Spirituality
27 Dec 07
10 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaI always sound just like me, and there are few things that get me riled up like somebody lying about what I believe or what I've claimed. Apparently, you see no problem with misrepresenting the position of someone despite clear and decisive evidence to the contrary. This is just intellectual dishonesty on your part.
Every day you sound like more like Scribbles or no1marauder and less and less like LemonJello.
10 Jan 08
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Originally posted by bbarrMy quotes of your words are explicit. And you still fail to address my point about the motivation of the theist.
I've already responded to this above. My claim was about typical deliberative processes of belief formation (as was explicit in the post), the role of pragmatic vs. epistemic reasons in such processes (as was explicit in the post), and the giving and taking of reasons in discussions like those that appear in these threads (as was explicit in the post). So, bugger off.
Why pick and choose which type of processes of belief formation you want to talk about? If the purpuse is to (and I quote) "save others", then you have to include all processes of belief formation or provide reasons on why to exclude them (beyond "these are the ones I'm talking about" ).
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by bbarrHow is quoting you directly a "misrepresentation"?
I always sound just like me, and there are few things that get me riled up like somebody lying about what I believe or what I've claimed. Apparently, you see no problem with misrepresenting the position of someone despite clear and decisive evidence to the contrary. This is just intellectual dishonesty on your part.
I'm very interested in belief formation, so I found your topic interesting. I really don't know why you've been chiding me from the start. Nor do I see the point.
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by PalynkaYour quotes are partial, ignore the contexts within which they're situated, and you ignore explicit claims of mine that run contrary to your straw-man interpretation. Consider the following post of mine from this thread:
My quotes of your words are explicit. And you still fail to address my point about the motivation of the theist.
Why pick and choose which type of processes of belief formation you want to talk about? If the purpuse is to (and I quote) "save others", then you have to include all processes of belief formation or provide reasons on why to exclude them (beyond "these are the ones I'm talking about" ).
It is certainly possible that we are disposed to believe some falsehoods because those falsehoods confer an advantage on us. My initial point was not that false beliefs cannot confer an advantage, or that true beliefs may confer a disadvantage. My point was that the actual process by which we form beliefs is normally not sensitive to these pragmatic considerations. I cannot bring myself to believe something on the basis of pragmatic reasons. This is not the same as saying that pragmatic considerations do not exert some tacit or unconscious influence on belief formation. For all I know, they do. But it is important that this sort of influence must be beneath conscious awareness. Suppose I promise to give you $1,000,000 if you sincerely believe that 2+2=5. This may lead you to cast around for evidence that 2+2=5, but it will not itself suffice for you to come to believe that 2+2=5
Of course, you will probably ignore this since it runs contrary to your initial claim that my view of beliefs was "static". Funny how I mention in this quote exactly what you mention in your so-called "refutation" of my claim. Far from ignoring the possibility of unconscious belief formation, I explicitly mention it!
Sincere theists will try to persuade in any way they take to be most efficient. I am claiming that the most efficient way to persuade in contexts like these threads, given the constraints on deliberative belief formation, is to provide epistemic reasons. If I'm right, then sincere theists should provide epistemic reasons because this is the most efficient way to persuade in contexts such as these. Misguided but sincere theists will do whatever it is they will do.
Are you dense? I'm talking about these processes of belief formation because they are the ones generally applicable to the process of giving and taking reasons in contexts like the discussions that occur in these threads!
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by PalynkaIf you represented my position accurately, and revised your mistaken interpretation in light of the actual evidence clear to anyone with eyes to see, then there would be no chiding.
How is quoting you directly a "misrepresentation"?
I'm very interested in belief formation, so I found your topic interesting. I really don't know why you've been chiding me from the start. Nor do I see the point.
10 Jan 08
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Originally posted by bbarrFor me, that quote is still a relatively static view of how beliefs are formed. Why?
Your quotes are partial, ignore the contexts within which they're situated, and you ignore explicit claims of mine that run contrary to your straw-man interpretation. Consider the following post of mine from this thread:
[b]It is certainly possible that we are disposed to believe some falsehoods because those falsehoods confer an advantage on us. My initia f giving and taking reasons in contexts like the discussions that occur in these threads![/b]
Because beliefs can change even if no real new evidence has showed up. You seem to fail to realize this, but this is still why some people ask God for help in fox-holes or when they're dying. The only new information that they have is that they might die soon. This is not evidence for the existence of God in any way. And yet, beliefs are reformulated. This is the point of my argument.
