Originally posted by LemonJelloBull. There is nothing about your basis for belief that makes it impossible for you to hold mistaken beliefs about, say, Hitler's actions.
[b]My knowledge of Hitler's actions IS infallible. It's impossible for me not to know what Hitler chose to do.
Bull. There is nothing about your basis for belief that makes it impossible for you to hold mistaken beliefs about, say, Hitler's actions. You could be a brain in a vat for all you know and "Hitler's actions" as you think you know them c ...[text shortened]... is a problem between the knowledge you claim God has and your notion of human free will.[/b]
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NOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! Of course there could be historical innaccuracies and I could be delusional etc etc , but the point is that given a perfect mind and a perfect histroical record I would be infallible in my knowledge. You are jumping across contexts and using the analogy in the wrong way.
In any case , the perfectness (or lack of) in my mind is not the issue. It's my relative position in time that makes my knowldge infallible.
Your objection is not based on the perfectness of God's mind as such but his ability to supposedly know things "in advance" , and in that respect I can do that with Hitler.
Whether my knowledge is imperfect or not is not the issue because even if I only know 1% of hitler's future infallibly it's still an amazing feat according to you because I should not be able to know anything about it because from Hitler's viewpoint he hasn't done it yet!!!
Originally posted by LemonJelloWould you please just answer my question? Do you or do you not maintain that God's knowledge is infallible? If you do maintain that his knowledge is infallible, what exactly do you mean by this? In what way is it not possible for God to be mistaken?
[b]My knowledge of Hitler's actions IS infallible. It's impossible for me not to know what Hitler chose to do.
Bull. There is nothing about your basis for belief that makes it impossible for you to hold mistaken beliefs about, say, Hitler's actions. You could be a brain in a vat for all you know and "Hitler's actions" as you think you know them c ...[text shortened]... is a problem between the knowledge you claim God has and your notion of human free will.[/b]
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God's knowledge is infallible because he is present to all points in time and just has to see what's going on. He can no more be mistaken about an event than you can be mistaken about switching your computer on yesterday (given that your memory is 100% reliable)
You simply have failed to grasp that he doesn't make guesses - he just watches stuff happening. Even human scientists have a fantastic record when they just observe the outcomes of events , it's only when they make predictions that they come unstuck.
Originally posted by knightmeisterIn any case , the perfectness (or lack of) in my mind is not the issue. It's my relative position in time that makes my knowldge infallible.
Bull. There is nothing about your basis for belief that makes it impossible for you to hold mistaken beliefs about, say, Hitler's actions.
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NOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! Of course there could be historical innaccuracies and I could be delusional etc etc , but the point is that given a perfect mind and a perfect histroical re able to know anything about it because from Hitler's viewpoint he hasn't done it yet!!!
No. You just do not in any sense whatsoever understand the concept of infallibility as it relates to knowledge. That's too bad, because it means you have also failed to understand my argument. You are not infallible. I don't care what your "relative position" is, you cannot avoid the mere possibility that you are mistaken in regards to virtually any of your beliefs. As a trivial example, like I alread said, you could be brain in a vat for all you know. Your entire phenomenology is broadly compatible with this possibility and hence you cannot rule out this mere possibility.
Now, if God is just somehow mysteriously different such that it is simply impossible for Him to be mistaken in any of his eternal beliefs, then I'm afraid somehow mysteriously it also is the case that his eternal knowledge precludes our freedom of a libertarian sort. This is what my argument shows.
Your objection is not based on the perfectness of God's mind as such but his ability to supposedly know things "in advance" , and in that respect I can do that with Hitler.
Do me a favor and learn to frickin read, knightmeister! My revised argument in no way supposes that God knows things "in advance" (or that God is in any way subject to temporal development). My argument is fully consistent with your idea that God is an eternal thing, and everything He knows, He knows eternally. And despite your inability to understand this point: God's supposed infallibility with respect to knowledge IS material to my argument. Try reading the latest version of my argument again.
Whether my knowledge is imperfect or not is not the issue because even if I only know 1% of hitler's future infallibly it's still an amazing feat according to you because I should not be able to know anything about it because from Hitler's viewpoint he hasn't done it yet!!!
That makes no sense whatsoever. Like I said, YOU don't infallibly know anything about Hitler. And YOU are also not an eternal being, which is what G is supposed to be in my argument. From your viewpoint as a temporal being it is not the case that "from Hiter's viewpoint he hasn't done it yet!!!" From your viewpoint, Hitler no longer even exists.
