Doxastic control?

Originally posted by bbarr
How do you think RBHill's injunction could "help" you believe. Would such help be open to introspective access? Would the help be merely hidden and brute causal? Suppose in the case at hand RBHill's injunction springs to mind. Would you thereby, as a result of deliberation, come to believe in God, repentance, etc.?

Fear of after-death punishment has been a tool of religions since at least Sumeria. It works.

But again, "as a result of deliberation" of course I wouldn't. I'm saying it works on a subconscious level. To believe this is relevant is again having a static view of belief formation and information processing.

Originally posted by bbarr
The portrait was of Aslan, but for the rest you're spot on.

If you're looking for an experience, drop some acid. If you want to find God, follow Jesus.

Originally posted by Palynka
Every day you sound like more like Scribbles or no1marauder and less and less like LemonJello.

Eek! Why I am being mentioned here?

After reading through, I actually agree with bbarr here. Generally I find myself agreeing with his posts a lot because he just seems to flat out know what he's talking about. But more particularly I agree with him here for the following reasons.

You raised some interesting points in and of themselves, and I think they would certainly be relevant if bbarr had been trying to advance the idea that pragmatic considerations cannot influence belief states; or the idea that subconcious processes cannot influence belief; or something along those lines. But I thought it was pretty clear that he was talking about typical deliberative belief formation in the context of debates that involve the explicit offering of reasons for and against. His claims are with respect to such context. I thought this was clear in his first post because, for example, he used such phrases as "Belief formation typically (in everyday cases) proceeds..." (and his example was of one concerning deliberative belief formation) and "in the context of debates like those that rage through these threads". If he says that pragmatic reasons are immaterial or ineffective within such context that doesn't commit him generally to a "static" view of belief that denies that pragmatic reasons can have effects on belief in other ways.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Jesus had meals with his friends.

Jesus told his disciples that their fishing nets were misplaced.

Jesus carried his cross up a steep hill, and then descended deep into hell, and then ascended all the way up to heaven.

This suggests to me that the reason you can't find Jesus when you look for him is because you are Jesus.

Wow, good observations.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Eek! Why I am being mentioned here?

After reading through, I actually agree with bbarr here. Generally I find myself agreeing with his posts a lot because he just seems to flat out know what he's talking about. But more particularly I agree with him here for the following reasons.

You raised some interesting points in and of themselves, and I thi ...[text shortened]... w of belief that denies that pragmatic reasons can have effects on belief in other ways.

Thank you. I thought I was taking crazy pills.

Originally posted by Palynka
You've eluded the question.

[b]This is the most reliable way to persuade because our explicit deliberations about what to believe are generally immune to pragmatic reasons

Here you restrict yourself to explicit deliberations to show that the theist should restrict himself. You have to first provide reasons why the theist should try to persuade only y are an increment and therefore theists should not always abstain from using them.[/b]

I am not claiming that the theist must not provide pragmatic reasons, and I never have claimed that. The theist can do whatever he feels will do the most good. But, there are are at least four general reasons why a theist should think twice before presenting pragmatic reasons in order to persuade. First, there is no reason to think that pragmatic reasons for belief will be effective in persuasion, and there is reason to think it is possible that they will actually dissuade the non-believer, especially when presented in the absence of epistemic reasons. You see this all the time in these threads, when atheists who call for evidence claim of considerations of Heaven and Hell not only that they fail to provide evidence, but also that beliefs based on such considerations are distasteful (indicative of fear, hope for reward, etc. especially when theistic belief is conjoined with ethical theory and yields ultimately egoistic reasons for acting as one should). Second, pragmatic reasons generally presuppose claims that the non-believer has no reason to believe. Considerations of Heaven and Hell, for instance, are only going to motivate if the non-believer has some reason to think that it is minimally plausible that Heaven and Hell exist. So, the efficacy of pragmatic reasons often tacitly presupposes the availability of epistemic reasons. Third, pragmatic reasons very well may not issue in belief but rather in a desire to believe. A desire to believe may very well motivate one to be on the lookout for epistemic reasons, but a desire to belief in the absence of epistemic reasons has to remain hidden from cognitive view in order to stand in a supporting relation to the belief in question. Finding out one believes merely because one wants to is an especially effective way to extinguish both the belief and the desire that gave rise to it. Relatedly, beliefs that are based merely on unconscious desires are more likely to be unstable in the face of contrary evidence than beliefs based upon epistemic reasons. That is, unless such beliefs are insulated from epistemic reasons (pace many theists here in these threads). But even here there is likely to result from pragmatically based belief cognitive dissonance over the long run. Finally, epistemic reasons are just substantially better in influencing belief formation than are pragmatic reasons since our doxastic states are primed to form in light of epistemic reasons, and are insulated from pragmatic influence in cases of explicit deliberation.

Originally posted by bbarr
I am still operating under the hypothetical posit that God exists, but nothing out of the ordinary has happened. I have had no epiphany, nor have I seen anything external to me that was out of the ordinary. My psychological states are as they were before I engaged in this experiment. I am still happy and calm. I still enjoy my existence without being commi ...[text shortened]... e context of this experiment I'm engaged in. Your advice on this matter would be appreciated.

