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16 Oct 12
Originally posted by kevcvs57I think this points to the logical impossibility of there being more than one of those beings. We'd become God, not Gods. Or simply by realizing that we are describing ourselves, we'd become aware of being God. Ommmmmmm...
Would'nt we be in mortal danger of becoming Gods.
16 Oct 12
1 edit
Originally posted by AgergYou just solved the paradox of the stone. Congratulations.
Ok...but then acknowledging the point about memory, is it not possible (in theory) that it could impose some constraint C denying[hidden]let P = \"painting apples turquoise\"[/hidden]itself both the ability of P, and the memory of C (and action P) for some finite length of "time"?[hidden]where \"time\" is some temporal \"thingy-majig\" allowing some god to do ...[text shortened]... ibly the memory of imposing it returns), whence it is no longer powerless to do P.
An omnipotent being can place temporary limitations on himself so then he can make a rock that he couldn't have lifted yesterday yet he can lift it now.
16 Oct 12
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Originally posted by tomtom232Acknowledging the possible sarcasm in your post here, it was merely an enquiry into whether the proposition that the sequence O -> ¬O -> O is hypothetically tenable. I make no attempt to suggest this has any application other than a thought experiment.
You just solved the paradox of the stone. Congratulations.
An omnipotent being can place temporary limitations on himself so then he can make a rock that he couldn't have lifted yesterday yet he can lift it now.
16 Oct 12
2 edits
Originally posted by JS357I might not be reading what you post correctly but you seem to suggest that the maximum number of omnipotent beings is one. I don't see why this should be true
I think this points to the logical impossibility of there being more than one of those beings. We'd become God, not Gods. Or simply by realizing that we are describing ourselves, we'd become aware of being God. Ommmmmmm...
there is possibly the the notion that for two omnipotent entities X and Y, either should be able to annihilate the other and/or defend themselves from such annihilation; but then perhaps the proposition that omnipotent X should be able to annihilate omnipotent Y is as illogical as the proposition 1 + 1 = 3 can be rendered true
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16 Oct 12
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Originally posted by AgergI was following up on a comment that we would become Gods if omnipotence is defined as able to do all things that are logically possible --LP.
I might not be reading what you post correctly but you seem to suggest that the maximum number of omnipotent beings is one. I don't see why this should be true[hidden]there is possibly the the notion that for two omnipotent entities X and Y, either should be able to annihilate the other and/or defend themselves from such annihilation; but then perhaps the prop ...[text shortened]... ihilate omnipotent Y is as illogical as the proposition 1 + 1 = 3 can be rendered true[/hidden]
It's not just mutual annihilation that would have to be impossible. There would have to be some division of spheres of influence, and soon enough we have the Greek pantheon. I think the term "omnipotent" would not apply to such Gods in any reasonable way.
Of course we can stipulate that the entities could not come into such conflicts, but doing that is not a matter of LP. Rules that would simply declare such cases illogical are not the principals of logic (identity, excluded middle, etc.), they are laws of a "natural" world except that natural world is the world of these Gods. They are like the "laws" of nature that some say God stipulated. It is not illogical for the laws of nature to be other than they are; otherwise this God would not even have control over the speed of light. So we can set up a world where there are multiple Gods whose acts do not conflict, but that world is not logically compelled and they should hardly be called omnipotent.
16 Oct 12
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Originally posted by JS357Ok, I wasn't aware that the discussion had moved into the realms of paraconsistent (LP) logic (I don't have any background in this area - to me, trapped in the realm of classical logic, P ^ ¬P is not something I spend too much time worrying about - there be dragons and all). If you're happy to bear with me as I struggle through this in laymans terms I'm still not convinced we'd need a division of influence; I'm happy to suppose we could have two omnipotent entities X, and Y who's actions are "limited" only in the sense that neither can do what is logically impossible; and these can quite cheerfully tread on each others toes as they see fit.
I was following up on a comment that we would become Gods if omnipotence is defined as able to do all things that are logically possible --LP.
It's not just mutual annihilation that would have to be impossible. There would have to be some division of spheres of influence, and soon enough we have the Greek pantheon. I think the term "omnipotent" would not ap t, but that world is not logically compelled and they should hardly be called omnipotent.
- If X wants to paint apples turquoise then X goes ahead and does it.
- If Y wants to paint apples scarlet, then it comes along and undoes what X just did.
- If both X and Y want to paint the same apples turquoise and scarlet (respectively) at the same time then since (at least in classical logic) apples cannot be both turquoise & not turquoise (or scarlet & not scarlet) this event is impossible (what may instead happen, should they attempt this, is some undefined (to us) result simple humans like me have no place to be speculating about). I don't see a failure for both to accomplish what they want in this case as undermining omnipotence
- If X wants to paint apples turquoise, and Y wishes to prevent X from doing this then this is just a reformulation of the annihilation problem (and so it remains to argue (as opposed to declare) that this event is either logically possible, or not logically possible - I suspect the latter).
