"evil"

Originally posted by serigado
Good 🙂 we're getting somewhere.
But societies change because people change. Do you think that perfect morale as to be adapted with time?

I'm not sure, but I suspect you didn't understand the intent of my previous post. I'm sure I could have been clearer. The logical conclusion would be one society with one morality. Anything less than that would be unstable.

Originally posted by KellyJay
Is evil simply something we think or feel isn't what we like, what we
think is bad and we can measure it in degrees or is it just plain and
simply evil and that is all it is? We can measure temp and see degree,
but I call my son my child, there is not degree to that, which is evil
like? Can what we think are evil choices that are just not as bad as
oth ...[text shortened]... ourney of evil just that, a path of that may seem
not so bad, but it all really is!?
Kelly

Can we bottom out on what 'evil' is? Is it nothing at all really, is it
a break with reality, is it just stuff we do not like at the moment but
may like later, is it something that just is and our thoughts about it
just don't matter one way or another?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
Can we bottom out on what 'evil' is? Is it nothing at all really, is it
a break with reality, is it just stuff we do not like at the moment but
may like later, is it something that just is and our thoughts about it
just don't matter one way or another?
Kelly

I guess we cannot bottom out on it than.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
Can we bottom out on what 'evil' is? Is it nothing at all really, is it
a break with reality, is it just stuff we do not like at the moment but
may like later, is it something that just is and our thoughts about it
just don't matter one way or another?
Kelly

I don’t know. 🙂

Evil originally meant just anything that was unpleasant, undesirable, without having specific moral connotation. To say that something is “evil-smelling” was just to say that it “stinks”—at one point in its etymological history, I don’t even think it meant that something stinks really, really badly, but was just an unpleasant smell.

This is also the broad sense of the Hebrew word ra, as in the tree of knowledge of tov (good) and ra (evil). One can, for example, have good luck (mazel tov, as in the toast “Mazel tov!” ) or bad luck (mazel ra).

This seems to be the basis of the philosophical distinction between “natural evil” and “moral evil”—the former referring to such things as people suffering due to natural disasters such as earthquakes, the latter to suffering caused by (deliberate?) human agency. This understanding of moral evil reminds me of the story of the masochist and the sadist—

M: “Beat me, hurt me, make me suffer!”

S: “No.”

I personally do not have a well-defined moral theory, though I think I tend to be closest to virtue theory. I would call, say, child rape, an always and everywhere evil act—but the question becomes whether or not that is the result of my intuitive disgust at such a thing. One might suggest that humanity’s basic survival drive leads to disgust at such things, especially since that drive is social as well as individual (that is, we might be closer to lions than to tigers, the latter being generally solitary except for mating; some individual humans—myself for instance—tend to be more solitary and less social than others). If one were to plot a statistical distribution of what different people—or different cultures—consider to be morally evil behavior, it may well be a bell-shaped curve with a broad area of central tendency around such things as child rape.

One of the commonalities seems to be that causing deliberate harm to another being requires some sort of justification—what constitutes a reasonable justification (e.g., self-defense, or pain caused as part of medical treatment) may vary widely; but we are likely to consider one who claims no necessity for such justification (even a “feeble excuse” ) to be, not immoral, but insane. Arguments about the morality of causing harm then center on the question of justification: is this particular infliction of “evil” on another justified or not? By what criteria? This is really the focus in the (in)famous arguments on here about God ordering the vicious extinction of the Amakelites, for example.

To say that moral evil is the unjustified causing of deliberate harm (or suffering, or unpleasantness) to another, at least, it seems to me, has the advantage of focusing the question on the italicized word, rather than on the seemingly insoluble question “Does evil exist?” The question becomes: “What constitutes a justification for causing harm/suffering? Under what circumstances?”

I do not pretend that the answer to that question is straightforward or self-evident generally. But it does seem to me to be a more fruitful and focused question to explore.

