Originally posted by lucifershammerYou seem to be implying that Mike has the same level of responsibility in the death of the stabbed man in both cases. Clearly, that is not the case.
Let's stick with moral evil for the moment.
Consider the following cases:
(1) Mike stabs a man, who bleeds to death.
(2) Mike comes across a man who has been stabbed, but does nothing to save him.
You seem to be implying that Mike has the same level of responsibility in the death of the stabbed man in both cases. Clearly, that is not the cas ...[text shortened]... thing about God) - refer back to our "ineffability" conversation in the other thread.
Well, I wasn’t implying that, but that is because I moved from the moral evil scenario. I think you are correct that scenarios of moral evil and those of natural evil cannot simply be lumped together.
I observe an "all or nothing" approach when you speak of knowing God (or anything about God) - refer back to our "ineffability" conversation in the other thread.
The problem I have was outlined in my three questions in that other thread. If someone asserts that we can know some, but not all, things about a supernatural being called “God,” then I ask what things can we know, how do we know them, and how do we know that we know them; to these, I could add a fourth that I assumed would be covered under the others: what is about the unknowable things that makes them unknowable?
Underlying all this are questions of sources, assumptions (axioms), etc.
Originally posted by vistesdI would say that there are two categories of truths that can be known about God:
[b]You seem to be implying that Mike has the same level of responsibility in the death of the stabbed man in both cases. Clearly, that is not the case.
Well, I wasn’t implying that, but that is because I moved from the moral evil scenario. I think you are correct that scenarios of moral evil and those of natural evil cannot simply be lumped together. ...[text shortened]... them unknowable?
Underlying all this are questions of sources, assumptions (axioms), etc.[/b]
1. Philosophical
2. Theological
The first can be discovered by the use of reason. For instance, in the Summa:
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm
THE ONE GOD
EXISTENCE: The existence (2) of God.
ESSENCE: We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not. So to study Him, we study what He has not -- such as composition and motion. His simplicity (3) or lack of composition. His perfection: and because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak of His goodness (6) -- and goodness in general (5) -- as well as His perfection (4). His infinity (7) and omnipresence (8). His immutability (9), and His eternity (10) following on His immutability. His unity (11). How God is known by us (12). The names of God (13).
OPERATIONS (INTELLECT): God's knowledge (14). The ideas (15), which exist in His knowledge. Truth (16) in God, for knowledge is of things that are true. Falsity (17) in God. The life of God (18), since to understand belongs to living beings.
OPERATIONS (WILL): God's will (19). In our own wills we find both the passions (such as joy and love), and the habits of the moral virtues (such as justice and fortitude). Hence we shall first consider the love (20) of God, and secondly His justice and mercy (21).
OPERATIONS (INTELLECT AND WILL): Providence (22), in respect to all created things; for in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence belongs. Predestination (23) and the book of life (24).
POWER: The power of God (25), the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. The divine beatitude (26)
___________
The second refers to things known by Revelation - because God Himself tells us.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerAs for the first, I need to look at St. T's "proofs" for the existence of God as such.
I would say that there are two categories of truths that can be known about God:
1. Philosophical
2. Theological
The first can be discovered by the use of reason. For instance, in the Summa:
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm
THE ONE GOD
EXISTENCE: The existence (2) of God.
ESSENCE: We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not ___________
The second refers to things known by Revelation - because God Himself tells us.
As for the second, I do not admit written revelation, and I hold the scriptures to be subject to the same human limits of understanding and propensity for error as I do the spiritual or mystical experiences thay may underlay them. That they are anything else seems to me to be an assumption, per se.
EDIT: You never answered my question about Thomas' declaration that all he had written was as straw compared to what he experienced? Why do you think he said that? Why do you think he never said anything else, in the short time remaining? Why do you think he said that now he was just waiting to die? Why do you think he would hold to his arguments in the Summa? Maybe he had a "Zen" experience that undid, for him, all his work?
EDIT 2: Speaking of written revelation, you never acknowledged my lengthy responses in the Midrash thread.
Originally posted by vistesd1. Good luck!
As for the first, I need to look at St. T's "proofs" for the existence of God as such.
As for the second, I do not admit written revelation, and I hold the scriptures to be subject to the same human limits of understanding and propensity for error as I do the spiritual or mystical experiences thay may underlay them. That they are anything else seems to me to be an assumption, per se.
2. I see no logical impediment to written revelation, nor do I see a logical impediment to an omnipotent (with some limitations as mentioned earlier and in GAFE-II) God providing means of protection against human error in interpreting Scriptures.
Originally posted by lucifershammerThanks.
1. Good luck!
2. I see no logical impediment to written revelation, nor do I see a logical impediment to an omnipotent (with some limitations as mentioned earlier and in GAFE-II) God providing means of protection against human error in interpreting Scriptures.
I don't know that there's a logical impediment to written revelation, though there may be some circularity involved unless you first conclude that there is a God of the kind that could provide such revelation.
I wrote the above edits while you were replying to me... 😕
Originally posted by vistesdI wasn't aware there was an open question on Thomas!
EDIT: You never answered my question about Thomas' declaration that all he had written was as straw compared to what he experienced? Why do you think he said that? Why do you think he never said anything else, in the short time remaining? Why do you think he said that now he was just waiting to die? Why do you think he would hold to his arguments in the ...[text shortened]... ing of written revelation, you never acknowledged my lengthy responses in the Midrash thread.
You never answered my question about Thomas' declaration that all he had written was as straw compared to what he experienced? Why do you think he said that?
It's one thing to reason that God is good, quite another to experience that goodness. Ditto for beauty, power, mercy, justice etc. It doesn't mean that God is not good etc. - just that our normal ways of thinking about those terms do not do Him justice.