Implicit in your 2+2=5 argument is that unless new evidence is found, the belief about 2+2=5 would not change. I dispute this.
Also, in what way can one measure the efficiency of epistemic reasons with respect to pragmatic considerations? If anything, I think its more likely that people change their beliefs in the cases I mentioned above (near death) AND because of these pragmatic reasons.
I'm talking about these processes of belief formation because they are the ones generally applicable to the process of giving and taking reasons in contexts like the discussions that occur in these threads!
What do you mean by "applicable"? Both can be discussed or mentioned here, so both have a real possibility of having an impact on the beliefs of readers. Even if by different processes.
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by PalynkaAgain, and for the third (fourth?) time, I think that unconscious cognitive processes can influence belief formation. I think that pragmatic reasons can exert arational causal influence on belief formation. I think that unconscious deliberation can rationally influence belief formation. So, it is an entailment of my view that beliefs can change even in the absence of new evidence, where 'evidence' is read as indicating epistemic reasons to which one has access. How can you still not get this?
For me, that quote is still a relatively static view of how beliefs are formed. Why?
Because beliefs can change even if no real new evidence has showed up. You seem to fail to realize this, but this is still why some people ask God for help in fox-holes or when they're dying. The only new information that they have is that they might die soon. This is no ...[text shortened]... l possibility of having an impact on the beliefs of readers. Even if by different processes.
Nothing is implicit in my '2+2=5' argument. It is an argument aimed merely at showing that being provided with a very good pragmatic reason to believe is insufficient to elicit the belief as a result of explicit deliberation. Pragmatic reasons are impotent when open to cognitive access. For pragmatic reasons to influence belief formation they need to be hidden from cognitive view.
What do you mean by "impact"? If you mean an unconscious causal influence, then that is something that I have never denied. If you mean that they can play a role in explicit deliberation about what it true, then they are impotent.
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by bbarrOf course. After all, disagreement with you implies a sophist attitude or a dim mind.
If you represented my position accurately, and revised your mistaken interpretation in light of the actual evidence clear to anyone with eyes to see, then there would be no chiding.
10 Jan 08
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Originally posted by bbarrWe return to the other point in these debates.
Again, and for the third (fourth?) time, I think that unconscious cognitive processes can influence belief formation. I think that pragmatic reasons can exert arational causal influence on belief formation. I think that unconscious deliberation can rationally influence belief formation. So, it is an entailment of my view that beliefs can change even i they can play a role in explicit deliberation about what it true, then they are impotent.
It is an argument aimed merely at showing that being provided with a very good pragmatic reason to believe is insufficient to elicit the belief as a result of explicit deliberation.
If the purpose is to "save others" by making them change beliefs it's irrelevant if it's the result of explicit or implicit/subconscious deliberation. Like I said you cannot exclude the latter without a good reason unless you wish to state that the goal of the theist is not just to "save others" but only to convince them within the limits of each single debate.
Why should the theist restrict itself?
If RBHill says if I repent I can still be saved from the pits of hell and that helps me push after the boundary of asking sincerely God to forgive me as my plane is falling, wouldn't he see it as a victory over my atheism?
10 Jan 08
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Originally posted by PalynkaI have already answered this question above. In contexts like these, where there is the giving and taking of reasons for belief, the most reliable way to persuade is to present epistemic reasons. This is the most reliable way to persuade because our explicit deliberations about what to believe are generally immune to pragmatic reasons (as the 2+2=5 example shows) whereas epistemic reasons open to cognitive view will generally inform belief acquisition. To attempt to elicit belief by virtue of the presentation of pragmatic reasons is to simply attempt to cause belief by going around the target's deliberative faculties. Whether this will be effective will be a matter of a host of non-rational factors, and there is no reason to believe that it will be better than chance odds that pragmatic reasons will elicit motivations to believe (which is crucially different than eliciting belief directly) on the part of the target. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that the chances of effecting such a change will be slim, since if the pragmatic reason happens to manifest in the deliberations of the target, the target will generally find the reason impotent since it bears no evidential relation to the truth of the belief at issue.
We return to the other point in these debates.
[b]It is an argument aimed merely at showing that being provided with a very good pragmatic reason to believe is insufficient to elicit the belief as a result of explicit deliberation.
If the purpose is to "save others" by making them change beliefs it's irrelevant if it's the result of explicit or imp od to forgive me as my plane is falling, wouldn't he see it as a victory over my atheism?[/b]
10 Jan 08
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How do you think RBHill's injunction could "help" you believe. Would such help be open to introspective access? Would the help be merely hidden and brute causal? Suppose in the case at hand RBHill's injunction springs to mind. Would you thereby, as a result of deliberation, come to believe in God, repentance, etc.?