Originally posted by EcstremeVenom
does evil exist? what is good and evil? are we not just animals with no more of a significant existence of every other animal? if so, is there any significance to morals at all?

what is good to me is evil to someone else. it's a matter of relevance. evil is an obstract terminology if evil is hate or having hateful intents, then animals certainly aren't evil. they don't understand humin emotions. yet if they did they may consider us evil because we're on a higher link on the food chain.

if you were on a farm and you hatched an egg ( a baby in our human terms) and some hungry farmer took it, is he evil because he is hungry? to him, he's not evil unless nature made him that way. should he apologize for what his nature dictates for his own survival?

I'm sure the chicken wouldn't see him as good!

Originally posted by vistesd
I don’t know. 🙂

Evil originally meant just anything that was unpleasant, undesirable, without having specific moral connotation. To say that something is “evil-smelling” was just to say that it “stinks”—at one point in its etymological history, I don’t even think it meant that something stinks really, really badly, but was just an unpleasant smell.

...[text shortened]... vident generally. But it does seem to me to be a more fruitful and focused question to explore.

What it might have meant originally seems a powerful statement to
me, ‘originally’ carries a lot of weight when being applied to anything
don’t you think? To also suggest it meant something ‘originally’ and
then going onto talking about what it means now also implies
that ‘evil’ has changes through time. That sort of implies it is just
simply a human construct doesn’t it?

If ‘evil’ is simply what we think about things alone it can be anything,
feeding children could be called ‘evil’ if people thought and believed it
so for some odd strange reason, being forced to pay one’s own debts
could be thought of as ‘evil’ and I imagine more than a few people do
think that too.

If we were too look at scripture you have to see that Adam and Eve
were exposed to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This
suggests to me anyway that the human point of view about
both ‘good and evil’ didn’t matter before they ate of that tree, evil
was real without a human point of view about it, as good also was real
without a human point of view.

Genesis 2:9
9And out of the ground made the LORD God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

I agree we use ‘evil’ to describe things we dislike, we also use the
word ‘love’ like that too to reflect strong desire, lust, and a few other
things that do not really have anything to do with love. When we strip
away all our likes and dislikes about things is there at the core of
things ‘evil’, and if so what does that do to reality as we live it?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
What it might have meant originally seems a powerful statement to
me, ‘originally’ carries a lot of weight when being applied to anything
don’t you think? To also suggest it meant something ‘originally’ and
then going onto talking about what it means now also implies
that ‘evil’ has changes through time. That sort of implies it is just
simply a human ...[text shortened]... here at the core of
things ‘evil’, and if so what does that do to reality as we live it?
Kelly

What it might have meant originally seems a powerful statement to
me, ‘originally’ carries a lot of weight when being applied to anything
don’t you think? To also suggest it meant something ‘originally’ and
then going onto talking about what it means now also implies
that ‘evil’ has changes through time. That sort of implies it is just
simply a human construct doesn’t it?

Well, we are using language. The meanings (usages) of words can change over time. I was going by having looked up the etymology of the English word “evil” in John Ayto, Dictionary of Word Origins, and by my previous studies of the etymology and use of the Hebrew words ra and tov. Ayto says of the word “evil” that “it is only in modern English that its connotations of ‘extreme moral wickedness’ came to the fore.” As I noted, “moral badness” (“wickedness” ) was not excluded from the words: their meaning/usage just was not restricted to that.

The Bibilical word ra still is not so restricted in Jewish usage—whether or not it is being used to refer strictly to moral wickedness is either decalred, or is to be understood from context. The same for then English word evil (as when philosophers talk about natural evil and moral evil).

Now, I use a word: tree. The word consists of a signifier and a signified. The signifier is the letters t-r-e-e, or their phonetic sound. The signified is the definition of that signifier: what it means; in this case a plant of a certain kind that can be described such-and-such. A word may or may not have a real-world referent—such as that tree over there (pointing).