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16 Oct 12
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Originally posted by AgergAgreed. The point is neither can do, with the other existing, what he can do without that. And there is no limit to the reduction in power. Y can simply say, "I want X to never get his way." In what sense is is either of them omnipotent? I believe it is logically impossible for the omnipotence that X and Y each have over their own sphere of influence, to be a property of X and Y sharing a sphere of influence. Another way to say this is that neither of them can have omnipotence WRT the other.
Ok, I wasn't aware that the discussion had moved into the realms of paraconsistent (LP) logic (I don't have any background in this area - to me, trapped in the realm of classical logic, P ^ ¬P is not something I spend too much time worrying about - there be dragons and all). If you're happy to bear with me as I struggle through this in laymans terms I'm still event is either logically possible, or not logically possible - I suspect the latter).
17 Oct 12
3 edits
Originally posted by JS357Ok, point taken; but then either of two omnipotent gods still have the potential to do precisely whatever a solo omnipotent god could do - it would simply be the case that what they actually do may be tempered by the other; and at any rate we could argue a similar thing should happen even with only one such god.
Agreed. The point is neither can do, with the other existing, what he can do without that. And there is no limit to the reduction in power. Y can simply say, "I want X to never get his way." In what sense is is either of them omnipotent? I believe it is logically impossible for the omnipotence that X and Y each have over their own sphere of influence, to be a ...[text shortened]... influence. Another way to say this is that neither of them can have omnipotence WRT the other.
Indeed for some situation x, if an omnipotent god X could potentially do any of, say, {x_1, ..., x_n} but it reasons that, say, {x_3, ...,, x_n} are bad ideas then the set of things we should expect it would actually do is {x_1,x_2}. Assuming this to be the case would X be any less omnipotent given that the set of things it would do is strictly less than the set of things it could potentially do?
Yes, if for all eternity Y devotes all its time to undermining any actions attempted by X then the set of things X will actually do successfully may be
and I say \"may\" because given an infinite amount of time for X to attempt x_k at time k (resulting in y_k because of Y) it might be the case that all the x_k happen anyway (albeit in a different order than X intended)
less than the set of things it could potentially do successfully - but I'm not so sure this is a statement about either gods' power to do any x when they choose so much as it is a statement about their freedom to do any x when they choose.
18 Oct 12
Originally posted by JS357What about the act of omnipotent X limiting (in some way) X's own omnipotence, such that, in the specified way, X's ability to act is limited; X lacks full potency in that way? Is this impossible?
In the spirit of laziness, I will ask a question here instead of searching your thread on omnipotence. But feel free to refer me to it.
What about the act of omnipotent X limiting (in some way) X's own omnipotence, such that, in the specified way, X's ability to act is limited; X lacks full potency in that way? Is this impossible?
The question can have t ...[text shortened]... a world, could entail a decision that some things will be logically impossible to do.
The question can have two versions. (1) Can X limit X's potency "for the time being" or conditionally, such that X can cancel the limitation or state a condition which will cancel it? (2) Can X irrevocably limit X's potency, meaning can X make it so that X cannot do something, unconditionally?
This was touched on in my old thread to which I linked. Since you are being lazy 😠, I will re-post below the relevant exchange between myself and Palynka. You may or may not find it interesting. I also make no claim here that our exchange solved anything or broke any new ground; we were just sort of thinking aloud, really:
"Palynka: Isn't this the same as asking if an omnipotent being can bring about limits to its own omnipotence?... Can the omnipotent being limit his ability to "lift" rocks to rocks of size lower than Y?
LemonJello: This question as you state it could maybe seem ambiguous between something like (A) Can the omnipotent being choose (say) to not fully exercise his lifting capacities? and something like (B) Can the omnipotent being bring it about that he cannot lift rocks larger than Y?
Either way, I do not see any problem. I suppose the answer to (A) would be yes, and the answer to (B) would be no.
Palynka: Why would the answer to B be no?
Why can't an omnipotent being bring about that it becomes an amoeba? (Yes, I know it sounds silly, but I don't see it as being logically impossible).
LemonJello: I think a yes answer to B leads to contradiction. (That is, unless you make allowance for accidental omnipotence, as opposed to essential omnipotence. If you allow that X is only accidentally omnipotent, then it may make sense to talk about X's bringing it about that X is no longer omnipotent. There is some brief discussion on that in the stanford encyclopedia article I linked.)
Palynka: Thanks, just read it. It seems to say that accidental omnipotence is enough to "solve" the paradox, which was what I had in mind.
