Doxastic control?

Originally posted by Palynka
This probably was mentioned before, but I think you take a somewhat static view of how beliefs are formed.

If at any point in time somebody points out the pragmatic reasons of believing in God, then I think that one is consciously unable (at least for a vast majority) to will oneself into changing beliefs. That we certainly can agree with.

However, thi ...[text shortened]... this, but that doesn't mean that there is no long-run effect of such pragmatic considerations.

bbarr:

Did you miss my refutation to your original post?

Originally posted by Palynka
bbarr:

Did you miss my refutation to your original post?

Do you know what "refutation" means? I ask because your post starts by agreeing with my original contention and then makes some irrelevant claim about the subconcious. Since my post concerned the limitations of my ability to exert control over the the formation of my beliefs via the consideration of reasons, the fact that there may be subconscious causes of belief formation is not germane. Perhaps your refutation resides in some other post?

Originally posted by bbarr
Do you know what "refutation" means? I ask because your post starts by agreeing with my original contention and then makes some irrelevant claim about the subconcious. Since my post concerned the limitations of my ability to exert control over the the formation of my beliefs via the consideration of reasons, the fact that there may be subconscious causes of belief formation is not germane. Perhaps your refutation resides in some other post?

You obviously didn't understand why I mention that you have a static (and therefore incorrect) view of how beliefs are formed.

But if you're unable to be civil and skip the snide remarks, I don't see the point of continuing this with you. Have fun.

Originally posted by Palynka
You obviously didn't understand why I mention that you have a static (and therefore incorrect) view of how beliefs are formed.

But if you're unable to be civil and skip the snide remarks, I don't see the point of continuing this with you. Have fun.

Chaff.

Originally posted by bbarr
Chaff.

bbarr: "The only reasons that theists should present, if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc. What say you?"

Hint.

Originally posted by Palynka
bbarr: "The only reasons that theists should present, [b]if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc. What say you?"

Hint.[/b]

Not all causes of belief are reasons for belief. Get it?

Originally posted by bbarr
Not all causes of belief are reasons for belief. Get it?

But these are causes AND reasons. Because it's all about subconscious reasoning.

But that's mostly semantics. Fact remains. "If they are sincerely out to save others", presenting pragmatic reasons CAN have an effect and therefore it is false that pragmatic arguments are irrelevant "if they are sincerely out to save others".

Originally posted by Palynka
But these are causes AND reasons. Because it's all about subconscious reasoning.

But that's mostly semantics. Fact remains. "If they are sincerely out to save others", presenting pragmatic reasons CAN have an effect and therefore it is false that pragmatic arguments are irrelevant "if they are sincerely out to save others".

If you want to call some subconscious causes of belief 'reasons', it is fine with me. But please remember that I'm talking about reasons to which we have cognitive access. My concern in this thread was with the sort of reasons that can play a role in conscious deliberation. My hope was that my examples would have communicated this, but perhaps I was not as clear as I could have been (though LJ, Dr. Scribbles, Visted, et. al seemed to understand perfectly what I was saying). It is certainly the case that subconscious cognitive processes can eventuate in belief. It is certainly the case that subconscious cognitive processes can be sensitive to epistemic reasons (thank god for this, as perceptual inferences are important and largely subconscious). But as I thought was clear from my original post, I'm talking about the giving and taking of reasons in the sorts of discussions we find in these threads. I was fairly explicit about this. And what we're dealing with here are the giving and taking of reasons for belief that are aimed at influencing deliberation about what to believe. My claim, which stands, is that we are incapable of explicitly taking merely pragmatic reasons as standing in evidential relations to propositions, and hence cannot be rationally moved by them in our theoretical deliberations. For all of this, it is still the case that arational conversion processes take place, and theists could engender such processes by tapping into subconscious beliefs and desires. But the efficacy of such processes resides partly in the fact that they are hidden from the cognitive view of the subject.

Originally posted by bbarr
If you want to call some subconscious causes of belief 'reasons', it is fine with me. But please remember that I'm talking about reasons to which we have cognitive access. My concern in this thread was with the sort of reasons that can play a role in conscious deliberation. My hope was that my examples would have communicated this, but perhaps I was not as ses resides partly in the fact that they are hidden from the cognitive view of the subject.

Cut to the chaff.

You take a static view of beliefs that is, simply put, wrong. If you want to cut your argument and restrict it to a particular set of beliefs so you might save face, then that's fine. Restrict away.

Your argument intended to show that pragmatic considerations would not help theists, if they truly wanted to save others. I've show that such a blanket statement is wrong. I have the easy position here. You make a claim that all arguments are fruitless. All I need to do is show a possibility where such arguments are not fruitless. Which I did.

