1 edit
Originally posted by knightmeister….1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
-----lemon--------------------
Given that time is relative and not Newtonian the term "in advance" needs to be challenged here. What does 1) really mean? Somehow God's knowledge is being placed within a time reference which may or may not be accurate.
In the quote below the traveller might be able to kn nds of years, depending on your choice of reference frame." --------------------WIKI
-----lemon--------------------
Given that time is relative and not Newtonian the term "in advance" needs to be challenged here.
..…
You misunderstand relativity here. Relativity does NOT say that what is "in advance" must always be relative! -whether or not it is relative depends on whether or not one event is within the light come of the other:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_cone
If event X is within the “past light cone” (see diagram of the link above) of event Y then X IS "in advance" of Y NOT relatively so but absolutely so! (i.e. in ALL frames of reference).
Although the exact time interval between the two events IS relative, this doesn’t change the fact that one event is in the absolute past of the other PROVIDING it is in the past light cone of the other thus "in advance" is not necessarily a relative term.
Your quote from WIKI doesn’t contradict this so lemon’s argument is not erroneous merely because of his use of the term "in advance" -according to modern physics there is nothing wrong in using that term in this context.
Note that this means there such thing as an absolute future and an absolute past but ONLY in the very narrow context of any given event X.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_future#Causal_structure
“…..The causal future (also called the absolute future) ,
….
….
….The causal past (also called the absolute past) …”
1 edit
Originally posted by knightmeisterYou have subsequently admitted that this changes nothing. So, how do you answer the dilemma? God could tell me about every 'free choice' that I will make tomorrow, and I would be unable to do otherwise.
At that point, Peter was fated to do it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
If the information is leaked to the individual then the timeline is contaminated , that does change things because the information affects the individual.
5 edits
Originally posted by knightmeisterThe phrase "will do" is still problematic because for God it's not a case of "will do" but "has done".
The phrase "will do" is still problematic because for God it's not a case of "will do" but "has done". The point being that from one frame of reference the act has taken place already , but from the other it hasn't.
The tricky part is realising that due to time being relative BOTH are equally true. The event in question has both happened and not ha ee because 1939 really hasn't happened yet and we can know his future because it has.
No it isn't problematic.
Your claim is that it is not proper to speak of GOD as being temporally constrained as we are; your argument has never been that it is unreasonable to view subject S in the argument as temporally constrained. The argument does not in any way violate this. For the last time, the argument assumes that God's knowledge, beliefs, and in short his entire perspective is eternal. The 'will do' has nothing to do with God's perspective! It doesn't entail that the event A is improperly temporally indexed within God's perspective! Again, feel perfectly free to interpret that everything about God's perspective is 'eternal' in just the sense you desire. The 'will do' part of the argument only requires that the event A can be temporally indexed to the future with respect to the perspective of subject S (and God's perfect knowledge, eternal or not, of course must reflect this). I thought this would have been clear enough.
EDIT: This all really only goes to underscore the incoherence of your ideas on G's eternality. That G could hold 'eternal' knowledge of an event that is still a future event within S's perspective; that G could know eternally that S has yet to do A while at the "same time" knowing eternally that S is in the processing of doing A while at the "same time" knowing eternally that S has already done A while at the "same time" knowing eternally that S has been dead for 8 billion years while at the "same time" knowing eternally that S has not even been born yet,...;yes, it's a little difficult to figure how this all could possibly work. That's a concern on your side, not mine. My argument, I maintain, fully accomodates your views on eternality without improperly imposing temporal constraint on G's perspective.
4 edits
Originally posted by knightmeisterFor the last time, I already made concession and accommodation for your views on eternality. I even said that now it is no longer a case of god's having foreknowledge -- it is now instead a case of his having eternal knowledge that precludes libertarian freedom (in virtue of its also being infallible).
if he does have infallible foreknowledge
------lemon----------------------------
He has NO foreknowledge of any event. He has POST knowledge.
Do you have foreknowledge of Hitler's death ? No , from your RELATIVE position in space/time you have POST knowledge , but for Hitler it would seem like foreknowledge.