Try responding to my actual argument instead of making crap up as you go and saying that this crap is "according to me".
Here, I'll reproduce my argument again so you do not have to go back and look for the latest version:
Here, T is some point on our timeline which is in the future with respect to the temporal development of subject S. A is some action. And, again, we suppose that G is some perfect eternal knower, by which I mean both that G eternally knows everything that can be eternally known and that all of G's eternal knowledge is infallible.
1. G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T.
2. It is not possible both that G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T and that S refrain from A-ing at T (infallibility condition).
3. From 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from A-ing at T.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from A-ing at T, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from A-ing at T.
5. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from A-ing at T, then S is not free with respect to A-ing at T.
6. Hence, if G knows eternally that S is A-ing at T, then S is not free with respect to A-ing at T.
Originally posted by knightmeisterHe can no more be mistaken about an event than you can be mistaken about switching your computer on yesterday (given that your memory is 100% reliable)
Would you please just answer my question? Do you or do you not maintain that God's knowledge is infallible? If you do maintain that his knowledge is infallible, what exactly do you mean by this? In what way is it not possible for God to be mistaken?
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God's knowledge is infallible because he is p serve the outcomes of events , it's only when they make predictions that they come unstuck.
Well, if it's already given that my memory is 100% reliable, then I guess it follows naturally that I cannot be mistaken in my memories. This seems pretty circular: if you are perfect in your memories, then you cannot be mistaken in your memories. At any rate (not just circularly starting from the assumption that your memories are perfectly reliable), there is nothing about your remembering switching on your computer yesterday that makes you immune in principle from error in this belief: like I said, you could just be a brain in a vat and your memories are all based on false appearances; or it is broadly possible that someone manipulated your mentality overnight and outfitted it with false memories; or etc. You cannot exclude these mere possibilities.
I get from this that God is infallible (at least I gather that this is your claim). But I am still not sure in what sense it is impossible for God to be mistaken. Doesn't matter too much to me: If you claim God must be infallible (for whatever reason or if he "just has to" be as such), then you'll have to deal with my argument.
knightmeister, this discussion seems to be going nowhere. So let me try to explain from a different angle why I think G's infallible knowledge precludes libertarian freedom (whereas ordinary knowledge, or fallible knowledge, doesn't).
Let's say you have a neighbor, N. N walks his dog everyday at noon. Every day, it doesn't matter if it is rain or snow or shine, N is walking his dog at noon. So let's say you know that N will be walking his dog tomorrow at noon. Does this state of affairs (your knowing that N will walk his dog tomorrow at noon) preclude the possibility of N's "doing otherwise"? No, it doesn't. There still may well exist the possibility that N will do otherwise tomorrow at noon. That is because ordinary knowledge doesn't require your meeting any sort of infallibility criterion. It doesn't entail that there is no possibility that you could be mistaken. In particular, if there are alternative eventualities (which upon obtaining would prove you wrong), these alternatives may well still be possible even if they in fact do not end up obtaining to prove you wrong.
But now let's say you know infallibly that N will walk his dog tomorrow at noon. Does this states of affairs (your knowing infallibly that N will walk his dog tomorrow at noon) preclude N's doing otherwise? Yes, I think it does. Because your knowing now entails satisfaction of an infallibility criterion such that it is not possible even in principle that you could be mistaken. There are simply no possible alternatives (such that if any one were to obtain it would prove you mistaken). There exists no possibility that N could do otherwise.
The same goes for God, whether he is in eternity or not. If, from eternity, God knows infallibly that N is walking his dog at noon tomorrow; then there are/were/will be simply no possible alternatives (such that if they obtain/obtained/will obtain would prove God mistaken). And within his own temporal framework, there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise at noon tomorrow. If there did exist such possibility, God's knowledge would not be infallible since there would exist alternatives that could prove God mistaken (and that is regardless of the fact that they don't/didn't/will not obtain to actually prove Him mistaken).
These are the sorts of ideas that form the basis for my Premise 2 (why I think it follows from the supposition of infallibility).
Originally posted by LemonJelloAnd within his own temporal framework, there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise at noon tomorrow. If there did exist such possibility, God's knowledge would not be infallible since there would exist alternatives that could prove God mistaken
knightmeister, this discussion seems to be going nowhere. So let me try to explain from a different angle why I think G's infallible knowledge precludes libertarian freedom (whereas ordinary knowledge, or fallible knowledge, doesn't).
