God's Priorities

Originally posted by vistesd
(2) I note your use of the word "some."

1. I didn't really stop to think too much when I was writing it - the "some" probably slipped in inadvertently.

2. On further reflection, I think it's perfectly possible that (given we do not have a "God's eye view" - as you eloquently phrased it) some things society considers 'evil' may not, in fact, be so. And vice-versa.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
1. I didn't really stop to think too much when I was writing it - the "some" probably slipped in inadvertently.

2. On further reflection, I think it's perfectly possible that (given we do not have a "God's eye view" - as you eloquently phrased it) some things society considers 'evil' may not, in fact, be so. And vice-versa.

Inadvertant slips happen to me all the time--I'm glad I could catch one of yours for a change! 😉

If God cannot prevent evils without generating a more evil situation, wouldn't humanity's attempts, if successful, end up doing the same thing? If God cannot prevent suffering S without causing greater evil, how does humanity's prevention of S not also have the same result?

Is there some easier way to find GAFE II than paging back through the thread list? I think I got to page 20... (I remember the thread, but not all the details...)

EDIT: With regard to (2), that seems likely. However, there are some things (a conscious child burning to death, for example) that I cannot under any circumstances call "good."

Originally posted by vistesd
Inadvertant slips happen to me all the time--I'm glad I could catch one of yours for a change! 😉

If God cannot prevent evils without generating a more evil situation, wouldn't humanity's attempts, if successful, end up doing the same thing? If God cannot prevent suffering S without causing greater evil, how does humanity's prevention of S not also have ...[text shortened]... us child burning to death, for example) that I cannot under any circumstances call "good."

If God cannot prevent evils without generating a more evil situation, wouldn't humanity's attempts, if successful, end up doing the same thing? If God cannot prevent suffering S without causing greater evil, how does humanity's prevention of S not also have the same result?

Because, at least in the case of moral evil, it is humanity committing the act. So, for one, the person committing the crime can always choose to do otherwise.

Further, it is not the prevention of the evil act itself that causes the damage (and this was something I pointed out in GAFE II as well - I think I have it bookmarked at home, so I might be able to post a threadid) - but the manner in which it is prevented. Since the manner of divine [extraordinary] and human interventions are different, they cannot have the same result.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]If God cannot prevent evils without generating a more evil situation, wouldn't humanity's attempts, if successful, end up doing the same thing? If God cannot prevent suffering S without causing greater evil, how does humanity's prevention of S not also have the same result?

Because, at least in the case of moral evil, it is humanity [i]comm ...[text shortened]... vine [extraordinary] and human interventions are different, they cannot have the same result.[/b]

[/i]How (in what manner) would a divine intervention to prevent evil generate a greater evil, if human intervention would not do so? I would’ve though that divine agency would be perfect, and human agency not. So how would divine agency change the causal-complex for the worse, while human agency would not?

For example, how would God’s preventing the murderer from murdering change the causal-complex such that a different chain (or interconnected chains) of events would be different than it would be in the case of the murderer simply deciding not to commit the murder? And how would it be worse?

If it makes more sense for me to re-read the GAFE II thread before continuing, I will—save you from simply repeating what you’ve already said.

Note: I just now saw your free will edit in one of the prior posts. I am following the free will discussion. Have not yet reached a firm conclusion, but bbarr’s outline there of the compatibilist view seems pretty clear.

Originally posted by vistesd
[/i]How (in what manner) would a divine intervention to prevent evil generate a greater evil, if human intervention would not do so? I would’ve though that divine agency would be perfect, and human agency not. So how would divine agency change the causal-complex for the worse, while human agency would not?

For example, how would God’s preventing the mur ...[text shortened]... ached a firm conclusion, but bbarr’s outline there of the compatibilist view seems pretty clear.

Some of it is in the GAFE II thread, but I'll try some brief replies:

How (in what manner) would a divine intervention to prevent evil generate a greater evil, if human intervention would not do so? I would’ve though that divine agency would be perfect, and human agency not.