What I am saying is that it seem ...[text shortened]... e could say that he is watching you make all the choices in your life all at the same "time".
Try actually reading my posts for once!
I still maintain that the argument is a serious problem for you even given that we are fully treating God's entire perspective as 'eternal'.
1 edit
Originally posted by knightmeisterWhich specific premise(s) of my revised argument do you dispute?
if he does have infallible foreknowledge
------lemon----------------------------
He has NO foreknowledge of any event. He has POST knowledge.
Do you have foreknowledge of Hitler's death ? No , from your RELATIVE position in space/time you have POST knowledge , but for Hitler it would seem like foreknowledge.
What I am saying is that it seem ...[text shortened]... e could say that he is watching you make all the choices in your life all at the same "time".
1 edit
knightmeister, I think I understand your objection better now, but I want to clarify.
Your objection is toward premise 1, and your objection is that while it is true that G eternally knows S has already performed A, it is not true that G eternally knows S will do A. Is this a faithful statement of your objection?
Originally posted by LemonJelloYou seem to be getting much closer now. My main point is that God cannot be placed exclusively on our timeline as if he is looking forward towards some event that hasn't happened yet.
knightmeister, I think I understand your objection better now, but I want to clarify.
Your objection is toward premise 1, and your objection is that while it is true that G eternally knows S has already performed A, it is not true that G eternally knows S will do A. Is this a faithful statement of your objection?
God does not know what we "will do" apart from the actual moment when we do it. Right now he knows what you ARE doing tomorrow. For you it feels as if he knows what you WILL do , but for him it's what you ARE doing and have done. BOTH perspectives are true and valid.
This sounds paradoxical but according to relativity it is a valid argument to say that tomorrow has both happened and not happened depending on where you are looking at the timeline from.
This means that for you tomorrow is still up for grabs and you can still choose freely but for God it is known and BOTH are true. Tomorrow you will make a free choice , God is watching do it right "now" (eternally)
Originally posted by knightmeisterI don't find it paradoxical, but I do find that it tells us something important about the universe and its relationship to God.
God does not know what we "will do" apart from the actual moment when we do it. Right now he knows what you ARE doing tomorrow. For you it feels as if he knows what you WILL do , but for him it's what you ARE doing and have done. BOTH perspectives are true and valid.
This sounds paradoxical but according to relativity it is a valid argument to say ...[text shortened]... w has both happened and not happened depending on where you are looking at the timeline from.
1. God is static from our perspective. Because it is the same external him that sees us today and tomorrow, then then he is totally static as far as we are concerned.
2. Or future is static, ie although we may not know what comes next, it is fixed.
3. Time travel of information is theoretically possible ie God can tell us what will happen next leading to some rather interesting time paradoxes.
This means that for you tomorrow is still up for grabs and you can still choose freely
Er - no. That clearly is false. There is and can only ever be one specific tomorrow that God knows about and it is irrelevant where he sits and sees it from. If he knows I will do X tomorrow then there is no way I can do Y. Y is not 'up for grabs'.
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadThere is and can only ever be one specific tomorrow that God knows about and it is irrelevant where he sits and sees it from. If he knows I will do X tomorrow then there is no way I can do Y. Y is not 'up for grabs'.
I don't find it paradoxical, but I do find that it tells us something important about the universe and its relationship to God.
1. God is static from our perspective. Because it is the same external him that sees us today and tomorrow, then then he is totally static as far as we are concerned.
2. Or future is static, ie although we may not know what com ...[text shortened]... m. If he knows I will do X tomorrow then there is no way I can do Y. Y is not 'up for grabs'.
-----------whitey---------------------------------
The question is this though. At that point in time is X or Y possible and what is it that fixes it in place on the timeline? From God's standpoint X has been chosen but from yours X has not yet been chosen and Y is still possible. X may be fixed but it could be a free will choice that fixed it.
