Originally posted by Halitose
[b]To say that the absurd is incompatible with all meaning is patently false.
Righto. So essentially you are arguing that “meaning” and “the absurd” are not mutually exclusive since neither of them is used as an absolute. Is that correct?
I was under the impression that you were a supporter of deontological maxims: I find it surprising that you g without committing the fallacy, since your origins are inherently naturalistic.[/b]
"If our actions are ultimately unrelated to our destiny, I submit that
everything is permissible."
Yes, I do subscribe to deontological maxims, and no, I despise the view
where the "end justifying the means"
Your stance on this matter is contradictory. In particular, your first claim above contradicts the very core of deontology; so if you actually hold belief in that claim while simultaneously subscribing to deontological principles, then there is something very wrong and inconsistent with your belief system. Deontology holds that any action that possesses moral worth is necessarily an action that is carried out in accordance with duty; further, this moral worth derives not from any inclinations with respect to intended effects; and not from any consequences that are actually realized; but merely from the "principle of volition", or the maxim that determines the undertaking of the action. When you say that you subscribe to deontological maxims, you are claiming that there exist duties that bear no relation whatsoever to consequences or futures states or proposed ends or any considerations thereof. On the other hand, your first (Dostoevskian) claim above contradicts this entirely because it entails that no such duties exist. Your first claim above entails that the existence of moral worth necessarily implies some relation to effecting future states -- and that's about as un-deontological as you can get. I would argue deontology holds that accordance with the principles of volition renders some actions meaningful in and of themselves, with no regard to effects and relations with "destiny". Your Dostoevskian claim precludes such meaning. It's ironic how you say that you despise the view in which the "ends justify the means" because that's exactly what your first claim above entails: under such a view, everything is merely a means to an eschatological end. Nothing can be viewed as an end in and of itself.
how does confrontation cause contentment, unless confrontation is the end goal?
Realize that Camus employs 'confrontation' in a context that is different than normal usage. Camus claims that sustained confrontation is a necessary entity for living "without appeal". If you read Camus, don't expect him to furnish you with sufficient conditions for happiness. But I would say he does discuss what he considers to be necessary conditions. I would also say that many of his ideas are confused. But what really resounds with me is his portrayal of Sisyphean adventure; living "without appeal"; and conscious revolt. None of that is causally sufficient for happiness; but it is certainly compatible with the cultivation of happiness. "Confrontation causes happiness" is not at all the point Camus is trying to make.
You're not getting away this easily...
Where did you get the idea that my version of absurdism represents a worldview? It doesn't. It is simply a claim against immortality and eternal significance. My worldview is a complicated patchwork of different textures, absurdism constituting only a stitch or three.
The problem lies in that your worldview does not allow for objective moral/ethical judgments, only subjective preference claims.
Wrong. By my "worldview" you are referring (incorrectly, as discussed above) to my absurdism, and by "does not allow" you can only be referring to logical contradiction; so this claim of yours is just plain false. If it were the case, for example, that the act of one's using his armpits to produce fart noises is objectively wrong, then demonstrate exactly how that would lead to a logical contradiction within my version of absurdism.
BTW, that a worldview "addresses" a certain question does not imply that it yields any sort of substantive answer. Some of the questions you mention don't have any justified answers.
At least my normative beliefs are ontologically undergirded by our "endowment"
No they aren't. I ain't no paper cutter, and neither are you. As I have stated before, your "solution" offers no more substance than that of the atheist who states that some things are objectively right/wrong "just because". The problem of God's existence is immaterial here. The problem, as I see it, is one that
every person faces (God included, if He were to exist):
basic normative beliefs must exist if we are to 1. hold any normative beliefs at all AND 2. not commit any is-ought fallacies. So how are we to say that these basic normative beliefs are
properly basic and therefore compatible with our noetic structures' being rational? What criteria are there for the identification of a properly basic normative belief? I don't see any simple answers there. Worse still, it seems to me that the foundationalism I am espousing also implicitly assumes normative beliefs about how noetic structures should be organized. Metaphysics of morals is not easy, and that you think you have a suitable solution in Divine Command is laughable.
With respect to metaphysics of morals, one thing I am quite certain of is that empiricism will get us nowhere. Empirical observations and motives can tell us something about anthropology and what are taken to be social norms – but that's a different topic. I like the work of Kant in this area where he searches for
a priori grounding, but I'm not convinced.