Let's say you have a neighbor, N. N walks his dog everyday at noon. Every day, it doesn't matter if it is rain or sn ...[text shortened]... for my Premise 2 (why I think it follows from the supposition of infallibility).
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Firstly I see no reason why an alternative has to actually exist in reality for it to be a possibility. N is either going to walk his dog or he isn't BUT he can't do both. Only one option can be known and only one timeline can be known. The important thing to understand is that free will choices and determined choices both produce one timeline. Simply knowing that one timeline does not prove anything either way. The results are identical (one timeline).
The question is whether a "possibility" has to exist in actuality for it to be a true possibility. Right now I am making a choice. I can make only one choice (not two) that will become my timeline. Does the fact that I make one choice only exclude the possibility that I could have ever chosen differently? Of course it doesn't.
Secondly , it does make a difference if God is in eternity or not. If there is no fifth dimension included in the scenario then the whole thing is paradoxical and contradictory. I noticed in your argument that you started from your perpsective on time and then projected that on to God . You need to try ,at least, thinking in 5 dimensions not 4.
Originally posted by LemonJelloThere exists no possibility that N could do otherwise.
knightmeister, this discussion seems to be going nowhere. So let me try to explain from a different angle why I think G's infallible knowledge precludes libertarian freedom (whereas ordinary knowledge, or fallible knowledge, doesn't).
Let's say you have a neighbor, N. N walks his dog everyday at noon. Every day, it doesn't matter if it is rain or sn ...[text shortened]... for my Premise 2 (why I think it follows from the supposition of infallibility).
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But this state of affairs only occurs because N DOES infact walk his dog , so although he is going to do it and there is no possibility that he won't do it - this doesn't prove that he could never have done anything else.
Think about your knowledge of Hitler. He is going to invade poland , he will invade poland , he has invaded poland - BUT- How do we know that he could never have invaded Finland? How can we exclude that possibility on the basis of our infallible knowledge?
Originally posted by knightmeisterThis discussion is frankly painful for me. You simply don't get it. How else can I explain my argument to you? How else can I explain the implications of infallibility to you? You're going to have to help me help you because this just isn't going anywhere.
And within his own temporal framework, there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise at noon tomorrow. If there did exist such possibility, God's knowledge would not be infallible since there would exist alternatives that could prove God mistaken
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Firstly I see no reason why an alternative has to then projected that on to God . You need to try ,at least, thinking in 5 dimensions not 4.
Firstly I see no reason why an alternative has to actually exist in reality for it to be a possibility.
Neither do I because that just doesn't even make any sense. Where did I claim that an alternative has to "actually exist in reality" for it to be a possibility? That doesn't make sense: if it already exists in reality it is not the case that it merely has a possibility of obtaining -- rather, it has already obtained.
The question is whether a "possibility" has to exist in actuality for it to be a true possibility.
No it isn't (see above).
Right now I am making a choice. I can make only one choice (not two) that will become my timeline. Does the fact that I make one choice only exclude the possibility that I could have ever chosen differently? Of course it doesn't.
That is not even remotely what my argument is! Nowhere have I ever stated that the fact that you choose A thereby precludes the possibility that you could have chosen B. Please try getting with the program: my claims deal materially with the supposed infallibility of God's knowledge.
Secondly , it does make a difference if God is in eternity or not.
Actually it really doesn't; but at any rate, my argument supposes -- just as you insist -- that God is eternal.
I noticed in your argument that you started from your perpsective on time and then projected that on to God .
Bull. There is absolutely nothing in my argument that supposes God is in time like we are. Get with the program knightmeister!
Go back to my numbered argument and tell me specifically what premise(s) you reject and why.
Originally posted by knightmeisterBut this state of affairs only occurs because N DOES infact walk his dog ,
There exists no possibility that N could do otherwise.
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But this state of affairs only occurs because N DOES infact walk his dog , so although he is going to do it and there is no possibility that he won't do it - this doesn't prove that he could never have done anything else.
Think about your knowle ...[text shortened]... invaded Finland? How can we exclude that possibility on the basis of our infallible knowledge?
No. The state of affairs in question (that there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise) only occurs because of the infallibility conditions surrounding G's knowledge. And of course, this state of affairs precludes N's libertarian freedom.
