Originally posted by LemonJello
I really don't understand the problem here with respect to Molinism. Under Molinism, God is a personal creator; he's a cognizer and an agent, etc. So, in keeping, they attribute unto him doxastic states like beliefs and knowledge, etc, and they attribute unto him agency and intentionality, etc. That's all coherent. And what's anthropmorphic about it? he is not; why not a Molinist? Of course, these kinds of claims may court other problems.

All I know about Molinism is what you said about it. Until I saw this thread I didn't know there were people who differentiated themselves from other theists with this belief of theirs. I'm still not sure why Molinists are so intently focused on this one little possible attribute of an omniscient and omnipotent God. I am aware of other groups who differentiate and isolate themselves based on some obscure or fanciful idea about God, or perhaps focus on one little out of context passage from their bibles and then build an entire theology out of it. I'm also aware of the intellectual stimulation some get from blathering on about obscure ideas that somehow work to support their own core beliefs (whether they be theistic or atheistic). Someone made the point that beliefs don't change the fact that humans are inclined to error, and we don't (because we can't) automatically become better humans for simply joining one little faction of the human race.

As far as free will and the problem of evil is concerned, anyone assuming free will should (or even could) exist with no problems or consequenses (and then of course passing blame onto God for creating us with free will) sounds a bit self indulgent, like someone believing they should be able to play the stock market without having to risk any possible losses. It's not realistic to envision free will entities such as people and angels and then expect them to not exercise that free will. It is free will that allows us to choose between doing good or doing evil. This is why free will and personal responsibility are two sides of the same coin... you can't realistically expect to have one without having the other.

Originally posted by LemonJello

It seems to me that this line of reasoning reduces the Molinist dilemma to the problem of evil.

I am not sure what the "Molinist dilemma" refers to, but yes my point relates to the evidential problem of evil. It seems to me that the Molinist, on the basis of his commitments to divine middle knowledge and how it relates to divine creativ ...[text shortened]... our free choices.[/quote]

I'm not sure I understand. Why must any of these be the case?

I am following your posts with interest, but I would be remiss if I didn't point out that...

... It seems to me that the Molinist, on the basis of his commitments to
divine middle knowledge...

Should be "on the basis of their commitments..."

No reason why Molinist's should be considered to be male by default.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Yeah, according to Molinism, God provides for our freedom. But he does so selectively, based on his rolodex of counterfactual knowledge of creaturely freedom. If God knows that KellyJay would freely do A1 in circumstances C1; and yet KellyJay's freely doing A1 does not align with the divine will; then God won't actualize KellyJay in C1. He'll instead a ...[text shortened]... as much responsible for that as KellyJay? Is he not a willing accomplice in your doing A2?

It goes back to honesty and trust in my opinion, do we live and make
choices? The thing about what we are presented each of us will either be
treated the same way or not, examples would be where Jesus talks to
some of the people in the New Testament where Jesus shares that if the
things done in past were done in their time they would have repented. So
what we are left with are all of us are presented with the same type of
things and we will do with each of them as we will. I don't think we will
see one group treated differently than another, but instead what we will see
are different choices made when those treatments are presented. It will
also show clearly judgments where when we condemn another and we see
our own choices making those same types of choices we will be condemning
ourselves, because we knew better.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello

It seems to me that this line of reasoning reduces the Molinist dilemma to the problem of evil.

I am not sure what the "Molinist dilemma" refers to, but yes my point relates to the evidential problem of evil. It seems to me that the Molinist, on the basis of his commitments to divine middle knowledge and how it relates to divine creativ ...[text shortened]... our free choices.[/quote]

I'm not sure I understand. Why must any of these be the case?

Me: It must be the case that the goodness of the existence of free will in at least some worlds, exceeds the evil that occurs in those worlds, and exceeds the goodness of any world that lacks free will.

It must be the case that the world that God chooses to actualize, has the greatest net amount of goodness that any world can have after the evil is accounted for.

It must be the case that there are many worlds having free will, that have the same maximal net amount of goodness, and God limits our free will. such that one of those maximally good worlds is actualized by our free choices.



