Molinism

Originally posted by LemonJello

Okay, then I think that makes you a proponent of so-called accidental omniscience (vice essential omniscience), whereby an entity can be omniscient at one time but not other times. That's fine, but it has little or nothing to do with Molinism. As I have tried to explain, omniscience is not really here or there with respect to Molinism: it is icient for Molinism. You can thank Bobby for confusing the issue by trying to imply otherwise.

"Bobby was trying to say that if one thinks there is an omniscient God, then that person should also be committed to Molinism, presumably because Bobby thinks such knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom follows from omniscience." (LemonJello)

"In basic terms, Molinists hold that in addition to knowing everything that does or will happen, God also knows what His creatures would freely choose if placed in any circumstance." (wiki) = Omniscience.

Omniscience = "Omniscience [1] mainly in religion, is the capacity to know everything that there is to know. In particular, Hinduism and the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) believe that there is a divine being who is omniscient. An omniscient point-of-view, in writing, is to know everything that can be known about a character, including past history, thoughts, feelings, etc. In Latin, omnis means "all" and sciens means "knowing". (wiki)

Academia #101.

"what would a god or goddess without omniscience and omnipotence have
to offer the human race, perhaps the underwhelming gift of lower case..." (gb)

"Yes. Still wonder about the meaning of "... such counterfactuals to be known they need to have determinate truth values" (gb)

"Even within the secular realm, Omniscience is regarded as an attribute (or an inherent characteristic)." (gb)

"As I have tried to explain, omniscience is not really here or there with respect to Molinism: it is neither necessary nor sufficient for Molinism. You can thank Bobby for confusing the issue by trying to imply otherwise." (LemonJello)

Bobby provided several Googled quotations and posted three (3) sentences relating directly to those 'several Googled quotations and posted three (3) sentences'. (Bobby)

Originally posted by KellyJay
So could this God in your opinion choose to forget anything?
Kelly

Which 'God' are you referring to? An omniscient God? A Molinist God?

With respect to omniscience, I suppose it would depend on the definition of 'omniscience' in play. If, for example, you consider the one that Bobby provided, it only entails the capacity for knowledge. But as I mentioned before, capacities are such that they may not be exercised. So, it's coherent, on the basis of that definition, that an omniscient God could choose, say, to not exercise his capacity for knowledge in some area. This may have the same effect as "choosing to forget" stuff in that same area.

Regarding Molinism, perhaps we would need a Molinist to help clarify their position. From what I understand, Molinists would be committed to God's having actual knowledge in some areas (such as the aforementioned counterfactuals of freedom); but I would suppose that they could allow that God could choose not to exercise his capacity for knowledge in other areas.

In general, I would say that an omniscient god who "chooses to forget" some stuff is a coherent concept. But, again, that may not hold, depending on the definitions involved, on case by case basis.

Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
"Bobby was trying to say that if one thinks there is an omniscient God, then that person should also be committed to Molinism, presumably because Bobby thinks such knowledge of the counterfactuals of freedom follows from omniscience." (LemonJello)

"In basic terms, Molinists hold that in addition to knowing everything that does or will happen, God als ...[text shortened]... se[/i] 'several Googled quotations and posted three (3) sentences'. (Bobby)

Try directly stating an actual point for once.

If you're now trying to say that it was not your intention to imply that all the proponents of the Abrahamic religions should also be considered Molinists; well, I think we can safely say that you are now lying through your teeth. That was your intention. You even added in "Academia #101" to smugly imply that it is should be considered an obvious, elementary point that those who believe in an omniscient god are also thereby Molinists. Problem is, as I have already shown, not only is that not obvious or elementary, it's blatantly false. If you want to stand your ground and make a defense of the idea that omniscience implies middle knowledge, then go ahead; try to make an actual point for once. Or else retract your intial claim. That would all be fair enough, and I would humor you. But please do not pretend like you didn't try to make the point. That's just disingenuous of you. You continue to climb up to higher and higher spots on my sh#t list.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Try directly stating an actual point for once.