How can we exclude that possibility on the basis of our infallible knowledge?
You just don't get it, do you? There is nothing about OUR knowlege of Hitler that is infallible. Somehow, God is different in this respect from us. Again, try getting with the program. I feel like this whole discussion has been a waste of my time.
Originally posted by LemonJelloNo. The state of affairs in question (that there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise) only occurs because of the infallibility conditions surrounding G's knowledge.
[b]But this state of affairs only occurs because N DOES infact walk his dog ,
No. The state of affairs in question (that there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise) only occurs because of the infallibility conditions surrounding G's knowledge. And of course, this state of affairs precludes N's libertarian freedom.
How can we excl ...[text shortened]... try getting with the program. I feel like this whole discussion has been a waste of my time.
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How does God's knowledge "make" N walk his dog exactly? You talk as if God had fallen asleep or something then N would magically re-gain his free will. If God did not exist then would N then be free to do what he liked without any contradictions?
If God does not exist then N will still presumably do something and whatever that thing is (eg walking his dog) will be what he does at that time.
Originally posted by LemonJelloThere is nothing about OUR knowlege of Hitler that is infallible.
[b]But this state of affairs only occurs because N DOES infact walk his dog ,
No. The state of affairs in question (that there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise) only occurs because of the infallibility conditions surrounding G's knowledge. And of course, this state of affairs precludes N's libertarian freedom.
How can we excl ...[text shortened]... try getting with the program. I feel like this whole discussion has been a waste of my time.
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I know what his future choices will be . That's not bad for a mere mortal.
Originally posted by knightmeisterHow does God's knowledge "make" N walk his dog exactly?
No. The state of affairs in question (that there exists no possibility that N could do otherwise) only occurs because of the infallibility conditions surrounding G's knowledge.
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How does God's knowledge "make" N walk his dog exactly? You talk as if God had fallen asleep or something then N would magically re-gain his fr ...[text shortened]... something and whatever that thing is (eg walking his dog) will be what he does at that time.
Have I ever stated that G's knowledge "makes" N walk his dog? Of course not.
You talk as if God had fallen asleep or something then N would magically re-gain his free will. If God did not exist then would N then be free to do what he liked without any contradictions?
No. Look, the theist's claim is that some God infallibly knows everything. It is the existence of this infallible knowledge on which my argument rests. And, yes, the supposition of infallibility DOES place demands on the world (the "world" broadly construed) because it places a very strong demand on God's basis for knowing.
Originally posted by knightmeisterAgain, you just don't get it. You just don't understand what I mean when I talk about infallibility, and you just don't get how this distinction is central to my argument. I'm willing to bear a heavy part of this responsibility myself: perhaps I have just failed in presenting my argument in clear terms.
There is nothing about OUR knowlege of Hitler that is infallible.
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I know what his future choices will be . That's not bad for a mere mortal.
But, anyway, I am going to bow out of this discussion. Thanks for the discussion, KM.
Maybe I will think about how to present my argument to you in yet another different way, and maybe I will revisit this discussion.
Originally posted by knightmeisterI don't think so, and early Hebrew stories don't seem to support this, nor does the larger picture of the OT.
The argument that free will and God's omniscience (FW v O) are logically contradictory can be countered in many ways. Here's another way of looking at things.
The argument rests on the idea that God can ONLY know our future choices if they are pre-determined in some way.
BUT .....let's think about this..
If God really did exist as eternal , ...[text shortened]... re random , free or determined - there's no way he cannot know -
He just HAS to know!
Originally posted by LemonJelloI think the difficulty is in understanding that God's knowledge is contingent on our choices. If don't make choice X then his knowledge of X cannot exist. The hard bit is the eternal dimension side of things. From our perspective it looks as if we have to "perform" X in order to fulfil God's knowledge , but from an eternal perspective we are not fulfilling anything we are just doing it at that moment.
Again, you just don't get it. You just don't understand what I mean when I talk about infallibility, and you just don't get how this distinction is central to my argument. I'm willing to bear a heavy part of this responsibility myself: perhaps I have just failed in presenting my argument in clear terms.
But, anyway, I am going to bow out of this disc ...[text shortened]... t my argument to you in yet another different way, and maybe I will revisit this discussion.
One final question . God is (in theory) watching you now make a choice right now. How long do you think he has had to wait to see your choice? A week? A decade?