As long as the objective of the theists is to "save others", then pragmatic arguments are not necessarily useless for the theists.

PS: There is a vast literature by neuroscientists that have already shown the impact of emotions on reasoning and, consequently, also have an impact on the formation of beliefs. Ignore that literature at your own risk.

Originally posted by bbarr
For all of this, it is still the case that arational conversion processes take place, and theists could engender such processes by tapping into subconscious beliefs and desires. But the efficacy of such processes resides partly in the fact that they are hidden from the cognitive view of the subject.

Exactly. Is that not how propaganda has such a powerful impact on beliefs?

To say that such tactics do not help at all a theist willing to convert others is simply false.

Originally posted by Palynka
Cut to the chaff.

You take a static view of beliefs that is, simply put, wrong. If you want to cut your argument and restrict it to a particular set of beliefs so you might save face, then that's fine. Restrict away.

Your argument intended to show that pragmatic considerations would not help theists, if they truly wanted to save others. I've show that y, also have an impact on the formation of beliefs. Ignore that literature at your own risk.

I believe that beliefs can be formed by rational or arational cognitive processes, that they can be formed by brute causation or by explicit deliberation, and that deliberation can be conscious or subconscious. Seems like a pretty dynamic account to me!

The point of the thread was not that pragmatic considerations can not influence belief. I have never denied that! I am denying that pragmatic considerations can play an evidential role in deliberation; that when we deliberate about what to believe, we are incapable to taking merely pragmatic reasons as evidence. This is perfectly consistent with the claim that pragmatic considerations can have a causal, arational influence on belief formation.

I have never claimed that "all such arguments are fruitless" in regards to the presentation of pragmatic reasons. I claimed that, since belief formation typically proceed via deliberation on epistemic reasons, the theist should present epistemic reasons in debates like these. The presentation of pragmatic reasons is immaterial to our deliberations about what to believe. Again, this is consistent with the claim that pragmatic reasons can arationally cause belief.

If you go back and read the first post, you'll find that my claim about belief formation was limited to typical everyday cases of belief formation. I was explicit about this. You'll also find that my claims about the presentation of pragmatic reasons was limited to debated like these. Again, I was explicit about this.

The lesson of all this: You need to learn to read.

Originally posted by Palynka
Exactly. Is that not how propaganda has such a powerful impact on beliefs?

To say that such tactics do not help [b]at all a theist willing to convert others is simply false.[/b]

Now you're just being disingenuous, because nobody can be as dim as you now appear to be. I never claimed that propaganda does not help the theist, nor that the presentation of pragmatic reasons cannot influence belief. Again, I was talking about deliberative belief formation in the context of discussions of the sort that appear in these threads. So, you can either continue to post idiotic rubbish, saddling me with views I do not hold and have not expressed, or you can suck it up and admit you were mistaken. Really, learn to read. All you are doing here is embarrassing yourself.

Originally posted by bbarr
I believe that beliefs can be formed by rational or arational cognitive processes, that they can be formed by brute causation or by explicit deliberation, and that deliberation can be conscious or subconscious. Seems like a pretty dynamic account to me!

The point of the thread was not that pragmatic considerations can not influence belief. I have never de ...[text shortened]... Again, I was explicit about this.

The lesson of all this: You need to learn to read.

You need to remember what you wrote. The punchline and the question you decided to pose this forum after your introductory comments was this:

The only reasons that theists should present, if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc.

Everything you said afterwards (and before, actually) abstracts from the bold part in the quotation.

If you had written:
The only reasons that theists should present, if they hope to win these debates, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc.

Then I would have agreed from the start. These two things are not equivalent.

If you wish to claim that you meant the latter and not the former, then I have no beef with your argument, except that I believe that the first one is more relevant.

Originally posted by bbarr
Now you're just being disingenuous, because nobody can be as dim as you now appear to be. I never claimed that propaganda does not help the theist, nor that the presentation of pragmatic reasons cannot influence belief. Again, I was talking about deliberative belief formation in the context of discussions of the sort that appear in these threads. So, you ca ...[text shortened]... it you were mistaken. Really, learn to read. All you are doing here is embarrassing yourself.

Every day you sound like more like Scribbles or no1marauder and less and less like LemonJello.

Originally posted by Palynka
You need to remember what you wrote. The punchline and the question you decided to pose this forum after your introductory comments was this:

The only reasons that theists should present, [b]if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc. ...[text shortened]... e no beef with your argument, except that I believe that the first one is more relevant.[/b]

I've already responded to this above. My claim was about typical deliberative processes of belief formation (as was explicit in the post), the role of pragmatic vs. epistemic reasons in such processes (as was explicit in the post), and the giving and taking of reasons in discussions like those that appear in these threads (as was explicit in the post). So, bugger off.