You: I'm not sure I understand. Why must any of these be the case?

I had said, to salvage God's reputation. I mean, in order to defend the omni-claims of goodness, power, and knowledge, in the face of the actual (not merely potential) existence of evil, these three conditions have to be shown to be true.

Alternatively one could adopt the stance presented by God in Job: the more or less antirationalist stance that human are in no position, by right or intellect of knowledge, to judge God.

Originally posted by lemon lime
All I know about Molinism is what you said about it. Until I saw this thread I didn't know there were people who differentiated themselves from other theists with this belief of theirs. I'm still not sure why Molinists are so intently focused on this one little possible attribute of an omniscient and omnipotent God. I am aware of other groups who differen of the same coin... you can't realistically expect to have one without having the other.

If all you know about Molinism is what I have said here, then it simply baffles me why you would feel the need to make sweeping generalizations about their position. After all, I have not tried to give any sort of detailed characterization of their position or to outline a criterion for it in terms of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions. In fact, the only thing I have focused on in terms of Molinism specifically is what I take to be a necessary condition of the position -- that one maintain that God holds knowledge in the form of those aforementioned counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and that this knowledge informs the divine creative process. My arguments in reference to Molinism only deal with this necessary condition of the position; so if you're purporting to respond to my arguments, please try to stick to the facts.

The vast majority of everything you say here is irrelevant to what I have argued. An exception is this point:

free will and personal responsibility are two sides of the same coin... you can't realistically expect to have one without having the other

Yes, I agree with this point. And this is related to my point about Molinism. Again, my point just concerns the necessary condition of Molinism mentioned above and how I think it leads to an interesting implication. My point is simply as follows. According to the Molinist, God's creative process is informed by his knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in that he actualizes a creation based on this knowledge and based on what accords with his divine will. He basically chose (freely) to actualize what is actual over what is not actual based on his counterfactual knowledge. And, just as you said, personal responsibility attends free choice. It seems that on the Molinist account, if it's an actual state of affairs that some creature S in circumstances C freely chooses to do A; that's ultimately only because God freely chose to actualize S in C, knowing full well that S would freely choose to do A. That A happens is proximately the responsibility of S, but it is also ultimately the responsibility of God. So, it seems to me that, on the Molinist account, God shares as much responsibility for A as does S. If that is the case, then this should presumably lead to some complications for the Molinist since in the actual world A takes on all sorts of heinous things; and the implication would be that God is a willing accomplice in all these.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I am following your posts with interest, but I would be remiss if I didn't point out that...

... It seems to me that the Molinist, on the basis of [b]his commitments to
divine middle knowledge...

Should be "on the basis of their commitments..."

No reason why Molinist's should be considered to be male by default.[/b]

Sure. You can just replace 'his' with 'his or her'. If you check the OP, you'll see I made sure to say himself/herself, but after that I have been lazier about that issue.

Originally posted by KellyJay
It goes back to honesty and trust in my opinion, do we live and make
choices? The thing about what we are presented each of us will either be
treated the same way or not, examples would be where Jesus talks to
some of the people in the New Testament where Jesus shares that if the
things done in past were done in their time they would have repented. So
...[text shortened]... ng those same types of choices we will be condemning
ourselves, because we knew better.
Kelly

OK. What does this have to do with whether or not under Molinism God is a willing accomplice in your doing A2?

Originally posted by JS357
Me: It must be the case that the goodness of the existence of free will in at least some worlds, exceeds the evil that occurs in those worlds, and exceeds the goodness of any world that lacks free will.

It must be the case that the world that God chooses to actualize, has the greatest net amount of goodness that any world can have after the evil is a nalist stance that human are in no position, by right or intellect of knowledge, to judge God.

Thanks for those clarifications. The logical structure of what you say doesn't make any sense to me. You say that a,b,c all "must be" the case for S to salvage G's reputation; but then you add on that alternatively S can just say d. If S can just say d, though, and acheive the objective; then it cannot be that a, b, c must all the be the case to achieve the same. So I don't really follow.