This might help, if you are truly willing:

"God is infinitely patient. He will not push himself into our lives. He knows the greatest thing he has given us is our freedom. If we want habitually, even exclusively, to operate from the level of our own reason, he will respectfully keep silent. We can fill ourselves with our own thoughts, ideas, images, and feelings. He will not interfere. But if we invite him with attention, opening the inner spaces with silence, he will speak to our souls, not in words or concepts, but in the mysterious way that Love expresses itself -- by presence."

- M. Basil Pennington

Originally posted by epiphinehas
This might help, if you are truly willing:

"God is infinitely patient. He will not push himself into our lives. He knows the greatest thing he has given us is our freedom. If we want habitually, even exclusively, to operate from the level of our own reason, he will respectfully keep silent. We can fill ourselves with our own thoughts, ideas, image ...[text shortened]... but in the mysterious way that Love expresses itself -- by presence."

- M. Basil Pennington

If the evidence here is non-conceptual, how can it ground an inference to the conclusion that God exists? I am sympathetic with this contemplative view of being emptied, opened and filled. I happen to think that this is one core commitment of any view that concords with the perennial philosophy. I am unable to figure out how the experiences that follow from such practices lend credence to your particular conception of the divine.

Originally posted by bbarr
So, suppose I have good pragmatic reasons to believe that God exists (perhaps because it will benefit me, or harm me if I don't). These reasons are not of the sort that exert a rational constraint on belief formation. Belief formation typically (in everyday cases) proceeds via the consideration of evidential reasons, not pragmatic ones. If I was assured tha e truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc. What say you?

I believe that "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead" and so on.
I'm not sure what you are getting at with the rest of your post, are
you of the opinion that since I believe in God my mind should shut
down to all else when it comes to posting? With respect to winning
souls or saving the lost, you never know what it is that someone
needs to hear. The truth be told if God isn't involved it is all just
talk anyway and nothing comes of it except a few lives are turned
around completely leaving their old ways to a new one. Many stay
turned to that new path the rest of thier lives. Just because someone
gave them a line about this, that, or the other thing one day.
Kelly

Originally posted by bbarr
If the evidence here is non-conceptual, how can it ground an inference to the conclusion that God exists? I am sympathetic with this contemplative view of being emptied, opened and filled. I happen to think that this is one core commitment of any view that concords with the perennial philosophy. I am unable to figure out how the experiences that follow from such practices lend credence to your particular conception of the divine.

Well, you need to start somewhere. In order to pursue God, you must first believe that He exists (or at least have the suspicion that He does). That's where I started. (Emersonian transcendentalism was my personal introduction to the Divine.)

Vistesd and I had a few discussions once involving the impossibility of inferring revealed attributes about God from the experience of the "Ground of all being." For instance, contemplation cannot possibly reveal to the seeker whether or not God is an intelligent, peerless, and eternal Being Who has never been taught. Contemplation cannot ascertain whether God is triune or simply a nebulous blob, etc. Some truths require revelation.

I have to admit, you have me here -- there is no way to infer that Christ is Lord by practicing God's presence. I know from my own experience that Christ's lordship was not immediately evident to me; in fact, I pursued every other possibility before I ever approached Christ.

The difference I see, between the various manifestations of perennial philosophy and with the God of Christ, is that one must believe that the God of Christ cares enough to reward those who seek Him. That God could "care" about us, in the Christian usage, is not meant in some figurative sense, but literally and truly. This idea, that God has the capacity to care, in itself is revelatory; a fact about God impossible to apprehend without God Himself revealing it to us.

Faith is produced by utter dependence upon revelation, not merely upon experience or logical inferences. I don't think there is any escape from this difficulty. This is why I stress that one must seek God in His word.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Eek! Why I am being mentioned here?

After reading through, I actually agree with bbarr here. Generally I find myself agreeing with his posts a lot because he just seems to flat out know what he's talking about. But more particularly I agree with him here for the following reasons.

You raised some interesting points in and of themselves, and I thi w of belief that denies that pragmatic reasons can have effects on belief in other ways.

I must be the one taking crazy pills then.

My problem is that his conclusion does not follow he limits himself to deliberate formation of beliefs. His conclusion is this (and I quote):

The upshot is this: Pragmatic arguments for the existence of God are absolutely immaterial in the context of debates like those that rage through these threads. The only reasons that theists should present, if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc.

If they are out to save others, all they need to do is achieve a belief change. Regardless of conscious or subconsious processes. That this debates can only be "won" through the conscious ones is not the same as saying that pragmatic considerations within this forum cannot affect the subconscious ones (which we all agree that they can).

Why then should the theist abstain then from pragmatic considerations within this forums? This is a question I haven't found an answer from bbarr that I can feel comfortable with and that is the point of this whole thread. Perhaps you can reformulate it in a way I'd see what I'm missing here.

Note that all the reasons he numbers in his post above are not contained in his original argument and do not follow from it. Although I still disagree with them, they are mostly an empirical question (as they are about what is more effective and not if something is effective or not) and we both only have anedoctal evidence.