God 's knowledge of tomorrow depends upon your choice of X. If you choose Y then he knows Y instead. Logically he HAS to know either X or Y (being unrestricted by time) , so it's unsurprising that only one of these options is known by God and not the other one. But because one is known and the other not does not prove that Y was never possible.
I accept that there is only one tomorrow that God can know about but I challenge your assumption that this therefore means that there could only ever have been one tomorrow.
The fact that there is only one timeline is just a truism that proves nothing. I know one specific timeline that Hitler set but this does not tell me whether that timeline was determined or freely chosen. Why? Becasue the results would be the same for both- namely one timeline. Known infallibly by me.
It seems a contradiction to think that X or Y can be up for grabs (for you) whilst at the same time X is known (by God). But it's only contradictory if we unconsciously invoke Newtonian notions of time. With relativity we CAN say that X has happened but also that it hasn't happened. It's both.
Originally posted by knightmeisterLooks like you've answered your own question. 😏
The argument that free will and God's omniscience (FW v O) are logically contradictory can be countered in many ways. Here's another way of looking at things.
The argument rests on the idea that God can ONLY know our future choices if they are pre-determined in some way.
BUT .....let's think about this..
If God really did exist as eternal , ...[text shortened]... re random , free or determined - there's no way he cannot know -
He just HAS to know!
Originally posted by knightmeisterIn a universe where there can exist an entity that is external to the timeline and that can interact with any point in the timeline, the timeline is static and standpoints become irrelevant.
The question is this though. At that point in time is X or Y possible and what is it that fixes it in place on the timeline? From God's standpoint X has been chosen but from yours X has not yet been chosen and Y is still possible. X may be fixed but it could be a free will choice that fixed it.
I know we have discussed this before, and last time as I recall you probably retreated with the old 'my God is illogical'.
Think of it as a computer program. Although there may be if statements in the program, as long as the program has been run by at least one external entity with a given set of variables, the if statements become fixed. There are no internal choices any more.
The fact that there is only one timeline is just a truism that proves nothing. I know one specific timeline that Hitler set but this does not tell me whether that timeline was determined or freely chosen.
Well what do you mean by 'determined' and what do you mean by 'freely chosen'?
It seems a contradiction to think that X or Y can be up for grabs (for you) whilst at the same time X is known (by God). But it's only contradictory if we unconsciously invoke Newtonian notions of time. With relativity we CAN say that X has happened but also that it hasn't happened. It's both.
I really cant see how Newton or relativity fit into this at all.
Originally posted by knightmeisterOkay, fair enough, you have some issues with my use of 'will do'. I will simply revise my argument accordingly.
You seem to be getting much closer now. My main point is that God cannot be placed exclusively on our timeline as if he is looking forward towards some event that hasn't happened yet.
God does not know what we "will do" apart from the actual moment when we do it. Right now he knows what you ARE doing tomorrow. For you it feels as if he knows what ...[text shortened]... true. Tomorrow you will make a free choice , God is watching do it right "now" (eternally)
Remember, it is your contention that G is in eternity, which means his existence is atemporal and not subject to temporal development as our is; and that G sees our entire timeline all at once, so to speak. You maintain that he doesn't know eternally what you "will do" tomorrow, but that he does know eternally "what you are doing tomorrow" (your words). Fine, then my revised argument is below.
Here, T is some point on our timeline which is in the future with respect to the temporal development of subject S. A is some action. And, again, we suppose that G is some perfect eternal knower, by which I mean both that G eternally knows everything that can be eternally known and that all of G's eternal knowledge is infallible.
1. G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T.
2. It is not possible both that G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (infallibility condition).
3. From 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from A-ing at T.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from A-ing at T, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from A-ing at T.
5. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from A-ing at T, then S is not free with respect to A-ing at T.
6. Hence, if G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T, then S is not free with respect to A-ing at T.
As far as I can tell, this argument is logically valid (the conclusion follows logically from the premises). So, if you don't like the conclusion that G's infallible eternal knowledge would preclude our libertarian freedom, then you'll need to reject one or more of the premises.
Which premise(s) do you reject and why?