We're talking about situations where divine agency would, in fact, not be "perfect".

For example, how would God’s preventing the murderer from murdering change the causal-complex such that a different chain (or interconnected chains) of events would be different than it would be in the case of the murderer simply deciding not to commit the murder? And how would it be worse?

The first question is a little convoluted, but I think you're asking how the chain of events in scenario A (God intervenes, murderer does not commit crime) is different from scenario B (murderer chooses not to commit crime). Clearly the two chains of events are different - because God's intervention and the murderer's choice are also events in that chain.

How would it be worse? I simply don't know - I'm not omniscient. I can hypothesise, for instance, that it might involve the violation of free will which can result in greater evil.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Some of it is in the GAFE II thread, but I'll try some brief replies:

[b]How (in what manner) would a divine intervention to prevent evil generate a greater evil, if human intervention would not do so? I would’ve though that divine agency would be perfect, and human agency not.

We're talking about situations where divine agency would, in fa nce, that it might involve the violation of free will which can result in greater evil.[/b]

Clearly the two chains of events are different - because God's intervention and the murderer's choice are also events in that chain.

I used “causal-complex” rather than chain, because I didn’t want to assume a linear process.

I don’t see how God’s intervention versus the murderer’s choice necessarily changes the subsequent causal-complex in a way that makes the former worse than the latter, except—the argument that free will is somehow worth, e.g., the holocaust. But I accept your honest “I don’t know” on that score.

I also don’t see how the fact of God’s intervention versus the murderer’s choice necessarily means that the results stemming from the subsequent chain(s) of events will be significantly different either way. Even if one assumes a “butterfly effect”—e.g., based on a sea-change in the murderer’s character and attitudes—one has to allow other, countering “butterfly effects” as well.

Now, I recognize that I am using the word “necessarily, “ and you are not.

In the end, is your “easing” of God’s omnipotence in order to preserve omni-benevolence logical? I think so. Does it represent a plausible argument vis-à-vis the GAFE? I don’t think so. It seems to me that it opens a lot of speculation simply in order to preserve omni-benevolence. And I think that part of this may stem from offering a specific, narrow exception to God’s omnipotence.

That is, I am not sure that it accomplishes anything more than simply saying, “God is powerful—even powerful beyond human ability to measure—but not all-powerful. There may be circumstances under which humanity can prevent evils that God cannot, and there are evils that neither seems powerful enough to prevent. I trust that God is doing the best [s]he can.” That, of course, is giving up a lot, from the point of view of conventional Christian theology.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Clearly the two chains of events are different - because God's intervention and the murderer's choice are also events in that chain.

I used “causal-complex” rather than chain, because I didn’t want to assume a linear process.

I don’t see how God’s intervention versus the murderer’s choice necessarily changes the subsequent causal-complex in a wa ...[text shortened]... hat, of course, is giving up a lot, from the point of view of conventional Christian theology.[/b]

In trying to evaluate whether free will is worth the Shoah, you are attempting to evaluate something that human beings have no capability of evaluating. In a thread some days back, I asked a poster what his calculus of morality was. How many hungry people do you need to feed to make up for the evil of one premeditated murder?

*shrugs*

Ultimately this entire philosophical discussion is from a "God's eye" view. Like an algebraic expression, we can locate the relationship between the variables, but we cannot actually assign values to those variables.

I am not "easing" God's omnipotence in order to preserve omni-benevolence. As I argued in the GAFE-II thread, the normal definition of omnipotent (i.e. capable of causing any logically possible state of affairs to attain) is inherently self-contradictory. I posited the existence of a class of states of affairs (essentially of the form "God cannot cause this state of affairs to attain" ) that God cannot cause to attain. I also argued that historical cases involving freely willed evil acts belong to this class.

There is nothing novel about understanding God's 'omnipotence' as actually being 'maximally potent'. This is something modern Christian philosophers like Plantinga have also argued.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
In trying to evaluate whether free will is worth the Shoah, you are attempting to evaluate something that human beings have no capability of evaluating. In a thread some days back, I asked a poster what his calculus of morality was. How many hungry people do you need to feed to make up for the evil of one premeditated murder?