Why do you think he never said anything else, in the short time remaining?
He probably did - but they would've been things like "Pass the salt please" or "Stop snoring". Hardly the stuff of legend! 😉
Why do you think he said that now he was just waiting to die?
Because he knew what was waiting for him - and his present live seemed meaningless in comparison.
Why do you think he would hold to his arguments in the Summa?
Because he never denounced them. Never said it was falsified by his direct experience of God. Simply that it was inadequate - not that it was incorrect.
Maybe he had a "Zen" experience that undid, for him, all his work?
Not "undid" - "fulfilled". It's the map and the territory again. The map is not wrong - just not a complete representation of the territory.
2. Apologies. And thanks. I was just seeking a better understanding of Jewish hermeneutical principles.
Originally posted by lucifershammerNow, I think your explanations for Thomas are speculation (well, except maybe for "pass the salt!" nice touch--or nice touche); but, so would mine.
I wasn't aware there was an open question on Thomas!
[b]You never answered my question about Thomas' declaration that all he had written was as straw compared to what he experienced? Why do you think he said that?
It's one thing to reason that God is good, quite another to experience that goodness. Ditto for beauty, power, mercy, justice etc ...[text shortened]... s. I was just seeking a better understanding of Jewish hermeneutical principles.[/b]
No problem; I just didn't know if you had read them.
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Originally posted by vistesdActually, we do know something about St. Thomas's last days:
Now, I think your explanations for Thomas are speculation (well, except maybe for "pass the salt!" nice touch--or nice touche); but, so would mine.
In 1274, when Aquinas was nearly fifty, the Pope ... sent word to him, asking him to come to a Council on [matters regarding debates with Arab philosophers] to be held at Lyons... He set out with his friend on the journey, proposing to rest for the night with his sister, to whom he was deeply devoted; and when he came into her house he was stricken down with some unnamed malady... He was eventually taken to a monastery at Fossanuaova; and his strange end came upon him with great strides. It may be worth remarking, for those who think that he thought too little of the emotional or romantic side of religious truth, that he asked to have The Song of Solomon read through to him from beginning to end... He confessed his sins and he received his God (LH: i.e. the Eucharist)...
Granted that we can only speculate about what he meant about his "straw" statement, but his actions prior to his death do not appear to be those of a man who had disowned a lifetime of defending the faith and philosophy.
EDIT: The citation is from G.K. Chesterton's biography of Aquinas.
Originally posted by lucifershammerThat's a lovely picture by Chesterton.
Actually, we do know something about St. Thomas's last days:
[quote]In 1274, when Aquinas was nearly fifty, the Pope ... sent word to him, asking him to come to a Council on [matters regarding debates with Arab philosophers] to be held at Lyons... He set out with his friend on the journey, proposing to rest for the night with his sister, to whom he w ...[text shortened]... faith and philosophy.
EDIT: The citation is from G.K. Chesterton's biography of Aquinas.
"Straw" may not (I would bet not, actually) refer to "error," but to "inadequacy."
But, the Zen folks have a phrase for such speculation: "putting legs on a snake." They advise against it.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerI do think there are scenarios (especially involving moral evil) where God is constrained to permit some evil to occur because the "cost" of preventing it is too high; i.e. results in greater evil.
Let's stick with moral evil for the moment.
Consider the following cases:
(1) Mike stabs a man, who bleeds to death.
(2) Mike comes across a man who has been stabbed, but does nothing to save him.
You seem to be implying that Mike has the same level of responsibility in the death of the stabbed man in both cases. Clearly, that is not the cas thing about God) - refer back to our "ineffability" conversation in the other thread.
Does not such a limitation derive directly from the assumption if God’s omni-benevolence—that is, that a God who is all-good by nature would be incapable of not preventing evil unless the result of so doing would result in a greater evil?
Does not such an assumption, coupled with God’s omnipotence and omniscience (as you say, the OOO God), entail that we in fact live in the best of all possible worlds—that is, God is incapable of making this world better by preventing evil (especially natural evil)? Even if one argues that God created the best of all possible worlds, but the first humans mucked it up (through their disobedience, causing not only moral evil but also natural evil), does this not entail that the best of all possible worlds was one which God could not sustain without introducing even greater evil?
Does this not entail that the best of all possible worlds (BOPW) necessitated the possibility of evil (and, if one admits omniscience, possibly the actuality as well)?
In the face of, say, the holocaust (moral evil) or brutal suffering/death by earthquake (natural evil), this scenario seems blushingly Panglossian.
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Originally posted by vistesdNo. As I argued in the GAFE-II thread, that God cannot make this world a better place by preventing some forms of evil does not imply that we cannot do so.
[b]I do think there are scenarios (especially involving moral evil) where God is constrained to permit some evil to occur because the "cost" of preventing it is too high; i.e. results in greater evil.
Does not such a limitation derive directly from the assumption if God’s omni-benevolence—that is, that a God who is all-good by nature would be incapabl ...[text shortened]... utal suffering/death by earthquake (natural evil), this scenario seems blushingly Panglossian.[/b]
EDIT: bbarr correctly pointed out that this would be true only if free will were libertarian (and there is a thread elsewhere on libertarian vs. compatibilist free will that I've been too busy to read). Now, since the underlying assumption of virtually any guide to moral action is that free will is, indeed, free will, I don't want to get bogged down by this.
Originally posted by lucifershammer(1) With or without the assumption of God--or a utopian vision of BOPW, though such might provide inspiration--humanity might have the capability of making the world better.
No. As I argued in the GAFE-II thread, that God cannot make this world a better place by preventing some forms of evil does not imply that we cannot do so.
(2) I note your use of the word "some."