God just HAS to know...!

Originally posted by LemonJello
Okay, fair enough, you have some issues with my use of 'will do'. I will simply revise my argument accordingly.

Remember, it is your contention that G is in eternity, which means his existence is atemporal and not subject to temporal development as our is; and that G sees our entire timeline all at once, so to speak. You maintain that he doesn't kn ...[text shortened]... eject one or more of the premises.

[b]Which premise(s) do you reject and why?[/b]

2. It is not possible both that G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (infallibility condition).
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I reject this one. Until S gets to T in his time then A has not taken place for S. A has not happened. It has "happened" for God but not for S , and both are true and both are valid relative perspectives. In this sense A has both happened and not happened. God knows that at T , S is doing A (instead of B) but until S gets to T himself A has not been chosen yet and B is still possible.

Originally posted by knightmeister
2. It is not possible both that G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (infallibility condition).
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I reject this one. Until S gets to T in his time then A has not taken place for S. A has not happened. It has "happened" for God but not for S , and both are true an ...[text shortened]... instead of B) but until S gets to T himself A has not been chosen yet and B is still possible.

Until S gets to T in his time then A has not taken place for S. A has not happened. It has "happened" for God but not for S , and both are true and both are valid relative perspectives. In this sense A has both happened and not happened. God knows that at T , S is doing A (instead of B) but until S gets to T himself A has not been chosen yet

Yes. So what?

and B is still possible.

No it isn't. The supposition is that G's knowledge is infallible. This means that the conditions of G's knowing satisfy an infallibility criterion, and this criterion's being met entails that G's knowledge is held in a way such that it is not possible that G could be mistaken. A general infallibility thesis would be that G knows P on basis B only if it is not possible that G has B and P is false. This means that it is not possible both that G knows S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (which is Premise 2). The possibility of S's "doing otherwise" or refraining from A-ing at T is precluded by the supposed conditions (of infallibility) under which G's knowledge is held.

If, on the other hand, you do not hold that God's knowledge is infallible in a sense similar to the above, then I do not think you have a problem between your notion of free will and God's omniscience. (Of course, you will still have the problem that your notion of free will makes no sense to begin with as well as the problem that your notion of God as the 'eternal' causal agent is self-contradictory).

Originally posted by knightmeister
I reject this one. Until S gets to T in his time then A has not taken place for S. A has not happened. It has "happened" for God but not for S , and both are true and both are valid relative perspectives. In this sense A has both happened and not happened. God knows that at T , S is doing A (instead of B) but until S gets to T himself A has not been chosen yet and B is still possible.

Is it therefore impossible for God to insert knowledge of A into the time line prior to T?
Surely such an act would instantaneously remove your objection.
What if God acts on information about A prior to T? Wont it create some sort of feedback scenario similar to a recursive function in programming?
Most importantly of all, if God does not know about A until after A, can he do anything about it? ie God cannot act to prevent A as such an action would result in him not knowing about A thus causing a paradox for him. All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Is it therefore impossible for God to insert knowledge of A into the time line prior to T?
Surely such an act would instantaneously remove your objection.
What if God acts on information about A prior to T? Wont it create some sort of feedback scenario similar to a recursive function in programming?
Most importantly of all, if God does not know about A ...[text shortened]... line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

Yes. Knightmeister's view of God is self-contradictory. He maintains that God is eternal in the sense outlined here, but he is at the same time committed to the idea that God can (and has) causally influence our existences.

Originally posted by LemonJello
All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

Yes. Knightmeister's view of God is self-contradictory. He maintains that God is eternal in the sense outlined here, but he is at the same time committed to the idea that God can (and has) causally influence our existences.[/b]

Imagine a computer program in which there are some random variables inserted at various points along the way.
You can run the program and read the outputs. You can also sit looking at a transcript of its progress.
But although you are external from the transcript and can look at it at various points and while looking at an earlier point know what occurs at a later point, you cannot in any way modify an earlier point based on the outcome of a later point.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

Yes. Knightmeister's view of God is self-contradictory. He maintains that God is eternal in the sense outlined here, but he is at the same time committed to the idea that God can (and has) causally influence our existences.[/b]

When you say "the" future , what do you mean? Is "the" future the same for everyone? What you call tomorrow is ancient history for someone in 2350.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Is it therefore impossible for God to insert knowledge of A into the time line prior to T?
Surely such an act would instantaneously remove your objection.
What if God acts on information about A prior to T? Wont it create some sort of feedback scenario similar to a recursive function in programming?
Most importantly of all, if God does not know about A ...[text shortened]... line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.

Most importantly of all, if God does not know about A until after A, can he do anything about it? ie God cannot act to prevent A as such an action would result in him not knowing about A thus causing a paradox for him. All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective.
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You are right. God cannot prevent something unless that thing happens , but then he would not be able to prevent it because then he wouldn't know it. However, he can still interfere on the basis of his knowledge of individuals and could still make predictions based on guesswork. His guesswork would be pretty good though.