*shrugs*

Ultimately ...[text shortened]... '. This is something modern Christian philosophers like Plantinga have also argued.

In trying to evaluate whether free will is worth the Shoah, you are attempting to evaluate something that human beings have no capability of evaluating.

I’m not sure I agree--that is, I’m not sure that we can escape it, despite our limitations. If I see you raping and murdering a child, and I know I can prevent it, and the reason I choose not to is that I would be interfering with your free will (e.g., assume that I know I would not be harmed)—or because I fear that some greater, unknown evil might result—I don’t see that as something we can shrug off. I will either decide that violating your free will is the greater evil in that case, or I will not. All sorts of philosophical or religious-doctrinal points may inform my choice, but none of them relieve me of the choice, with which I have to live.

If a “God’s-eye view,” with moral certainty, were required to make moral decisions, we could make none.

In a thread some days back, I asked a poster what his calculus of morality was. How many hungry people do you need to feed to make up for the evil of one premeditated murder?

None. One has absolutely nothing to do with the other. That is the point many have made in discussing the Job story: How does giving Job new children make up for the grief, pain and suffering at the deaths of his first set of beloved children. That does not relieve the kind of choice I outlined above—whether regarding feeding the hungry or permitting rape/murder.

(Nice rabbinical shrug, though. 😉)

And, as I argued in one of the Job (or Joshua, can’t recall which) discussions, I do not think we are relieved of making a moral judgment simply by introducing God into the equation. (Recall Avraham’s argument with God; A.J. Heschel gives a powerful midrashic twist to the story (based on a suitably weird reading of a Hebrew word) by saying: “And Avraham is still standing there!” )

As I argued in the GAFE-II thread, the normal definition of omnipotent (i.e. capable of causing any logically possible state of affairs to attain) is inherently self-contradictory. I posited the existence of a class of states of affairs (essentially of the form "God cannot cause this state of affairs to attain" ) that God cannot cause to attain. I also argued that historical cases involving freely willed evil acts belong to this class.

Ah. Well, I really have to re-read that thread then.

There is nothing novel about understanding God's 'omnipotence' as actually being 'maximally potent'.

On the contrary, I think one could argue—from a standard monotheistic view, now, even without any of my monistic “hijinks”—that such an understanding is scripturally quite sound, at least from a point of view that emphasizes a Judaic strain over a Hellenistic one.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]In trying to evaluate whether free will is worth the Shoah, you are attempting to evaluate something that human beings have no capability of evaluating.

I’m not sure I agree--that is, I’m not sure that we can escape it, despite our limitations. If I see you raping and murdering a child, and I know I can prevent it, and the reason I choose ...[text shortened]... nd, at least from a point of view that emphasizes a Judaic strain over a Hellenistic one.[/b]

Please do re-read that GAFE-II thread, and see why LH's argument is based on the presupposition that libertarian free will is coherent.

GAFE-II

Thread 25481

The links to the original GAFE thread are in the first post.

God answers all prayer, but petty prayers like "Pliz God clean my bedroom" (kind of prayers i consider petty) ain't answered by God, maybe one should distiguish between a prayer and a wish, rather go to the wish master for wishes and petty paryer rather rather than waste God's time

Originally posted by bbarr
Please do re-read that GAFE-II thread, and see why LH's argument is based on the presupposition that libertarian free will is coherent.

Actually, I've been thinking about whether it requires libertarian free will or whether any non-deterministic free will will satisfy the conditions needed.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Actually, I've been thinking about whether it requires libertarian free will or whether any non-deterministic free will will satisfy the conditions needed.

That would be a wonderful thread topic. I'm anxious to see what you come up with.

Originally posted by bbarr
Please do re-read that GAFE-II thread, and see why LH's argument is based on the presupposition that libertarian free will is coherent.

Yes, I see that.