However, it states that traditional Western theism implies essential omnipotence but I'm not sure where they got that from... Can you shed some light on that?
LemonJello: I'm not entirely sure if their claim about traditional Western theism implying essential omnipotence is justified (or even what 'traditional Western theism' means exactly). But I could think of some considerations that might indicate some tension between such theism and accidental omnipotence. For instance, the accidental property tends to indicate change (or at least the capacity for change); but some traditional forms of theism champion an unchanging (or in some sense immutable) God. Also, relatedly, the accidental property tends to implicate temporal relations (such as that the property is held at some time but not at some different time); but some traditional forms of theism champion a God outside such temporal relations. Maybe these kinds of considerations are at issue.
Palynka: Well, the temporal relations are not necessarily an issue for the theist in my view, as he can simply claim that such a God could limit his omnipotence...but why would he? As you note, capacity for change is not the same as executing change.
In fact, from a first glance it seems to me that such an accidental omnipotent God can actually do more than one that is constrained to not change. If I think of the ontological argument, it points out that such (willing) accidental omnipotence is then actually what the theists have more in mind.
LemonJello: I agree with you that it could seem at the surface that this accidentally omnipotent (AO-) being can do more than an essentially omnipotent (EO-) being. I am unsure, though, whether or not this claim will survive deeper scrutiny; and, even supposing it does, I would still be unsure as to whether or not this ability for the AO-being to "do more" actually translates into any genuine power advantage.
Here are some (hopefully) relevant considerations. Taking your example earlier, the AO-being could (let's suppose) bring it about that he is an amoeba (and no longer omnipotent). The EO-being cannot, for although presumably he could behave as an amoeba and willfully refrain from fully exercising his capacities, he cannot stand in every relation as an actual amoeba stands to the world (since, for one thing, the EO-being cannot give up his omnipotence). It is not clear, though, that this nets the AO-being any more actual power. It would be kind of similar to my arguing that I can create stuff with the property that its creator cannot lift it; whereas an EO-being cannot; hence, I can do something an EO-being cannot. Okay, but this does not show I possess any actual power that an EO-being does not; it really only speaks to a limitation I have (that I could intend to lift some created object and fail; whereas the EO-being cannot). The AO-being can bring it about that he can fail in such ways, whereas the EO-being cannot; the AO-being can presumably bring it about that he is genuinely limited in, say, his lifting capacities, whereas the EO-being cannot; but this does not really seem to translate into any actual power advantage for the AO-being. There are other reasons as well why it is not clear to me that there is any practical advantage. For instance, if the AO-being is not in direct control over when he loses or gains his omnipotence, then perhaps his capacity for change in this respect entails some limitation on his overall power. If, on the other hand, he is in direct control over the changes, then it is not all clear to me how any of this would work. If he brings it about that he is an actual amoeba, then what? Actual amoebas do not have the capacity or potentiality to suddenly become omnipotent. If the AO-being can become as an amoeba but can still simply decide to reacquire omnipotence, then it seems (just like the EO-being), the AO-being has not really stood in every relation as an actual amoeba does to the world. For practical purposes, I see no difference between that and the case of an EO-being who chooses to behave as an amoeba (even though he retains omnipotence, as an EO-being must).
Some of this stuff makes my head hurt, so not sure if I am making complete sense in all places...would not surprise me if am not."
Also think about X's general "inability" to do anything that is logically impossible to do -- did X "make it so" that this is the case? Or did X have no say in the matter? I am thinking that a decision to bring order out of chaos and create a world, could entail a decision that some things will be logically impossible to do.
That logically impossible tasks cannot be done (by anyone/anything) just follows from the law of non-contradiction. If one wants to claim, instead, that such things could be done in principle or that the status of such things is dependent on some agent's will, or some such; then I would think he needs to jettison the law of non-contradiction and perhaps embrace some form of dialetheism and/or paraconsistency, etc. I do not have much opinion on this, except that sure seems like a tough row to hoe.
18 Oct 12
Originally posted by checkbaiterwhat I was looking for was the bigger question, "Is God in total control of every thing that happens?"
Thank you, that was a very sound and reasonable post. You understand the concept better than myself. I knew the question was silly, but what I was looking for was the bigger question, "Is God in total control of every thing that happens?"
Most theist's say yes, to which I disagree...because then God gets blamed for every thing, good or bad...and the scripture is contradicted..
Most theist's say yes, to which I disagree...because then God gets blamed for every thing, good or bad...and the scripture is contradicted..
Hmmm, I was under the impression that most theists would say no to this "bigger question" of yours because, for instance, they usually hold to some version of human free will (of a libertarian sort) that features into, for example, their attempts at theodicy.