God's knowledge of future events might not make him able to prevent them , but he could help us prepare for them. In any case even if God's knowledge was useless it wouldn't make it impossible. I'm not interested in the pragmatics of it - simply the theoretical.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Until S gets to T in his time then A has not taken place for S. A has not happened. It has "happened" for God but not for S , and both are true and both are valid relative perspectives. In this sense A has both happened and not happened. God knows that at T , S is doing A (instead of B) but until S gets to T himself A has not been chosen yet

Y ...[text shortened]... lem that your notion of God as the 'eternal' causal agent is self-contradictory).[/b]

This means that it is not possible both that G knows S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (which is Premise 2). The possibility of S's "doing otherwise" or refraining from A-ing at T is precluded by the supposed conditions (of infallibility) under which G's knowledge is held.
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Ok , let's test this. I know Hitler's future infallibly yes? I know Hitler is A-ing at T. Presumably this proves that Hitler could never have done B? It doesn't of course.

Originally posted by knightmeister
This means that it is not possible both that G knows S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (which is Premise 2). The possibility of S's "doing otherwise" or refraining from A-ing at T is precluded by the supposed conditions (of infallibility) under which G's knowledge is held.
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Ok g at T. Presumably this proves that Hitler could never have done B? It doesn't of course.

I know Hitler's future infallibly yes?

Are you asking me a question, or are you making a supposition? I doubt you, knightmeister, know much of anything infallibly because infallibility is generally a very strong condition to place on knowledge.

I know Hitler is A-ing at T. Presumably this proves that Hitler could never have done B? It doesn't of course.

Again, I do not maintain that ordinary knowledge about our actions precludes libertarian freedom. I maintain that infallible knowledge does so. I'm not in the least bit convinced you understand this distinction whatsoever.

Do you or do you not hold that God's eternal knowledge is infallible? Remember, infallibility is a thesis about the conditions under which God holds his knowledge. Again, a general infallibility thesis might be that God knows P on basis B only if it is not possible that God have B and P is false.

If you maintain that God is omniscient but nevertheless not an infallible knower in this sense, then I repeat that I do not think you will have a problem between your notion of free will and God's omniscience. However, you will then have to live with the idea that God is a fallible knower, that He could in principle be mistaken in his beliefs (not that he is ever mistaken necessarily, but that it is possible [however we want to construe this possibility] that he could be).

Originally posted by knightmeister
When you say "the" future , what do you mean? Is "the" future the same for everyone? What you call tomorrow is ancient history for someone in 2350.

I don't understand your question. Where in that post of mine did I talk about "the future"?

Originally posted by knightmeister
Most importantly of all, if God does not know about A until after A, can he do anything about it? ie God cannot act to prevent A as such an action would result in him not knowing about A thus causing a paradox for him. All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually ...[text shortened]... 't make it impossible. I'm not interested in the pragmatics of it - simply the theoretical.

However, he can still interfere

No.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't understand your question. Where in that post of mine did I talk about "the future"?

All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective. - LJ

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I know Hitler's future infallibly yes?

Are you asking me a question, or are you making a supposition? I doubt you, knightmeister, know much of anything infallibly because infallibility is generally a very strong condition to place on knowledge.

I know Hitler is A-ing at T. Presumably this proves that Hitler could never have done B? It doe ...[text shortened]... , but that it is possible [however we want to construe this possibility] that he could be).

Again, I do not maintain that ordinary knowledge about our actions precludes libertarian freedom. I maintain that infallible knowledge does so. I'm not in the least bit convinced you understand this distinction whatsoever.
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Oh come on. My knowledge of Hitler's actions IS infallible. It's impossible for me not to know what Hitler chose to do. I know Hitler is A-ing at T and because of my relative position in time to Hitler he cannot escape me or second guess me. I will always know that Hitler is A-ing at T . He can have free will or no free will it makes no difference, my knowledge is infallible because it's based on my position in time compared to his. I do not have to make any predictions or guesses.

Is this what you call ordinary knowledge? If so then God has it too , it's just that he can see a lot , lot more than me. He can see Hitler was A-ing at T just in the same way I can. He can also see me A-ing at 2020.

Theoretically this is not a problem for an eternal God.

Why don't you just accept that my knowledge of Hitler A=ing at T is infallible and that this does not exclude Hitler having had free will at T.

Originally posted by knightmeister
All this leads me to believe that God cannot reliably interfere with the time line and his supposed knowledge of the future is actually worthless to him from our perspective. - LJ

Those are twhitehead's words (which I quoted).

Originally posted by knightmeister
Again, I do not maintain that ordinary knowledge about our actions precludes libertarian freedom. I maintain that infallible knowledge does so. I'm not in the least bit convinced you understand this distinction whatsoever.
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Oh come on. My knowledge of Hitler's actions IS infallible. It's impossible for A=ing at T is infallible and that this does not exclude Hitler having had free will at T.

My knowledge of Hitler's actions IS infallible. It's impossible for me not to know what Hitler chose to do.

Bull. There is nothing about your basis for belief that makes it impossible for you to hold mistaken beliefs about, say, Hitler's actions. You could be a brain in a vat for all you know and "Hitler's actions" as you think you know them could actually all be based on false appearances. Or you could just have imperfect cognitive faculties which cause you to form false beliefs every now and then. Or you could be basing your knowledge of Hitler on texts that are factually inaccurate. There are any number of ways in which your general knowledge of the world fails to be infallible.

Would you please just answer my question? Do you or do you not maintain that God's knowledge is infallible? If you do maintain that his knowledge is infallible, what exactly do you mean by this? In what way is it not possible for God to be mistaken? If you can answer these, it will help me understand whether or not I think there is a problem between the knowledge you claim God has and your notion of human free will.