On page 1 of the GAFE II thread, LH wrote:

“Let's take a concrete example. In his defence of Premise 2, bbarr raises the example of a Nazi killing an infant. There are at least two [classes of] alternate states of affairs that could have attained instead:

A1. The Nazi freely chooses not to kill the infant.
A2. God causes some supernatural event to be so that the Nazi does not kill the infant.

We would both agree that (A1) is an instance of R; i.e. A1 > S. But is it logically possible that God can act so that A1 comes to be? If God tampers with the Nazi's free will (so that he chooses not to kill the infant), then this scenario (A1'😉 is not identical with A1 - because the choice of the Nazi is no longer free - what we have is an instance of (A2) instead.

It is logically impossible for God, by any act of His alone, to keep A1 identical to S right up to the point of choice by the Nazi such that the Nazi necessarily freely chooses otherwise. In other words, the only person who could logically cause A1 to attain was the Nazi himself! God is TI1 constrained with respect to this scenario!”

Then the discussion ensued wherein you made the point about libertarian free will.

However, it seems to me that all LH has done—even assuming the coherency of libertarian free will—is show that it is not logically possible for God to cause (A1). I do not see where he shows that (A2) necessarily represents a scenario in which God’s intervention would lead to greater evil (with or without God’s continued intervention in the natural order)—unless, as I noted above, that the violation of free will itself is such an evil. (My response to the question of whether the Shoa is “worth the candle” vis-à-vis free will still stands—especially if we are talking about an incoherent notion of free will.)

If the standard definition of God’s omnipotence leads to a contradiction (with or without libertarian free will), then a replacement understanding of God’s potency—e.g., what exactly does “maximally potent” mean?—needs to be offered; and the question of why God’s interference would lead to greater evil, while human choice would not, needs to be revisited.

Finally, I do not see the question of natural evil being answered by the contradiction raised by LH (sorry to refer to you in the third-person here!).

_______________________________

I guess I would be interested in seeing two things here: (1) a revised understanding of God’s potency, with its ramifications for the problem of evil;* and (2) whatever offering LH might have based on another view of free will.

* That is, unless one is content simply to say that God is not able to prevent the evil in the world, and let it go at that, without trying to delineate the limits of God’s potency. As I noted above, one could simply say: “God is powerful, but not all-powerful. There may be circumstances under which humanity can prevent evils that God cannot, and there are evils that neither seems powerful enough to prevent. I trust that God is doing the best [s]he can.”

Originally posted by vistesd
Yes, I see that.

On page 1 of the GAFE II thread, LH wrote:

“Let's take a concrete example. In his defence of Premise 2, bbarr raises the example of a Nazi killing an infant. There are at least two [classes of] alternate states of affairs that could have attained instead:

A1. The Nazi freely chooses not to kill the infant.
A2. God causes some sup ...[text shortened]... that neither seems powerful enough to prevent. I trust that God is doing the best [s]he can.”

I can't "show" that A2 necessarily represents a scenario where God's intervention leads to greater evil - that requires near-omniscience. Yes, your question still stands - but that's a question no human can ever answer.

what exactly does “maximally potent” mean?

I suspect this is one of those terms that can only be understood via negativa; i.e. one cannot show what it is, only what it is not.

the question of why God’s interference would lead to greater evil, while human choice would not, needs to be revisited...

That is, unless one is content simply to say that God is not able to prevent the evil in the world, and let it go at that, without trying to delineate the limits of God’s potency. As I noted above, one could simply say: “God is powerful, but not all-powerful. There may be circumstances under which humanity can prevent evils that God cannot, and there are evils that neither seems powerful enough to prevent.

Because there are no evils that both God and Man (I'm ignoring other moral agents like angels, for the moment) cannot prevent. It's like a team sport - God holds up his end, we need to hold up ours.

Finally, I do not see the question of natural evil being answered by the contradiction raised by LH

It is if one views natural evil as a consequence of moral evil. I'm not positing the Pat Robertson view that Katrina was the consequence of New Orleans citizens' sinfulness or such. Rather, it's more like greenhouse gas emissions in Texas contributing to global warming.