Originally posted by bbarr
I am not claiming that the theist must not provide pragmatic reasons, and I never have claimed that.

bbarr: The only reasons that theists should present, if they are sincerely out to save others, are reasons that directly bear on the truth of propositions like "God exists", "Jesus rose from the dead", etc.

You did. If you wish to retract that "only" from there, then of course I'd agree. And if you wish to substitute "main" instead of "only", then you need to change your initial argument to include the considerations you number in your recent post. Because the initial argument is insufficient and you need to go to empirical testing to see which is more effective.

Originally posted by bbarr
I am not claiming that the theist must not provide pragmatic reasons, and I never have claimed that. The theist can do whatever he feels will do the most good. But, there are are at least four general reasons why a theist should think twice before presenting pragmatic reasons in order to persuade. First, there is no reason to think that pragmatic reasons fo ...[text shortened]... epistemic reasons, and are insulated from pragmatic influence in cases of explicit deliberation.

Epistemic reason = Biblical scripture, the trusted testimony of others concerning Christ's ministry / the integrity of the testimony reinforced by the fulfillment of scriptural promises in the life of the believer.

For instance, you believe your uncle when he tells you there is a killer in your closet. I ask you for proof that your uncle is right about the killer in the closet, demanding sufficient reason why he can be trusted. You launch into various examples of his past reliability and his general character and so forth; I weigh whether or not you yourself are a reliable judge of character, a sensible person, etc. Based on what I can ascertain I form a belief about whether or not there is indeed a killer behind the door, i.e., I form a belief about the relative reliability of scripture and either embrace it, reject it, or remain ambivalent. This belief may cause me to approach the closet door (read the Bible) and turn the knob (test the Bible's practicality), and when the killer jumps out (scripture proves itself trustworthy) I then have the evidence that my trust in you and your uncle was warranted.

Originally posted by Palynka
I must be the one taking crazy pills then.

My problem is that his conclusion does not follow he limits himself to deliberate formation of beliefs. His conclusion is this (and I quote):

The upshot is this: Pragmatic arguments for the existence of God are absolutely immaterial in the context of debates like those that rage through these threads. The [ ive and not if something is effective or not) and we both only have anedoctal evidence.

Right, I think I understand well the point you are making. First, you agree that pragmatic reasons are immaterial within the context of typical deliberative belief formation that may proceed from debates such as these. BUT, you claim: supposing that pragmatic reasons can effect belief in other ways (e.g., through subconscious trajectories), then it may -- all things considered -- still be in the believer's interest (with respect to saving others) to present pragmatic reasons in debates such as these. That is, there may be cases in which the offering of pragmatic reasons in debates such as these has no immediate effect during explicit deliberation but eventually would influence belief in the direction intended (through other means -- again, maybe through subconscious processes over time). Bbarr can correct me if I'm wrong in this: but I don't think bbarr would disagree with you that such cases could exist. But again, in fairness to his first post, he was talking about belief formation that proceeds via explicit deliberation. Viewed within this context, you don't disagree with him, and your claim above is tangential.

But I do see your point: if it's the case that pragmatic reasons for theism carry any significant doxastic influence through these other means (like subconscious processes), then prima facie that is a problem for the conclusion that theists should present only epistemic reasons for theism. An all things considered investigation into this would naturally lead to your next question:

Why then should the theist abstain then from pragmatic considerations within this forums?

One of bbarr's posts on this page addresses more or less exactly this question. He goes through "four general reasons" why he thinks it might be better for a theist to abstain, and I think his reasons are all good ones worth considering. If I am being honest, in debates such as these, I actually find the offering of pragmatic reasons to be dissuasive on average (for largely the reasons bbarr cites above), but of course this is in the context of my conscious deliberations -- I'm not sure what I can say about the underlying subconscious processes, if any, that may be going on. I think it would be hard to go about assessing from our armchairs how effective the types of subconscious trajectories you mention are or may be. But I personally cannot help shaking the feeling that there is something irresponsible (epistemologically or otherwise) in trying to elicit belief in the indirect manners that might be consistent with pragmatic offerings (e.g., maybe the subconscious implantation you mention) -- given that my view of the spirit of debate is in exercising the practices of justification, the offering of reasons for/against that grants one some sort of rational entitlement to his views.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Right, I think I understand well the point you are making. First, you agree that pragmatic reasons are immaterial within the context of typical deliberative belief formation that may proceed from debates such as these. BUT, you claim: supposing that pragmatic reasons can effect belief in other ways (e.g., through subconscious trajectories), then it may ...[text shortened]... of reasons for/against that grants one some sort of rational entitlement to his views.

Offering a point of view to save:
When sharing I think what can happen is one of three things:
1. Planting a seed
2. watering a seed
3. Harvesting
Jesus spoke about it, we don't know where everyone is at and we
certainly don't know how they got where ever they are at when we
share, discuss, debate and so on. I don't worry about results, I try
not to worry about winning either since the worst case in a debate is
I can be shown I'm wrong. If someone gets saved great, but that
does not mean that only during those times did the debate or
discussion matter, before that odds are seeds were planted and
watered.
Kelly