Both the signifer and the signifed are, in fact, human constructs; the referent to which they refer is not (in this example, anyway). They are constructs that allow us to talk about the referent(s), and to understand one another, with out actually having to do the physical pointing.

A word: unicorn. There is certainly as signifer and a signified embodied in that word. Is there a referent? Can we think of the picture formed by our imagination as a referent?

A word: e-v-i-l. What is the signifed for that word? What is the meaning of that word? Does it have more than one meaning that we need to specifcy before we know what referent it may or may not refer to (e.g., are earthquakes evil? Or are we using the word to refer to strictly human behavior?)?

___________________________________________

Just talking about moral evil—to the exclusion of so-called “natural evil”, or bad luck (mazel ra) or the like—I don’t know how to talk about that except with reference to the behavior of moral agents.

Suppose someone says that a certain action, A, is morally evil. My first question is: “What are the criteria for deciding what that word evil means (or might mean) in such a context?” And : “Are there any conditions under which A might not be morally evil?”

So I offer a definition (a signified, a statement of meaning): “Moral evil is the unjustified causing of deliberate harm (or suffering, or unpleasantness) to another.”

With that definition, however, the focus becomes: “What constitutes justification for causing deliberate harm or suffering?”

That is the only way that I know to talk about moral evil. If someone wants to offer another definition, though, I’ll consider it.

Originally posted by vistesd
To say that moral evil is the unjustified causing of deliberate harm (or suffering, or unpleasantness) to another, at least, it seems to me, has the advantage of focusing the question on the italicized word, rather than on the seemingly insoluble question “Does evil exist?” The question becomes: “What constitutes a justification for causing harm/suffering? Under what circumstances?”

I think three important things must be noted.
1. Refusal or failure to assist others in need, though not 'deliberate harm' may also be considered evil. Again the question is "what constitutes justification for not assisting?"
This ranges from the extreme - not stopping a child being rapped right before your eyes - to the almost unnoticed - not sending money to help the starving in Ethiopia.
2. Our concepts of evil are almost exclusively confined to the human race. Only a small minority of people grant animals any form of rights.
Possibly it is a case of valuing humans so much more than animals that most suffering or unpleasantness caused to animals is considered fully justified if even the slightest benefit to a human can be identified.
3. Almost an extension of 2 is the fact that we often give different values to different people and thus will modify our "justification" curve according to the victim. For example you mentioned "child rape" not plain "rape". This implies (possibly) that you consider it less justified if the victim is a child - even though the suffering may be identical whatever the age of the victim.
But we often go further and mentally distinguish between say poor and rich or between race or gender. Also we use past actions in our 'justification' calculation ("shes a hooker - she deserved to get raped"😉.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I think three important things must be noted.
1. Refusal or failure to assist others in need, though not 'deliberate harm' may also be considered evil. Again the question is "what constitutes justification for not assisting?"
This ranges from the extreme - not stopping a child being rapped right before your eyes - to the almost unnoticed - not sending m ...[text shortened]... in our 'justification' calculation ("shes a hooker - she deserved to get raped"😉.

I accept all your points; the most cogent one to what I was trying to say is 1.

However, your others raise a further question, I think: not only whether X or Y is a valid justification, but what are the criteria for deciding justificatory validity in any case?

With your expansions/corrections accepted, do you agree with the general re-formulation of the question that I was trying to put forth?

Originally posted by vistesd
With your expansions/corrections accepted, do you agree with the general re-formulation of the question that I was trying to put forth?

I think it is a very interesting question and far more complex than it might at first seem. I am not sure though whether you are simply asking "what are the justifications for causing harm/suffering? Under what circumstances?" or whether you are asking "are such justifications once identified, absolute? ie a property of the universe that any intelligent enough entity could in theory arrive at."