At any rate, I'm not prepared to agree that any of those things must be the case for one to satisfactorily meet the problem of evil. Basically, for one to meet the problem of evil, I think he just needs to be able to show that it's sufficiently plausible that a god with all the omni- attributes coexists with the evil that exists (for the evidential problem of evil); or be able to show that it's logically consistent for such a god to coexist with the evil that exists (for the logical problem of evil). But I'm not prepared to cast these any further into specific claims that must be the case for this person to be successful in those regards. Also, in my opinion, the stance you mention in reference to the Book of Job does fine at getting around the logical problem of evil; but I would say is basically useless in trying to get around the evidential formulation of the argument.

At any rate, I've already said that I'm not even assuming here that the Molinist is committed to all the omni- attributes pertaining to God, so it was probably misleading on my part to say my point is related to 'theodicy' specifically. I have tried to clarify my point about Molinism in the post above to lemon lime.

Originally posted by LemonJello
If all you know about Molinism is what I have said here, then it simply baffles me why you would feel the need to make sweeping generalizations about their position. After all, I have not tried to give any sort of detailed characterization of their position or to outline a criterion for it in terms of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions. In fact ...[text shortened]... heinous things; and the implication would be that God is a willing accomplice in all these.

"If all you know about Molinism is what I have said here, then it simply baffles me why you would feel the need to make sweeping generalizations about their position."

Generalizations perhaps, but I see it as being more like speculation on my part. I don't know why you would be baffled by this because you go on to say:

"After all, I have not tried to give any sort of detailed characterization of their position or to outline a criterion for it in terms of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions."

I'm aware of how little information there is to work with here, but by your own admission this should also explain why I am not in a position to do much more than to speculate and make what you call sweeping generalizations. On the other hand, I'm baffled by how much hay you are able to make out of this considering how little information there is to work with and because the only idea up for consideration is the relatively simply idea of God contemplating things that won't happen so he can be better informed as to how to proceed with his act of creation. It sounds like an effort to divine the mind of God or perhaps work out the mechanics of thought becoming action by an omniscient and omnipotent being who we actually don't have much chance of fully understanding anyway, and this alone would seem to prompt the question Who in their right mind gives a rat's behind about any of this to begin with? Intellectually stimulating perhaps, but as much use to our minds as a body builders weight lifting is to his body. In other words, there is merit to simply exercising the mind, even if we never accomplish anything other than to beef up our ability to think and compose impressively long and tedious treatises for the purpose of keeping our nimble little fingers busy dancing across the keyboard and killing time until a favorite television program starts... and it starts in 2 minutes so hasta la vista baby, I am outta here!

Originally posted by lemon lime
"If all you know about Molinism is what I have said here, then it simply baffles me why you would feel the need to make sweeping generalizations about their position."

Generalizations perhaps, but I see it as being more like speculation on my part. I don't know why you would be baffled by this because you go on to say:

"After all, I have not tried t ...[text shortened]... program starts... and it starts in 2 minutes so hasta la vista baby, I am outta here!

Your nimble fingers could have googled Molinism instead of churning out this flotsam. And you'd learn something to boot.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Your nimble fingers could have googled Molinism instead of churning out this flotsam. And you'd learn something to boot.

When and if I do google this I might be surprised to see something I didn't see before, when someone else googled it and then told of what he had learned. With the exception of the first few paragraphs, flotsam is a fairly good word for most of what I just said. Adding a little of my own doesn't make the water level rise by much, so I'm really not too worried by any resulting blowback. I'm not one to spit in the ocean and then wait for news of the inevitable tsunami... this will all soon disappear into the aether and no one will remember it.

Originally posted by lemon lime
When and if I do google this I might be surprised to see something I didn't see before, when someone else googled it and then told of what he had learned. With the exception of the first few paragraphs, flotsam is a fairly good word for most of what I just said. Adding a little of my own doesn't make the water level rise by much, so I'm really not too wo vitable tsunami... this will all soon disappear into the aether and no one will remember it.

Well, the first paragraphs blamed the debate opponent for your own ignorance, missing the point that you should read up on the subject before making claims about it.

