however on reading this I
realise it doesn't really scan that way. I am happy with all the points, and don't feel like trying to re-write at 1:40 am and
peppering the post with smiley's doesn't seem suitable... So therefore this disclaimer... Also anyo ...[text shortened]... ays, the bible, along with all other religious texts, belong firmly in the fictional section. 😉

No, it means the Black Swan MIGHT be there.

My bad. I meant the possibility of the black swan. 🙁 And, yes everyone “knew” that any inquiry into the possible existence of black swans was “a waste of time”—in fact, it was a textbook case. And when the chaos theorists started out, they had difficulty getting published, let alone getting tenure, because they challenged the reigning paradigm. And there are noted physicists that are sure that string theory is not science.

My point is that I find your claims of what we know—with the contrary being absurd—to be a bit overblown, that’s all. Even when I agree with your position. You seem to think that we have the sword to cut every Gordian Knot, whereas I am (philosophically, not religiously) convinced that it is impossible for us to ask all the questions, let alone discover all the answers. We are always ourselves inescapably involved in our inquiries into the universe we inhabit—because that universe includes us, in our observations. I suspect we are likely centuries away from having any strong answers to the so-called “hard questions” of consciousness (if that is at all possible). No one—individually or collectively—has “a view from nowhere”. I am not convinced that “the grammar of our consciousness” is sufficient to exhaustively parse “the syntax of the universe”. Radical surprise—the black swan—is always possible.

I am sure of far less than you seem to be. To continue the analogy: I don’t necessarily believe there is a (theistic, in a non-dualistic sense—and a non-supernaturalist sense according to the perhaps pre-Carrier metaphysical understandings) “black swan” somewhere on the horizon. I prefer an attitude of openness to the possibility. At bottom, I’m a poet.

_____________________________________________________________


By the way, here is a link to a four-part critique of Carrier’s use (or not) of Bayesian analysis.

https://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2013/12/13/probably-not-a-fine-tuned-critique-of-richard-carrier-part-1/

The issue seems to be fine-tuning, but it is the critique that struck me.

My question for Bayseian analysis is this: when used in cases where there is there is an empirical end-point (breaking a code, finding a sunken ship) there is no question of its use. But in open-ended cases (such as “proving” a negative) it seems too easy to truncate the iterations wherever one decides that one is finished—and if all further inquiry is deemed a waste of time, the conclusion can be somewhat arbitrary. (And, yes, that’s a question—it just reflects an uneasiness I have with that.)

Even frequentists (the kind of statistics that I learned and forgot) I think have to accept the cases where there is, as I called it, an empirical end-point—because there’s too much evidence that it works as a heuristic method. However, if it is valid to use the Bayesian approach to “prove” (give overwhelming probabilistic weight to) the “null” hypothesis” (~god), then it is also valid used to “prove” (in the same sense) the alternative hypothesis (god)—so that one then has to analyze side-by-side the use of Bayes by Carrier with the use by William Lane Craig and Richard Unwin. Atheists such as Richard Dawkins (cited here: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-bayess-theorem-an/) and Michael Shermer (here: http://www.michaelshermer.com/2004/07/gods-number-is-up/) are critical of it.

___________________________________________

EDIT: I forgot this—

This means that if we were to come across a purported 'supernatural phenomena' according to his definition, and we rigorously tested this phenomena looking for any explanatory evidence/observations that were more basic than, and underlay the 'mental' processes that seem to be 'causing' the phenomena.

You still have not answered how such a test can be conducted in the natural world. That is, I think you essentially have a “separability” problem. You are not really testing that "supernatural phenomenon". You test natural phenomena to see if there is anything non-natural there—e.g. are there any mental phenomena absent some nonmental (physical) substratum, and you cannot do so. Your hypothetical is too abstract—a kind of “what if we could?”.

Here is my initial probability that, in observing and testing natural phenomena you will find any real evidence of the metaphysical supernatural: Zero. Note: that is not my assigned probability after all the best methods of empirical inquiry. And if there ends up being some positive final probability, then I think someone cooked the numbers (perhaps in some misguided effort to appear “fair” to the other side).

OR—

You’ve convinced me that:

1. The supernatural is a rational possibility;

2. The probability of the supernatural is small;

—Though I still maintain that you never are able to test the putative supernatural phenomena to see if there are underlying, more basic phenomena—but, in fact, the actual process must be the other way around. In fact, there are no supernatural phenomena to test (or so I so recently thought . . . .).

3. There will always be a non-negative probability that the supernatural is real;

4. One cannot validly foreclose the possibility of further evidence (artificially truncate the iterations with a refusal to revisit them), even if further inquiry now does not seem warranted;

5. Therefore there is always at least a small, and open, possibility that the supernatural is real.

That is not enough for epistemic belief (in my opinion). It is, however, sufficient warrant for hope, and to buttress pragmatic reasons for the kind of openness to possibility that I call “faith” (I am thinking, for example, of people I have known 12-step programs who “believed” because it kept them—sober or whatever—for years, even decades; and who didn’t need to think it through further than that; and I would not challenge them on the problems of pragmatic “belief” ).

So, I think I can let go of the natural/supernatural issue altogether. I don’t need to “believe” in Beethoven—or take account of those who think that religion must be more than "Beethoven" (a metaphor) (e.g., that it must entail a chain of historical/doctrinal truth claims and moral commands), or of those who think that “Beethoven” either cannot be, or ought not to be, as much of an enrichment to my daily life as it is.

Originally posted by googlefudge

Aren't you ever even the slightest bit curious about supernatural phenomena [including the existence of God]
which science is neither capable of proving nor disproving with any reasonable certainty?

There are no supernatural phenomena.
Science can and has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that there are no supernatural phenomena.
And ...[text shortened]... ically fantastic. However, unlike you, I can tell the difference between the imaginary and the real.

Originally posted by googlefudge
"There are no supernatural phenomena..."

Then why in the world would you be wasting your discretionary leisure time each week typing lengthy speculations and statements in an online spirituality rather than in a philosophy or formal debate or science forum? The salient question still remains: What if you're wrong?

Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
The salient question still remains: What if you're wrong?

How do you answer that question when you direct it at yourself?