To add more points to ponder:

If a sentient alien species arrives on earth, and they are far more intelligent than us and look down on us the same way we do at animals, would they be justified in treating us the same way we treat animals - in other words would your question then only really apply to themselves and not when they choose to harm us?

I think that your justification question is intimately tied to the concept of rights. Maybe it should not be about causing harm/suffering but about violation of rights. If I keep a slave, look after him and even convince him that he is happy, am I nevertheless violating his rights and therefore evil? He may in fact be better off as my slave than whatever other opportunity he might have had.

Also, to what extent is intent a justification. If I believe I am doing the right thing - or believe I am justified in doing something - am I therefore justified? If I am genuinely convinced that child rape is a good thing, am I evil for doing it?

Originally posted by twhitehead
I think it is a very interesting question and far more complex than it might at first seem. I am not sure though whether you are simply asking "what are the justifications for causing harm/suffering? Under what circumstances?" or whether you are asking "are such justifications once identified, absolute? ie a property of the universe that any intelligent e ...[text shortened]... tified? If I am genuinely convinced that child rape is a good thing, am I evil for doing it?

Again, you’re comments on justification are well-taken. I’m not to the point of talking about “absolutes” yet—I’m only trying to focus talk about (moral) “evil.” And to see if my offered definition helps in that regard. If it does, then we can explore what might or might not constitute justification for causing deliberate harm or suffering.

I don’t know if it’s helpful to introduce rights at this point—it may be. Then the whole concept of rights needs defining. But I think I can reframe my questions of justification along those lines: for example, do I have a (moral) right to not be caused deliberate harm or suffering without some overriding justification? On what basis do I assert such a right? Do non-human creatures have such a right? (I would think so, by the way—at least I grant them that—which goes also to your alien example.)

Thinking again, perhaps my definition does implicitly raise that kind of “rights” question. But I still think that the justification issue is central: under what circumstances am I justified in killing a human person? An animal?

Again, that seems to me to be a commonality across various moral views: any deliberate causing of harm or suffering (or also, as you point out, failure to prevent or alleviate such) is considered to be morally evil or not depending on what is viewed as sufficient justification, or justificatory circumstances (e.g., self-defense).

You are offering some cogent expansions, adjustments and questions that I accept. I am interested if anyone has an alternative definition of moral evil to offer.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]What it might have meant originally seems a powerful statement to
me, ‘originally’ carries a lot of weight when being applied to anything
don’t you think? To also suggest it meant something ‘originally’ and
then going onto talking about what it means now also implies
that ‘evil’ has changes through time. That sort of implies it is just
simply a ...[text shortened]... talk about moral evil. If someone wants to offer another definition, though, I’ll consider it.

[/b]I'll come back to your post later, but no matter what is used to
define "evil", it will without a doubt be outside of what is 'good' will
it not?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I'll come back to your post later, but no matter what is used to
define "evil", it will without a doubt be outside of what is 'good' will
it not?
Kelly[/b]

Yes: under the whole range of usages, tov and ra are opposites.

Originally posted by vistesd
Yes: under the whole range of usages, tov and ra are opposites.

Then everything that is evil is the opposite of everything that is good?

Does this mean then that there IS good and there IS evil?

Originally posted by josephw
Then everything that is evil is the opposite of everything that is good?

Does this mean then that there IS good and there IS evil?

Do mean in the sense that good and evil are objective, rather than subjective, categories?

Or that there is some independent force called “good” and some independent force called “evil”, as there is an independent force called gravity?

I have offered the following definition of moral evil (to which twhitehead has added some cogent expansions/adjustments above): “Moral evil is the unjustified deliberate causing of harm, suffering or unpleasantness to another.”

This definition then moves the question to that of what constitutes justification for causing deliberate harm, etc. The question of whether such justifications are objective or subjective still remains. I am unwilling to move to that question until, as Kelly Jay put it, we can “bottom out” on what we mean by the word “evil”.

Note: I guess there can be actions that are morally neutral.