And now you're quickly establishing a reputation for churning out crap and not caring that you do. I think you'll find that your posts disappear into aether faster than those of others.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Well, the first paragraphs blamed the debate opponent for your own ignorance, missing the point that you should read up on the subject before making claims about it.

And now you're quickly establishing a reputation for churning out crap and not caring that you do. I think you'll find that your posts disappear into aether faster than those of others.

It wasn't blame. I was simply pointing out the futility of expecting an in-depth discussion of a subject that has very little intrinsic depth to begin with. You could just as easily be critical of someone who doesn't seriously study and then discuss How many angels can dance on the head of a pin, so to borrow a line from Shakespeare this has been much ado about nothing.


By the way, vistesd summed this up rather well on the second page:

" 1. If an event E occurs, G know that it occurs (“omniscience simple” ).

2. G knows whether or not E will occur in some future (foreknowledge).

—Presumably G also knows the entailments of E's occurence (e1, e3, … , e(n)), i.e., what further effects are thereby entailed.

3. G knows what would happen if E did occur, even if it doesn’t (counterfactual). "

Originally posted by lemon lime
"If all you know about Molinism is what I have said here, then it simply baffles me why you would feel the need to make sweeping generalizations about their position."

Generalizations perhaps, but I see it as being more like speculation on my part. I don't know why you would be baffled by this because you go on to say:

"After all, I have not tried t program starts... and it starts in 2 minutes so hasta la vista baby, I am outta here!

It's humorous to watch you in action. I'm hoping this is an isolated case for you, but you seem incapable of even attempting to study this topic objectively. I mean, let's break this down for a second. You admit to knowing next to nothing about Molinism (you claim you know only what I have said about it here, and as I already mentioned I don't think I have really said that much about it here), and yet in the course of just a few posts, you have managed to accuse Molinists of pretty much all the following: that they waste their time on a subject that no one should give a rat's behind about; that their position suffers from willy-nilly anthropomorphism; that they are unjustifiably intensely focused on one little possible attribute (so in other words, that their scope of inquiry is unjustifiably narrow); and that they blather on and differentiate and isolate themselves from other theists based on some obscure and fanciful idea. I mean, WOW! It's like you cannot refrain from projectile vomiting all your caricatures and prejudices onto a view that you admittedly know very little about. Since you know very little about Molinism and seem unwilling to take the time to educate yourself further on it, it's really no surprise that none of your comments actually seem apt in reference to Molinism.

On top of that, regarding the little bits you do know about Molinism, you seem incapable of refraining from trivializing them. For example, concerning the Molinist doctrine of divine middle knowledge and how it feeds into the divine creative process, you say that this is a "relatively simply (sic) idea of God contemplating things that won't happen so he can be better informed as to how to proceed with his act of creation." But what's relatively simple about the Molinist idea that God possesses all that knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom? I hesitate to say that it's such a simple idea. It requires that there are all these true counterfactuals to begin with, and that requires a whole metaphysics of facts or truth-makers that would correspond to such propositions. It also requires some account of how a cognizer would be in a position to justifiably believe such propositions. How this would work and fit in with a (presumably) libertarian conception of freedom is not a trivial discussion, I would think. And, as I mentioned, I think the Molinist account may also have non-trivial implications for God's responsibility even for things that are otherwise taken to be the province of his creatures' autonomy.

You may find none of this particularly interesting, but there's no reason for you to project this indifference onto others. Likewise, your earthly projects and interests may just reduce to finding different ways to kill time in between your favorite TV shows, but again, no reason to project this onto others.

Originally posted by lemon lime
It wasn't blame. I was simply pointing out the futility of expecting an in-depth discussion of a subject that has very little intrinsic depth to begin with. You could just as easily be critical of someone who doesn't seriously study and then discuss How many angels can dance on the head of a pin, so to borrow a line from Shakespeare this has been m ...[text shortened]... led.

3. G knows what would happen if E did occur, even if it doesn’t (counterfactual). "

If you don't find the subject interesting then why are you here?

I completely concur with LemmonJello.

Except the bit about finding it amusing...