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by knightmeisterKnightmeister, I conducted this portion of the experiment, and I am now in a position to report on it. I had what seemed like quite a bit of dream activity. I am still confused as to what is supposed to bear relevancy to experimental outcome (regarding retainment or falsification of the God hypothesis), so I am just going to report on everything I remember about my dreams as documented by me directly upon waking. My hope is that you will lend your thoughts on what here is relevant and what is not.
try saying the prayer before you go to sleep and see what you dream about.
I remember specific bits and pieces of what seem like three distinct dreams.
In the first dream, my usual barbers had apparently converted their shop into an Italian restaurant. I was there with a group of people, I think they were my roommates. We waited for a table for a while and I spoke to one of the former barbers (turned host) though I don't recall what was said, and then our group had a sit down meal. Some sort of pasta dish.
In the second dream, I was at the house of one of my good friends who lives on the opposite side of the country. It wasn't really anything like his actual house, but in the dream it was his house. It was nighttime, we were in his backyard. He had erected a volleyball net and flood lighting, and he said he was holding nightly games for teams in his community. We had some sort of discussion where I think I ended up persuading him to take it all down given that (1) the commotion and lighting from the nightly games were keeping his wife and kids up (he and his wife don't actually have any kids in real life, but in the dream he did) and (2) the net seemed way too close to his garage to facilitate a game. I remember thinking the net was very poorly placed because it was only like several feet away from his garage door. After that, I hit a volleyball across the yard.
The third dream I recall least well. I was on some sort of scooter -- not a typical scooter, it was modified somehow. I was just sort of driving around at nighttime. I remember going up and down steep grades, but that's about it.
10 Jan 08
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Originally posted by LemonJelloJesus had meals with his friends.
Knightmeister, I conducted this portion of the experiment, and I am now in a position to report on it. I had what seemed like quite a bit of dream activity. I am still confused as to what is supposed to bear relevancy to experimental outcome (regarding retainment or falsification of the God hypothesis), so I am just going to report on everything I remem riving around at nighttime. I remember going up and down steep grades, but that's about it.
Jesus told his disciples that their fishing nets were misplaced.
Jesus carried his cross up a steep hill, and then descended deep into hell, and then ascended all the way up to heaven.
This suggests to me that the reason you can't find Jesus when you look for him is because you are Jesus.
10 Jan 08
Originally posted by bbarrYou've eluded the question.
I have already answered this question above. In contexts like these, where there is the giving and taking of reasons for belief, the most reliable way to persuade is to present epistemic reasons. This is the most reliable way to persuade because our explicit deliberations about what to believe are generally immune to pragmatic reasons (as the 2+2=5 example s ...[text shortened]... the reason impotent since it bears no evidential relation to the truth of the belief at issue.
This is the most reliable way to persuade because our explicit deliberations about what to believe are generally immune to pragmatic reasons
Here you restrict yourself to explicit deliberations to show that the theist should restrict himself. You have to first provide reasons why the theist should try to persuade only explicit deliberations AND NOT also throw pragmatic considerations that can affect the subconscious.
To attempt to elicit belief by virtue of the presentation of pragmatic reasons is to simply attempt to cause belief by going around the target's deliberative faculties.
And? If the theist objective is to "save others" (and I quote) then what's the problem? I actually believe that pragmatic considerations are exactly the function that Hell (or equivalents) serve in the dogma of religions that believe it.
Whether this will be effective will be a matter of a host of non-rational factors, and there is no reason to believe that it will be better than chance odds that pragmatic reasons will elicit motivations to believe on the part of the target.
It's actually even irrelevant if the odds are lower. Repeating the same epistemic argument gives you a zero increment of odds. The number of epistemic arguments that can be given are finite (and, dare I say, all I've seen are refutable and therefore useless), so the point stands that theist should not abstain from them (note your "only" in the original post).
In fact, there are good reasons to believe that the chances of effecting such a change will be slim, since if the pragmatic reason happens to manifest in the deliberations of the target, the target will generally find the reason impotent since it bears no evidential relation to the truth of the belief at issue.
This flies in the face of the evidence provided by my examples of near death changing of beliefs. The fact that it bears no evidential relation is not sufficient for claiming that the "chances" are "slim". And again, slim as they may be, they are an increment and therefore theists should not always abstain from using them.