If you're now trying to say that it was not your intention to imply that all the proponents of the Abrahamic religions should also be considered Molinists; well, I think we can safely say that you are now lying through your teeth. That was your intention. You even added in "Academia #101" to smugly imply ...[text shortened]... disingenuous of you. You continue to climb up to higher and higher spots on my sh#t list.

"You continue to climb up to higher and higher spots on my sh#t list." (LemonJello)

Such temper. Little wonder the frictions generated by your lengthy paragraphs create more heat than light. (gb)

Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
"You continue to climb up to higher and higher spots on my sh#t list." (LemonJello)

Such temper. Little wonder the frictions generated by your lengthy paragraphs create more heat than light. (gb)

🙄😴

Are you prepared to defend your earlier implication that proponents of an omniscient God should thereby be viewed as Molinists? If not, kindly retract it.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Okay, then I think that makes you a proponent of so-called accidental omniscience (vice essential omniscience), whereby an entity can be omniscient at one time but not other times. That's fine, but it has little or nothing to do with Molinism. As I have tried to explain, omniscience is not really here or there with respect to Molinism: it is neit ...[text shortened]... icient for Molinism. You can thank Bobby for confusing the issue by trying to imply otherwise.

Sorry for hijacking your threat, bu if an "entity" can choose to be omniscient or not, doesn't that in the end make him omniscient after all? If I make a rock and then choose to make myself incapable of being able to lift it - while knowing full well I can undo that decision at any time - am I not simply choosing in a very cumbersome way to not lift the rock? It seems to me that's what RJHinds said.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Which 'God' are you referring to? An omniscient God? A Molinist God?

With respect to omniscience, I suppose it would depend on the definition of 'omniscience' in play. If, for example, you consider the one that Bobby provided, it only entails the capacity for knowledge. But as I mentioned before, capacities are such that they may not be exercised. gain, that may not hold, depending on the definitions involved, on case by case basis.

So the choices of God if God wants to remember could happen or not, well
if that could be true, could this all powerful God also choose not to force
anyone do anything beyond what they want to give someone else a choice
to make?
Kelly

Originally posted by Great King Rat
Sorry for hijacking your threat, bu if an "entity" can choose to be omniscient or not, doesn't that in the end make him omniscient after all? If I make a rock and then choose to make myself incapable of being able to lift it - while knowing full well I can undo that decision at any time - am I not simply choosing in a very cumbersome way to not lift the rock? It seems to me that's what RJHinds said.

Sorry, but I really don't understand what you're asking.

All I said, in response to RJ, is basically that his view would make him some sort of proponent of omniscience as an accidental property, not an essential one. But is RJ's view a coherent one? That's debatable, I'm sure.

I think your question is about whether or not accidental omniscience or accidental omnipotence would be coherent ideas. For what it's worth, Palynka and I had some discussion on such questions here in the following thread. Check it out if you are interested.

Thread 134210

Originally posted by KellyJay
So the choices of God if God wants to remember could happen or not, well
if that could be true, could this all powerful God also choose not to force
anyone do anything beyond what they want to give someone else a choice
to make?
Kelly

I don't really understand this question. Could you please rephrase?

Originally posted by LemonJello
As usual, you haven't stated any clear point. If I had to hazard a guess, your point is that belief in an omniscient divine being also commits one to Molinism. Presumably, then, your point is that all proponents of the Abrahamic religions are also Molinists. If so, you're badly mistaken. I'm afraid it is not that easy.

Just because one believes t ...[text shortened]... think otherwise, is it safe to say that you consider yourself a Molinist?

This is why I almost flunked Philosophy. It all sounds like "one hand clapping" to me, and makes about as much sense.

Originally posted by Suzianne
This is why I almost flunked Philosophy. It all sounds like "one hand clapping" to me, and makes about as much sense.

The point I was trying to make is a basic one. Just because one thinks there exists some entity with the "capacity to know everything that there is to know" doesn't mean one is committed to the Molinist idea of divine middle knowledge. Bobby was trying to imply otherwise, and he was wrong.

Originally posted by LemonJello
The point I was trying to make is a basic one. Just because one thinks there exists some entity with the "capacity to know everything that there is to know" doesn't mean one is committed to the Molinist idea of divine middle knowledge. Bobby was trying to imply otherwise, and he was wrong.

LJ, is this a fairly accurate simplified version of the questions at play?

1. If an event E occurs, G know that it occurs (“omniscience simple” ).

2. G knows whether or not E will occur in some future (foreknowledge).

—Presumably G also knows the entailments of E's occurence (e1, e3, … , e(n)), i.e., what further effects are thereby entailed.

3. G knows what would happen if E did occur, even if it doesn’t (counterfactual).

Originally posted by vistesd
LJ, is this a fairly accurate simplified version of the questions at play?

1. If an event E occurs, G know that it occurs (“omniscience simple” ).

2. G knows whether or not E will occur in some future (foreknowledge).

—Presumably G also knows the entailments of E's occurence (e1, e3, … , e(n)), i.e., what further effects are thereby entailed.

3. G knows what would happen if E did occur, even if it doesn’t (counterfactual).

Yes, that's basically one thing Molinism requires, that God holds knowledge in the form of the counterfactuals of freedom. So it requires that there are true counterfactuals of the form "If S were in circumstances C, then S would freely choose to do A" and that God knows them.

But this type of knowledge does not just somehow follow generally from omniscience. Hilariously, if we take Bobby's definition of omniscience as "the capacity to know everything there is to know", it doesn't necessarily follow that an omniscient G knows anything at all! That's because a capacity may not be exercised. It would be like saying some ballpark has infinite seating capacity; okay, but that doesn't imply there are any fans at the game. Even if we take a stronger notion of omniscience (say, as having knowledge of everything there is to know, or if we take an infallibility condition like the one we have discussed on these boards previously, such as "necessarily, if P then G knows P" ) it still wouldn't follow that an omniscient G has the divine middle knowledge required by Molinism. There may be several reasons for that. As one example, it could simply be denied that there are any true counterfactuals of the form described above.

So, my question about whether or not there are any Molinists around here does not simply reduce to the question of whether or not there are any persons around here who hold belief in an omniscient G. That's what Bobby apparently intended to imply, and he was badly mistaken there. I suppose my question could instead be asked as are there any here who think there are true counterfactuals of the form above and that God knows them all (but I'm not sure that in itself suffices for Molinism, although I think it is required for it).

Originally posted by LemonJello
Which 'God' are you referring to? An omniscient God? A Molinist God?

With respect to omniscience, I suppose it would depend on the definition of 'omniscience' in play. If, for example, you consider the one that Bobby provided, it only entails the capacity for knowledge. But as I mentioned before, capacities are such that they may not be exercised. ...[text shortened]... gain, that may not hold, depending on the definitions involved, on case by case basis.

I suppose you can define anything any way you want, but if possible, that
solves many issues for many people, mainly because if He could forget He
could also not force anyone to do anything against their wills.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
I suppose you can define anything any way you want, but if possible, that
solves many issues for many people, mainly because if He could forget He
could also not force anyone to do anything against their wills.
Kelly

I guess it may be able to resolve some tension for them, but it may create other problems for them too. An implication would be that their God is forgetful, but maybe they would be okay with that? As I mentioned, another way to potentially achieve the same effect is to say that God, say, chooses to not exercise some of His capacities to the fullest. But there's always an upshot: that leaves you with a God that doesn't operate at max capacity.

To be honest, though, when it comes to human freedom, I do not think there is any actual problem for the theist. I think even the theist who wants to have his cake and eat it too can do so on this issue. The idea that human freedom is not compatible somehow with the attributes of God is generally called theological "fatalism". But I'm reasonably convinced I have never seen a sound argument for theological fatalism. The most extreme case, in my opinion, would be a theist who wants to hold both that God has infallible foreknowledge and that humans are still free in a libertarian sense. I think even this theist has nothing to fear from fatalism. For instance, we have discussed on these boards previously the infallibility condition "Necessarily, if P then God knows P". If the theist sticks to an infallibility condition like this on God's knowledge, there is no threat of fatalism that I can see.

So, I think the Molinists are trying to jump through hoops that there is no real need for them to jump through. But I was hoping to learn more about Molinism. That's why I wanted to know if there were any here who consider themselves Molinists.